[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 17 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 17

        On the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 21, 1997

Mr. Lugar submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
        On the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Resolved, That (a) the Senate hereby expresses its intention to 
give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention at the appropriate time after the Senate has proceeded to 
the consideration of the Convention, subject to the conditions of 
subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):
    (b) Conditions.--It is the sense of the Senate that the advice and 
consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Convention should be 
subject to the following conditions, which would be binding upon the 
President:
            (1) Amendment conferences.--The United States will be 
        present and participate fully in all Amendment Conferences and 
        will cast its vote, either affirmatively or negatively, on all 
        proposed amendments made at such conferences, to ensure that--
                    (A) the United States has an opportunity to 
                consider any and all amendments in accordance with its 
                Constitutional processes; and
                    (B) no amendment to the Convention enters into 
                force without the approval of the United States.
            (2) Presidential certification on data declarations.--(A) 
        Not later than 10 days after the Convention enters into force, 
        or not later than 10 days after the deposit of the Russian 
        instrument of ratification of the Convention, whichever is 
        later, the President shall either--
                    (i) certify to the Senate that Russia has complied 
                satisfactorily with the data declaration requirements 
                of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding; or
                    (ii) submit to the Senate a report on apparent 
                discrepancies in Russia's data under the Wyoming 
                Memorandum of Understanding and the results of any 
                bilateral discussions regarding those discrepancies.
            (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``Wyoming 
        Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum of 
        Understanding Between the Government of the United States of 
        America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
        Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and 
        Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, 
        signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
            (3) Presidential certification on the bilateral destruction 
        agreement.--Before the deposit of the United States instrument 
        of ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify 
        in writing to the Senate that--
                    (A) a United States-Russian agreement on 
                implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement 
                has been or will shortly be concluded, and that the 
                verification procedures under that agreement will meet 
                or exceed those mandated by the Convention, or
                    (B) the Technical Secretariat of the Organization 
                for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will be 
                prepared, when the Convention enters into force, to 
                submit a plan for meeting the Organization's full 
                monitoring responsibilities that will include United 
                States and Russian facilities as well as those of other 
                parties to the Convention.
            (4) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a 
        party to the Convention is in violation of the Convention and 
        that the actions of such party threaten the national security 
        interests of the United States, the President shall--
                    (A) consult with, and promptly submit a report to, 
                the Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the 
                Convention;
                    (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the 
                highest diplomatic level with the Organization for the 
                Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (in this resolution 
                referred to as the ``Organization'') and the 
                noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the 
                noncompliant party into compliance;
                    (C) in the event that a party to the Convention is 
                determined not to be in compliance with the Convention, 
                request consultations with the Organization on whether 
                to--
                            (i) restrict or suspend the noncompliant 
                        party's rights and privileges under 
the Convention until the party complies with its obligations;
                            (ii) recommend collective measures in 
                        conformity with international law; or
                            (iii) bring the issue to the attention of 
                        the United Nations General Assembly and 
                        Security Council; and
                    (D) in the event that noncompliance continues, 
                determine whether or not continued adherence to the 
                Convention is in the national security interests of the 
                United States and so inform the Senate.
            (5) Financing implementation.--The United States 
        understands that in order to ensure the commitment of Russia to 
        destroy its chemical stockpiles, in the event that Russia 
        ratifies the Convention, Russia must maintain a substantial 
        stake in financing the implementation of the Convention. The 
        costs of implementing the Convention should be borne by all 
        parties to the Convention. The deposit of the United States 
        instrument of ratification of the Convention shall not be 
        contingent upon the United States providing financial 
        guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia 
        or any other party to the Convention.
            (6) Implementation arrangements.--If the Convention does 
        not enter into force or if the Convention comes into force with 
        the United States having ratified the Convention but with 
        Russia having taken no action to ratify or accede to the 
        Convention, then the President shall, if he plans to implement 
        reductions of United States chemical forces as a matter of 
        national policy or in a manner consistent with the Convention--
                    (A) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of 
                such reductions on the national security of the United 
                States; and
                    (B) take no action to reduce the United States 
                chemical stockpile at a pace faster than that currently 
                planned and consistent with the Convention until the 
                President submits to the Senate his determination that 
                such reductions are in the national security interests 
                of the United States.
            (7) Presidential certification and report on national 
        technical means.--Not later than 90 days after the deposit of 
        the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, 
        the President shall certify that the United States National 
        Technical Means and the provisions of the Convention on 
        verification of compliance, when viewed together, are 
        sufficient to ensure effective verification of compliance with 
        the provisions of the Convention. This certification shall be 
        accompanied by a report, which may be supplemented by a 
        classified annex, indicating how the United States National 
        Technical Means, including collection, processing and analytic 
        resources, will be marshalled, together with the Convention's 
        verification provisions, to ensure effective verification of 
        compliance. Such certification and report shall be submitted to 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
    (c) Declarations.--It is the sense of the Senate that the advice 
and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Convention should be 
subject to the following declarations, which would express the intent 
of the Senate:
            (1) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based 
        principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) 
        of the Resolution of Ratification with respect to the INF 
        Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988. For purposes of 
        this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty 
        Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related 
        memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the 
        Senate on May 27, 1988.
            (2) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
        declares its intention to consider for approval international 
        agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
        limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
        militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power 
        set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
        Constitution.
            (3) Retaliatory policy.--The Senate declares that the 
        United States should strongly reiterate its retaliatory policy 
        that the use of chemical weapons against United States military 
        forces or civilians would result in an overwhelming and 
        devastating response, which may include the whole range of 
        available weaponry.
