[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2906 Introduced in House (IH)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2906

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 21, 1999

   Mr. Watts of Oklahoma (for himself, Mr. Payne, Mr. Tancredo, Mr. 
Markey, and Mr. Wolf) introduced the following bill; which was referred 
  to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the 
Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined 
 by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as 
        fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan 
        intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas 
        outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 2,000,000 
        lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a sustained and 
        coordinated international effort to pressure combatants to end 
        hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers the 
        best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to the continuing 
        war in Sudan.
            (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
        peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
        chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
        human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
            (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief 
        operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to 
        bring an end to the war.
            (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
            (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
        of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the 
        absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major 
        impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people 
        and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
            (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
        peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of 
        Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to 
        subjugate their population, and Congress finds that 
        internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a 
        critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human 
        suffering.
            (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and 
        organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other 
        irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
        outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort 
        to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
        themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans 
        on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through 
        selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's 
        accountability internationally.
            (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
        intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
        increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
        outside its control.
            (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
        flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to 
        manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from 
        the United States and other donor countries as a devastating 
        weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan 
        to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
            (10) The United States and other donors' efforts in 
        delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have 
        played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS 
        and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
        donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
            (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
        facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
        population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
        Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
        of their ability to sustain themselves.
            (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
        Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely 
        from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their 
        populations at increased risk of famine.
            (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and 
        with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food 
        needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
        operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long 
        term.
            (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
        against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
        control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
        the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
        officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
        battlefield will be achieved.
            (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
        available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, 
        including--
                    (A) the maintenance or strengthening of sanctions 
                against the Government of Sudan;
                    (B) the support or creation of viable democratic 
                civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan 
                outside government control;
                    (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
                reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside 
                of government control;
                    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
                relief to those areas;
                    (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the 
                United States and within multilateral institutions 
                toward those ends; and
                    (F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and 
                multilateral economic and diplomatic means to compel 
                Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again 
                assume a constructive stance toward facilitating a 
                comprehensive solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
        means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
            (2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-Governmental 
        Authority on Development.
            (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
        operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
        participating NGOs known as ``Operation Lifeline Sudan''.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW 
              TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

    Congress hereby--
            (1) condemns--
                    (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the 
                conflict in Sudan;
                    (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights 
                record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war 
                and the denial of basic human and political rights to 
                all Sudanese;
                    (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role 
                of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating 
                the practice; and
                    (D) the Government of Sudan's increasing use and 
                organization of ``murahalliin'', Popular Defense Forces 
                (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into organized 
                and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al 
                Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile 
                regions; and
            (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
        transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of 
        raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
        shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
        societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka and Nuba peoples 
        in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--
            (1) declares its support for the efforts by executive 
        branch officials of the United States to lead in a 
        reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace process;
            (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the 
        Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to 
        support the peace process; and
            (3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation of the 
        process.
    (b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense of 
Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the 
conflict in Sudan are best made through IGAD and that the President 
must not create any process or diplomatic facility or office which 
could be viewed as a parallel or competing diplomatic track.
    (c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is 
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the 
support of--
            (1) the secretariat of IGAD;
            (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
        Sudan and opposition forces;
            (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the 
        National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF); 
        and
            (4) other United States diplomatic efforts with respect to 
        Sudan.

SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the 
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should--
            (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security 
        Council to investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and 
        provide recommendations on measures for its eventual 
        elimination;
            (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights practices of 
        the Government of Sudan at the United Nations conference on 
        human rights in Geneva in 2000;
            (3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the 
        United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to 
        human rights monitors in Sudan;
            (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red 
        Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
        Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international 
        organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those 
        individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in 
        bondage or servitude in Sudan;
            (5) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General 
        Assembly condemning the human rights violations of the 
        Government of Sudan; and
            (6) sponsor a resolution of condemnation in the United 
        Nations each time the Government of Sudan conducts an aerial 
        bombardment of a civilian target.

SEC. 7. SUPPORTING SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN.

