[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 64 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 64

   To state the national missile defense policy of the United States.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 21, 1997

   Mr. Lugar introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To state the national missile defense policy of the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Defend the United States of America 
Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    (a) Missile Defenses and Arms Control Agreements.--With respect to 
missile defenses and arms control agreements, Congress makes the 
following findings:
            (1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threaten United 
        States Armed Forces engaged abroad. Therefore, the expeditious 
        deployment of theater missile defenses to intercept ballistic 
        missiles threatening the Armed Forces abroad is the highest 
        priority among all ballistic missile defense programs.
            (2) The United States is developing defensive systems to 
        protect the United States against the emerging threat of 
        limited strategic ballistic missile attacks. Ground-based 
        defensive systems are attainable, are permitted by the ABM 
        Treaty, are available sooner and are more affordable than 
        spaced-based interceptors or space-based lasers, and can 
        protect all of the United States from limited ballistic missile 
        attack.
            (3) Deterring limited ballistic missile attacks upon our 
        national territory requires not only national missile defenses 
        but arms control agreements and nonproliferation measures that 
        can lower the threat and curb the spread of ballistic missile 
        technology.
            (4) The massive retaliatory capability of the United States 
        deterred the Soviet Union, and any other nation, from launching 
        an attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles throughout the 
        Cold War. The Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the 
        Department of Defense affirms the fundamental effectiveness of 
        deterrence of large-scale nuclear attacks now and into the 
        future. While the threat of intentional attack upon the United 
        States has receded, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized 
        attack by Russia or China remains, albeit remotely.
            (5) United States arms control agreements (notably the 
        START I Treaty and the START II Treaty, once implemented) will 
        significantly reduce the threat to the United States from 
        large-scale nuclear attack. The START I Treaty, when fully 
        implemented, will reduce deployed strategic warheads by over 40 
        percent below 1990 levels. By the end of 1996, only Russia, 
        among the states of the former Soviet Union, will deploy 
        nuclear weapons. The START II Treaty, once implemented, will 
        reduce strategic warheads deployed in Russia by 66 percent 
        below their levels before the START I Treaty.
            (6) As strategic offensive weapons are reduced, the 
        efficacy and affordability of defensive systems increases, 
        strengthening the long-term prospects for deterrence based upon 
        effective defenses in addition to deterrence based upon the 
        threat of retaliation.
            (7) Countries hostile to the United States (such as Iraq, 
        Iran, North Korea, and Libya) have manifested an interest in 
        developing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable 
        of reaching the United States. In the absence of outside 
        assistance, newly emerging threats from these countries may 
        take as long as 15 years or more to mature, according to recent 
        intelligence estimates. These countries could accelerate the 
        development of long-range missiles if they receive external 
        support.
            (8) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Biological and 
        Chemical Weapons Conventions, and continuing United States 
        efforts to enforce export controls may prevent or delay 
        external assistance needed by those countries to develop 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
        destruction. Cooperation among our allies and the Russian 
        Federation to limit exports of the relevant hardware and 
        knowledge can help.
            (9) The ABM Treaty has added to strategic stability by 
        restraining the requirement on both sides for strategic 
        weapons. At the summit in May 1995, the President of the United 
        States and the President of Russia each reaffirmed his 
        country's commitment to the ABM Treaty.
            (10) Abrogating the ABM Treaty to deploy a noncompliant 
        national missile defense system will not add to strategic 
stability if it impedes implementation of the START I or START II 
Treaties. Without the reductions to strategic weapons required by both 
treaties, the consequences and risks of unauthorized or accidental 
launches will increase.
            (11) If the nuclear arsenal of the United States must be 
        maintained at START I levels, significant unbudgeted costs will 
        be incurred, encroaching on funds for ballistic missile 
        defenses and all other defense requirements.
            (12) Should the combination of arms control, 
        nonproliferation efforts, and deterrence fail, the United 
        States must be able to defend itself against limited ballistic 
        missile attack.
            (13) National missile defense systems consistent with the 
        ABM Treaty are capable of defending against limited ballistic 
        missile attack. Should a national missile defense system 
        require modification of the ABM Treaty, the treaty establishes 
        the means for the parties to amend the treaty, which the 
        parties have used in the past.
            (14) While a single-site national missile defense system 
        can defend all of the United States against limited ballistic 
        missile attacks, the addition of a second site would 
        substantially improve the effectiveness of a limited national 
        missile defense system.
            (15) Adding a second national missile defense site to the 
        initial national missile defense system at the former Safeguard 
        antiballistic missile defense site at Grand Forks, North 
        Dakota, results in only a slight degradation of two-site 
        effectiveness when compared to two optimally-sited national 
        missile defense deployment locations.
    (b) Weapons of Mass Destruction Other Than Missile-Delivered 
Nuclear Weapons.--With respect to threatened employment of weapons of 
mass destruction other than nuclear weapons delivered by long-range 
ballistic missiles against the United States, Congress makes the 
following findings:
            (1) In addition to the threat of nuclear weapons delivered 
        by long-range ballistic missiles, the United States faces other 
        threatened uses of weapons of mass destruction, including 
        chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and other 
