[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 48 Introduced in House (IH)]
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. J. RES. 48
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the court-martial
conviction of the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay, III, and
calling upon the President to award a Presidential Unit Citation to the
final crew of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 28, 1999
Mr. Scarborough (for himself, Ms. Carson, Mr. Kennedy of Rhode Island,
Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. Maloney of Connecticut, Mrs. Emerson,
Mr. Bilbray, Mr. Brown of Ohio, Mr. Farr of California, Mr. Frost, Mrs.
Mink of Hawaii, Mrs. Thurman, Mr. Pease, Mr. Kleczka, Mr. Snyder, Mr.
Ney, Mr. Stenholm, Mr. Boyd, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, Mr. Ackerman,
Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Towns, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr.
Stump, Mr. Gary Miller of California, Mrs. Meek of Florida, Mr.
Underwood, Mr. Ehlers, Mr. English, Mr. Sawyer, Mr. McCollum, Mr.
Metcalf, Mr. Barrett of Nebraska, Mr. Lipinski, Mr. Miller of Florida,
Mr. Callahan, Mr. Regula, Mr. Cook, Mr. Fossella, Ms. Eddie Bernice
Johnson of Texas, Mr. McInnis, Mr. John, Mr. Udall of New Mexico, and
Ms. Rivers) introduced the following joint resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
JOINT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the court-martial
conviction of the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay, III, and
calling upon the President to award a Presidential Unit Citation to the
final crew of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.
Whereas shortly after midnight on the night of July 30, 1945, during the closing
days of World War II, the United States Navy heavy cruiser U.S.S.
INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine;
Whereas of the 1,196 crew members, only 316 survived the attack and subsequent
five-day ordeal adrift at sea, the rest dying from battle wounds,
drowning, shark attacks, exposure, or lack of food and water, making the
sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS the worst sea disaster in United States
naval history;
Whereas following the rescue of the surviving crew members, the commanding
officer of the INDIANAPOLIS, Captain Charles Butler McVay III, who
survived the sinking and the ordeal at sea, was charged with ``suffering
a vessel to be hazarded through negligence'' and was convicted by a
court-martial of that charge, notwithstanding a great many extenuating
circumstances, some of which were not presented at the court-martial
trial;
Whereas Captain McVay had an excellent record throughout his naval career before
the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS, beginning with his graduation from the
United States Naval Academy in 1919 and including an excellent combat
record that included participation in the landings in North Africa and
award of the Silver Star for courage under fire earned during the
Solomon Islands campaign;
Whereas after assuming command of the INDIANAPOLIS on November 18, 1944, Captain
McVay led the ship during her participation in the assaults on Iwo Jima
and Okinawa;
Whereas during the latter assault, the INDIANAPOLIS suffered a damaging kamikaze
attack which penetrated the ship's hull, but the ship was made seaworthy
and skillfully returned by Captain McVay and her crew to San Francisco
for repairs;
Whereas following completion of those repairs, the INDIANAPOLIS was given the
mission of transporting to the island of Tinian vital parts of the
atomic bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima, a mission which was
completed successfully on July 26, 1945, at a record average speed of 29
knots;
Whereas following the accomplishment of that mission, the INDIANAPOLIS sailed
from Tinian to Guam and from there embarked for Leyte Gulf in the
Philippines to join training with the fleet assembling for the final
assault on the Japanese mainland;
Whereas as the INDIANAPOLIS began its trip across the Philippine Sea on July 28,
1945, the war was virtually over in that area of the south Pacific, with
hostilities having moved 1,000 miles to the north, the Japanese navy's
surface fleet was nonexistent, and United States naval intelligence
reported only four operational Japanese submarines in the entire Pacific
theater of war, all of which resulted in the state of alert among shore-
based personnel routing and tracking the INDIANAPOLIS across the
Philippine Sea being affected accordingly;
Whereas before departure from Guam Captain McVay requested a destroyer escort
because his ship was not equipped with antisubmarine detection devices,
but, despite the fact that no capital ship such as the INDIANAPOLIS had
made the transit between Guam and the Philippines without escort during
World War II, that request was denied, and a 1996 report by the Navy's
Judge Advocate General's office concedes that ``Captain McVay and the
routing officer did not discuss the availability of an escort after the
operations officer for COMMARIANNAS confirmed that an escort was not
necessary'';
Whereas although Captain McVay was informed of ``submarine sightings'' in the
Philippine Sea, such sightings were commonplace, and none of those
reported to Captain McVay had been confirmed, and at the same time there
was a failure to inform him that a submarine within range of his path
had sunk the U.S.S. UNDERHILL four days before his departure from Guam;
Whereas United States military intelligence activities, through a code-breaking
system called ULTRA, had learned that the Japanese submarine I-58 was
operating in the Philippine Sea area, but Captain McVay was not told of
this intelligence, which remained classified as Top Secret until the
early 1990's, and this intelligence (and the fact that it was withheld
from Captain McVay when he sailed from Guam) was not brought to light at
his court-martial;
Whereas the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk by this same submarine;
Whereas the commander of that submarine, Mochitsura Hashimoto, testified at the
court-martial that once he had detected the ship, he would have been
able to make a successful torpedo attack whether or not the ship was
