[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 75 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. EXEC. RES. 75

   To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
               Convention, subject to certain conditions.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 17, 1997

Mr. Helms submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                          EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION


 
   To advise and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
               Convention, subject to certain conditions.

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

    The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (as defined in section 3 of this resolution), 
subject to the conditions in section 2.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

    The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention is subject to the following conditions, which shall 
be binding upon the President:
            (1) Effect of Article XXII.--Upon the deposit of the United 
        States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify 
        to the Congress that the United States has informed all other 
        States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the 
        right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to 
        give its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention 
        subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the 
        Convention.
            (2) Financial contributions.--Notwithstanding any provision 
        of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of 
        the United States for payments or assistance (including the 
        transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article IV, 
        paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII, 
        paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision 
        of the Convention, without statutory authorization and 
        appropriation.
            (3) Establishment of an internal oversight office.--
                    (A) Certification.--Not later than 240 days after 
                the deposit of the United States instrument of 
                ratification, the President shall certify to the 
                Congress that the current internal audit office of the 
                Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an 
                independent internal oversight office whose functions 
                will be transferred to the Organization for the 
                Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment 
                of the Organization. The independent internal oversight 
                office shall be obligated to protect confidential 
                information pursuant to the obligations of the 
                Confidentiality Annex. The independent internal 
                oversight office shall--
                            (i) make investigations and reports 
                        relating to all programs of the Organization;
                            (ii) undertake both management and 
                        financial audits, including--
                                    (I) an annual assessment verifying 
                                that classified and confidential 
                                information is stored and handled 
                                securely pursuant to the general 
                                obligations set forth in Article VIII 
                                and in accordance with all provisions 
                                of the Annex on the Protection of 
                                Confidential Information; and
                                    (II) an annual assessment of 
                                laboratories established pursuant to 
                                paragraph 55 of Part II of the 
                                Verification Annex to ensure that the 
                                Director General of the Technical 
                                Secretariat is carrying out his 
                                functions pursuant to paragraph 56 of 
                                Part II of the Verification Annex;
                            (iii) undertake performance evaluations 
                        annually to ensure the Organization has 
                        complied to the extent practicable with the 
recommendations of the independent internal oversight office;
                            (iv) have access to all records relating to 
                        the programs and operations of the 
                        Organization;
                            (v) have direct and prompt access to any 
                        official of the Organization; and
                            (vi) be required to protect the identity 
                        of, and prevent reprisals against, all 
                        complainants.
                    (B) Compliance with recommendations.--The 
                Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable, 
                compliance with recommendations of the independent 
                internal oversight office, and shall ensure that annual 
                and other relevant reports by the independent internal 
                oversight office are made available to all member 
                states pursuant to the requirements established in the 
                Confidentiality Annex.
                    (C) Withholding a portion of contributions.--Until 
                a certification is made under subparagraph (A), 50 
                percent of the amount of United States contributions to 
                the regular budget of the Organization assessed 
                pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be 
                withheld from disbursement, in addition to any other 
                amounts required to be withheld from disbursement by 
                any other provision of law.
                    (D) Assessment of first year contributions.--
                Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for 
                the first year of the Organization's operation, ending 
                on April 29, 1998, the United States shall make its 
                full contribution to the regular budget of the 
                Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
                Article VIII.
                    (E) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, 
                the term ``internal oversight office'' means the head 
                of an independent office (or other independent entity) 
                established by the Organization to conduct and 
                supervise objective audits, inspections, and 
                investigations relating to the programs and operations 
                of the Organization.
            (4) Cost sharing arrangements.--
                    (A) Annual reports.--Prior to the deposit of the 
                United States instrument of ratification, and annually 
                thereafter, the President shall submit a report to 
                Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with 
                the Organization.
                    (B) Cost-sharing arrangement required.--The United 
                States shall not undertake any new research or 
                development expenditures for the primary purpose of 
                refining or improving the Organization's regime for 
                verification of compliance under the Convention, 
                including the training of inspectors and the provision 
                of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling 
                and analysis techniques, or share the articles, items, 
                or services resulting from any research and development 
                undertaken previously, without first having concluded 
                and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing 
                arrangement with the Organization.
                    (C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be 
                construed as limiting or constricting in any way the 
                ability of the United States to pursue unilaterally any 
                project undertaken solely to increase the capability of 
                the United States means for monitoring compliance with 
                the Convention.
            (5) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
                    (A) Provision of intelligence information to the 
                organization.--
                            (i) In general.--No United States 
                        intelligence information may be provided to the 
                        Organization or any organization affiliated 
                        with the Organization, or to any official or 
                        employee thereof, unless the President 
                        certifies to the appropriate committees of 
                        Congress that the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence, in consultation with the 
                        Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
                        Defense, has established and implemented 
                        procedures, and has worked with the 
                        Organization to ensure implementation of 
                        procedures, for protecting from unauthorized 
                        disclosure United States intelligence sources 
                        and methods connected to such information. 
                        These procedures shall include the requirement 
                        of--
                                    (I) the offer and provision of 
                                advice and assistance to the 
                                Organization in establishing and 
                                maintaining the necessary measures to 
                                ensure that inspectors and other staff 
                                members of the Technical Secretariat 
                                meet the highest standards of 
                                efficiency, competence, and integrity, 
                                pursuant to paragraph 1(b) of the 
                                Confidentiality Annex, and in 
                                establishing and maintaining a 
                                stringent regime governing the handling 
                                of confidential information by the 
                                Technical Secretariat, pursuant to 
                                paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality 
                                Annex;
                                    (II) a determination that any 
                                unauthorized disclosure of United 
                                States intelligence information to be 
                                provided to the Organization or any 
                                organization affiliated with the 
                                Organization, or any official or 
                                employee thereof, would result in no 
                                more than minimal damage to United 
                                States national security, in light of 
                                the risks of the unauthorized 
                                disclosure of such information;
                                    (III) sanitization of intelligence 
                                information that is to be provided to 
                                the Organization to remove all 
                                information that could betray 
                                intelligence sources and methods; and
                                    (IV) interagency United States 
                                intelligence community approval for any 
                                release of intelligence information to 
                                the Organization, no matter how 
                                thoroughly it has been sanitized.
