[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2056 Introduced in House (IH)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2056

To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity of 
    requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, 
   intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of 
                        Lebanon's independence.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 8, 1999

  Mr. Forbes introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees 
on Ways and Means, and Banking and Financial Services, for a period to 
      be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity of 
    requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, 
   intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of 
                        Lebanon's independence.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Lebanon Independence Restoration Act 
of 1999''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The people of Lebanon have a rich, proud, and honorable 
        history dating from biblical times to the present, and Lebanon 
        has been a free and democratic nation for much of its modern 
        history.
            (2) Lebanon and the United States have enjoyed a history of 
        friendship and cooperation which has been witnessed by the 
        immigration of millions of Lebanese to the United States where 
        they and their descendants have contributed greatly to the 
        fabric of American life.
            (3) Lebanon witnessed foreign incursions and occupations 
        during its 15-year civil war. Although that war ended in 1990, 
        non-Lebanese forces still control much of the country. These 
        forces include an Israeli force that controls a 9-mile wide 
        security zone in Lebanon contiguous with Israel's northern 
        border, and approximately 30,000 Syrian troops, several armed 
        Palestinian factions, and other terrorist groups that control 
        the remainder of the country.
            (4) There is a crucial distinction between the presence of 
        Syrian and Israeli military forces in Lebanon. Israel exercises 
        no control over the Government of Lebanon and in 1998 offered 
        to withdraw unilaterally from the security zone in return for 
        security guarantees, whereas Syria has never recognized 
        Lebanon's independence, or exchanged ambassadors with Lebanon, 
        and effectively dictates the major policies and actions of the 
        Government of Lebanon.
            (5) Various Lebanese factions signed a peace settlement in 
        Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989 as a step toward ending the civil 
        war. This accord provided for the phased redeployment and 
        withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon beginning in 1992.
            (6) The Government of Syria has refused to carry out any 
        redeployment as envisioned by the Taif Accord. Syrian 
        domination over Lebanese politics and political leaders is at 
        the root of the Lebanese Government's failure to press Syria 
        for a withdrawal of Syria's occupying forces.
            (7) In addition to its armed forces, Syria maintains a 
        massive intelligence service presence in Lebanon to enforce its 
        control over the Lebanese people.
            (8) Syrian domination is so pervasive that Lebanon has 
        effectively become a Syrian satellite state. This relationship 
        with Syria does not reflect the will of the majority of the 
        Lebanese public. Moreover, Syria has sought to change Lebanon's 
        demographic balance by the population transfer of as many as 
        1,000,000 Syrian laborers to Lebanon.
            (9) Syrian domination has prevented Lebanon from developing 
        direct contacts with Israel and participating in the 
        multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.
            (10) Syrian domination has been associated with a 
        deterioration in Lebanon's human rights situation. Syria has 
        engineered Lebanese election results to its liking, Syrian 
        intelligence units have been implicated in the disappearance of 
        Lebanese citizens, and the Syrian-controlled Lebanese 
        Parliament has imposed curbs on Lebanon's media, once the 
        freest in the Arab world.
            (11) Syrian domination has failed to curtail international 
        narcotics traffickers or terrorist groups, including Hizballah 
        and the Kurdish Workers Party, that operate in Lebanon under 
        Syrian control.
            (12) Syrian domination has prevented the Lebanese Army from 
        entering southern Lebanon to restore order and stability in 
        that region. Consequently, southern Lebanon has been a staging 
        area for military provocations against Israel by terrorist 
        groups supported by Syria and Iran.
            (13) The United States Congress is concerned about the 
        potential for a miscalculation between Israel and Syria that 
        could inadvertently lead to large-scale hostilities, especially 
        in southern Lebanon. In this regard the Congress views with 
        grave concern Syria's acquisition of weapons of mass 
        destruction, especially chemical and biological weapons and 
        missile delivery systems. Syrian surface-to-surface missiles 
        can reach major urban centers in Israel, Turkey, and Jordan.
            (14) The United States Congress has expressed itself 
        repeatedly in resolutions that insist that Syria make good on 
        its commitments to withdraw its military and security forces 
        from Lebanon.
            (15) It is not in the interest of the United States that 
        freedom and democracy depart irreversibly from Lebanon. Lebanon 
        has a constructive role to play in the search for Middle East 
        peace. It can only do so when it is free, sovereign, and 
        governed by a truly representative government.
            (16) The withdrawal of Syrian and other foreign forces from 
        Lebanon would not only promote regional stability, but also 
        would create the necessary conditions for the restoration of 
        Lebanon's independence, freedom, and democracy. Truly free 
        elections are not possible with the presence of foreign 
        military and security forces and terrorist groups in Lebanon.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    The Congress calls for the following:
            (1) A complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of 
        all Syrian military, intelligence, and security forces and 
        their proxies and all Palestinian and other terrorist forces 
        from Lebanon, to be followed by the eventual withdrawal of 
        Israeli forces.
            (2) Following the withdrawals described in paragraph (1) 
        and restoration of a freely elected, democratic government in 
        Lebanon, the deployment of the Lebanese Army to southern 
        Lebanon to restore order and stability in that region, and for 
        disbanding all armed groups in Lebanon with the exception of 
        the legitimate national armed forces.
            (3) At the same time as the deployment described in 
        paragraph (2), the assurance by the Government of Lebanon for 
        the safety and well-being of all members of the South Lebanon 
        Army (SLA) and their families.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENT 
              BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should not 
ratify or in any other way affirm, support, recognize, or participate 
in any peace agreement between Syria and Israel that does not provide 
for the full and verifiable withdrawal of Syrian military, 
intelligence, and security forces and their proxies from Lebanon.

