[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2056 Introduced in House (IH)]
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2056
To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity of
requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security,
intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of
Lebanon's independence.
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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 8, 1999
Mr. Forbes introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees
on Ways and Means, and Banking and Financial Services, for a period to
be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity of
requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security,
intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of
Lebanon's independence.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Lebanon Independence Restoration Act
of 1999''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The people of Lebanon have a rich, proud, and honorable
history dating from biblical times to the present, and Lebanon
has been a free and democratic nation for much of its modern
history.
(2) Lebanon and the United States have enjoyed a history of
friendship and cooperation which has been witnessed by the
immigration of millions of Lebanese to the United States where
they and their descendants have contributed greatly to the
fabric of American life.
(3) Lebanon witnessed foreign incursions and occupations
during its 15-year civil war. Although that war ended in 1990,
non-Lebanese forces still control much of the country. These
forces include an Israeli force that controls a 9-mile wide
security zone in Lebanon contiguous with Israel's northern
border, and approximately 30,000 Syrian troops, several armed
Palestinian factions, and other terrorist groups that control
the remainder of the country.
(4) There is a crucial distinction between the presence of
Syrian and Israeli military forces in Lebanon. Israel exercises
no control over the Government of Lebanon and in 1998 offered
to withdraw unilaterally from the security zone in return for
security guarantees, whereas Syria has never recognized
Lebanon's independence, or exchanged ambassadors with Lebanon,
and effectively dictates the major policies and actions of the
Government of Lebanon.
(5) Various Lebanese factions signed a peace settlement in
Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989 as a step toward ending the civil
war. This accord provided for the phased redeployment and
withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon beginning in 1992.
(6) The Government of Syria has refused to carry out any
redeployment as envisioned by the Taif Accord. Syrian
domination over Lebanese politics and political leaders is at
the root of the Lebanese Government's failure to press Syria
for a withdrawal of Syria's occupying forces.
(7) In addition to its armed forces, Syria maintains a
massive intelligence service presence in Lebanon to enforce its
control over the Lebanese people.
(8) Syrian domination is so pervasive that Lebanon has
effectively become a Syrian satellite state. This relationship
with Syria does not reflect the will of the majority of the
Lebanese public. Moreover, Syria has sought to change Lebanon's
demographic balance by the population transfer of as many as
1,000,000 Syrian laborers to Lebanon.
(9) Syrian domination has prevented Lebanon from developing
direct contacts with Israel and participating in the
multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.
(10) Syrian domination has been associated with a
deterioration in Lebanon's human rights situation. Syria has
engineered Lebanese election results to its liking, Syrian
intelligence units have been implicated in the disappearance of
Lebanese citizens, and the Syrian-controlled Lebanese
Parliament has imposed curbs on Lebanon's media, once the
freest in the Arab world.
(11) Syrian domination has failed to curtail international
narcotics traffickers or terrorist groups, including Hizballah
and the Kurdish Workers Party, that operate in Lebanon under
Syrian control.
(12) Syrian domination has prevented the Lebanese Army from
entering southern Lebanon to restore order and stability in
that region. Consequently, southern Lebanon has been a staging
area for military provocations against Israel by terrorist
groups supported by Syria and Iran.
(13) The United States Congress is concerned about the
potential for a miscalculation between Israel and Syria that
could inadvertently lead to large-scale hostilities, especially
in southern Lebanon. In this regard the Congress views with
grave concern Syria's acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction, especially chemical and biological weapons and
missile delivery systems. Syrian surface-to-surface missiles
can reach major urban centers in Israel, Turkey, and Jordan.
(14) The United States Congress has expressed itself
repeatedly in resolutions that insist that Syria make good on
its commitments to withdraw its military and security forces
from Lebanon.
(15) It is not in the interest of the United States that
freedom and democracy depart irreversibly from Lebanon. Lebanon
has a constructive role to play in the search for Middle East
peace. It can only do so when it is free, sovereign, and
governed by a truly representative government.
(16) The withdrawal of Syrian and other foreign forces from
Lebanon would not only promote regional stability, but also
would create the necessary conditions for the restoration of
Lebanon's independence, freedom, and democracy. Truly free
elections are not possible with the presence of foreign
military and security forces and terrorist groups in Lebanon.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
The Congress calls for the following:
(1) A complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of
all Syrian military, intelligence, and security forces and
their proxies and all Palestinian and other terrorist forces
from Lebanon, to be followed by the eventual withdrawal of
Israeli forces.