                            (ii) Waiver authority.--
                                    (I) In general.--The Director of 
                                Central Intelligence may waive the 
                                application of clause (i) if the 
                                Director of Central Intelligence 
                                certifies in writing to the appropriate 
                                committees of Congress that providing 
                                such information to the Organization or 
                                an organization affiliated with the 
                                Organization, or to any official or 
                                employee thereof, is in the vital 
                                national security interests of the 
                                United States and that all possible 
                                measures to protect such information 
                                have been taken, except that such 
                                waiver must be made for each instance 
                                such information is provided, or for 
                                each such document provided. In the 
                                event that multiple waivers are issued 
                                within a single week, a single 
                                certification to the appropriate 
                                committees of Congress may be 
                                submitted, specifying each waiver 
                                issued during that week.
                                    (II) Delegation of duties.--The 
                                Director of Central Intelligence may 
                                not delegate any duty of the Director 
                                under this paragraph.
                    (B) Periodic and special reports.--
                            (i) In general.--The President shall report 
                        periodically, but not less frequently than 
                        semiannually, to the Select Committee on 
                        Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
                        Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                        of Representatives on the types and volume of 
                        intelligence information provided to the 
                        Organization or affiliated organizations and 
                        the purposes for which it was provided during 
                        the period covered by the report.
                            (ii) Exemption.--For purposes of this 
                        subparagraph, intelligence information provided 
                        to the Organization or affiliated organizations 
                        does not cover information that is provided 
                        only to, and only for the use of, appropriately 
                        cleared United States Government personnel 
serving with the Organization or an affiliated organization.
                    (C) Special reports.--
                            (i) Report on procedures.--Accompanying the 
                        certification provided pursuant to subparagraph 
                        (A)(i), the President shall provide a detailed 
                        report to the Select Committee on Intelligence 
                        of the Senate and the Permanent Select 
                        Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
                        Representatives identifying the procedures 
                        established for protecting intelligence sources 
                        and methods when intelligence information is 
                        provided pursuant to this section.
                            (ii) Reports on unauthorized disclosures.--
                        The President shall submit a report to the 
                        Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
                        and the Permanent Select Committee on 
                        Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
                        within 15 days after it has become known to the 
                        United States Government regarding any 
                        unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
                        provided by the United States to the 
                        Organization.
                    (D) Delegation of duties.--The President may not 
                delegate or assign the duties of the President under 
                this section.
                    (E) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in this 
                paragraph may be construed to--
                            (i) impair or otherwise affect the 
                        authority of the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence to protect intelligence sources 
                        and methods from unauthorized disclosure 
                        pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National 
                        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); 
                        or
                            (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the 
                        provisions of title V of the National Security 
                        Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
                    (F) Definitions.--In this section:
                            (i) Appropriate committees of congress.--
                        The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
                        means the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
                        the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                        Senate and the Committee on International 
                        Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on 
                        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
                            (ii) Organization.--The term 
                        ``Organization'' means the Organization for the 
                        Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established 
                        under the Convention and includes any organ of 
                        that Organization and any board or working 
                        group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board, 
                        that may be established by it.
                            (iii) Organization affiliated with the 
                        organization.--The terms ``organization 
                        affiliated with the Organization'' and 
                        ``affiliated organizations'' include the 
                        Provisional Technical Secretariat under the 
                        Convention and any laboratory certified by the 
                        Director-General of the Technical Secretariat 
                        as designated to perform analytical or other 
                        functions.
            (6) Amendments to the convention.--
                    (A) Voting representation of the united states.--A 
                United States representative will be present at all 
                Amendment Conferences and will cast a vote, either 
                affirmative or negative, on all proposed amendments 
made at such conferences.
                    (B) Submission of amendments as treaties.--The 
                President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and 
                consent to ratification under Article II, Section 2, 
                Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States any 
                amendment to the Convention adopted by an Amendment 
                Conference.
            (7) Continuing vitality of the australia group and national 
        export controls.--
                    (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that the 
                collapse of the informal forum of states known as the 
                ``Australia Group,'' either through changes in 
                membership or lack of compliance with common export 
                controls, or the substantial weakening of common 
                Australia Group export controls and non-proliferation 
                measures in force on the date of United States 
                ratification of the Convention, would constitute a 
                fundamental change in circumstances to United States 
                ratification of the Convention.
                    (B) Certification requirement.--Prior to the 
                deposit of the United States instrument of 
                ratification, the President shall certify to Congress 
                that--
                            (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the 
                        United States to accept any modification, 
                        change in scope, or weakening of its national 
                        export controls;
                            (ii) the United States understands that the 
                        maintenance of national restrictions on trade 
                        in chemicals and chemical production technology 
                        is fully compatible with the provisions of the 
                        Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely 
                        within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United 
                        States;
                            (iii) the Convention preserves the right of 
                        State Parties, unilaterally or collectively, to 
                        maintain or impose export controls on chemicals 
                        and related chemical production technology for 
                        foreign policy or national security reasons, 
                        notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
                            (iv) each Australia Group member, at the 
                        highest diplomatic levels, has officially 
                        communicated to the United States Government 
                        its understanding and agreement that export 
                        control and nonproliferation measures which the 
                        Australia Group has undertaken are fully 
                        compatible with the provisions of the 
                        Convention, including Article XI(2), and its 
                        commitment to maintain in the future such 
                        export controls and nonproliferation measures 
                        against non-Australia Group members.
                    (C) Annual certification.--
                            (i) Effectiveness of australia group.--The 
                        President shall certify to Congress on an 
                        annual basis that--
                                    (I) Australia Group members 
                                continue to maintain an equally 
                                effective or more comprehensive control 
                                over the export of toxic chemicals and 
                                their precursors, dual-use processing 
                                equipment, human, animal and plant 
                                pathogens and toxins with potential 
                                biological weapons application, and 
                                dual-use biological equipment, as that 
                                afforded by the Australia Group as of 
                                the date of ratification of the 
                                Convention by the United States; and
                                    (II) the Australia Group remains a 
                                viable mechanism for limiting 
the spread of chemical and biological weapons-related materials and 
technology, and that the effectiveness of the Australia Group has not 
been undermined by changes in membership, lack of compliance with 
common export controls and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening 
of common controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of the 
date of ratification of the Convention by the United States.
                            (ii) Consultation with senate required.--In 
                        the event that the President is, at any time, 
                        unable to make the certifications described in 
                        clause (i), the President shall consult with 
                        the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a 
                        resolution of continued adherence to the 
                        Convention, notwithstanding the fundamental 
                        change in circumstance.
