[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 97 Introduced in House (IH)]
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES. 97
Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the
Government of Indonesia until the President certifies that the
Government of Indonesia is no longer arming, financing, or supporting
paramilitary units in East Timor and has taken certain other actions
relating to East Timor, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 5, 1999
Mr. Kennedy of Rhode Island (for himself, Mrs. Lowey, Mr. Lantos, Ms.
McKinney, Mr. Evans, and Mr. Hall of Ohio) submitted the following
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on
International Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the
Government of Indonesia until the President certifies that the
Government of Indonesia is no longer arming, financing, or supporting
paramilitary units in East Timor and has taken certain other actions
relating to East Timor, and for other purposes.
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ``East Timor
Paramilitary Accountability Resolution''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1)(A) Paramilitary violence in East Timor has escalated
significantly beginning in November 1998.
(B) Since then, some 10,000 civilians have fled from the
countryside to seek refuge in churches, schools and private
homes.
(C) Incidents of rape, beatings, torture and disappearance
have been reported frequently.
(2) Indonesia invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975, and
has illegally occupied that nation for more than 23 years.
(3) The Indonesian occupation has claimed the lives of over
200,000 East Timorese--fully a third of the population--in
massacres, by torture, and through forced starvation.
(4) The Indonesian military (ABRI) and elite units like the
Kopassus special forces have carried out a systematic reign of
terror in East Timor, numbering over 21,000 troops according to
ABRI documents from September 1998.
(5) East Timorese Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and diplomat
Jose Ramos-Horta were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
1996 for their acts of courage on behalf of their people.
(6)(A) On May 21, 1998, 33 years after he seized power in a
bloody coup, Indonesian dictator Suharto was forced to resign
in the wake of mass pro-democracy protests and a severe
economic crisis.
(B) His handpicked successor, B.J. Habibie, assumed the
presidency.
(7) In June 1998, Indonesian President Habibie, in a
striking change of policy, introduced a plan for autonomy for
East Timor, but excluded East Timorese control over the
military, foreign policy and currency, and a referendum on
self-determination.
(8)(A) In July 1998, the United States Senate unanimously
adopted a resolution supporting East Timor's right to a
referendum on self-determination.
(B) In October 1998, the United States Congress went on
record as supporting self-determination for East Timor in a
provision included in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999.
(9) On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President Habibie
offered that Indonesia would consider Indonesian withdrawal
from East Timor as a ``second option'' for East Timor if the
majority of its people were to reject his autonomy plan.
(10) In February 1999, jailed East Timorese resistance
leader Xanana Gusmao was moved from prison to house arrest.
(11)(A) Also in February 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright met with Gusmao, as well as Indonesian officials,
during a visit to Jakarta.
(B) Afterward she praised Gusmao's character, and expressed
United States support for several of the steps necessary for a
peaceful transition in East Timor including an international
monitoring presence and the disarming of Indonesian-backed
paramilitary units as soon as possible.
(12)(A) The United Nations, under Secretary General Kofi
Annan, has sponsored a series of talks between Portugal and
Indonesia on East Timor's political status.
(B) In February 1999 these talks yielded a tentative
agreement to hold a United Nations-sponsored ballot in East
Timor to determine East Timor's rejection or acceptance of an
Indonesian autonomy plan.
(13)(A) On April 6, 1999, over 25 internally displaced
persons were attacked and killed by machete-wielding members of
the paramilitary unit Besi Merah Putih, while members of the
Indonesian military (ABRI) assisted.
(B) The number injured is still unknown, but the Indonesian
Government has apparently obstructed attempts to deliver
international humanitarian assistance.
(14) The United States Congress has placed high hopes in
the beginnings of a democratic process in Indonesia, especially
the June 7, 1998, elections, and has issued support and funding
to assist in that process.
(15) If parliamentary elections, widely perceived as
completely illegitimate in East Timor, are allowed to proceed
in the occupied territory, and if paramilitary units are not
disbanded, violence in East Timor is likely to further
destabilize the overall environment in Indonesia and diminish
the likelihood of genuine democratic reform.
(16) Despite the April 21, 1999, signing of an agreement on
a ceasefire by East Timorese resistance representatives,
paramilitary leaders, and the Indonesian military (ABRI)
commander in East Timor, paramilitary violence has not
lessened.
(17) Another brutal attack was waged against civilians in
the area of Suai on April 22, 1999, and more than 8 individuals
were killed.
(18) On April 23, 1999, United Nations talks yielded a
tentative agreement that is expected to be signed on May 5,
1999, in New York.
(19) Any such agreement must be followed with a free and
fair vote, United Nations and other international monitors, and
the disarming and disbanding of the paramilitary units.
SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF POLICY.
The Congress declares that the United States will no longer accept,
condone, finance, or supply the Indonesian military occupiers, nor
their proxies, the paramilitary civilian militia units, in East Timor.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EAST TIMOR.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense should take an active and visible role in urging
the Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian military--
(1) to permit an international investigation of the
massacre at Liquica; and
(2) to bring to justice those individuals responsible for
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in
East Timor.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDONESIA.
(a) Prohibition.--It is the sense of the Congress that United
States military assistance and arms transfers should not be provided to
the Government of Indonesia unless the President certifies to the
Congress that the Government of Indonesia--
(1) is no longer arming, financing, or supporting
paramilitary units in East Timor, and ceases its own military
attacks on civilians, separate from and together with these
paramilitary units;
(2) has assisted in the successful disarming and disbanding
of the paramilitary units in East Timor;
(3) allows free and open access to East Timor to a
continuing United Nations presence, international human rights
and relief and development organizations, and the press; and
(4) has reduced substantially the Indonesian military
(ABRI) troop presence in East Timor, as the beginning of a
United Nations-monitored withdrawal;
(b) United States Military Assistance and Arms Transfers.--In this
section, the term ``United States military assistance and arms
transfers'' means--
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance),
including the transfer of excess defense articles under section
516 of that Act;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military
education and training or ``IMET''), including military
education and training for civilian personnel under section 541
of such Act (commonly referred to as ``Expanded IMET''); or
(3) assistance under the ``Foreign Military Financing''
Program under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2763) and the transfer of defense articles, defense
services, design and construction services, or any other
defense-related training under that Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et
seq.).
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