[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1873 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 1873

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a 
missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United 
            States against limited ballistic missile attack.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 27, 1998

   Mr. Cochran (for himself, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Lott, Mr. 
 Thurmond, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Helms, Mr. Warner, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Nickles, 
 Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Craig, 
   Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Burns, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Mack, Mr. 
 McConnell, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Allard, Mr. Sessions, Mr. 
   Faircloth, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Bond, Mr. 
   Hagel, Mr. Frist, Mr. Abraham, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Smith of 
Oregon, Mr. McCain, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Ashcroft, and Mr. Grams) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                           on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a 
missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United 
            States against limited ballistic missile attack.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``American Missile Protection Act of 
1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
        long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious 
        security issues facing the United States.
                    (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton 
                certified, that ``I ... find that the proliferation of 
                nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of 
                mass destruction') and the means of delivering such 
                weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
                to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
                of the United States, and hereby declare a national 
                emergency to deal with that threat.'' This state of 
                emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
                    (B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is 
                nothing more important to our security and the world's 
                stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
                and ballistic missiles''.
                    (C) Several countries hostile to the United States 
                have been particularly determined to acquire missiles 
                and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton 
                observed in January of 1998, for example, that ``Saddam 
                Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and 
                much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the 
                Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and 
                biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them''.
                    (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in 
                the supreme interest of the United States to defend 
                itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile 
                attack, whatever the source.''
            (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United 
        States is increasing.
                    (A) Several adversaries of the United States have 
                stated their intention to acquire intercontinental 
                ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United 
                States.
                            (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has 
                        stated, ``If they know that you have a 
                        deterrent force capable of hitting the United 
                        States, they would not be able to hit you. If 
                        we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that 
                        could reach New York--we would have hit it at 
                        the same moment. Consequently, we should build 
                        this force so that they and others will no 
                        longer think about an attack.''
                            (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine 
                        Liberation Front, has stated, ``I would love to 
                        be able to reach the American shore, but this 
                        is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will 
                        have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab 
                        country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better 
                        for the United States and for Israel to reach 
                        peace with the Palestinians before that day.''
                            (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our 
                        missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could 
                        reach Washington, we would strike if the need 
                        arose.''
                            (iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. 
                        Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range 
                        ballistic missiles capable of striking Central 
                        Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration 
                        of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent 
                        to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-
                        increasing range.
                    (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic 
                missiles, with at least 10 of those countries 
                developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.
                    (C) From the end of World War II until 1980, 
                ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since 
                1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired 
                in at least six different conflicts.
                    (D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the 
                United States is toward having ballistic missiles of 
                greater range.
                            (i) North Korea first acquired 300-
                        kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and 
                        deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is 
                        currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range 
                        No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer 
                        range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range 
                        Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of 
                        striking Alaska and Hawaii.
                            (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-
                        8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C, 
                        and is developing the 1300-kilometer range 
                        Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4, 
                        which would allow Iran to strike Central 
                        Europe.
                            (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, 
                        produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with 
                        twice the range of its Scud Bs.
                            (iv) Experience gained from extending the 
                        range of short- and medium-range ballistic 
                        missiles facilitates the development of 
                        intercontinental ballistic missiles.
                    (E) The technical information, hardware, and other 
                resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are 
                increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
                            (i) Due to advances in information 
                        technology, a vast amount of technical 
                        information relating to ballistic missile 
                        design, much of it formerly classified, has 
                        become widely available and is increasingly 
                        accessible through the Internet and other 
                        distribution avenues.
                            (ii) Components, tools, and materials to 
                        support ballistic missile development are 
                        increasingly available in the commercial 
                        aerospace industry.
                            (iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based 
                        telecommunications is adding to the demand for 
                        commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ 
                        technology that is essentially identical to 
                        that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As 
                        this increasing demand is met, the technology 
                        and expertise associated with space launch 
                        vehicles also proliferate.
                    (F) Russia and China have provided significant 
                technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile 
                programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In 
                June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
                reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-
                related equipment, materials, and technology, stated 
                that ``China and Russia continued to be the primary 
                suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem 
                the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to 
                countries of concern.''
                    (G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile 
                proliferation.
                            (i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not 
                        to assist Iran with its ballistic missile 
                        program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                        State for Nonproliferation testified to the 
                        Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a 
                        disconnect between those reassurances, which we 
                        welcome, and what we believe is actually 
                        occurring.''
                            (ii) Regarding China's actions to 
                        demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to 
                        nonproliferation, the Director of Central 
                        Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 
                        28, 1998, that, ``the jury is still out on 
                        whether the recent changes are broad enough in 
                        scope and whether they will hold over the 
                        longer term. As such, Chinese activities in 
                        this area will require continued close 
                        watching.''
                    (H) The inability of the United States to defend 
                itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by 
                long-range ballistic missile provides additional 
                incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range 
                ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United 
                States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools 
                for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.
            (3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future 
        ballistic missile threats is questionable.
                    (A) The Intelligence Community has failed to 
                anticipate many past technical innovations (for 
                example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and 
                its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside 
                assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional 
                technological obstacles to obtaining or developing 
                ballistic missiles of increasing range.
                    (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence reported to Congress that ``many Third 
                World countries--with Iran being the most prominent 
                example--are responding to Western counter-
                proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate 
                commercial firms as procurement fronts and by 
                developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
                    (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central 
                Intelligence stated to Congress that ``gaps and 
                uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly 
                when `rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
                    (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence 
                testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile 
                by 2007. One year later the Director stated, ``since I 
                testified, Iran's success in getting technology and 
                materials from Russian companies, combined with recent 
                indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a 
                medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last 
                year.'' Department of State officials have testified 
                that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as 
                early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been 
                predicted one year before by the Director of Central 
                Intelligence.
            (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range 
        ballistic missile threats could have severe national security 
        and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
                    (A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic 
                missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction 
                could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens 
                of the United States and severe damage to their 
                property.
                    (B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United 
                States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may 
                constrain the United States' options in dealing with 
                regional threats to its interests, deter the United 
                States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies 
                to question United States security guarantees, thereby 
                weakening alliances of the United States and the United 
                States' world leadership position.
            (5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations 
        acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of 
        mass destruction.
                    (A) In its resolution of ratification for the START 
                II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that 
                ``because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the 
                United States against long-range ballistic missile 
                threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new 
                deterrent strategies.''
                    (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense 
                Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now 
                have opportunity to create a new relationship based not 
                on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather 
                on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''
                    (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and 
                the administration are quite willing to acknowledge 
                that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, 
                beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of 
                reaching the United States, we would have to give very, 
                very serious attention to deploying a limited national 
                missile defense.''
            (6) The United States has no defense deployed against 
        weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic 
        missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile 
        defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or 
deliberate).
                                 <all>