                    (D) Periodic consultation with congressional 
                committees.--The President shall consult periodically, 
                but not less frequently than twice a year, with the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
                Committee on International Relations of the House of 
                Representatives, on Australia Group export control and 
                nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group 
                member adopts a position at variance with the 
                certifications and understandings provided under 
                subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia 
                Group acquiescence or approval for an interpretation 
                that various provisions of the Convention require it to 
                remove chemical-weapons related export controls against 
                any State Party to the Convention, the President shall 
                block any effort by that Australia Group member to 
                secure Australia Group approval of such a position or 
                interpretation.
                    (E) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
                            (i) Australia group.--The term ``Australia 
                        Group'' means the informal forum of states, 
                        chaired by Australia, whose goal is to 
                        discourage and impede chemical and biological 
                        weapons proliferation by harmonizing national 
                        export controls chemical weapons precursor 
                        chemicals, biological weapons pathogens, and 
                        dual-use production equipment, and through 
                        other measures.
                            (ii) Highest diplomatic levels.--The term 
                        ``highest diplomatic levels'' means at the 
                        levels of senior officials with the power to 
                        authoritatively represent their governments, 
                        and does not include diplomatic representatives 
                        of those governments to the United States.
            (8) Negative security assurances.--
                    (A) Reevaluation.--In forswearing under the 
                Convention the possession of a chemical weapons 
                retaliatory capability, the Senate understands that 
                deterrence of attack by chemical weapons requires a 
                reevaluation of the negative security assurances 
                extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
                    (B) Classified report.--Accordingly, 180 days after 
                the deposit of the United States instrument of 
                ratification, the President shall submit to the 
                Congress a classified report setting forth the findings 
                of a detailed review of United States policy on 
                negative security assurances, including a determination 
                of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or 
                biological weapons against the Armed Forces of the 
                United States, United States citizens, allies, and 
                third parties.
            (9) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to the 
        deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and on 
        January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall certify 
        to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the 
        House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial 
        activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and 
        pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being 
        significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on 
        access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed 
        in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
            (10) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
                    (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
                            (i) the Convention is in the interests of 
                        the United States only if all State Parties are 
                        in strict compliance with the terms of the 
                        Convention as submitted to the Senate for its 
                        advice and consent to ratification, such 
                        compliance being measured by performance and 
not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to comply; and
                            (ii) the Senate expects all State Parties 
                        to be in strict compliance with their 
                        obligations under the terms of the Convention, 
                        as submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
                        consent to ratification;
                    (B) Briefings on compliance.--Given its concern 
                about the intelligence community's low level of 
                confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with 
                the Convention, the Senate expects the executive branch 
                of the Government to offer regular briefings, not less 
                than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
                International Relations of the House of Representatives 
                on compliance issues related to the Convention. Such 
                briefings shall include a description of all United 
                States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
                channels and forums to resolve compliance issues and 
                shall include a complete description of--
                            (i) any compliance issues the United States 
                        plans to raise at meetings of the Organization, 
                        in advance of such meetings;
                            (ii) any compliance issues raised at 
                        meetings of the Organization, within 30 days of 
                        such meeting;
                            (iii) any determination by the President 
                        that a State Party is in noncompliance with or 
                        is otherwise acting in a manner inconsistent 
                        with the object or purpose of the Convention, 
                        within 30 days of such a determination.
                    (C) Annual reports on compliance.--The President 
                shall submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee 
                on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
                International Relations of the House of Representatives 
                a full and complete classified and unclassified report 
                setting forth--
                            (i) a certification of those countries 
                        included in the Intelligence Community's 
                        Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the 
                        Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control 
                        Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or 
                        any successor document setting forth 
                        intelligence priorities in the field of the 
                        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) 
                        that are determined to be in compliance with 
                        the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
                            (ii) for those countries not certified 
                        pursuant to clause (i), an identification and 
                        assessment of all compliance issues arising 
                        with regard to the adherence of the country to 
                        its obligation under the Convention;
                            (iii) the steps the United States has 
                        taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction 
                        with another State Party--
                                    (I) to initiate challenge 
                                inspections of the noncompliant party 
                                with the objective of demonstrating to 
                                the international community the act of 
                                noncompliance;
                                    (II) to call attention publicly to 
                                the activity in question; and
                                    (III) to seek on an urgent basis a 
                                meeting at the highest diplomatic level 
                                with the noncompliant party with the 
                                objective of bringing the noncompliant 
                                party into compliance;
                            (iv) a determination of the military 
                        significance and broader security risks arising 
                        from any compliance issue identified pursuant 
                        to clause (ii); and
                            (v) a detailed assessment of the responses 
                        of the noncompliant party in question to action 
                        undertaken by the United States described in 
                        clause (iii).
                    (D) Countries previously included in compliance 
                reports.--For any country that was previously included 
                in a report submitted under subparagraph (C), but which 
                subsequently is not included in the Intelligence 
                Community's Monitoring Strategy (or successor 
                document), such country shall continue to be included 
                in the report submitted under subparagraph (C) unless 
                the country has been certified under subparagraph 
                (C)(i) for each of the previous two years.
                    (E) Form of certifications.--For those countries 
                that have been publicly and officially identified by a 
                representative of the intelligence community as 
                possessing or seeking to develop chemical weapons, the 
                certification described in subparagraph (C)(i) shall be 
                in unclassified form.
                    (F) Annual reports on intelligence.--On January 1, 
                1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign 
                Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on 
                International Relations, National Security, and 
                Permanent Select Committee of the House of 
                Representatives, a full and complete classified and 
                unclassified report regarding--
                            (i) the status of chemical weapons 
                        development, production, stockpiling, and use, 
                        within the meanings of those terms under the 
                        Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
                            (ii) any information made available to the 
                        United States Government concerning the 
                        development, production, acquisition, 
                        stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or 
                        indirect transfer of novel agents, including 
                        any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised 
                        of chemical components not identified on the 
                        schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a 
                        country-by-country basis;
                            (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals 
                        potentially relevant to chemical weapons 
                        programs, including all Australia Group 
                        chemicals and chemicals identified on the 
                        schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a 
                        country-by-country basis;
                            (iv) the monitoring responsibilities, 
                        practices, and strategies of the intelligence 
                        community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
                        National Security Act of 1947) and a 
                        determination of the level of confidence of the 
                        intelligence community with respect to each 
                        specific monitoring task undertaken, including 
                        an assessment by the intelligence community of 
                        the national aggregate data provided by State 
                        Parties to the Organization, on a country-by-
                        country basis;
                            (v) an identification of how United States 
                        national intelligence means, including national 
                        technical means and human intelligence, is 
                        being marshaled together with the Convention's 
                        verification provisions to monitor compliance 
                        with the Convention; and
                            (vi) the identification of chemical weapons 
                        development, production, stockpiling, or use, 
                        within the meanings of those terms under the 
                        Convention, by subnational groups, including 
                        terrorist and paramilitary organizations.
