[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3710 Introduced in House (IH)]
105th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 3710
To exonerate the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III, captain of
the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS when it was sunk on July 30, 1945, from
responsibility for that sinking, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 22, 1998
Mr. Scarborough (for himself, Ms. Carson, Mr. Cunningham, Mrs. Mink of
Hawaii, Mr. Sawyer, Mr. Abercrombie, and Mr. Frost) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on National
Security
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To exonerate the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III, captain of
the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS when it was sunk on July 30, 1945, from
responsibility for that sinking, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Charles Butler McVay and U.S.S.
INDIANAPOLIS Relief Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Shortly after midnight on the night of July 30, 1945,
during the closing days of World War II, the United States Navy
heavy cruiser U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) was torpedoed and
sunk by a Japanese submarine.
(2) Of the 1,196 crew members, only 316 survived the attack
and subsequent five-day ordeal adrift at sea, the rest of the
crew dying from battle wounds, drowning, shark attacks,
exposure, or lack of food and water, making the sinking of the
INDIANAPOLIS the worst sea disaster in United States naval
history.
(3) Following the rescue of the surviving crew members, the
commanding officer of the INDIANAPOLIS, Captain Charles Butler
McVay III, who survived the sinking and the ordeal at sea, was
charged with ``suffering a vessel to be hazarded through
negligence'' and was convicted by a court-martial of that
charge, notwithstanding a great many extenuating circumstances,
some of which were not presented at the court-martial trial.
(4) Captain McVay had an excellent record throughout his
naval career before the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS, beginning
with his graduation from the United States Naval Academy in
1919 and including an excellent combat record throughout World
War II that included participation in the landings in North
Africa and award of the Silver Star for courage under fire
earned during the Solomon Island campaign.
(5) Assuming command of the INDIANAPOLIS on November 18,
1944, Captain McVay led the ship during her participation in
the assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. During the latter
assault, the INDIANAPOLIS suffered a damaging kamikaze attack,
but was skillfully returned by Captain McVay and her crew to
San Francisco for repairs.
(6) Following completion of those repairs, the INDIANAPOLIS
was given the mission of transporting to the island of Tinian
the vital parts for the two atomic bombs used in ending the war
against Japan, a mission which was completed successfully on
July 26, 1945, at a record average speed of 29 knots.
(7) Following the accomplishment of that mission, the
INDIANAPOLIS sailed from Tinian to Guam and from there embarked
for Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, to join with the fleet
assembling for the assault on Japan.
(8) Before that last voyage, the headquarters of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), failed to inform
Captain McVay of intelligence in its possession concerning the
activities of four Japanese submarines sighted along the route
the INDIANAPOLIS would be sailing and where a Japanese
submarine had sunk the U.S.S. UNDERHILL just days earlier.
Nevertheless, Captain McVay was instructed to sail a direct
route from Guam to Leyte, although this route brought the ship
to the crossroads of the Guam-Leyte and Palau-Okinawa routes,
an area that Japanese submarines would likely have heavily
targeted due to the greater chance of spotting United States
naval traffic there.
(9) Because the INDIANAPOLIS did not have the capabilities
to detect enemy submarines, Captain McVay in Guam requested a
destroyer escort for the voyage to Leyte Gulf, a request which
was denied, making the INDIANAPOLIS the first United States
heavy warship to make that crossing unescorted during World War
II.
(10) After the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk, various Navy shore
offices compounded the previous errors which had led to the
ship being placed in jeopardy by failing to report the ship's
overdue arrival, thus leaving the approximately 950 members of
the crew who survived the sinking of the ship adrift for four days and
five nights until by chance the survivors were spotted by a routine air
patrol.
(11) Because the news of the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS,
coinciding with the end of the war in the Pacific, threatened
to detract from the Navy's role in that victory and from its
desire for prominent status in the post-war military
establishment, the Department of the Navy court-martialed
Captain McVay, who thus became the first United States Navy
commanding officer brought to trial for losing his ship in
combat in World War II, despite the fact that over 700 ships
were lost during World War II, including some under
questionable circumstances.
