[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 495 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 495

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT


 
 To provide criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful acquisition, 
 transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon, and to 
 reduce the threat of acts of terrorism or armed aggression involving 
the use of any such weapon against the United States, its citizens, or 
 Armed Forces, or those of any allied country, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Policy.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION 
                          OF THE UNITED STATES

                Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties

Sec. 101. Criminal and civil provisions.
              Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges

Sec. 111. Revocations of export privileges.
       TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS

Sec. 201. Sanctions for use of chemical or biological weapons.
Sec. 202. Continuation and enhancement of multilateral control regimes.
Sec. 203. Criteria for United States assistance to Russia relating to 
                            the elimination of chemical and biological 
                            weapons.
Sec. 204. Report on the state of chemical and biological weapons 
                            proliferation.
Sec. 205. International conference to strengthen the 1925 Geneva 
                            Protocol.
Sec. 206. Restriction on use of funds for the Organization for the 
                            Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Sec. 207. Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses.
Sec. 208. Negative security assurances.
Sec. 209. Riot control agents.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    The Congress finds that--
            (1) the United States eliminated its stockpile of 
        biological weapons pursuant to the 1972 Biological Weapons 
        Convention and has pledged to destroy its entire inventory of 
        chemical weapons by 2004, independent of the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention entering into force;
            (2) the use of chemical or biological weapons in 
        contravention of international law is abhorrent and should 
        trigger immediate and effective sanctions;
            (3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 620, adopted 
        on August 26, 1988, states the intention of the Security 
        Council to consider immediately ``appropriate and effective'' 
        sanctions against any nation using chemical and biological 
        weapons in violation of international law;
            (4) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade recognizes 
        that national security concerns may serve as legitimate grounds 
        for limiting trade; title XXI of the General Agreement on 
        Tariffs and Trade states that ``nothing in this Agreement shall 
        be construed . . . to prevent any contracting party from taking 
        any action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
        its essential security interests. . .'';
            (5) on September 30, 1993, the President declared by 
        Executive Order No. 12868 a national emergency to deal with 
        ``the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
        security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States'' 
        posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical 
        weapons, and of the means for delivering such weapons;
            (6) Russia has not implemented the 1990 United States-
        Russian Bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production 
        of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the 
        Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, known as 
        the ``BDA'', nor has the United States and Russia resolved, to 
        the satisfaction of the United States, the outstanding 
        compliance issues under the Memorandum of Understanding Between 
        the United States of America and the Government of the Union of 
        Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification 
        Experiment and Data Exchange Related To Prohibition on Chemical 
        Weapons, known as the ``1989 Wyoming MOU'';
            (7) the Intelligence Community has stated that a number of 
        countries, among them China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
        Korea, Syria, and Russia, possess chemical and biological 
        weapons and the means to deliver them;
            (8) four countries in the Middle East--Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
        and Syria--have, as a national policy, supported international 
        terrorism;
            (9) chemical and biological weapons have been used by 
        states in the past for intimidation and military aggression, 
        most recently during the Iran-Iraq war and by Iraq against its 
        Kurdish minority;
            (10) the grave new threat of chemical and biological 
        terrorism has been demonstrated by the 1995 nerve gas attack on 
        the Tokyo subway by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo;
            (11) the urgent need to improve domestic preparedness to 
        protect against chemical and biological threats was underscored 
        by enactment of the 1997 Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction Act;
            (12) the Department of Defense, in light of growing 
        chemical and biological threats in regions of key concern, 
        including Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, has stated that 
        United States forces must be properly trained and equipped for 
        all missions, including those in which opponents might threaten 
        use of chemical or biological weapons; and
            (13) Australia Group controls on the exports of chemical 
        and biological agents, and related equipment, and the Missile 
        Technology Control Regime, together provide an indispensable 
        foundation for international and national efforts to curb the 
        spread of chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery 
        means.

SEC. 3. POLICY.

    It should be the policy of the United States to take all 
appropriate measures to--
            (1) prevent and deter the threat or use of chemical and 
        biological weapons against the citizens, Armed Forces, and 
        territory of the United States and its allies, and to protect 
        against, and manage the consequences of, such use should it 
        occur;
            (2) discourage the proliferation of chemical and biological 
        weapons, their means of delivery, and related equipment, 
        material, and technology;
            (3) prohibit within the United States the development, 
        production, acquisition, stockpiling, possession, and transfer 
        to third parties of chemical or biological weapons, their 
        precursors and related technology; and
            (4) impose unilateral sanctions, and seek immediately 
        international sanctions, against any nation using chemical and 
        biological weapons in violation of international law.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' refers 
        to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and chaired 
        by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical 
        and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national 
        export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical weapons, 
        biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use equipment, sharing 
        information on target countries, and seeking other ways to curb 
        the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons.
            (2) Biological weapon.--The term ``biological weapon'' 
        means the following, together or separately:
                    (A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, 
                viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or 
                infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
                engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
                organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever 
                its origin or method of production, capable of 
                causing--
                            (i) death, disease, or other biological 
                        malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or 
                        another living organism;
                            (ii) deterioration of food, water, 
                        equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind; 
                        or
                            (iii) deleterious alteration of the 
                        environment.
                    (B) Any munition or device specifically designed to 
                cause death or other harm through the release, 
                dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous 
                properties of those biological weapons specified in 
                subparagraph (A).
                    (C) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
                or devices specified in subparagraph (B).
                    (D) Any living organism specifically designed to 
                carry a biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) 
                to a host.
            (3) Chemical weapon.--The term ``chemical weapon'' means 
        the following, together or separately:
                    (A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, 
                Sarin, Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, 
                phosgene oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, 
                ethyldichloroarsine, methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, 
                diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and 
                arsine.
                    (B) Any of the 54 chemicals other than a riot 
                control agent that is controlled by the Australia Group 
                as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                    (C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed 
                if the use of the agent would be intended to produce an 
                effect consistent with that of a chemical agent or 
                other chemical described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
                    (D) Any munition or device specifically designed to 
                cause death or other harm through the release, 
                dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous 
                properties of a chemical weapon specified in 
                subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
                    (E) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
                or devices specified in subparagraph (D).
            (4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' is used within the 
        meaning of ``knowing'' as that term is defined in section 104 
        of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-
        2).
            (5) National of the united states.--The term ``national of 
        the United States'' has the same meaning given such term in 
        section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
            (6) Person.--The term ``person'' means any individual, 
        corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal 
        entity.
            (7) Riot control agent.--The term ``riot control agent'' 
        means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine, 
        diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone, 
        chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene 
        malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate, that is designed 
        or used to produce rapidly in humans any nonlethal sensory 
        irritation or disabling physical effect that disappears within 
        a short time following termination of exposure.
            (8) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the 
        several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
        and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the 
        United States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or 
        control of the United States, including--
                    (A) any of the places within the provisions of 
                paragraph (41) of section 40102 of title 49, United 
                States Code;
                    (B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the 
                United States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs 
                (18) and (36) of section 40102 of title 49, United 
                States Code; and
                    (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term 
                is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug 
                Enforcement Act, as amended (46 U.S.C., App. sec. 
                1903(b)).

TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION 
                          OF THE UNITED STATES

                Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties

SEC. 101. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROVISIONS.

    (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
by inserting after chapter 11A the following new chapter:

             ``CHAPTER 11B--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

``Sec.
``229. Prohibited activities.
``229A. Penalties.
``229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons.
``229C. Other prohibitions.
``229D. Injunctions.
``229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in 
                            certain emergencies.
``229F. Definitions.
``Sec. 229. Prohibited activities.
    ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and 
(c), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly--
            ``(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer, 
        directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, 
        possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon or any 
        biological weapon; or
            ``(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to 
        violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate 
        paragraph (1).
    ``(b) Exempted Conduct.--Subsection (a) does not apply to conduct 
that satisfies the following requirements of both paragraphs (1) and 
(2):
            ``(1) Lawful purpose.--The chemical weapon or biological 
        weapon is intended for any of the following purposes:
                    ``(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose 
                related to an industrial, agricultural, research, 
                medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
                    ``(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly 
                related to protection against a chemical or biological 
                weapon.
                    ``(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military 
                purpose of the United States that is not connected with 
                the use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon or 
                that is not dependent on the use of the toxic or 
                poisonous properties of the chemical weapon or 
                biological weapon to cause death or other harm.
                    ``(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law 
                enforcement purpose, including any domestic riot 
                control purpose.
                    ``(E) Individual self-defense purposes.--Any 
                individual self-defense purpose involving a pepper 
                spray or chemical mace.
            ``(2) Limitation on type and quantity.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The type and quantity of the 
                chemical weapon or biological weapon is strictly 
                limited to the type and quantity that can be justified 
                for the purpose intended under paragraph (1).
                    ``(B) Excessive quantities per person.--The 
                requirement of this paragraph is not satisfied if the 
                quantity per person at any given time is, under the 
                circumstances, inconsistent with the purpose intended 
                under paragraph (1).
    ``(c) Exempted Agencies and Persons.--
            ``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the 
        retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a 
        chemical weapon or a biological weapon by a department, agency, 
        or other entity of the United States, or by a person described 
        in paragraph (2), pending destruction of the weapon.
            ``(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph 
        (1) is--
                    ``(A) a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
                States or any other person that is authorized by law or 
                by an appropriate officer of the United States to 
                retain, own, possess, transfer, or receive the chemical 
                or biological weapon; or
                    ``(B) in an emergency situation, any other person 
                if the person is attempting to destroy or seize the 
                weapon or if the person is a victim of the use of the 
                weapon.
    ``(d) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within 
the jurisdiction of the United States if the prohibited conduct--
            ``(1) takes place in the United States;
            ``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is 
        committed by a national of the United States;
            ``(3) is committed against a national of the United States 
        while the national is outside the United States; or
            ``(4) is committed against any property that is owned, 
        leased, or used by the United States or by any department or 
        agency of the United States, whether the property is within or 
        outside the United States.
``Sec. 229A. Penalties
    ``(a) Criminal Penalties.--
            ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates section 229 of 
        this title shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for 
        any term of years, or both.
            ``(2) Death penalty.--Any person who violates section 229 
        of this title and by whose action the death of another person 
        is the result shall be punished by death or imprisoned for 
        life.
    ``(b) Civil Penalties.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may bring a civil 
        action in the appropriate United States district court against 
        any person who violates section 229 of this title and, upon 
        proof of such violation by a preponderance of the evidence, 
        such person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty in an 
        amount not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
            ``(2) Relation to other proceedings.--The imposition of a 
        civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any other 
        criminal or civil statutory, common law, or administrative 
        remedy, which is available by law to the United States or any 
        other person.
    ``(c) Reimbursement of Costs.--The court shall order any person 
convicted of an offense under subsection (a) to reimburse the United 
States for any expenses incurred by the United States incident to the 
seizure, storage, handling, transportation, and destruction or other 
disposition of any property that was seized in connection with an 
investigation of the commission of the offense by that person. A person 
ordered to reimburse the United States for expenses under this 
subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for such expenses with 
each other person, if any, who is ordered under this subsection to 
reimburse the United States for the same expenses.
``Sec. 229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons
    ``(a) Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture.--Any person 
convicted under section 229A(a) shall forfeit to the United States 
irrespective of any provision of State law--
            ``(1) any property, real or personal, involved in the 
        offense, including any chemical weapon or biological weapon;
            ``(2) any property constituting, or derived from, and 
        proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
        result of such violation; and
            ``(3) any of the person's property used, or intended to be 
        used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the 
        commission of, such violation.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in 
addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to section 229A(a), 
that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in 
this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by section 
229A(a), a defendant who derived profits or other proceeds from an 
offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other 
proceeds.
    ``(b) Procedures.--Property subject to forfeiture under this 
section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any administrative or 
judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by 
subsections (b) through (p) of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except that 
any reference under those subsections to--
            ``(1) `this subchapter or subchapter II' shall be deemed to 
        be a reference to section 229A(a); and
            ``(2) `subsection (a)' shall be deemed to be a reference to 
        subsection (a) of this section.
    ``(c) Destruction or Other Disposition.--The Attorney General shall 
provide for the destruction or other appropriate disposition of any 
chemical or biological weapon seized and forfeited pursuant to this 
section.
    ``(d) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request the head of any 
agency of the United States to assist in the handling, storage, 
transportation, or destruction of property seized under this section.
``Sec. 229C. Other prohibitions
    ``(a) In General.--Whoever knowingly uses riot control agents as an 
act of terrorism, or knowingly assists any person to do so, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned for a term of not more than 10 
years, or both.
    ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by this section is within 
the jurisdiction of the United States if the prohibited conduct--
            ``(1) takes place in the United States;
            ``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is 
        committed by a national of the United States;