SEC. 5. WITHDRAWAL OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR IMPORTS FROM 
              SYRIA AND LEBANON.

    (a) Withdrawal.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except 
subsection (b)), nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation 
treatment) shall not apply with respect to any goods that--
            (1) are the product of Syria or Lebanon; and
            (2) are entered into the customs territory of the United 
        States on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act.
    (b) Restoration of Nondiscriminatory Treatment.--The President may 
restore nondiscriminatory treatment to goods that--
            (1) are the product of Lebanon beginning 30 days after the 
        President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, 
        security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon 
        have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and that the 
        Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected 
        and wholly democratic in nature; and
            (2) are the product of Syria beginning 30 days after the 
        President certifies to the Congress that the requirements 
        described in paragraph (1) have been met and that the 
        Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected 
        and wholly democratic in nature.

SEC. 6. PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND LEBANON.

    (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
economic assistance may not be provided to Syria or Lebanon.
    (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply--
            (1) with respect to Lebanon beginning 30 days after the 
        President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, 
        security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon 
        have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and that the 
        Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected 
        and wholly democratic in nature; and
            (2) with respect to Syria beginning 30 days after the 
        President certifies to the Congress that the requirements 
        described in paragraph (1) have been met and that the 
        Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected 
        and wholly democratic in nature.
    (c) Economic Assistance.--In this section, the term ``economic 
assistance'' means any assistance under part I of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or any related 
assistance under any other provision of law.

SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF 
              LEBANON.

    (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
military assistance may not be provided to the Government of Lebanon.
    (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply beginning 30 days 
after the President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, 
security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon have 
been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and the Government of Lebanon is 
certified to have been freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
    (c) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that 
any assistance prohibited by reason of the application of subsection 
(a) should be redirected to assistance for humanitarian, democracy 
building, human rights and educational efforts in Lebanon.
    (d) Military Assistance.--In this section, the term ``military 
assistance''--
            (1) means any assistance under part II of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.) and any 
        assistance under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
        seq.); and
            (2) includes any other form of military cooperation with 
        the Government of Lebanon.

SEC. 8. REQUIREMENT TO OPPOSE LOANS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND 
              LEBANON BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

    (a) Requirement.--Beginning 15 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the President shall instruct the United States 
representative to each international financial institution (including 
the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) to which the United States is a member 
to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the initiation 
or renewal of any loan or other form of assistance for Syria or 
Lebanon.
    (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply--
            (1) with respect to Lebanon beginning 30 days after the 
        President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, 
        security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon 
        have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and that the 
        Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected 
        and wholly democratic in nature; and
            (2) with respect to Syria beginning 30 days after the 
        President certifies to the Congress that the requirements 
        described in paragraph (1) have been met and that the 
        Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected 
        and wholly democratic in nature.

SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORTS.

    As part of the annual human rights report required under sections 
116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151n(d) and 2304(b)), the Secretary of State shall pay special 
attention to the report on Lebanon and shall include in such report the 
following:
            (1) A detailed assessment of Syrian influence in the three 
        branches of the Government of Lebanon.
            (2) An assessment of human rights abuses attributable to 
        Syrian influence in the Government of Lebanon.
            (3) An assessment of the role played by Syrian intelligence 
        services in Lebanon.
            (4) An estimate of the number of Syrian military, security, 
        and intelligence forces and their proxies and terrorist groups 
        in Lebanon.
            (5) Progress made by the Government of Lebanon in disarming 
        terrorist groups, and an assessment of the causes for the 
        Lebanese Government's failure to disarm such groups.
            (6) The specific steps and concrete actions taken by the 
        Department of State to affect a withdrawal of all Syrian 
        military, security, and intelligence forces and their proxies 
        from Lebanon.

SEC. 10. DEFINITION.

    As used in this Act, the term ``Syrian military, security, and 
intelligence forces and their proxies'' includes Syrian Army regulars, 
paramilitary forces, and plain clothes intelligence and security 
officials.