                    (G) Reports on resources for monitoring.--Each 
                report required under subparagraph (F) shall include a 
                full and complete classified annex submitted solely to 
                the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
                to the Permanent Select Committee of the House of 
                Representatives regarding--
                            (i) a detailed and specific identification 
                        of all United States resources devoted to 
                        monitoring the Convention, including 
                        information on all expenditures associated with 
                        the monitoring of the Convention; and
                            (ii) an identification of the priorities of 
                        the executive branch of Government for the 
                        development of new resources relating to 
                        detection and monitoring capabilities with 
                        respect to chemical and biological weapons, 
                        including a description of the steps being 
                        taken and resources being devoted to 
                        strengthening United States monitoring 
                        capabilities.
            (11) Enhancements to robust chemical and biological 
        defenses.--
                    (A) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the 
                Senate that--
                            (i) chemical and biological threats to 
                        deployed United States Armed Forces will 
                        continue to grow in regions of concern around 
                        the world, and pose serious threats to United 
                        States power projection and forward deployment 
                        strategies;
                            (ii) chemical weapons or biological weapons 
                        use is a potential element of future conflicts 
                        in regions of concern;
                            (iii) it is essential for the United States 
                        and key regional allies to preserve and further 
                        develop robust chemical and biological 
                        defenses;
                            (iv) the United States Armed Forces are 
                        inadequately equipped, organized, trained and 
                        exercised for chemical and biological defense 
                        against current and expected threats, and that 
                        too much reliance is placed on non-active duty 
                        forces, which receive less training and less 
modern equipment, for critical chemical and biological defense 
capabilities;
                            (v) the lack of readiness stems from a de-
                        emphasis of chemical and biological defenses 
                        within the executive branch of Government and 
                        the United States Armed Forces;
                            (vi) the armed forces of key regional 
                        allies and likely coalition partners, as well 
                        as civilians necessary to support United States 
                        military operations, are inadequately prepared 
                        and equipped to carry out essential missions in 
                        chemically and biologically contaminated 
                        environments;
                            (vii) congressional direction contained in 
                        the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                        Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201) 
                        should lead to enhanced domestic preparedness 
                        to protect against chemical and biological 
                        weapons threats; and
                            (viii) the United States Armed Forces 
                        should place increased emphasis on potential 
                        threats to forces deployed abroad and, in 
                        particular, make countering chemical and 
                        biological weapons use an organizing principle 
                        for United States defense strategy and 
                        development of force structure, doctrine, 
                        planning, training, and exercising policies of 
                        the United States Armed Forces.
                    (B) Actions to strengthen defense capabilities.--
                The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions 
                necessary to ensure that the United States Armed Forces 
                are capable of carrying out required military missions 
                in United States regional contingency plans, despite 
                the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In 
                particular, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that 
                the United States Armed Forces are effectively 
                equipped, organized, trained, and exercised (including 
                at the large unit and theater level) to conduct 
                operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated 
                environment that are critical to the success of the 
                United States military plans in regional conflicts, 
                including--
                            (i) deployment, logistics, and 
                        reinforcement operations at key ports and 
                        airfields;
                            (ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie 
                        generation at critical regional airbases; and
                            (iii) ground force maneuvers of large units 
                        and divisions.
                    (C) Discussions with regional allies and likely 
                coalition partners.--
                            (i) In general.--The Secretaries of Defense 
                        and State shall, as a priority matter, initiate 
                        discussions with key regional allies and likely 
                        regional coalition partners, including those 
                        countries where the United States currently 
                        deploys forces, where United States forces 
                        would likely operate during regional conflicts, 
                        or which would provide civilians necessary to 
                        support United States military operations, to 
                        determine what steps are necessary to ensure 
                        that allied and coalition forces and other 
                        critical civilians are adequately equipped and 
                        prepared to operate in chemically and 
                        biologically contaminated environments.
                            (ii) Reporting requirement.--Not later than 
                        one year after deposit of the United States 
                        instrument of ratification, the Secretaries of 
                        Defense and State shall submit a report to the 
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and to 
the Speaker of the House on the result of these discussions, plans for 
future discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of 
foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased military 
assistance, including through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign 
Military Financing, and the International Military Education and 
Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
                    (D) United states army chemical school.--The 
                Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary 
                to ensure that the United States Army Chemical School 
                remains under the oversight of a general officer of the 
                United States Army.
                    (E) Sense of the senate.--Given its concerns about 
                the present state of chemical and biological defense 
                readiness and training, it is the sense of the Senate 
                that--
                            (i) in the transfer, consolidation, and 
                        reorganization of the United States Army 
                        Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or 
                        diminish the training and readiness of the 
                        United States Armed Forces to fight in a 
                        chemical-biological warfare environment;
                            (ii) the Army should continue to operate 
                        the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort 
                        McClellan until such time as the replacement 
                        training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is 
                        functional.