            ``(3) is committed against a national of the United States 
        while the national is outside the United States; or
            ``(4) is committed against any property that is owned, 
        leased, or used by the United States or by any department or 
        agency of the United States, whether the property is within or 
        outside the United States.
``Sec. 229D. Injunctions
    ``The United States may obtain in a civil action an injunction 
against--
            ``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 229 or 229C of 
        this title; or
            ``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct 
        prohibited under section 229 or 229C of this title.
``Sec. 229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in 
              certain emergencies
    ``The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense to 
provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in support of 
Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of section 
229 of this title in an emergency situation involving a biological 
weapon or chemical weapon. The authority to make such a request may be 
exercised by another official of the Department of Justice in 
accordance with section 382(f)(2) of title 10.
``Sec. 229F. Definitions
    ``In this chapter:
            ``(1) Australia group.--The term `Australia Group' refers 
        to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and chaired 
        by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical 
        and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national 
        export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical weapons, 
        biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use equipment, sharing 
        information on target countries, and seeking other ways to curb 
        the use of chemical and biological weapons.
            ``(2) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon' 
        means the following, together or separately:
                    ``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, 
                viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or 
                infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
                engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
                organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever 
                its origin or method of production, capable of 
                causing--
                            ``(i) death, disease, or other biological 
                        malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or 
                        another living organism;
                            ``(ii) deterioration of food, water, 
                        equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind; 
                        or
                            ``(iii) deleterious alteration of the 
                        environment.
                    ``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed 
                to cause death or other harm through the release, 
                dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous 
                properties of those biological weapons specified in 
                subparagraph (A).
                    ``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
                or devices specified in subparagraph (B).
                    ``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to 
                carry a biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) 
                to a host.
            ``(3) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means 
        the following, together or separately:
                    ``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, 
                Sarin, Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, 
                phosgene oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, 
                ethyldichloroarsine, methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, 
                diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and 
                arsine.
                    ``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot 
                control agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of 
                the date of the enactment of this Act.
                    ``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be 
                developed if the use of the agent would be intended to 
                produce an effect consistent with that of a chemical 
                agent or other chemical described in subparagraph (A) 
                or (B).
                    ``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed 
                to cause death or other harm through the release, 
                dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous 
                properties of a chemical weapon specified in 
                subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
                    ``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
                or devices specified in subparagraph (D).
            ``(4) Knowingly.--The term `knowingly' is used within the 
        meaning of `knowing' as that term is defined in section 104 of 
        the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-2).
            ``(5) National of the united states.--The term `national of 
        the United States' has the same meaning given such term in 
        section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
            ``(6) Person.--The term `person' means any individual, 
        corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal 
        entity.
            ``(7) Riot control agent.--The term `riot control agent' 
        means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine, 
        diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone, 
        chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene 
        malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate that is designed or 
        used to produce rapidly in humans any nonlethal sensory 
        irritation or disabling physical effect that disappears within 
        a short time following termination of exposure.
            ``(8) Terrorism.--The term `terrorism' means activities 
        that--
                    ``(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to 
                human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of 
                the United States or of any State, or that would be a 
                criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction 
                of the United States or of any State; and
                    ``(B) appear to be intended--
                            ``(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
                        population;
                            ``(ii) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; or
                            ``(iii) to affect the conduct of a 
                        government by assassination or kidnapping.
            ``(9) United states.--The term `United States' means the 
        several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
        and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the 
        United States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or 
        control of the United States, including--
                    ``(A) any of the places within the provisions of 
                section 40102(41) of title 49, United States Code;
                    ``(B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the 
                United States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs 
                (16) and (37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 
                49, United States Code; and
                    ``(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term 
                is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law 
                Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a of title 
        18, United States Code, is amended--
                    (A) by striking ``Sec. 2332a. Use of weapons of 
                mass destruction'' and inserting ``Sec. 2332a. Use of 
                certain weapons of mass destruction'';
                    (B) in subsection (a), by striking ``, including 
                any biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms 
                are defined in section 178)'' and inserting ``other 
                than a chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those 
                terms are defined in section 229F)''; and
                    (C) in subsection (b), by inserting ``(other than a 
                chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those terms 
                are defined in section 229F))'' after ``weapon of mass 
                destruction''.
            (2) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters for part I of 
        title 18, United States Code, is amended--
                    (A) by striking the item relating to chapter 10; 
                and
                    (B) by inserting after the item for chapter 11A the 
                following new item:

``11B. Chemical and Biological Weapons......................     229''.
    (c) Repeals.--The following provisions of law are repealed:
            (1) Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, relating to 
        biological weapons.
            (2) Section 2332c of title 18, United States Code, relating 
        to chemical weapons.
            (3) In the table of sections for chapter 113B of title 18, 
        United States Code, the item relating to section 2332c.

              Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges

SEC. 111. REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES.

    If the President determines, after notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing in accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code, 
that any person within the United States, or any national of the United 
States located outside the United States, has committed any violation 
of section 229 of title 18, United States Code, the President may issue 
an order for the suspension or revocation of the authority of the 
person to export from the United States any goods or technology (as 
such terms are defined in section 16 of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415)).

       TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS

SEC. 201. SANCTIONS FOR USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

    Title III of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating section 309 as section 312; and
            (2) by striking sections 306 through 308 and inserting the 
        following new sections:

``SEC. 306. PURPOSE.

    ``The purpose of sections 306 through 311 is--
            ``(1) to provide for the imposition of sanctions against 
        any foreign government--
                    ``(A) that has used chemical or biological weapons 
                in violation of international law; or
                    ``(B) that has used chemical or biological weapons 
                against its own nationals; and
            ``(2) to ensure that the victims of the use of chemical or 
        biological weapons shall be compensated and awarded punitive 
        damages, as may be determined.

``SEC. 307. PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.

    ``(a) Bilateral Sanctions.--Except as provided in subsections (c) 
and (d), the President shall, after the consultation with Congress, 
impose the sanctions described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 
308 if the President determines that any foreign government--
            ``(1) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon in 
        violation of international law; or
            ``(2) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon 
        against its own nationals.
    ``(b) Multilateral Sanctions.--The sanctions imposed pursuant to 
subsection (a) are in addition to any multilateral sanction or measure 
that may be otherwise agreed.
    ``(c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the application 
of any of the sanctions imposed pursuant to subsection (a) if the 
President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate that implementing such measures would have a substantial 
negative impact upon the supreme national interests of the United 
States.
    ``(d) Sanctions Not Applied to Certain Existing Contracts.--A 
sanction described in section 308 shall not apply to any activity 
pursuant to a contract or international agreement entered into before 
the date of the Presidential determination under subsection (a) if the 
President determines that performance of the activity would reduce the 
potential for the use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon by the 
sanctioned country.

``SEC. 308. MANDATORY SANCTIONS.

    ``(a) Minimum Number of Sanctions.--After consultation with 
Congress and making a determination under section 307 with respect to 
the actions of a foreign government, the President shall impose not 
less than 5 of the following sanctions against that government for a 
period of three years:
            ``(1) Foreign assistance.--The United States Government 
        shall terminate assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961, except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food or 
        other agricultural commodities or products.
            ``(2) Arms sales.--The United States Government shall not 
        sell any item on the United States Munitions List and shall 
        terminate sales to that country under this Act of any defense 
        articles, defense services, or design and construction 
        services. Licenses shall not be issued for the export to the 
        sanctioned country of any item on the United States Munitions 
        List, or for commercial satellites.
            ``(3) Arms sale financing.--The United States Government 
        shall terminate all foreign military financing under this Act.
            ``(4) Denial of united states government credit or other 
        financial assistance.--The United States Government shall deny 
        any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by 
        any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States 
        Government, including the Export-Import Bank of the United 
        States.
            ``(5) Export controls.--The authorities of section 6 of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the 
        export of any goods or technology on that part of the control 
        list established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act, and all 
        other goods and technology under this Act (excluding food and 
        other agricultural commodities and products) as the President 
        may determine to be appropriate.
            ``(6) Multilateral bank assistance.--The United States 
        shall oppose, in accordance with section 701 of the 
        International Financial Institutions Act, the extension of any 
        loan or financial or technical assistance by international 
        financial institutions.
            ``(7) Bank loans.--The United States Government shall 
        prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or 
        providing any credit, including to any agency or 
        instrumentality of the government, except for loans or credits 
        for the purpose of purchasing food or other agricultural 
        commodities or products.
            ``(8) Aviation rights.--
                    ``(A) In general.--
                            ``(i) Notification.--The President is 
                        authorized to notify the government of a 
                        country with respect to which the President has 
                        made a determination pursuant to section 307(a) 
                        of his intention to suspend the authority of 
                        foreign air carriers owned or controlled by the 
                        government of that country to engage in foreign 
                        air transportation to or from the United 
                        States.
                            ``(ii) Suspension of aviation rights.--
                        Within 10 days after the date of notification 
                        of a government under subclause (I), the 
                        Secretary of Transportation shall take all 
                        steps necessary to suspend at the earliest 
                        possible date the authority of any foreign air 
                        carrier owned or controlled, directly or 
                        indirectly, by that government to engage in 
                        foreign air transportation to or from the 
                        United States, notwithstanding any agreement 
                        relating to air services.
                    ``(B) Termination of air service agreements.--
                            ``(i) In general.--The President may direct 
                        the Secretary of State to terminate any air 
                        service agreement between the United States and 
                        a country with respect to which the President 
                        has made a determination pursuant to section 
                        307(a), in accordance with the provisions of 
                        that agreement.
                            ``(ii) Termination of aviation rights.--
                        Upon termination of an agreement under this 
                        clause, the Secretary of Transportation shall 
                        take such steps as may be necessary to revoke 
                        at the earliest possible date the right of any 
                        foreign air carrier owned, or controlled, 
                        directly or indirectly, by the government of 
                        that country to engage in foreign air 
                        transportation to or from the United States.
                    ``(C) Exception.--The Secretary of Transportation 
                may provide for such exceptions from the sanction 
                contained in subparagraph (A) as the Secretary 
                considers necessary to provide for emergencies in which 
                the safety of an aircraft or its crew or passengers is 
                threatened.
                    ``(D) Definitions.--For purposes of this paragraph, 
                the terms `aircraft', `air transportation', and 
                `foreign air carrier' have the meanings given those 
                terms in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code.
            ``(9) Diplomatic relations.--The President shall use his 
        constitutional authorities to downgrade or suspend diplomatic 
        privileges between the United States and that country.
    ``(b) Blocking of Assets.--Upon making a determination under 
section 307, the President shall take all steps necessary to block any 
transactions in any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States in which the foreign country or any national thereof has any 
interest whatsoever, for the purpose of compensating the victims of the 
chemical or biological weapons use and for punitive damages as may be 
assessed.
    ``(c) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section limits the 
authority of the President to impose a sanction that is not specified 
in this section.