(2) Following the withdrawals described in paragraph (1)
and restoration of a freely elected, democratic government in
Lebanon, the deployment of the Lebanese Army to southern
Lebanon to restore order and stability in that region, and for
disbanding all armed groups in Lebanon with the exception of
the legitimate national armed forces.
(3) At the same time as the deployment described in
paragraph (2), the assurance by the Government of Lebanon for
the safety and well-being of all members of the South Lebanon
Army (SLA) and their families.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should not
ratify or in any other way affirm, support, recognize, or participate
in any peace agreement between Syria and Israel that does not provide
for the full and verifiable withdrawal of Syrian military,
intelligence, and security forces and their proxies from Lebanon.
SEC. 5. WITHDRAWAL OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR IMPORTS FROM
SYRIA AND LEBANON.
(a) Withdrawal.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except
subsection (b)), nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation
treatment) shall not apply with respect to any goods that--
(1) are the product of Syria or Lebanon; and
(2) are entered into the customs territory of the United
States on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(b) Restoration of Nondiscriminatory Treatment.--The President may
restore nondiscriminatory treatment to goods that--
(1) are the product of Lebanon beginning 30 days after the
President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military,
security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon
have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and that the
Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) are the product of Syria beginning 30 days after the
President certifies to the Congress that the requirements
described in paragraph (1) have been met and that the
Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature.
SEC. 6. PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND LEBANON.
(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
economic assistance may not be provided to Syria or Lebanon.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply--
(1) with respect to Lebanon beginning 30 days after the
President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military,
security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon
have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and that the
Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) with respect to Syria beginning 30 days after the
President certifies to the Congress that the requirements
described in paragraph (1) have been met and that the
Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature.
(c) Economic Assistance.--In this section, the term ``economic
assistance'' means any assistance under part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or any related
assistance under any other provision of law.
SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON.
(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
military assistance may not be provided to the Government of Lebanon.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply beginning 30 days
after the President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military,
security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon have
been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and the Government of Lebanon is
certified to have been freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
(c) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that
any assistance prohibited by reason of the application of subsection
(a) should be redirected to assistance for humanitarian, democracy
building, human rights and educational efforts in Lebanon.
(d) Military Assistance.--In this section, the term ``military
assistance''--
(1) means any assistance under part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.) and any
assistance under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et
seq.); and
(2) includes any other form of military cooperation with
the Government of Lebanon.
SEC. 8. REQUIREMENT TO OPPOSE LOANS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND
LEBANON BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) Requirement.--Beginning 15 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall instruct the United States
representative to each international financial institution (including
the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development) to which the United States is a member
to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the initiation
or renewal of any loan or other form of assistance for Syria or
Lebanon.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply--
(1) with respect to Lebanon beginning 30 days after the
President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military,
security, and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon
have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon and that the
Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) with respect to Syria beginning 30 days after the
President certifies to the Congress that the requirements
described in paragraph (1) have been met and that the
Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature.
SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORTS.
As part of the annual human rights report required under sections
116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2151n(d) and 2304(b)), the Secretary of State shall pay special
attention to the report on Lebanon and shall include in such report the
following:
(1) A detailed assessment of Syrian influence in the three
branches of the Government of Lebanon.
(2) An assessment of human rights abuses attributable to
Syrian influence in the Government of Lebanon.
(3) An assessment of the role played by Syrian intelligence
services in Lebanon.
(4) An estimate of the number of Syrian military, security,
and intelligence forces and their proxies and terrorist groups
in Lebanon.
(5) Progress made by the Government of Lebanon in disarming
terrorist groups, and an assessment of the causes for the
Lebanese Government's failure to disarm such groups.
(6) The specific steps and concrete actions taken by the
Department of State to affect a withdrawal of all Syrian
military, security, and intelligence forces and their proxies
from Lebanon.
SEC. 10. DEFINITION.
As used in this Act, the term ``Syrian military, security, and
intelligence forces and their proxies'' includes Syrian Army regulars,
paramilitary forces, and plain clothes intelligence and security
officials.