                    (F) Annual reports on chemical and biological 
                weapons defense activities.--On January 1, 1998, and 
                annually thereafter, the President shall submit a 
                report to the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Armed Services of the Senate and 
                the Committee on International Relations, National 
                Security, and Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives, and Speaker of the House on previous, 
                current, and planned chemical and biological weapons 
                defense activities. The report shall contain for the 
                previous fiscal year and for the next three fiscal 
                years--
                            (i) proposed solutions to each of the 
                        deficiencies in chemical and biological warfare 
                        defenses identified in the March 1996 report of 
                        the General Accounting Office entitled 
                        ``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis 
                        Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing 
                        Problems'', and steps being taken pursuant to 
                        subparagraph (B) to ensure that the United 
                        States Armed Forces are capable of conducting 
                        required military operations to ensure the 
                        success of United States regional contingency 
                        plans despite the threat or use of chemical or 
                        biological weapons;
                            (ii) identification of the priorities of 
                        the executive branch of Government in the 
                        development of both active and passive chemical 
                        and biological defenses;
                            (iii) a detailed summary of all budget 
                        activities associated with the research, 
                        development, testing, and evaluation of 
                        chemical and biological defense programs;
                            (iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on 
                        research, development, testing, and evaluation, 
                        and procurement of chemical and biological 
                        defenses by fiscal years defense programs, 
                        department, and agency;
                            (v) a detailed assessment of current and 
                        projected vaccine production capabilities and 
                        vaccine stocks, including progress in 
                        researching and developing a multivalent 
                        vaccine;
                            (vi) a detailed assessment of procedures 
                        and capabilities necessary to protect and 
                        decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce 
                        United States power-projection forces, 
                        including progress in developing a nonaqueous 
                        chemical decontamination capability;
                            (vii) a description of progress made in 
                        procuring light-weight personal protective gear 
                        and steps being taken to ensure that programmed 
                        procurement quantities are sufficient to 
                        replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and 
                        chemical protective overgarments to maintain 
                        required wartime inventory levels;
                            (viii) a description of progress made in 
                        developing long-range standoff detection and 
                        identification capabilities and other 
                        battlefield surveillance capabilities for 
                        biological and chemical weapons, including 
                        progress on developing a multi-chemical agent 
                        detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
                        unmanned ground sensors;
                            (ix) a description of progress made in 
                        developing and deploying layered theater 
                        missile defenses for deployed United States 
                        Armed Forces which will provide greater 
                        geographic coverage against current and 
                        expected ballistic missile threats and will 
                        assist in mitigating chemical and biological 
                        contamination through higher altitude 
                        intercepts and boost-phase intercepts;
                            (x) an assessment of--
                                    (I) the training and readiness of 
                                the United States Armed Forces to 
                                operate in a chemically or biologically 
                                contaminated environment; and
                                    (II) actions taken to sustain 
                                training and readiness, including 
                                training and readiness carried out at 
                                national combat training centers;
                            (xi) a description of progress made in 
                        incorporating chemical and biological 
                        considerations into service and joint exercises 
                        as well as simulations, models, and war games 
                        and the conclusions drawn from these efforts 
                        about the United States capability to carry out 
                        required missions, including missions with 
                        coalition partners, in military contingencies;
                            (xii) a description of progress made in 
                        developing and implementing service and joint 
                        doctrine for combat and non-combat operations 
                        involving adversaries armed with chemical or 
                        biological weapons, including efforts to update 
                        the range of service and joint doctrine to 
                        better address the wide range of military 
                        activities, including deployment, 
                        reinforcement, and logistics operations in 
                        support of combat operations, and for the 
                        conduct of such operations in concert with 
                        coalition forces; and
                            (xiii) a description of progress made in 
                        resolving issues relating to the protection of 
                        United States population centers from chemical 
                        and biological attack, including plans for 
                        inoculation of populations, consequence 
                        management, and a description of progress made 
                        in developing and deploying effective cruise 
                        missile defenses and a national ballistic 
                        missile defense.
            (12) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in 
        the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other 
        action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of 
        the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
            (13) Noncompliance.--
                    (A) In general.--If the President determines that 
                persuasive information exists that a State Party to the 
                Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production 
                or production mobilization capability, is developing 
                new chemical agents, or is in violation of the 
                Convention in any other manner so as to threaten the 
                national security interests of the United States, then 
                the President shall--
                            (i) consult with the Senate, and promptly 
                        submit to it, a report detailing the effect of 
                        such actions;
                            (ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge 
                        inspection of the facilities of the relevant 
                        party in accordance with the provisions of the 
                        Convention with the objective of demonstrating 
to the international community the act of noncompliance;
                            (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent 
                        basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level 
                        with the relevant party with the objective of 
                        bringing the noncompliant party into 
                        compliance;
                            (iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions 
                        against the relevant party as required by law;
                            (v) if noncompliance has been determined, 
                        seek on an urgent basis within the Security 
                        Council of the United Nations a multilateral 
                        imposition of sanctions against the 
                        noncompliant party for the purposes of bringing 
                        the noncompliant party into compliance; and
                            (vi) in the event that the noncompliance 
                        continues for a period of longer than one year 
                        after the date of the determination made 
                        pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly consult 
                        with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a 
                        resolution of support of continued adherence to 
                        the Convention, notwithstanding the changed 
                        circumstances affecting the object and purpose 
                        of the Convention.
                    (B) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be 
                construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority 
                of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
                intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
                disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the 
                National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
                    (C) Presidential determinations.--If the President 
                determines that an action otherwise required under 
                subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the 
                authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to 
                protect intelligence sources and methods from 
                unauthorized disclosure, the President shall report 
                that determination, together with a detailed written 
                explanation of the basis for that determination, to the 
                chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
                and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence not later than 15 days after making such 
                determination.
            (14) Financing russian implementation.--The United States 
        understands that, in order to be assured of the Russian 
        commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles, 
        Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
        implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement 
        and the Convention. The United States shall not accept any 
        effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's instrument of 
        ratification contingent upon the United States providing 
        financial guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments 
        by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the 
        Convention.
            (15) Assistance under article x.--
                    (A) In general.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
                States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
                certify to the Congress that the United States shall 
                not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article 
                X.
                    (B) Countries ineligible for certain assistance 
                under the foreign assistance act.--Prior to the deposit 
                of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
                President shall certify to the Congress that for any 
                State Party the government of which is not eligible for 
                assistance under chapter 2 of part II (relating to 
                military assistance) or chapter 4 of part II (relating 
                to economic support assistance) of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961--
                            (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of 
                        Article X will be provided to the State Party; 
                        and
                            (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of 
                        Article X other than medical antidotes and 
                        treatment will be provided to the State Party.
            (16) Protection of confidential information.--
                    (A) Unauthorized disclosure of united states 
                business information.--Whenever the President 
                determines that persuasive information is available 
                indicating that--
                            (i) an officer or employee of the 
                        Organization has willfully published, divulged, 
                        disclosed, or made known in any manner or to 
                        any extent not authorized by the Convention any 
                        United States confidential business information 
                        coming to him in the course of his employment 
                        or official duties or by reason of any 
                        examination or investigation of any return, 
                        report, or record made to or filed with the 
                        Organization, or any officer or employee 
                        thereof, and
                            (ii) such practice or disclosure has 
                        resulted in financial losses or damages to a 
                        United States person,
                the President shall, within 30 days after the receipt 
                of such information by the executive branch of 
                Government, notify the Congress in writing of such 
                determination.