``SEC. 309. REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS.

    ``(a) Certification Requirement.--The President shall remove the 
sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign government pursuant to this 
section if the President determines and so certifies to the Congress, 
after the end of the three-year period beginning on the date on which 
sanctions were initially imposed on that country pursuant to section 
307, that--
            ``(1) the government of that country has provided reliable 
        assurances that it will not use any chemical weapon or 
        biological weapon in violation of international law and will 
        not use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against its 
        own nationals;
            ``(2) the government of the country is willing to accept 
        onsite inspections or other reliable measures to verify that 
        the government is not making preparations to use any chemical 
        weapon or biological weapon in violation of international law 
        or to use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against its 
        own nationals; and
            ``(3) the government of the country is making restitution 
        to those affected by any use of any chemical weapon or 
        biological weapon in violation of international law or against 
        its own nationals.
    ``(b) Reasons for Determination.--The certification made under this 
subsection shall set forth the reasons supporting such determination in 
each particular case.
    ``(c) Effective Date.--The certification made under this subsection 
shall take effect on the date on which the certification is received by 
the Congress.

``SEC. 310. NOTIFICATIONS AND REPORTS OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
              USE AND APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.

    ``(a) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after persuasive 
information becomes available to the executive branch of Government 
indicating the substantial possibility of the use of chemical or 
biological weapons by any person or government, the President shall so 
notify Congress in writing.
    ``(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after making a notification 
under subsection (a), the President shall submit a report to Congress 
that contains--
            ``(1) an assessment by the President in both classified and 
        unclassified form of the circumstances of the suspected use of 
        chemical or biological weapons, including any determination by 
        the President made under section 307 with respect to a foreign 
        government; and
            ``(2) a description of the actions the President intends to 
        take pursuant to the assessment, including the imposition of 
        any sanctions or other measures pursuant to section 307.
    ``(c) Progress Report.--Not later than 60 days after submission of 
a report under subsection (b), the President shall submit a progress 
report to Congress describing actions undertaken by the President under 
sections 306 through 311, including the imposition of unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions and other punitive measures, in response to the 
use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon described in the 
report.
    ``(d) Recipients of Notifications and Reports.--Any notification or 
report required by this section shall be submitted to the following:
            ``(1) The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of 
        the House of Representatives.
            ``(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
            ``(3) The Committee on International Relations and the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.

``SEC. 311. DEFINITIONS.

    ``In sections 306 through 310:
            ``(1) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon' 
        means the following, together or separately:
                    ``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, 
                viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or 
                infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
                engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
                organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever 
                its origin or method of production, capable of 
                causing--
                            ``(i) death, disease, or other biological 
                        malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or 
                        another living organism;
                            ``(ii) deterioration of food, water, 
                        equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind; 
                        or
                            ``(iii) deleterious alteration of the 
                        environment.
                    ``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed 
                to cause death or other harm through the release, 
                dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous 
                properties of those biological weapons specified in 
                subparagraph (A).
                    ``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
                or devices specified in subparagraph (B).
                    ``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to 
                carry a biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) 
                to a host.
            ``(2) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means 
        the following, together or separately:
                    ``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, 
                Sarin, Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, 
                phosgene oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, 
                ethyldichloroarsine, methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, 
                diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and 
                arsine.
                    ``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot 
                control agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of 
                the date of the enactment of this Act.
                    ``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be 
                developed if the use of the agent would be intended to 
                produce an effect consistent with that of a chemical 
                agent or other chemical described in subparagraph (A) 
                or (B).
                    ``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed 
                to cause death or other harm through the release, 
                dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous 
                properties of a chemical weapon specified in 
                subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
                    ``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
                or devices specified in subparagraph (D).
            ``(3) Person.--The term `person' means any individual, 
        corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal 
        entity.''.