    (a) Sanctions.--Until the President determines, and so certifies to 
Congress, that the Government of Sudan has--
            (1) fully committed to and has made verifiable progress 
        toward a comprehensive, peaceful solution to the war or has 
        otherwise committed to and made verifiable progress in a good 
        faith effort with both northern and southern opposition toward 
        a comprehensive solution to the conflict based on the 
        Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi Kenya, on July 20, 
        1994,
            (2) made substantial and verifiable progress in controlling 
        the raiding and slaving activities of all regular and irregular 
forces, including Popular Defense Forces and other militias and 
murahalliin,
            (3) instituted credible reforms with regard to providing 
        basic human and civil rights to all Sudanese, and
            (4) ceased aerial bombardment of civilian targets,
the following are prohibited, except to the extent provided in section 
203(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may 
be issued pursuant to this section:
                    (A) The importation into the United States of any 
                goods or services of Sudanese origin, other than 
                information or informational materials.
                    (B) The exportation or reexportation, directly or 
                indirectly, to Sudan of any goods, technology 
                (including technical data, software, or other 
                information), or services from the United States or by 
                a United States person, wherever located, or requiring 
                the issuance of a license by a Federal agency, except 
                for donations of articles intended to relieve human 
                suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine.
                    (C) The facilitation by a United States person, 
                including but not limited to brokering activities of 
                the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, 
                or services from Sudan to any destination, or to Sudan 
                from any location.
                    (D) The performance by any United States person of 
                any contract, including a financing contract, or use of 
                any other financial instrument, in support of an 
                industrial, commercial, public utility, or governmental 
                project in Sudan.
                    (E) The grant or extension of credits or loans by 
                any United States person to the Government of Sudan.
                    (F) Any transaction by a United States person 
                relating to transportation of cargo to or from Sudan; 
                the provision of transportation of cargo to or from the 
                United States by any Sudanese person or any vessel or 
                aircraft of Sudanese registration; or the sale in the 
                United States by any person holding authority under 
                subtitle 7 of title 49, United States Code, of any 
                transportation of cargo by air that includes any stop 
                in Sudan.
                    (G) Any transaction by any United States person or 
                within the United States that evades or avoids, or has 
                the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to 
                violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this 
                section.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
sanctions in subsection (a), and in the President's Executive Order of 
November 4, 1997, should be applied to include the sale of stocks in 
the United States or to any United States person, wherever located, or 
any other form of financial instruments or derivatives, in support of a 
commercial, industrial, public utility, or government project or 
transaction in or with Sudan.
    (c) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
application of any of the sanctions described in subsection (a) if he 
determines and certifies to Congress that it is important to the 
national security of the United States to do so.
    (d) Report.--Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this 
Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a report 
to Congress on--
            (1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's 
        financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure 
        and pipelines;
            (2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the 
        United States or with involvement of United States citizens;
            (3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in 
        subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 4, 1997;
            (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of 
        Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, 
        frequency, and best estimates of damage;
            (5) the number, duration, and locations of air strips or 
        other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is denied 
        by any party to the conflict; and
            (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process or any 
        other ongoing efforts to end the conflict, including the 
        specific and verifiable steps taken by parties to the conflict, 
        the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD 
        toward a comprehensive solution to the war.
    (e) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
prohibit--
            (1) transactions for the conduct of the official business 
        of the Federal Government or the United Nations by employees 
        thereof;
            (2) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activity by 
        persons regularly employed in such capacity by a news-gathering 
        organization; or
            (3) legitimate humanitarian operations.
    (f) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``entity'' means a partnership, association, 
        trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization;
            (2) the term ``Government of Sudan'' includes the 
        Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumentalities and 
        controlled entities, and the Central Bank of Sudan;
            (3) the term ``person'' means an individual or entity; and
            (4) the term ``United States person'' means any United 
        States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
        under the laws of the United States (including foreign 
        branches), or any person in the United States.

SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should organize and 
maintain a formal consultative process with the European Union, its 
member states, the members of the United Nations Security Council, and 
other relevant parties on coordinating an effort within the United 
Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the 
Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief 
flights.

SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.

    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by officials of 
the executive branch of Government toward greater utilization of non-
OLS agencies for more effective distribution of United States relief 
contributions.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in 
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress 
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).

SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and implementable 
contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices, the 
greatest possible amount of United States Government and privately 
donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba 
Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of 
Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport 
relief flights.
    (b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection (a) shall 
include coordination of other donors in addition to the United States 
Government and private institutions.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 2 months after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a classified report to Congress on 
the costs and startup time such a plan would require in the event of a 
total ban on air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial 
or incremental ban on such flights if the President has made the 
determination required by subsection (a)(2).
    (d) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the 
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for 
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of 
the plan.

SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID'S SUDAN TRANSITION ASSISTANCE FOR 
              REHABILITATION (STAR) PROGRAM.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby expresses its support for 
the President's ongoing efforts to diversify and increase effectiveness 
of United States assistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of 
the control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus 
shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) 
program with its emphasis on promoting future democratic governance, 
rule of law, building indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and 
enhancing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.
    (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available to carry 
out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to development assistance) for the period 
beginning on October 1, 1999, and ending on September 30, 2002, 
$16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable civil 
authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in Sudan, including 
the provision of technical assistance, and for people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.

SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER AREAS 
              SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes that civilians in the Nuba 
Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan are not 
receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions by the Government 
of Sudan.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should--
            (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian 
        needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile 
        regions of Sudan;
            (2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such 
        assessment; and
            (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made 
        under paragraph (2).

SEC. 13. PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, SEPARATING CIVILIANS FROM 
              COMBATANTS, AND REDUCING FOOD DIVERSION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) diversion of food assistance from civilians to 
        combatants is a hindrance to an effective and comprehensive 
        relief effort;
            (2) the proximity of combatants to humanitarian operations 
        for noncombatants poses a security risk for both humanitarian 
        relief personnel and for those they serve;
            (3) the lack of a reliable and adequate means of securing 
        food is a major factor in the ability of populations in areas 
        outside of the control of the Government of Sudan to defend 
        themselves from aggression by Government of Sudan forces and 
        related militias or paramilitary groups, thus resulting in 
        diversions of food; and
            (4) options to address the situation are very limited.
    (b) Authority To Provide Direct Food Assistance.--
            (1) Authority.--For the purpose of minimizing diversions of 
        food assistance and to insulate noncombatants and the relief 
        operations which serve them from combatants in areas outside 
        the control of the Government of Sudan, the President is 
        authorized to provide food assistance directly to the National 
        Democratic Alliance participants or other groups engaged in the 
        protection of civilian populations from attacks from regular 
        government forces, associated militias, or other paramilitary 
        groups supported by the Government of Sudan.
            (2) Supersedes existing law.--The authority of paragraph 
        (1) supersedes any other provision of law.
    (c) Limitation.--The assistance described in subsection (b) may 
only be provided in such a way that--
            (1) does not endanger, compromise, or otherwise reduce the 
        United States support for existing unilateral, multilateral, or 
        private humanitarian operations or the beneficiaries of those 
        operations; or
            (2) compromise any ongoing or future people-to-people 
        reconciliation efforts in Sudan.
    (d) Relation to Current or Future Humanitarian Operations.--The 
assistance described in subsection (b) shall be implemented separate 
from and not in proximity to current humanitarian efforts, both within 
Operation Lifeline Sudan or outside of Operation Lifeline Sudan, or any 
other current or future humanitarian operations which serve 
noncombatants.
    (e) Determinations of Eligibility.--In determining the eligibility 
of potential recipients described in subsection (b), the President 
shall take into account the groups' respect for human rights, civil 
authority, civil institutions, and the integrity of ongoing 
humanitarian operations.
    (f) Report.--The President shall submit a report to Congress, in 
classified form if necessary--
            (1) describing the effectiveness in preventing diversions 
        of such food assistance;
            (2) whether or not the provision of such food assistance 
        has resulted in or has the potential to inadvertently allow for 
        the enrichment of any individual or organization by the resale 
        or other transfer of the assistance for other purposes, either 
        to the intended recipients or other parties;
            (3) whether such operations have affected ongoing 
        humanitarian operations described in subsections (c) or 
        operations described in subsection (d); and
            (4) the extent to which the provision of assistance in 
        subsection (b) has impacted respect for human rights and rule 
        of law.
                                 <all>