                    (B) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.--
                            (i) Certification.--Not later than 270 days 
                        after notification of Congress under 
                        subparagraph (A), the President shall certify 
                        to Congress that the immunity from jurisdiction 
                        of such foreign person has been waived by the 
                        Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.
                            (ii) Withholding of portion of 
                        contributions.--If the President is unable to 
                        make the certification described under clause 
                        (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each 
                        annual United States contribution to the 
                        regular budget of the Organization that is 
                        assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 
                        VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in 
                        addition to any other amounts required to be 
                        withheld from disbursement by any other 
                        provision of law, until--
                                    (I) the President makes such 
                                certification, or
                                    (II) the President certifies to 
                                Congress that the situation has been 
                                resolved in a manner satisfactory to 
                                the United States person who has 
                                suffered the damages due to the 
                                disclosure of United States 
                                confidential business information.
                    (C) Breaches of confidentiality.--
                            (i) Certification.--In the case of any 
                        breach of confidentiality involving both a 
                        State Party and the Organization, including any 
                        officer or employee thereof, the President 
                        shall, within 270 days after providing written 
                        notification to Congress pursuant to 
                        subparagraph (A), certify to Congress that the 
                        Commission described under paragraph 23 of the 
                        Confidentiality Annex has been established to 
                        consider the breach.
                            (ii) Withholding of portion of 
                        contributions.--If the President is unable to 
                        make the certification described under clause 
                        (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each 
                        annual United States contribution to the 
                        regular budget of the Organization that is 
                        assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 
                        VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in 
                        addition to any other amounts required to be 
                        withheld from disbursement by any other 
                        provision of law, until--
                                    (I) the President makes such 
                                certification, or
                                    (II) the President certifies to 
                                Congress that the situation has been 
                                resolved in a manner satisfactory to 
                                the United States person who has 
                                suffered the damages due to the 
                                disclosure of United States 
                                confidential business information.
                    (D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
                            (i) United States confidential business 
                        information.--The term ``United States 
                        confidential business information'' means any 
                        trade secrets or commercial or financial 
                        information that is privileged and 
                        confidential, as described in section 552(b)(4) 
                        of title 5, United States Code, and that is 
                        obtained--
                                    (I) from a United States person; 
                                and
                                    (II) through the United States 
                                National Authority or the conduct of an 
                                inspection on United States territory 
                                under the Convention.
                            (ii) United States person.--The term 
                        ``United States person'' means any natural 
                        person or any corporation, partnership, or 
                        other juridical entity organized under the laws 
                        of the United States.
                            (iii) United States.--The term ``United 
                        States'' means the several States, the District 
                        of Columbia, and the commonwealths, 
                        territories, and possessions of the United 
                        States.
            (17) Constitutional prerogatives.--
                    (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following 
                findings:
                            (i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
                        United States Constitution states that the 
                        President ``shall have Power, by and with the 
                        Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
                        Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators 
                        present concur''.
                            (ii) At the turn of the century, Senator 
                        Henry Cabot Lodge took the position that the 
                        giving of advice and consent to treaties 
                        constitutes a stage in negotiation on the 
                        treaties and that Senate amendments or 
                        reservations to a treaty are propositions 
                        ``offered at a later stage of the negotiation 
                        by the other part of the American treaty making 
                        power in the only manner in which they could 
                        then be offered''.
                            (iii) The executive branch of Government 
                        has begun a practice of negotiating and 
                        submitting to the Senate treaties which include 
                        provisions that have the purported effect of--
                                    (I) inhibiting the Senate from 
                                attaching reservations that the Senate 
                                considers necessary in the national 
                                interest; or
                                    (II) preventing the Senate from 
                                exercising its constitutional duty to 
                                give its advice and consent to treaty 
                                commitments before ratification of the 
                                treaties.
                            (iv) During the 85th Congress, and again 
                        during the 102d Congress, the Committee on 
                        Foreign Relations of the Senate made its 
                        position on this issue clear when stating that 
                        ``the President's agreement to such a 
                        prohibition cannot constrain the Senate's 
                        constitutional right and obligation to give its 
                        advice and consent to a treaty subject to any 
                        reservation it might determine is required by 
                        the national interest''.
                    (B) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the 
                Senate that--
                    (i) the advice and consent given by the Senate in 
                the past to ratification of treaties containing 
                provisions which prohibit amendments or reservations 
                should not be construed as a precedent for such 
                provisions in future treaties;
                    (ii) United States negotiators to a treaty should 
                not agree to any provision that has the effect of 
                inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations or 
                offering amendments to the treaty; and
                    (iii) the Senate should not consent in the future 
                to any article or other provision of any treaty that 
                would prohibit the Senate from giving its advice and 
                consent to ratification of the treaty subject to 
                amendment or reservation.
            (18) Laboratory sample analysis.--Prior to the deposit of 
        the United States instrument of ratification, the President 
        shall certify to the Senate that no sample collected in the 
        United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred 
        for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the 
        United States.
            (19) Effect on terrorism.--The Senate finds that--
                    (A) without regard to whether the Convention enters 
                into force, terrorists will likely view chemical 
                weapons as a means to gain greater publicity and 
                instill widespread fear; and
                    (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum 
                Shinrikyo would not have been prevented by the 
                Convention.
            (20) Constitutional separation of powers.--
                    (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following 
                findings:
                            (i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention 
                        allows a State Party to vote in the 
                        Organization if the State Party is in arrears 
                        in the payment of financial contributions and 
                        the Organization is satisfied that such 
                        nonpayment is due to conditions beyond the 
                        control of the State Party.
                            (ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United 
                        States Constitution vests in Congress the 
                        exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the 
                        United States.
                            (iii) Financial contributions to the 
                        Organization may be appropriated only by 
                        Congress.
                    (B) Sense of senate.--It is therefore the sense of 
                the Senate that--
                            (i) such contributions thus should be 
                        considered, for purposes of Article VIII(8) of 
                        the Convention, beyond the control of the 
                        executive branch of the United States 
                        Government; and
                            (ii) the United States vote in the 
                        Organization should not be denied in the event 
                        that Congress does not appropriate the full 
                        amount of funds assessed for the United States 
                        financial contribution to the Organization.