SEC. 202. CONTINUATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL CONTROL REGIMES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that any 
collapse of the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia 
Group'', either through changes in membership or lack of compliance 
with common export controls, or any substantial weakening of common 
Australia Group export controls and nonproliferation measures in force 
as of the date of enactment of this Act, would seriously undermine 
international and national efforts to curb the spread of chemical and 
biological weapons and related equipment.
    (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to continue close cooperation with other countries in 
        the Australia Group in support of its current efforts and in 
        devising additional means to monitor and control the supply of 
        chemicals and biological agents applicable to weapons 
        production;
            (2) to maintain an equivalent or more comprehensive level 
        of control over the export of toxic chemicals and their 
        precursors, dual-use processing equipment, human, animal and 
        plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons 
        application, and dual-use biological equipment, as that 
        afforded by the Australia Group as of the date of enactment of 
        this Act;
            (3) to block any effort by any Australia Group member to 
        achieve Australia Group consensus on any action that would 
        substantially weaken existing common Australia Group export 
        controls and nonproliferation measures or otherwise undermine 
        the effectiveness of the Australia Group; and
            (4) to work closely with other countries also capable of 
        supplying equipment, materials, and technology with particular 
        applicability to the production of chemical or biological 
        weapons in order to devise and harmonize the most effective 
        national controls possible on the transfer of such materials, 
        equipment, and technology.
    (c) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall 
determine and certify to Congress whether--
            (1) the Australia Group continues to maintain an equivalent 
        or more comprehensive level of control over the export of toxic 
        chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment, 
        human, animal, and plant pathogens and toxins with potential 
        biological weapons application, and dual-use biological 
        equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the 
        date of the last certification under this subsection, or, in 
        the case of the first certification, the level of control 
        maintained as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
            (2) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for 
        curtailing the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
        related materials and technology, and whether the effectiveness 
        of the Australia Group has been undermined by changes in 
        membership, lack of compliance with common export controls, or 
        any weakening of common controls and measures that are in 
        effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
    (d) Consultations.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall consult periodically, 
        but not less frequently than twice a year, with the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives, on 
        Australia Group export controls and nonproliferation measures.
            (2) Resulting from presidential certification.--If the 
        President certifies that either of the conditions in subsection 
        (c) are not met, the President shall consult within 60 days of 
        such certification with the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the 
        House of Representatives on steps the United States should take 
        to maintain effective international controls on chemical and 
        biological weapons-related materials and technology.

SEC. 203. CRITERIA FOR UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA RELATING TO 
              THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, United 
States assistance described in subsection (d) may not be obligated or 
expended unless a certification by the President is in effect under 
subsection (b) or subsection (c).
    (b) Certification With Respect to Russian Chemical and Biological 
Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall certify that--
            (1) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the 
        implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement;
            (2) the United States and Russia have made substantial 
        progress toward resolution, to the satisfaction of the United 
        States, of outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming 
        Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction 
        Agreement;
            (3) Russia has fully and accurately declared all 
        information regarding its unitary and binary chemical weapons, 
        chemical weapons production facilities, and other facilities 
        associated with the development of chemical weapons; and
            (4) Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the 
        Biological Weapons Convention.
    (c) Alternative Certification.--A certification under this 
subsection is a certification by the President that the President is 
unable to make a certification under subsection (b).
    (d) Period of Effectiveness of Certifications.--Each certification 
made under this section shall not be effective for a period of more 
than one year.
    (e) United States Assistance Covered.--United States assistance 
described in this subsection is United States assistance out of funds 
made available for fiscal year 1998 or any fiscal year thereafter that 
is provided with respect to Russia only for the purposes of--
            (1) facilitating the transport, storage, safeguarding, and 
        elimination of any chemical weapon or biological weapon or its 
        delivery vehicle;
            (2) planning, designing, or construction of any destruction 
        facility for a chemical weapon or biological weapon; or
            (3) supporting any international science and technology 
        center.
    (f) Definitions.--
            (1) Bilateral destruction agreement.--The term ``Bilateral 
        Destruction Agreement'' means Agreement Between the United 
        States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
        on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on 
        Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
        Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990.
            (2) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological 
        Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of 
        the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
        (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, done 
        at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972.
            (3) Wyoming memorandum of understanding.--The term 
        ``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum of 
        Understanding Between the Government of the United States of 
        America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
        Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and 
        Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, 
        signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
            (4) United states assistance.--The term ``United States 
        assistance'' has the meaning given the term in section 
        481(e)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2291(e)(4)).

SEC. 204. REPORT ON THE STATE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
              PROLIFERATION.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing 
the following:
            (1) Proliferation by foreign countries.--A description of 
        any efforts by China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
        Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Syria, and any country that has, 
        during the five years prior to submission of the report, used 
        any chemical weapon or biological weapon or attempted to 
        acquire the material and technology to produce and deliver 
        chemical or biological agents, together with an assessment of 
        the present and future capability of the country to produce and 
        deliver such agents.
            (2) Foreign persons assisting in proliferation.--An 
        identification of--
                    (A) those persons that in the past have assisted 
                the government of any country described in paragraph 
                (1) in that effort; and
                    (B) those persons that continue to assist the 
                government of the country described in paragraph (1) in 
                that effort as of the date of the report.
            (3) Third country assistance in proliferation.--An 
        assessment of whether and to what degree other countries have 
        assisted any government or country described in paragraph (1) 
        in its effort to acquire the material and technology described 
        in that paragraph.
            (4) Intelligence information on third country assistance.--
        A description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or 
        other information that any country has assisted the government 
        of any country described in paragraph (1) in that effort, 
        either directly or by facilitating the activities of the 
        persons identified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3) 
        or had knowledge of the activities of the persons identified in 
        subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3), but took no action to 
        halt or discourage such activities.
            (5) Intelligence information on subnational groups.--A 
        description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or other 
        information of the development, production, stockpiling, or 
        use, of any chemical weapon or biological weapon by subnational 
        groups, including any terrorist or paramilitary organization.
            (6) Funding priorities for detection and monitoring 
        capabilities.--An identification of the priorities of the 
        executive branch of Government for the development of new 
        resources relating to detection and monitoring capabilities 
        with respect to chemical weapons and biological weapons.

SEC. 205. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE 1925 GENEVA 
              PROTOCOL.

