[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 97 Introduced in House (IH)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 97

Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the 
    Government of Indonesia until the President certifies that the 
 Government of Indonesia is no longer arming, financing, or supporting 
 paramilitary units in East Timor and has taken certain other actions 
            relating to East Timor, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 5, 1999

 Mr. Kennedy of Rhode Island (for himself, Mrs. Lowey, Mr. Lantos, Ms. 
  McKinney, Mr. Evans, and Mr. Hall of Ohio) submitted the following 
     concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
                        International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the 
    Government of Indonesia until the President certifies that the 
 Government of Indonesia is no longer arming, financing, or supporting 
 paramilitary units in East Timor and has taken certain other actions 
            relating to East Timor, and for other purposes.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ``East Timor 
Paramilitary Accountability Resolution''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1)(A) Paramilitary violence in East Timor has escalated 
        significantly beginning in November 1998.
            (B) Since then, some 10,000 civilians have fled from the 
        countryside to seek refuge in churches, schools and private 
        homes.
            (C) Incidents of rape, beatings, torture and disappearance 
        have been reported frequently.
            (2) Indonesia invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975, and 
        has illegally occupied that nation for more than 23 years.
            (3) The Indonesian occupation has claimed the lives of over 
        200,000 East Timorese--fully a third of the population--in 
        massacres, by torture, and through forced starvation.
            (4) The Indonesian military (ABRI) and elite units like the 
        Kopassus special forces have carried out a systematic reign of 
        terror in East Timor, numbering over 21,000 troops according to 
        ABRI documents from September 1998.
            (5) East Timorese Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and diplomat 
        Jose Ramos-Horta were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
        1996 for their acts of courage on behalf of their people.
            (6)(A) On May 21, 1998, 33 years after he seized power in a 
        bloody coup, Indonesian dictator Suharto was forced to resign 
        in the wake of mass pro-democracy protests and a severe 
        economic crisis.
            (B) His handpicked successor, B.J. Habibie, assumed the 
        presidency.
            (7) In June 1998, Indonesian President Habibie, in a 
        striking change of policy, introduced a plan for autonomy for 
        East Timor, but excluded East Timorese control over the 
        military, foreign policy and currency, and a referendum on 
        self-determination.
            (8)(A) In July 1998, the United States Senate unanimously 
        adopted a resolution supporting East Timor's right to a 
        referendum on self-determination.
            (B) In October 1998, the United States Congress went on 
        record as supporting self-determination for East Timor in a 
        provision included in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
        Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999.
            (9) On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President Habibie 
        offered that Indonesia would consider Indonesian withdrawal 
        from East Timor as a ``second option'' for East Timor if the 
        majority of its people were to reject his autonomy plan.
            (10) In February 1999, jailed East Timorese resistance 
        leader Xanana Gusmao was moved from prison to house arrest.
            (11)(A) Also in February 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine 
        Albright met with Gusmao, as well as Indonesian officials, 
        during a visit to Jakarta.
            (B) Afterward she praised Gusmao's character, and expressed 
        United States support for several of the steps necessary for a 
        peaceful transition in East Timor including an international 
        monitoring presence and the disarming of Indonesian-backed 
        paramilitary units as soon as possible.
            (12)(A) The United Nations, under Secretary General Kofi 
        Annan, has sponsored a series of talks between Portugal and 
        Indonesia on East Timor's political status.
            (B) In February 1999 these talks yielded a tentative 
        agreement to hold a United Nations-sponsored ballot in East 
        Timor to determine East Timor's rejection or acceptance of an 
        Indonesian autonomy plan.
            (13)(A) On April 6, 1999, over 25 internally displaced 
        persons were attacked and killed by machete-wielding members of 
        the paramilitary unit Besi Merah Putih, while members of the 
        Indonesian military (ABRI) assisted.
            (B) The number injured is still unknown, but the Indonesian 
        Government has apparently obstructed attempts to deliver 
        international humanitarian assistance.
            (14) The United States Congress has placed high hopes in 
        the beginnings of a democratic process in Indonesia, especially 
        the June 7, 1998, elections, and has issued support and funding 
        to assist in that process.
            (15) If parliamentary elections, widely perceived as 
        completely illegitimate in East Timor, are allowed to proceed 
        in the occupied territory, and if paramilitary units are not 
        disbanded, violence in East Timor is likely to further 
        destabilize the overall environment in Indonesia and diminish 
        the likelihood of genuine democratic reform.
            (16) Despite the April 21, 1999, signing of an agreement on 
        a ceasefire by East Timorese resistance representatives, 
        paramilitary leaders, and the Indonesian military (ABRI) 
        commander in East Timor, paramilitary violence has not 
        lessened.
            (17) Another brutal attack was waged against civilians in 
        the area of Suai on April 22, 1999, and more than 8 individuals 
        were killed.
            (18) On April 23, 1999, United Nations talks yielded a 
        tentative agreement that is expected to be signed on May 5, 
        1999, in New York.
            (19) Any such agreement must be followed with a free and 
        fair vote, United Nations and other international monitors, and 
        the disarming and disbanding of the paramilitary units.

SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    The Congress declares that the United States will no longer accept, 
condone, finance, or supply the Indonesian military occupiers, nor 
their proxies, the paramilitary civilian militia units, in East Timor.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
              EAST TIMOR.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense should take an active and visible role in urging 
the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian military--
            (1) to permit an international investigation of the 
        massacre at Liquica; and
            (2) to bring to justice those individuals responsible for 
        gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in 
        East Timor.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES 
              MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GOVERNMENT 
              OF INDONESIA.

    (a) Prohibition.--It is the sense of the Congress that United 
States military assistance and arms transfers should not be provided to 
the Government of Indonesia unless the President certifies to the 
Congress that the Government of Indonesia--
            (1) is no longer arming, financing, or supporting 
        paramilitary units in East Timor, and ceases its own military 
        attacks on civilians, separate from and together with these 
        paramilitary units;
            (2) has assisted in the successful disarming and disbanding 
        of the paramilitary units in East Timor;
            (3) allows free and open access to East Timor to a 
        continuing United Nations presence, international human rights 
        and relief and development organizations, and the press; and
            (4) has reduced substantially the Indonesian military 
        (ABRI) troop presence in East Timor, as the beginning of a 
        United Nations-monitored withdrawal;
    (b) United States Military Assistance and Arms Transfers.--In this 
section, the term ``United States military assistance and arms 
transfers'' means--
            (1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance), 
        including the transfer of excess defense articles under section 
        516 of that Act;
            (2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military 
        education and training or ``IMET''), including military 
        education and training for civilian personnel under section 541 
        of such Act (commonly referred to as ``Expanded IMET''); or
            (3) assistance under the ``Foreign Military Financing'' 
        Program under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2763) and the transfer of defense articles, defense 
        services, design and construction services, or any other 
        defense-related training under that Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
        seq.).
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