        delivery means, including commercial or private aircraft, 
        cruise missiles, international shipping containers delivered by 
        land or sea, and domestic manufacture and delivery by private 
        entities.
            (2) Chemical weapons have already threatened United States 
        citizens. The terrorist bomb used against the World Trade 
        Center in New York City contained materials intended to 
        generate lethal chemicals in addition to the explosive effect, 
        but the materials failed to generate a toxic mixture.
            (3) The explosive device used against the Murrah Federal 
        Building in Oklahoma City was constructed of commonly available 
        materials in the United States and delivered by rental truck.
            (4) The Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan manufactured lethal 
        sarin gas and released it in Tokyo subways, causing numerous 
        fatalities and thousands of casualties.
            (5) Chechen rebels threatened to spread lethal radiation 
        throughout Moscow and revealed to the media the location of a 
        small radioactive source hidden in a Moscow park.
            (6) Federal, State, and local governments are all poorly 
        prepared to deal with threatened or actual use of chemical, 
        biological, or radiological weapons against United States 
        cities.
            (7) Therefore, it is necessary for priorities to be 
        established for dealing with the full spectrum of threatened 
        use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States 
based on assessments of the likelihood of the occurrence of each 
particular threat, and for funding to be allocated in accordance with 
those priorities.
    (c) Development of Complex Systems.--With respect to the 
development of complex systems, Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States developed and deployed an 
        antiballistic missile system known as Safeguard. The system was 
        deactivated only months after achieving initial operating 
        capability because of high cost and concern about limited 
        effectiveness.
            (2) Since 1983, the United States has expended more than 
        $35,000,000,000 on the development of missile defenses, and 
        most of that has been expended for the development of national 
        missile defenses.
            (3) There exists today no operational hardware that could 
        be deployed to provide a national missile defense capability 
        against strategic ballistic missiles. Therefore, there exist no 
        test data from which to assess the performance and cost of a 
        deployed national missile defense system.
            (4) Congress has traditionally insisted that major weapon 
        systems be rigorously tested prior to full-rate production so 
        that system performance is demonstrated and system cost 
        estimates are better refined.
            (5) Therefore, consistent with that tradition, it is 
        appropriate that any national missile defense system developed 
        for deployment be rigorously tested prior to a deployment 
        decision in order to demonstrate successful performance and 
        refine system costs.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    (a) Research and Development Program.--(1) The Secretary of Defense 
shall conduct a research and development program to develop an 
antiballistic missile system described in subsection (b) that could 
achieve initial operational capability by the end of 2003.
    (2) A decision whether to deploy the antiballistic missile system 
shall be made by Congress during 2000 in accordance with this section.
    (3) The Secretary shall ensure that the development and deployment 
of an antiballistic missile system under this section fully complies 
with the ABM Treaty and with all other treaty obligations.
    (b) System Design.--The antiballistic missile system developed 
under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be designed to protect the United States against 
        limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or 
        unauthorized launches or attacks by Third World countries;
            (2) be developed for deployment at a single site; and
            (3) include as the system components--
                    (A) fixed, ground-based, antiballistic missile 
                battle management radars at the site;
                    (B) up to 100 ground-based interceptor missiles;
                    (C) as necessary, space-based adjuncts, including 
                the Space Surveillance and Missile Tracking System, 
                that are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty; and
                    (D) as necessary, Large Phased Array Radars 
                (upgraded from other radars or newly constructed) that 
                are located on the periphery of the United States, face 
                outward, and are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
    (c) Deployment Decision Factors.--The factors to be considered by 
Congress for a decision to deploy the antiballistic missile system are 
as follows:
            (1) The projected threat of ballistic missile attack 
        against the United States in 2000 and following years.
            (2) The projected cost and effectiveness of the system, 
        determined on the basis of the technology available in 2000 and 
        the performance of the system as demonstrated in testing.
            (3) The projected cost and effectiveness of the system if, 
        at the time of the decision to deploy, development for 
        deployment were to be continued for--
                    (A) one additional year,
                    (B) two additional years, and
                    (C) three additional years,
        taking into consideration the projected availability of any 
        synergistic systems that are under development in 2000.
            (4) Arms control factors.
            (5) The preparedness of the United States to defend the 
        United States against the full range of threats of attack by 
        weapons of mass destruction, and the relative priorities for 
        funding of defenses against such threats.
    (d) Deployment Recommendation.--Not later than March 31, 2000, the 
President shall submit to Congress a report containing the President's 
recommendation regarding whether to deploy the antiballistic missile 
system developed under this section. In addition, the report shall 
include the following:
            (1) A description of the system that could be deployed.
            (2) A discussion of the basis for the President's 
        recommendation in terms of the factors set forth in subsection 
        (c).
    (e) Congressional Decision on Deployment.--(1) The report of the 
President under subsection (d) shall be referred to the Committee on 
Armed Services of the Senate upon receipt in the Senate and to the 
Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives upon 
receipt in that House.
    (2) A joint resolution described in paragraph (1) of subsection (f) 
that is introduced within the 30-day period beginning on the date on 
which Congress receives the President's report shall be considered 
under the expedited procedures set forth in that subsection.