zigzagging;
Whereas with visibility severely limited by a heavy overcast at approximately 11
p.m. on the night of July 29, 1945, Captain McVay gave the order to
cease zigzagging and retired to his cabin and shortly after midnight the
INDIANAPOLIS was struck by two torpedoes and sunk within 12 minutes;
Whereas the formal charge upon which Captain McVay was convicted for ``suffering
a vessel to be hazarded through negligence'' contained the phrase ``in
good visibility'' in reference to the weather conditions on that night,
which is contrary to the recollection of all survivors, who recall that
the visibility was very poor;
Whereas after the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk, various Navy shore offices compounded
the previous errors which had led to the ship being placed in jeopardy
by failing to report the ship's overdue arrival, thus leaving the
approximately 950 members of the crew who survived the sinking of the
ship adrift for four days and five nights until by chance the survivors
were spotted by a routine air patrol;
Whereas a court of inquiry to investigate the sinking was convened in Guam on
August 13, 1945, just two weeks after the sinking and nine days after
the survivors were rescued (a date so soon after the sinking that
Captain William Hillbert, the Navy judge advocate for the inquiry,
admitted that the inquiry was so rushed that they were ``. . . starting
the proceedings without having available all the necessary data'') and
recommended that Captain McVay be issued a Letter of Reprimand and that
he be court-martialed;
Whereas the headquarters staff of CINCPAC (commanded by Fleet Admiral Chester
Nimitz) disagreed with the recommendation of the court of inquiry,
stating that in not maintaining a zigzag course Captain McVay at worst
was guilty only of an error in judgment and not gross negligence and
concluded that the rule requiring zigzagging would not have applied in
any event since Captain McVay's orders gave him discretion on that
matter and took precedence over all other orders (a point that was never
made by Captain McVay's attorney during the court-martial);
Whereas the Department of the Navy delayed the announcement of the sinking of
the INDIANAPOLIS for almost two weeks to coincide with the announcement
of the surrender of Japan, thus diverting attention from the magnitude
of the disaster and lessening its public impact, and then, despite
opposition by Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Raymond Spruance (for whom the
INDIANAPOLIS had served as flagship), it brought court-martial charges
against Captain McVay in a rare instance when a commanding officer's
recommendations are contravened;
Whereas Captain McVay thus became the first United States Navy commanding
officer brought to trial for losing his ship in combat during World War
II, despite the fact that over 700 ships were lost during World War II,
including some under questionable circumstances;
Whereas Captain McVay was convicted on February 23, 1946, on the charge of
``suffering a vessel to be hazarded through negligence'', thus
permanently damaging his career as a naval officer, although when
Admiral Nimitz was advanced to the position of Chief of Naval Operations
later that same year, he remitted Captain McVay's sentence and restored
him to active duty;
Whereas following his court-martial conviction, Captain McVay remained on active
duty until retiring in 1949 upon completion of 30 years of active naval
service, with a final promotion, in accordance with then-applicable law,
to the grade of rear admiral, effective upon the date of his retirement;
Whereas Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III (retired), died on November 6,
1968, without having been exonerated from responsibility for the loss of
his ship and the lives of 880 members of her crew;
Whereas the survivors of the INDIANAPOLIS still living have remained steadfast
in their support of the exoneration of Captain McVay;
Whereas in 1993, Congress, in section 1165 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1765; 16 U.S.C.
431 note), recognized the memorial to the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) in
Indianapolis, Indiana, as the national memorial to that historic warship
and to her final crew; and
Whereas in 1994, Congress, in section 1052 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 2844), stating
that it was acting on behalf of the grateful people of the United
States--
(1) recognized the invaluable contributions of the U.S.S.
INDIANAPOLIS to the ending of World War II; and
(2) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of her tragic sinking,
and the dedication of the national memorial in Indianapolis on July 30,
1995, commended that ship and her crew for selfless and heroic service
to the United States: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTION OF
CHARLES BUTLER MCVAY, III.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the court-martial charges against then-Captain Charles
Butler McVay III, United States Navy, arising from the sinking
of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) on July 30, 1945, while
under his command were not morally sustainable;
(2) Captain McVay's conviction was a miscarriage of justice
that led to his unjust humiliation and damage to his naval
career; and
(3) the American people should now recognize Captain
McVay's lack of culpability for the tragic loss of the U.S.S.
INDIANAPOLIS and the lives of the men who died as a result of
her sinking.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION FOR
FINAL CREW OF THE U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should award a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew
of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) in recognition of the courage and
fortitude displayed by the members of that crew in the face of
tremendous hardship and adversity after their ship was torpedoed and
sunk on July 30, 1945.
(b) Waiver of Time Limitation.--A citation described in subsection
(a) may be awarded without regard to any provision of law or regulation
prescribing a time limitation that is otherwise applicable with respect
to recommendation for, or the award of, such a citation.
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