(12) A court of inquiry to investigate the sinking,
convened on August 13, 1945, just two weeks after the sinking
and 9 days after the survivors were rescued (a date so soon
after the sinking that Captain William Hillbert, the Navy judge
advocate for the inquiry, admitted that the inquiry was so
rushed that they were ``. . . starting the proceedings without
having available all the necessary data''), recommended that
Captain McVay be issued a Letter of Reprimand and that he be
court-martialed.
(13) The court-martial charge against Captain McVay was
entirely predicated upon his failure to order that the ship
maintain a zigzag course even though (A) standing orders stated
that zigzagging was not necessary during poor visibility
(reported to have been at best ``patchy'' that night), (B)
Mochitsura Hashimoto, the Japanese submarine commander who sank
the ship, testified at the inquiry that it would not have made
any difference if the ship were zigzagging or not, and (C) the
headquarters staff of CINCPAC concluded that the rule requiring
zigzagging would not have applied in any event since Captain
McVay's routine orders gave him discretion on the matter and
took precedence over all other orders (a point that was never
made by Captain McVay's attorney).
(14) The headquarters staff of CINCPAC disagreed with the
recommendation of the court of inquiry that Captain McVay
receive a Letter of Reprimand and that he be court-martialed,
stating that in not maintaining a zigzag course Captain McVay
at worst was guilty only of an error in judgment and not gross
negligence.
(15) Captain McVay was convicted on February 23, 1946, of
the charge of ``suffering a vessel to be hazarded through
negligence''.
(16) Following his court-martial conviction, Captain McVay
remained on active duty until mandatory retirement on June 30,
1949, upon completion of 30 years of active naval service, with
a final promotion, in accordance with then-applicable law, to
the grade of rear admiral, effective upon the date of his
retirement.
(17) Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III (retired), died
on November 6, 1968, without having been exonerated from
responsibility for the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS.
(18) Since the late 1980s, Navy documents have been
declassified that show that Captain McVay was not given
intelligence information in the possession of the Navy that
would have been instrumental in avoiding the disaster and that
that information, which was considered to be Top Secret, was
not made available for use in Captain McVay's court-martial,
where it would have been critical to his defense in showing
that he was court-martialed on ``super-technical'' charges
which nevertheless were unfounded.
(19) In 1993, Congress, in section 1165 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-
160; 107 Stat. 1765; 16 U.S.C. 431 note), recognized the
memorial to the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) in Indianapolis,
Indiana, as the national memorial to that historic warship and
to her final crew.
(20) In 1994, Congress, in section 1052 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-
337; 108 Stat. 2844), stating that it was acting on behalf of
the grateful people of the United States--
(A) recognized the invaluable contributions of the
U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS to the ending of World War II; and
(B) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of her
tragic sinking, and the dedication of the national
memorial in Indianapolis on July 30th, 1995, commended
that ship and her crew for selfless and heroic service
to the United States.
SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL EXONERATION.
The Congress hereby--
(1) exonerates the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay
III, United States Navy (retired), from responsibility for the
sinking of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) on July 30, 1945,
while under his command;
(2) expresses the sense of the Congress that the subsequent
court-martial conviction of Rear Admiral McVay (while in the
grade of captain) for ``suffering a vessel to be hazarded
through negligence'' was a grave injustice; and
(3) urges the President to grant a posthumous pardon to
Rear Admiral McVay.
SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that the
President should award a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew
of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS (CA-35) in recognition of the courage and
fortitude displayed by the members of that crew in the face of
tremendous hardship and adversity after their ship was torpedoed and
sunk on July 30, 1945.
(b) Waiver of Time Limitation.--A citation described in subsection
(a) may be made without regard to any provision of law or regulation
prescribing a time limitation that is otherwise applicable with respect
to recommendation for, or the award of, such a citation.
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