[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 188 Engrossed in House (EH)]


                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                      November 6, 1997.
Whereas the United States escort vessel U.S.S. Stark was struck by a cruise 
        missile in the Persian Gulf, causing the death of 37 United States 
        sailors;
Whereas the China National Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation is 
        marketing the C-802 model cruise missile for use against escort vessels 
        such as the U.S.S. Stark;
Whereas the China National Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation 
        delivered 60 C-802 cruise missiles to Iran for use by vessels of the 
        Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy;
Whereas Iran is constructing sites and equipment to launch C-802 cruise missiles 
        which will provide its armed forces with a weapon of greater range, 
        reliability, accuracy, and mobility than before;
Whereas 15,000 members of the United States Armed Forces are stationed within 
        the range of the C-802 cruise missiles acquired by Iran;
Whereas the Department of State believes that ``[t]hese cruise missiles pose 
        new, direct threats to deployed United States forces'';
Whereas the delivery of cruise missiles to Iran is a violation of the Iran-Iraq 
        Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
Whereas the executive branch has concluded at present that the known types (of 
        C-802 cruise missiles) are not of a ``destabilizing number and type'';
Whereas there is substantial evidence that missile technology and technical 
        advice have been provided from Russia to Iran, in violation of the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime;
Whereas these violations include providing assistance to Iran in developing 
        ballistic missiles, including the transfer of wind tunnel and rocket 
        engine testing equipment;
Whereas these technologies give Iran the capability to deploy a missile of 
        sufficient range to threaten United States military installations in the 
        Middle East and Persian Gulf, as well as the territory of Israel, and 
        our North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Turkey; and
Whereas President Clinton has raised with Russian President Boris Yeltsin United 
        States concerns about these activities and the Russian response has to 
        date been inadequate: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
            (1) finds that the delivery of cruise missiles to Iran is of a 
        destabilizing number and type and, therefore, is a violation of the 
        Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
            (2) urges the executive branch to enforce the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to the 
        acquisition by Iran of C-802 model cruise missiles; and
            (3) recommends that the Secretary of State should not issue any visa 
        to, and the Attorney General should not admit to the United States, any 
        national of the People's Republic of China where a consular officer or 
        the Attorney General knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
        applicant has been materially involved in the proliferation of advanced 
        conventional weapons; nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or 
        technology; or other sensitive or dual-use technologies, in 
        contravention of United States interests.
    Sec. 2. It is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
            (1) the President should demand that the Government of Russia take 
        concrete actions to stop governmental and nongovernmental entities in 
        the Russian Federation from providing missile technology and technical 
        advice to Iran, in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime;
            (2) if the Russian response is inadequate, the United States should 
        impose sanctions on the responsible Russian entities in accordance with 
        Executive Order No. 12938 on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction, and reassess cooperative activities with Russia;
            (3) the threshold under current law allowing for the waiver of the 
        prohibition on the release of foreign assistance to Russia should be 
        raised; and
            (4) the European allies of the United States should be encouraged to 
        take steps in accordance with their own laws to stop such proliferation.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.