[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1838 Introduced in House (IH)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1838

 To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 18, 1999

   Mr. DeLay (for himself, Mr. Andrews, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Deutsch, Mr. 
  Rohrabacher, Mr. Wu, Mr. Cox, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Diaz-Balart, Mrs. 
Lowey, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. 
 Cook, and Mr. Weldon of Florida) introduced the following bill; which 
   was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in 
    addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Security Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United 
        States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both 
        societies.
            (2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political 
        transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy 
        with a political system separate from and totally unlike that 
        of the People's Republic of China.
            (3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market 
        principles and is separate and distinct from the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States 
        Government withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on 
        Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, neither at that 
        time nor since has the United States Government adopted a 
        formal position as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than 
        to state that status must be decided by peaceful means. Any 
        determination of the ultimate status of Taiwan must have the 
        express consent of the people on Taiwan.
            (5) The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the 
        sole legitimate government of all of China.
            (6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states 
        that--
                    (A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area 
                are in the political, security, and economic interests 
                of the United States and are of international concern;
                    (B) the decision of the United States to establish 
                diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
                China rests upon the expectation that the future of 
                Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
                    (C) the United States would consider any effort to 
                determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
                means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the 
                peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of 
                grave concern to the United States;
                    (D) the United States will maintain the capacity to 
                resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the 
                security, or the social or the economic system, of the 
                people on Taiwan; and
                    (E) the preservation and enhancement of the human 
                rights of all the people on Taiwan are objectives of 
                the United States.
            (7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations 
        Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing 
        connection with and concern for Taiwan, its people, and their 
        ability to maintain themselves free of coercion and free of the 
        use of force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of forces 
        adequate for defense and deterrence is in the interest of the 
        United States in that it helps to maintain peace in the Taiwan 
        Strait area.
            (8) Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed 
        the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan have 
        maintained a defense and security relationship that has 
        contributed greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan 
        and the East Asia and Pacific regions.
            (9) The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint 
        training missions, have no direct military lines of 
        communication, and have only limited military-to-military 
        contacts. This lack of communication and interoperation between 
        the United States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense 
        of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event of future 
        aggression against Taiwan.
            (10) Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell 
        defensive weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan 
        Relations Act, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its 
        autonomy and freedom in the face of persistent hostility from 
        the People's Republic of China. However, pressures to delay, 
        deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been  prevalent 
since the signing of the August 17, 1982, communique with the People's 
Republic of China. Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions 
could prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capability for self-
defense.
            (11) As has been affirmed on several occasions by the 
        executive branch of Government, the provisions of the Taiwan 
        Relations Act take legal precedence over any communique with 
        the People's Republic of China.
            (12) The People's Republic of China has consistently 
        refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has 
        repeatedly threatened force against Taiwan, including implied 
        threats by unnamed People's Republic of China officials on 
        January 10, 1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the 
        development of theater missile defense capabilities with the 
        United States.
            (13) The missile firings by the People's Republic of China 
        near Taiwan in August 1995 and March 1996 clearly demonstrate 
the willingness of the People's Republic of China to use forceful 
tactics to limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
            (14) As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending, 
        the People's Republic of China continues a major and 
        comprehensive military buildup.
            (15)(A) This military buildup includes the development of 
        advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that will incorporate 
        precision guidance capability and the construction of new 
        imaging, radar, navigation, and electronic intelligence 
        satellites that will help target and guide ballistic and cruise 
        missiles.
            (B) According to the Department of Defense report entitled 
        ``The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait'', submitted to 
        Congress in February 1999, the size of the missile force of the 
        People's Republic of China is expected to grow substantially 
        and, by 2005, the People's Republic of China will possess an 
        ``overwhelming advantage'' in offensive missiles vis-a-vis 
        Taiwan.
            (C) The Department of Defense has also noted that the 
        People's Republic of China may already possess the capability 
        to damage satellite optical sensors with lasers, is researching 
        advanced anti-satellite lasers that could blind United States 
        intelligence satellites, and is procuring radio frequency 
        weapons that disable electronic equipment.
            (D) These missile and anti-satellite capabilities pose a 
        grave threat to Taiwan.
            (16) This military buildup also includes the construction 
        or procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including 
        Russian Kilo submarines that are difficult to detect, Russian 
        technology to assist the development of new nuclear-powered 
        attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed 
        with supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new long-
        range, all-weather naval attack aircraft called the JH-7, and 
        new indigenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be 
        launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack aircraft. 
        These naval capabilities pose a grave threat of blockade to 
        Taiwan.
            (17) This military buildup also includes the improvement of 
        air combat capabilities by procuring and co-producing hundreds 
        of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian 
        Su-30 all-weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with 
        advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile 
        and other precision guided munitions, constructing the 
        indigenously designed J-10 fighter, and seeking advanced 
        airborne warning and control systems from abroad. These 
        capabilities pose a grave airborne threat to Taiwan.
            (18) Because of the introduction of advanced submarines 
        into the Taiwan Strait area by the People's Republic of China 
        and the increasing capability of the People's Republic of China 
        to blockade Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered 
        submarines in order to maintain a capability to counter a 
        blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare training, and for 
        other purposes.
            (19) Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan 
        and the historically nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan, it 
        is highly unlikely that Taiwan would use submarines in an 
        offensive manner.
            (20) The current defense relationship between the United 
        States and Taiwan is deficient in terms of its capacity over 
        the long term to counter and deter potential aggression against 
        Taiwan by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Training of Taiwan Military Officers.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the 
military departments should make every effort to reserve additional 
positions for Taiwan military officers at the National Defense 
University and other professional military education schools specified 
in section 2162(d) of title 10, United States Code, and for prospective 
Taiwan military officers at the United States Military Academy, the 
United States Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.
    (b) Foreign Military Sales.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of State should, when considering foreign military sales to 
Taiwan--
            (1) take into account the special status of Taiwan; and
            (2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has full and 
        timely access to price and availability data for defense 
        articles and defense services.

SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.

    (a) Increase in Technical Staff of the American Institute in 
Taiwan.--Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
the President shall use funds available to the Department of Defense 
under the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail of 
additional technical staff to the American Institute in Taiwan.
    (b) Annual Reports.--Beginning 60 days after the next round of arms 
talks between the United States and Taiwan, and annually thereafter, 
the President shall submit a report to Congress--
            (1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of 
        defense articles and defense services during the one-year 
        period ending on the date of the report;
            (2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as 
        justification for those requests; and
            (3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify 
        any such request that was made during the one-year period 
        ending on the date of the report, the level at which the final 
        decision was made, and a justification for the decision.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

    (a) Maintenance of Sufficient Self-Defense Capabilities of 
Taiwan.--Congress finds that any determination of the nature or 
quantity of defense articles or defense services to be made available 
to Taiwan that is made on any basis other than the defense needs of 
Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Communique signed with 
the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive agreement, 
order, or policy would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment 
of section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
    (b) Plan Regarding Combined Training and Personnel Exchange 
Programs.--
            (1) Development.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
        with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the 
        enhancement of programs and arrangements for operational 
        training and exchanges of personnel between the Armed Forces of 
        the United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for work in 
        threat analysis, doctrine, force planning, operational methods, 
        and other areas. The plan shall provide for exchanges of 
        officers up to and including general and flag officers in the 
        grade of O-10.
            (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
        report to Congress, in classified or unclassified form, 
        containing the plan required under paragraph (1).
            (3) Implementation.--Not later than 210 days after the date 
        of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
        implement the plan required under paragraph (1).
    (c) Communications Between United States and Taiwan Military 
Commands.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct 
communications between the United States Pacific military command and 
the Taiwan military command.
    (d) Missile Defense Equipment.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment and related items, 
including--
            (1) ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems; 
        and
            (2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be 
        necessary to target and cue missile defense systems sold to 
        Taiwan.
    (e) Satellite Early Warning Data.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, satellite early warning data.
    (f) Air Defense Equipment.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including the following:
            (1) AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
            (2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and 
        control systems (AWACS).
            (3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and 
        missile attack.
            (4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated 
        joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
    (g) Naval Defense Systems.--Subject to subsection (h), the 
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at 
reasonable cost, defensive systems that counter the development by the 
People's Republic of China of new naval capabilities, including defense 
systems such as--
            (1) diesel-powered submarines;
            (2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems, 
        capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced Chinese nuclear 
        submarines;
            (3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis destroyers, 
        capable of defeating foreign supersonic anti-ship missiles; and
            (4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to 
        conduct joint-force naval defense operations.
    (h) Relation to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in this section 
supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export 
Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under 
this section.
                                 <all>