    (a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``1925 Geneva Protocol'' 
means the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods 
of Warfare, done at Geneva June 17, 1925 (26 UST 71; TIAS 8061).
    (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to work to obtain multilateral agreement to effective, 
        international enforcement mechanisms to existing international 
        agreements that prohibit the use of chemical and biological 
        weapons, to which the United States is a state party; and
            (2) pursuant to paragraph (1), to work to obtain 
        multilateral agreement regarding the collective imposition of 
        sanctions and other measures described in title III of the 
        Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
        Act of 1991, as amended by this Act.
    (c) Responsibility.--The Secretary of State shall, as a priority 
matter, take steps necessary to achieve United States objectives, as 
set forth in this section.
    (d) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate urges and directs the 
Secretary of State to work to convene an international negotiating 
forum for the purpose of concluding an international agreement on 
enforcement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
    (e) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amount authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 1998 under the 
appropriations account entitled ``International Conferences and 
Contingencies'', $5,000,000 shall be available only for payment of 
salaries and expenses in connection with efforts of the Secretary of 
State to conclude an international agreement described in subsection 
(d).

SEC. 206. RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
              PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

    (a) Prohibition.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant to any 
provision of law, including previously appropriated funds, may be 
available to make any voluntary or assessed contribution to the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or to reimburse 
any account for the transfer of in-kind items to the Organization, 
unless or until the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, opened for signature at Paris January 13, 1993, enters 
into force for the United States.
    (b) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) may be 
construed to apply to the Preliminary Commission for the establishment 
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

SEC. 207. ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons to 
        United States Armed Forces deployed in regions of concern will 
        continue to grow and will undermine United States strategies 
        for the projection of United States military power and the 
        forward deployment of United States Armed Forces;
            (2) the use of chemical or biological weapons will be a 
        likely condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
            (3) it is essential for the United States and key regional 
        allies of the United States to preserve and further develop 
        robust chemical and biological defenses;
            (4) the United States Armed Forces, both active and 
        nonactive duty, are inadequately equipped, organized, trained, 
        and exercised for operations in chemically and biologically 
        contaminated environments;
            (5) the lack of readiness stems from a deemphasis by the 
        executive branch of Government and the United States Armed 
        Forces on chemical and biological defense;
            (6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely 
        coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support 
        United States military operations, are inadequately prepared 
        and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically and 
        biologically contaminated environments;
            (7) congressional direction contained in the 1997 Defense 
        Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act is intended to lead to 
        enhanced domestic preparedness to protect against the use of 
        chemical and biological weapons; and
            (8) the United States Armed Forces should place increased 
        emphasis on potential threats to deployed United States Armed 
        Forces and, in particular, should make countering the use of 
        chemical and biological weapons an organizing principle for 
        United States defense strategy and for the development of force 
        structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising 
        policies of the United States Armed Forces.
    (b) Defense Readiness Training.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
take those actions that are necessary to ensure that the United States 
Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required military missions in 
United States regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of 
chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary of Defense 
shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces are effectively 
equipped, organized, trained, and exercised (including at the large 
unit and theater level) to conduct operations in chemically and 
biologically contaminated environments that are critical to the success 
of United States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
            (1) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at 
        key ports and airfields;
            (2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical 
        regional airbases; and
            (3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
    (c) Discussions With Allied Countries on Readiness.--
            (1) High-priority joint responsibility of secretaries of 
        defense and state.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 
        of State shall give a high priority to discussions with key 
        regional allies and likely regional coalition partners, 
        including those countries where the United States currently 
        deploys forces, where United States forces would likely operate 
        during regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians 
        necessary to support United States military operations, to 
        determine what steps are necessary to ensure that allied and 
        coalition forces and other critical civilians are adequately 
        equipped and prepared to operate in chemically and biologically 
        contaminated environments.
            (2) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a 
        report describing--
                    (A) the results of the discussions held under 
                paragraph (1) and plans for future discussions;
                    (B) the measures agreed to improve the preparedness 
                of foreign armed forces and civilians; and
                    (C) any proposals for increased military 
                assistance, including assistance provided through--
                            (i) the sale of defense articles and 
                        defense services under the Arms Export Control 
                        Act;
                            (ii) the Foreign Military Financing program 
                        under section 23 of that Act; and
                            (iii) chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign 
                        Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to 
                        international military education and training).
    (d) United States Army Chemical School.--
            (1) Command of school.--The Secretary of Defense shall take 
        those actions that are necessary to ensure that the United 
        States Army Chemical School remains under the oversight of a 
        general officer of the United States Army.
            (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
                    (A) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization 
                of the United States Army Chemical School should not 
                disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the 
                United States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-
                biological warfare environment; and
                    (B) the Army should continue to operate the 
                Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan 
                until such time as the replacement facility at Fort 
                Leonard Wood is functional.
    (e) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, and on January 1 every year thereafter, 
        the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
        on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on 
        International Relations, the Committee on National Security, 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of 
        Representatives on previous, current, and planned chemical and 
        biological weapons defense activities of the United States 
        Armed Forces.
            (2) Content of report.--Each report required by paragraph 
        (1) shall include the following information for the previous 
        fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years:
                    (A) Enhancement of defense and readiness.--Proposed 
                solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and 
                biological warfare defenses identified in the March 
                1996 General Accounting Office Report, titled 
                ``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains 
                Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems'', and 
                steps being taken pursuant to subsection (b) to ensure 
                that the United States Armed Forces are capable of 
                conducting required military operations to ensure the 
                success of United States regional contingency plans 
                despite the threat or use of chemical or biological 
                weapons.
                    (B) Priorities.--An identification of priorities of 
                the executive branch of Government in the development 
                of both active and passive defenses against the use of 
                chemical and biological weapons.
                    (C) RDT&E and procurement of defenses.--A detailed 
                summary of all budget activities associated with the 
                research, development, testing, and evaluation, and 
                procurement of chemical and biological defenses, set 
                forth by fiscal year, program, department, and agency.
                    (D) Vaccine production and stocks.--A detailed 
                assessment of current and projected vaccine production 
                capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in 
                researching and developing a multivalent vaccine.
                    (E) Decontamination of infrastructure and 
                installations.--A detailed assessment of procedures and 
                capabilities necessary to protect and decontaminate 
                infrastructure and installations that support the 
                ability of the United States to project power through 
                the use of its Armed Forces, including progress in 
                developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination 
                capability.
                    (F) Protective gear.--A description of the progress 
                made in procuring lightweight personal protective gear 
                and steps being taken to ensure that programmed 
                procurement quantities are sufficient to replace 
                expiring battledress overgarments and chemical 
                protective overgarments to maintain required wartime 
                inventory levels.
                    (G) Detection and identification capabilities.--A 
                description of the progress made in developing long-
                range standoff detection and identification 
                capabilities and other battlefield surveillance 
                capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, 
                including progress on developing a multichemical agent 
                detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground 
                sensors.
                    (H) Theater missile defenses.--A description of the 
                progress made in developing and deploying layered 
                theater missile defenses for deployed United States 
                Armed Forces which will provide greater geographic 
                coverage against current and expected ballistic missile 
                threats and will assist the mitigation of chemical and 
                biological contamination through higher altitude 
                intercepts and boost-phase intercepts.
                    (I) Training and readiness.--An assessment of the 
                training and readiness of the United States Armed 
                Forces to operate in chemically and biologically 
                contaminated environments and actions taken to sustain 
                training and readiness, including at national combat 
                training centers.
                    (J) Military exercises.--A description of the 
                progress made in incorporating consideration about the 
                threat or use of chemical and biological weapons into 
                service and joint exercises as well as simulations, 
                models, and wargames, together with the conclusions 
                drawn from these efforts about the United States 
                capability to carry out required missions, including 
                with coalition partners, in military contingencies.
                    (K) Military doctrine.--A description of the 
                progress made in developing and implementing service 
                and joint doctrine for combat and noncombat operations 
                involving adversaries armed with chemical or biological 
                weapons, including efforts to update the range of 
                service and joint doctrine to better address the wide 
                range of military activities, including deployment, 
                reinforcement, and logistics operations in support of 
                combat operations, and for the conduct of such 
                operations in concert with coalition forces.
                    (L) Defense of civilian population.--A description 
                of the progress made in resolving issues relating to 
                the protection of United States population centers from 
                chemical and biological attack and from the 
                consequences of such an attack, including plans for 
                inoculation of populations, consequence management, and 
                progress made in developing and deploying effective 
                cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic 
                missile defense.