    (f) Expedited Procedure.--(1) For the purposes of subsection 
(e)(2), ``joint resolution'' means only a joint resolution the matter 
after the resolving clause of which is as follows: ``Congress 
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to begin the deployment at the 
former Safeguard antiballistic missile site, Grand Forks, North Dakota, 
of an antiballistic missile system that--
            ``(1) is designed to protect the United States against 
        limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or 
        unauthorized launches or attacks by Third World countries;
            ``(2) is developed for deployment at a single site; and
            ``(3) includes as the system components--
                    ``(A) fixed, ground-based, antiballistic missile 
                battle management radars at the site;
                    ``(B) up to 100 ground-based interceptor missiles;
                    ``(C) as necessary, space-based adjuncts, including 
                the Space Surveillance and Missile Tracking System, 
                that are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty; and
                    ``(D) as necessary, Large Phased Array Radars 
                (upgraded from other radars or newly constructed) that 
                are located on the periphery of the United States, face 
                outward, and are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.''.
    (2) A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the House 
of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on National 
Security of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in 
paragraph (1) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. Such a resolution may not be 
reported before the eighth day after its introduction.
    (3) If the committee to which is referred a resolution described in 
paragraph (1) has not reported such resolution (or an identical 
resolution) at the end of 30 days after its introduction or at the end 
of the first day after there has been reported to the House involved a 
joint resolution described in paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, such 
committee shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration 
of such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on the 
appropriate calendar of the House involved.
    (4) When the committee to which a resolution is referred has 
reported, or has been deemed to be discharged (under paragraph (3)) 
from further consideration of, a resolution described in paragraph (1), 
it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to 
the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective 
House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, and 
all points of order against the resolution (and against consideration 
of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the 
House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not 
debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to 
postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other 
business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed 
to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
    (5) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that 
House described in paragraph (1), that House receives from the other 
House a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the following 
procedures shall apply:
            (A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred 
        to a committee.
            (B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1) 
        of the House receiving the resolution--
                    (i) the procedure in that House shall be the same 
                as if no resolution had been received from the other 
                House; but
                    (ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the 
                resolution of the other House.
    (6) This subsection is enacted by Congress--
            (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
        and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is 
        deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but 
        applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in 
        that House in the case of a resolution described in paragraph 
        (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it 
        is inconsistent with such rules; and
            (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
        either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
        procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to 
        the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 4. RELATIONSHIP OF ABM SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT AND ARMS CONTROL.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Deployment of an antiballistic missile system in 
        accordance with section 3 is fully consistent with the rights 
        of the parties to the ABM Treaty.
            (2) Deployment of an antiballistic missile system in 
        accordance with section 3 would not threaten the deterrent 
        capability of the Russian nuclear missile forces at force 
        levels agreed to under the START I Treaty, at force levels 
        permitted under the START II Treaty, or even at force levels 
        below the agreed or permitted force levels.
    (b) Discussions With Russia.--Congress urges the President to 
pursue discussions with Russia regarding--
            (1) potential opportunities for cooperation on research and 
        development of ballistic missile defense capabilities, 
        including, for example--
                    (A) research and development of missile warning and 
                tracking capabilities;
                    (B) research and development of intelligence and 
                warning indications regarding Third World activities on 
                ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction; and
                    (C) joint research and development of more 
                effective theater missile defenses;
            (2) amendments to the ABM Treaty, as necessary, that would 
        permit development and deployment of more effective limited 
        defenses of the two countries against long-range ballistic 
        missile attacks; and
            (3) establishment of conditions conducive to more effective 
        national missile defense, such as rescinding the 1974 Protocol 
        to the ABM Treaty and making conforming changes to the ABM 
        Treaty in order to permit in each country a second ballistic 
        missile defense site, optimally located, and up to 100 
        additional interceptor missiles at such site.
    (c) Alternative Action Under ABM Treaty.--If the President 
determines that, due to increasing threats of ballistic missile attack 
on the United States, it is necessary to expand the antiballistic 
missile system provided for under section 3 beyond limits provided 
under the ABM Treaty and that discussions between the United States and 
Russia regarding cooperative liberalization of those limits is 
unsuccessful, the President shall consult with Congress on whether to 
exercise the right under Article XV of the ABM Treaty for a party to 
withdraw from the treaty.

SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOW-ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES.

    The Secretary of Defense, through the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization, shall maintain a robust program of research and 
development of national missile defense technologies while developing 
for deployment the antiballistic missile system provided for under 
section 3. These research and development activities shall be conducted 
in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.

SEC. 6. POLICY REGARDING REDUCTION OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 
              FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

    (a) Measures To Address Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction.--
In order to defend against weapons of mass destruction by preventing 
the spread of fissile materials and other components of weapons of mass 
destruction, the President shall--
            (1) enhance efforts, both unilaterally and in cooperation 
        with other nations, to prevent terrorist organizations from 
        obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction;
            (2) expedite United States efforts to assist the 
        Governments of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as 
        appropriate, in improving the safety, security, and 
        accountability of fissile materials and nuclear warheads;
            (3) undertake additional steps to prevent weapons of mass 
        destruction and their components from being smuggled into the 
        United States, through the use of improved security devices at 
        United States ports of entry, increased numbers of Border 
        Patrol agents, increased monitoring of international borders, 
        and other appropriate measures;
            (4) seek the widest possible international adherence to the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime and pursue to the fullest 
        other export control measures intended to deter and counter the 
        spread of weapons of mass destruction and their components; and
            (5) enhance conventional weapons systems to ensure that the 
        United States possesses effective deterrent and counterforce 
        capabilities against weapons of mass destruction and their 
        delivery systems.
    (b) Measures To Address Threats From ICBMs.--In order to reduce the 
threat to the United States from weapons of mass destruction delivered 
by intercontinental ballistic missiles, including accidental or 
unauthorized launches, the President shall--
            (1) urge the Government and Parliament of Russia to ratify 
        the START II Treaty as soon as possible, permitting its 
        expeditious entry into force;
            (2) pursue with the Government of Russia, after START II 
        entry-into-force, a symmetrical program of early deactivation 
        of strategic forces to be eliminated under START II; and
            (3) work jointly with countries possessing intercontinental 
        ballistic missiles to improve command and control technology 
        (such as permissive actions links and other safety devices) and 
        operations to the maximum extent practicable.
    (c) Plan To Reduce Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction.--The 
Secretary shall develop a comprehensive plan for reducing the threat to 
the United States of weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary shall 
develop the plan jointly with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the 
Director of Central Intelligence. The plan shall implement the 
requirements of subsections (a) and (b).