            (21) On-site inspection agency.--It is the sense of the 
        Senate that the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of 
        Defense should have the authority to provide assistance in 
        advance of any inspection to any facility in the United States 
        that is subject to a routine inspection under the Convention, 
        or to any facility in the United States that is the object of a 
        challenge inspection conducted pursuant to Article IX, if the 
        consent of the owner or operator of the facility has first been 
        obtained.
            (22) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
                    (A) Limitation on annual assessment.--
                Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, and 
                subject to the requirements of subparagraphs (B), (C), 
                and (D) the United States shall pay as a total annual 
assessment of the costs of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
Article VIII not more than $25,000,000.
                    (B) Recalculation of limitation.--On January 1, 
                2000, and at each 3-year interval thereafter, the 
                amount specified in subparagraph (A) is to be 
                recalculated by the Administrator of General Services, 
                in consultation with the Secretary of State, to reflect 
                changes in the consumer price index for the immediately 
                preceding 3-year period.
                    (C) Additional contributions requiring 
                congressional approval.--
                            (i) Authority.--Notwithstanding 
                        subparagraph (A), the President may furnish 
                        additional contributions which would otherwise 
                        be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--
                                    (I) the President determines and 
                                certifies in writing to the Speaker of 
                                the House of Representatives and the 
                                Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                                Senate that the failure to provide such 
                                contributions would result in the 
                                inability of the Organization to 
                                conduct challenge inspections pursuant 
                                to Article IX or would otherwise 
                                jeopardize the national security 
                                interests of the United States; and
                                    (II) Congress enacts a joint 
                                resolution approving the certification 
                                of the President.
                            (ii) Statement of reasons.--The President 
                        shall transmit with such certification a 
                        detailed statement setting forth the specific 
                        reasons therefor, and the specific uses to 
                        which the additional contributions provided to 
                        the Organization would be applied.
                    (D) Additional contributions for verification.--
                Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for a period of not 
                more than ten years, the President may furnish 
                additional contributions to the Organization for the 
                purposes of meeting the costs of verification under 
                Articles IV and V.
            (23) Additions to the annex on chemicals.--
                    (A) Presidential notification.--Not later than 10 
                days after the Director-General of the Technical 
                Secretariat communicates information to all States 
                Parties pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of a proposal for 
                the addition of a chemical or biological substance to a 
                schedule of the Annex on Chemicals, the President shall 
                notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
                of the proposed addition.
                    (B) Presidential report.--Not later than 60 days 
                after the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat 
                communicates information of such a proposal pursuant to 
                Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a 
                positive recommendation by the Executive Council 
                pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever is sooner, the 
                President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate a report, in classified and 
                unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the 
                proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such 
                report shall include--
                            (i) an assessment of the likely impact on 
                        United States industry of the proposed addition 
                        of the chemical or biological substance to a 
                        schedule of the Annex on Chemicals;
                            (ii) a description of the likely costs and 
                        benefits, if any, to United States national 
                        security of the proposed addition of such 
                        chemical or biological substance to a schedule 
                        of the Annex on Chemicals; and
                            (iii) a detailed assessment of the effect 
                        of the proposed addition on United States 
                        obligations under the Verification Annex.
                    (C) Presidential consultation.--The President 
                shall, after the submission of the notification 
                required under subparagraph (A) and prior to any action 
                on the proposal by the Executive Council under Article 
                XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to 
                whether the United States should object to the proposed 
                addition of a chemical or biological substance pursuant 
                to Article XV(5)(c).
            (24) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based 
        principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) 
        of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF 
        Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF 
Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the 
related memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the 
Senate on May 27, 1988.
            (25) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate 
        declares its intention to consider for approval international 
        agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
        limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
        militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power 
        as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
        Constitution.
            (26) Riot control agents.--
                    (A) Permitted uses.--Prior the the deposit of the 
                United States instrument of ratification, the President 
                shall certify to Congress that the United States is not 
                restricted by the Convention in its use of riot control 
                agents, including the use against combatants who are 
                parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases:
                            (i) United states not a party.--The conduct 
                        of peacetime military operations within an area 
                        of ongoing armed conflict when the United 
                        States is not a party to the conflict (such as 
                        recent use of the United States Armed Forces in 
                        Somalia, Bosnia, and Ruanda).
                            (ii) Consensual peacekeeping.--Consensual 
                        peacekeeping operations when the use of force 
                        is authorized by the receiving state, including 
                        operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the United 
                        Nations Charter.
                            (iii) Chapter vii peacekeeping.--
                        Peacekeeping operations when force is 
                        authorized by the Securtity Council under 
                        Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
                    (B) Implementation.--The President shall take no 
                measure, and prescribe no rule or regulation, which 
                would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 
                8, 1975.
                    (C) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``riot 
                control agent'' has the meaning given the term in 
                Article II(7) of the Convention.
            (27) Chemical weapons destruction.--Prior to the deposit of 
        the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, 
        the President shall certify to the Congress that all of the 
        following conditions are satisfied:
                            (A) Exploration of alternative 
                        technologies.--The President has agreed to 
                        explore alternative technologies for the 
                        destruction of the United States stockpile of 
                        chemical weapons in order to ensure that the 
                        United States has the safest, most effective 
                        and environmentally sound plans and programs 
                        for meeting its obligations under the 
                        Convention for the destruction of chemical 
                        weapons.
                            (B) Convention extends destruction 
                        deadline.--The requirement in section 1412 of 
                        Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for 
                        completion of the destruction of the United 
                        States stockpile of chemical weapons by 
                        December 31, 2004, will be superseded upon the 
                        date the Convention enters into force with 
                        respect to the United States by the deadline 
                        required by the Convention of April 29, 2007.
                            (C) Authority to employ a different 
                        destruction technology.--The requirement in 
                        Article III(1)(a)(v) of the Convention for a 
                        declaration by each State Party not later than 
                        30 days after the date the Convention enters 
                        into force with respect to that Party, on 
                        general plans of the State Party for 
                        destruction of its chemical weapons does not 
                        preclude in any way the United States from 
                        deciding in the future to employ a technology 
                        for the destruction of chemical weapons 
                        different than that declared under that 
                        Article.