            (4) Chemical defense program.--The Senate declares that 
        ratification of the Convention will not obviate the need for a 
        robust, adequately funded chemical defense program, together 
with improved national intelligence capabilities in the 
nonproliferation area, maintenance of an effective deterrent through 
capable conventional forces, trade-enabling export controls, and other 
capabilities. In giving its advice and consent to ratification of the 
Convention, the Senate does so with full appreciation that the entry 
into force of the Convention enhances the responsibility of the Senate 
to ensure that the United States continues an effective and adequately 
funded chemical defense program. The Senate further declares that the 
United States should continue to develop theater missile defense to 
intercept ballistic missiles that might carry chemical weapons and 
should enhance defenses of the United States Armed Forces against the 
use of chemical weapons in the field.
            (5) Enforcement policy.--The Senate urges the President to 
        pursue compliance questions under the Convention vigorously and 
        to seek international sanctions if a party to the Convention 
        does not comply with the Convention, including the ``obligation 
        to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance 
        with this Convention'', pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article IX. 
        It should not be necessary to prove the noncompliance of a 
        party to the Convention before the United States raises issues 
        bilaterally or in appropriate international fora and takes 
        appropriate actions.
            (6) Approval of inspectors.--The Senate expects that the 
        United States will exercise its right to reject a proposed 
        inspector or inspection assistant when the facts indicate that 
        this person is likely to seek information to which the 
        inspection team is not entitled or to mishandle information 
        that the team obtains.
            (7) Assistance to russia.--The Senate declares that, if the 
        United States provides limited financial assistance for the 
        destruction of Russian chemical weapons, the United States 
        should, in exchange for such assistance, require Russia to 
        destroy its chemical weapons stocks at a proportional rate to 
        the destruction of United States chemical weapons stocks, and 
        to take the action before the Convention deadline. In addition, 
        the Senate urges the President to request Russia to allow 
        inspections of former military facilities that have been 
        converted to commercial production, given the possibility that 
        these plants could one day be reconverted to military use, and 
        that any United States assistance for the destruction of the 
        Russian chemical stockpile be apportioned according to Russia's 
        openness to these broad based inspections.
            (8) Expanding chemical arsenals in countries not party to 
        the chemical weapons convention.--It is the sense of the Senate 
        that, if during the time the Convention remains in force the 
        President determines that there has been an expansion of the 
        chemical weapons arsenals of any country not a party to the 
        Convention so as to jeopardize the supreme national interests 
        of the United States, then the President should consult on an 
        urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to 
        the Convention remains in the national interest of the United 
        States.
            (9) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear pattern of Soviet 
        noncompliance with arms control agreements and continued cases 
        of noncompliance by Russia, the Senate declares the following:
                    (A) The Convention is in the interest of the United 
                States only if both the United States and Russia, among 
                others, are in strict compliance with the terms of the 
                Convention as submitted to the Senate for its advice 
                and consent to ratification, such compliance 
being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or 
commitments to comply.
                    (B)(i) Given its concern about compliance issues, 
                the Senate expects the President to offer regular 
                briefings, but not less than several times a year, to 
                the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
                and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
                on compliance issues related to the Convention. Such 
                briefings shall include a description of all United 
                States efforts in diplomatic channels and bilateral as 
                well as the multilateral Organization fora to resolve 
                the compliance issues and shall include, but would not 
                necessarily be limited to a description of--
                            (I) any compliance issues, other than those 
                        requiring challenge inspections, that the 
                        United States plans to raise with the 
                        Organization; and
                            (II) any compliance issues raised at the 
                        Organization, within 30 days.
                    (ii) Any Presidential determination that Russia is 
                in noncompliance with the Convention shall be 
                transmitted to the committees specified in clause (i) 
                within 30 days of such a determination, together with a 
                written report, including an unclassified summary, 
                explaining why it is in the national security interests 
                of the United States to continue as a party to the 
                Convention.
            (10) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--The 
        Senate declares that after the Senate gives its advice and 
        consent to ratification of the Convention, any agreement or 
        understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or 
        reinterprets United States and Russian obligations, or those of 
        any other country, under the Convention, including the time 
        frame for implementation of the Convention, should be submitted 
        to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
            (11) Riot control agents.--(A) The Senate, recognizing that 
        the Convention's prohibition on the use of riot control agents 
        as a ``method of warfare'' precludes the use of such agents 
        against combatants, including use for humanitarian purposes 
        where combatants and noncombatants intermingled, urges the 
        President--
                    (i) to give high priority to continuing efforts to 
                develop effective nonchemical, nonlethal alternatives 
                to riot control agents for use in situations where 
                combatants and noncombatants are intermingled; and
                    (ii) to ensure that the United States actively 
                participates with other parties to the Convention in 
                any reassessment of the appropriateness of the 
                prohibition as it might apply to such situations as the 
                rescue of drowned air crews and passengers and escaping 
                prisoners or in situations in which civilians are being 
                used to mask or screen attacks.
            (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``riot control 
        agents'' is used within the meaning of Article II(4) of the 
        Convention.
    (d) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term 
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and the term ``Convention'' refer to 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 
opened for signature and signed by the United States at Paris on 
January 13, 1993, including the following annexes and associated 
documents, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively 
referred to in this resolution as the ``Convention'' (contained in 
Treaty Document 103-21):
            (1) The Annex on Chemicals.
            (2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification (also 
        known as the ``Verification Annex'').
            (3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information 
        (also known as the ``Confidentiality Annex'').
            (4) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission 
        for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
            (5) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
        Commission.
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