SEC. 7. JOINT PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AFTER DEPLOYMENT OF 
              INITIAL ABM SYSTEM.

    (a) Review Required.--After the first national missile defense 
system deployed after the date of the enactment of this Act attains 
initial operational capability, the President and Congress shall 
jointly review the matters described in subsection (b) in order to 
determine priorities for future research and development, and possible 
deployment of national missile defense technologies, and for continued 
cooperation with Russia on arms control.
    (b) Matters To Be Reviewed.--The review shall cover the following 
matters:
            (1) The status of cooperation and discussions between the 
        United States and Russia on matters described in section 4(b) 
        and on other matters of common interest for the national 
        security of both countries.
            (2) The projected threat of ballistic missile attack on the 
        United States.
            (3) Other projected threats of attacks on the United States 
        with weapons of mass destruction.
            (4) United States preparedness to respond to or defend 
        against such threats.
            (5) The status of research and development on national 
        missile defense technologies referred to in section 5.

SEC. 8. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    (a) Requirement.--Not later than March 15, 1998, the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the following plans:
            (1) The Secretary's plan for the carrying out the national 
        missile defense program in accordance with the requirements of 
        this Act.
            (2) The plan for reducing the threat to the United States 
        of weapons of mass destruction prepared pursuant to section 
        6(c).
    (b) Plan for National Missile Defense.--With respect to the 
Secretary's plan for the national missile defense program, the report 
shall include the following matters:
            (1) The antiballistic missile system architecture, 
        including--
                    (A) a detailed description of the system 
                architecture selected for development; and
                    (B) a justification of the architecture selected 
                and reasons for the rejection of the other candidate 
                architectures.
            (2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of 
        appropriations required for research, development, test, and 
        evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years 1998 
        through 2003 in order to achieve an initial operational 
        capability of the antiballistic missile system in 2003.
            (3) A description of promising technologies to be pursued 
        in accordance with the requirements of section 5.
            (4) A determination of the point, if any, at which any 
        activity that is required to be carried out under this title 
        would conflict with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with 
        a description of any such activity, the legal basis for the 
        Secretary's determination, and an estimate of the time at which 
        such point would be reached in order to meet an initial 
        operating capability in the year 2003.

SEC. 9. TREATIES DEFINED.

    In this Act:
            (1) ABM treaty.--The term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty 
        Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
        Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 
        signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes Protocols to 
        that Treaty signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, and all Agreed 
        Statements and amendments to such Treaty in effect.
            (2) START i treaty.--The term ``START I Treaty'' means the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
        Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, 
        including related annexes on agreed statements and definitions, 
        protocols, and memorandum of understanding.
            (3) START ii treaty.--The term ``START II Treaty'' means 
        the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
        Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including 
        the following protocols and memorandum of understanding, all 
        such documents being integral parts of and collectively 
        referred to as the ``START II Treaty'' (contained in Treaty 
        Document 103-1):
                    (A) The Protocol on Procedures Governing 
                Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing 
                Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to 
                the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
                Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation 
                of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the 
                ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
                    (B) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of 
                Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United 
                States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction 
                and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known 
                as the ``Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol'').
                    (C) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead 
                Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the 
                Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
                Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation 
                of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the 
                ``Memorandum on Attribution'').
            (4) Missile technology control regime.--The term ``Missile 
        Technology Control Regime'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 11B(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
        U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)).
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