                    (D) Procedures for extension of deadline.--The 
                President will consult with Congress on whether to 
                submit a request to the Executive Council of the 
                Organization for an extension of the deadline for the 
                destruction of chemical weapons under the Convention, 
                as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on 
                Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, 
                as a result of the program of alternative technologies 
                for the destruction of chemical munitions carried out 
                under section 8065 of the Department of Defense 
                Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 
                104-208), the President determines that alternatives to 
                the incineration of chemical weapons are available that 
                are safer and more environmentally sound but whose use 
                would preclude the United States from meeting the 
                deadlines of the Convention.
            (28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search 
        and seizure.--
                    (A) In general.--In order to protect United States 
                citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
                prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
                ratification, the President shall certify to Congress 
                that--
                            (i) for any challenge inspection conducted 
                        on the territory of the United States pursuant 
                        to Article IX, where consent has been withheld, 
                        the United States National Authority will first 
                        obtain a criminal search warrant based upon 
                        probable cause, supported by oath or 
                        affirmation, and describing with particularity 
                        the place to be searched and the persons or 
                        things to be seized; and
                            (ii) for any routine inspection of a 
                        declared facility under the Convention that is 
                        conducted on an involuntary basis on the 
                        territory of the United States, the United 
                        States National Authority first will obtain an 
                        administrative search warrant from a United 
                        States magistrate judge.
                    (B) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, 
                the term ``National Authority'' means the agency or 
                office of the United States Government designated by 
                the United States pursuant to Article VII(4) of the 
                Convention.
            (29) Russian elimination of chemical weapons.--Prior to the 
        deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
        President shall certify to the Congress that--
                    (A) Russia is making reasonable progress in the 
                implementation of the Agreement between the United 
                States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
                Republics on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical 
                Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral 
                Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, signed on June 
                1, 1990 (in this resolution referred to as the ``1990 
                Bilateral Destruction Agreement'');
                    (B) the United States and Russia have resolved, to 
                the satisfaction of the United States, outstanding 
                compliance issues under the Memorandum of Understanding 
                Between the Government of the United States of America 
                and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a 
                Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange 
                Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at 
                Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989, also 
                known as the ``1989 Wyoming Memorandum of 
                Understanding'', and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction 
                Agreement;
                    (C) Russia has deposited the Russian instrument of 
                ratification for the Convention and is in compliance 
                with its obligations under the Convention; and
                    (D) Russia is committed to forgoing any chemical 
                weapons capability, chemical weapons modernization 
                program, production mobilization capability, or any 
                other activity contrary to the object and purpose of 
                the Convention.
            (30) Chemical weapons in other states.--
                    (A) Certification requirement.--Prior to the 
                deposit of the United States instrument of ratification 
                the President, in consultation with the Director of 
                Central Intelligence, shall certify to the Congress 
                that countries which have been determined to have 
                offensive chemical weapons programs, including Iran, 
                Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of 
                Korea, China, and all other countries determined to be 
                state sponsors of international terrorism, have 
                ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention.
            (31) Exercise of right to bar certain inspectors.--
                            (i) In general.--The President shall 
                        exercise United States rights under paragraphs 
                        2 and 4 of Part II of the Verification Annex to 
                        indicate United States non-acceptance of all 
                        inspectors and inspection assistants who are 
                        nationals of countries designated by the 
                        Secretary of State as supporters of 
                        international terrorism under section 40(d) of 
                        the Arms Export Control Act, or nationals of 
                        countries that have been determined by the 
                        President, in the last five years, to have 
                        violated United States nonproliferation law, 
                        including--
                                    (I) chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the 
                                Arms Export Control Act;
                                    (II) sections 821 and 824 of the 
                                Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
                                1994;
                                    (III) sections 11b and 11c of the 
                                Export Administration Act of 1979;
                                    (IV) the Export-Import Bank Act of 
                                1945; and
                                    (V) sections 1604 and 1605 of the 
                                Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992.
                            (ii) Other grounds of exclusion.--The 
                        President shall also bar such nationals from 
                        entering United States territory for the 
                        purpose of conducting any activity associated 
                        with the Convention, notwithstanding paragraph 
                        7 of Part II of the Verification Annex.
            (32) Stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons.--Prior 
        to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, 
        the President shall certify to Congress that--
                    (A) the State Parties have concluded an agreement 
                amending the Convention--
                            (i) by striking Article X; and
                            (ii) by amending Article XI to strike any 
                        provision that states or implies disapproval of 
                        trade restrictions in the field of chemical 
                        activities, including paragraphs 2(b), 2(c), 
                        2(d), and 2(e); and
                    (B) no provision has been added to the Convention 
                or to any of its annexes, and no statement, written or 
                oral, has been issued by the Organization, stating or 
                implying the right or obligation of States Parties to 
                share or facilitate the exchange among themselves of 
                chemical weapons defense technology, chemicals, 
                equipment, or scientific and technical information.
            (33) Effective verification.--
                    (A) Certification.--Prior to the deposit of the 
                United States instrument of ratification, the President 
                shall certify to Congress that compliance with the 
                Convention is effectively verifiable.
                    (B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
                            (i) Effectively verifiable.--The term 
                        ``effectively verifiable'' means that 
the Director of Central Intelligence has certified to the President 
that the United States intelligence community (as defined in section 
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) has a high degree of 
confidence in its ability to detect militarily significant violations 
of the Convention, including the production, possession, or storage of 
militarily significant quantities of lethal chemicals, in a timely 
fashion, and to detect patterns of marginal violation over time.
                            (ii) Militarily significant.--The term 
                        ``militarily significant'' means one metric ton 
                        or more of chemical weapons agent.
                            (iii) Timely fashion.--The term ``timely 
                        fashion'' means detection within one year of 
                        the violation having occurred.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this resolution:
            (1) Chemical weapons convention or convention.--The terms 
        ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the 
        Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
        Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
        Destruction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the United 
        States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following 
        protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents 
        being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the 
        ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or the ``Convention'' 
        (contained in Treaty Document 103-21):
                    (A) The Annex on Chemicals.
                    (B) The Annex on Implementation and Verification.
                    (C) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
                Information.
                    (D) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory 
                Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of 
                Chemical Weapons.
                    (E) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
                Commission.
            (2) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the 
        Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
        established under the Convention.
            (3) State party.--The term ``State Party'' means any nation 
        that is a party to the Convention.
            (4) United states instrument of ratification.--The term 
        ``United States instrument of ratification'' means the 
        instrument of ratification of the United States of the 
        Convention.
                                 <all>