SEC. 208. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that in order 
to achieve an effective deterrence against attacks of the United States 
and United States Armed Forces by chemical weapons, the President 
should reevaluate the extension of negative security assurances by the 
United States to nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report, both in 
classified and unclassified forms, setting forth--
            (1) the findings of a detailed review of United States 
        policy on negative security assurances as a deterrence 
        strategy; and
            (2) a determination by the President of the appropriate 
        range of nuclear and conventional responses to the use of 
        chemical or biological weapons against the United States Armed 
        Forces, United States citizens, allies, and third parties.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Negative security assurances.--The term ``negative 
        security assurances'' means the assurances provided by the 
        United States to nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) 
        that the United States will forswear the use of certain weapons 
        unless the United States is attacked by that nonnuclear-weapon 
        state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.
            (2) Nonnuclear-weapon states.--The term ``nonnuclear-weapon 
        states'' means states that are not nuclear-weapon states, as 
        defined in Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
        of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 
        1, 1968 (21 UST 483).

SEC. 209. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.

    (a) Prohibition.--The President shall not issue any order or 
directive that diminishes, abridges, or alters the right of the United 
States to use riot control agents--
            (1) in any circumstance not involving international armed 
        conflict; or
            (2) in a defensive military mode to save lives in an 
        international armed conflict, as provided for in Executive 
        Order No. 11850 of April 9, 1975.
    (b) Circumstances Not Involving International Armed Conflict.--The 
use of riot control agents under subsection (a)(1) includes the use of 
such agents in--
            (1) peacekeeping or peace support operations;
            (2) humanitarian or disaster relief operations;
            (3) noncombatant evacuation operations;
            (4) counterterrorist operations and the rescue of hostages; 
        and
            (5) law enforcement operations and other internal 
        conflicts.
    (c) Defensive Military Mode.--The use of riot control agents under 
subsection (a)(2) may include the use of such agents--
            (1) in areas under direct and distinct United States 
        military control, including the use of such agents for the 
        purposes of controlling rioting or escaping enemy prisoners of 
        war;
            (2) to protect personnel or material from civil 
        disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations;
            (3) to minimize casualties during rescue missions of downed 
        air crews and passengers, prisoners of war, or hostages;
            (4) in situations where combatants and noncombatants are 
        intermingled; and
            (5) in support of base defense, rear area operations, 
        noncombatant evacuation operations, and operations to protect 
        or recover nuclear weapons.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
international law permits the United States to use herbicides, under 
regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation 
within United States bases and installations or around their immediate 
defensive perimeters.
    (e) Authority of the President.--The President shall take all 
necessary measures, and prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary, to ensure that the policy contained in this section is 
observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

            Passed the Senate April 17, 1997.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 495

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To provide criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful acquisition, 
 transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon, and to 
 reduce the threat of acts of terrorism or armed aggression involving 
the use of any such weapon against the United States, its citizens, or 
 Armed Forces, or those of any allied country, and for other purposes.