[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1758 Introduced in House (IH)]







105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1758

      To ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) proceeds in a manner consistent with United States 
   interests, to strengthen relations between the United States and 
 Russia, to preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to 
        certain arms control agreements, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 3, 1997

 Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. Armey, Mr. Solomon, Mr. Goss, Mr. Weldon 
 of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Cox of California) introduced the following 
  bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
      To ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) proceeds in a manner consistent with United States 
   interests, to strengthen relations between the United States and 
 Russia, to preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to 
        certain arms control agreements, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``European Security Act of 1997''.

SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    The Congress declares the following to be the policy of the United 
States:
            (1) Policy with respect to nato enlargement.--(A) The 
        emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that will be 
        invited to begin accession negotiations with the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in Madrid on July 
        8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last such countries invited to 
        join NATO.
            (B) The United States should seek to ensure that the NATO 
        leaders assembled in Madrid agree on a process whereby all 
        other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that 
        wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO as 
        soon as they meet the criteria for such membership.
            (2) Policy with respect to negotiations with russia.--(A) 
        NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to 
        underscore the Alliance's defensive nature and demonstrate to 
        Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all 
        countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United 
        States and its NATO Allies should make this intention clear in 
        the negotiations with Russia, including those regarding 
        adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 
        Treaty of November 19, 1990.
            (B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive 
        and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither 
        fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the 
        effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance 
        be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments should be made to 
        Russia that would have the effect of--
                    (i) extending rights or imposing responsibilities 
                on new NATO members different from those applicable to 
                current NATO members, including with respect to the 
                deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of 
                troops and equipment from other NATO members;
                    (ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the 
                territory of new NATO members by, for example, 
                restricting the construction of defense infrastructure 
                or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary 
                reinforcements;
                    (iii) providing any international organization, or 
                any country that is not a member of NATO, with 
                authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede 
                deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic 
                Council or the implementation of such decisions, 
                including with respect to the deployment of NATO forces 
                or the admission of additional members to NATO; or
                    (iv) impeding the development of enhanced relations 
                between NATO and other European countries that do not 
                belong to the Alliance.
            (C) In order to enhance security and stability in Europe, 
        the United States should seek commitments from the Russian 
        Federation--
                    (i) to demarcate and respect all its borders with 
                neighboring states;
                    (ii) to station its armed forces on the territory 
                of other states only with the consent of such states 
                and in strict accordance with international law; and
                    (iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and 
                conventional forces in Kaliningrad.
            (D) As negotiations on adaptation of the Conventional Armed 
        Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty proceed, the United States should 
        engage in close and continuous consultations not only with its 
        NATO allies, but also with the emerging democracies of Central 
        and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the newly independent states 
        of the Caucasus region.
            (3) Policy with respect to ballistic missile defense 
        cooperation with russia.--(A) As the United States proceeds 
        with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile 
        attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation with 
        Russia on matters related to missile defense. In particular, 
        the United States and its NATO allies should seek to cooperate 
        with Russia in such areas as early warning and technical 
        aspects of ballistic missile defense.
            (B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile 
        defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its 
        constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms 
        control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile 
        defense.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).
    (b) Designation of Additional Countries Eligible for NATO 
Enlargement Assistance.--
            (1) Designation of additional countries.--Effective 180 
        days after the date of the enactment of this Act, Romania, 
        Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are each designated as eligible 
        to receive assistance under the program established under 
        section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and shall 
        be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 
        203(d)(1) of such Act, except that any such country shall not 
        be so designated if, prior to such effective date, the 
        President certifies to the Committee on International Relations 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate that the country fails to meet the 
        criteria under section 203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation Act 
        of 1994.
            (2) Rule of construction.--The designation of countries 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance 
        under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO 
        Participation Act of 1994--
                    (A) is in addition to the designation of other 
                countries by law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of 
                such Act as eligible to receive assistance under the 
                program established under section 203(a) of such Act; 
                and
                    (B) shall not preclude the designation by the 
                President of other emerging democracies in Central and 
                Eastern Europe pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such 
                Act as eligible to receive assistance under the program 
                established under section 203(a) of such Act.
            (3) Sense of the congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
        that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--
                    (A) are to be commended for their progress toward 
                political and economic reform and meeting the 
                guidelines for prospective NATO members;
                    (B) would make an outstanding contribution to 
                furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, 
                freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO 
                members; and
                    (C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant 
                criteria should be invited to become full NATO members 
                at the earliest possible date.
    (c) Regional Airspace Initiative and Partnership for Peace 
Information Management System.--
            (1) In general.--Funds described in paragraph (2) are 
        authorized to be made available to support the implementation 
        of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for 
        Peace Information Management System, including--
                    (A) the procurement of items in support of these 
                programs; and
                    (B) the transfer of such items to countries 
                participating in these programs.
            (2) Funds described.--Funds described in this paragraph are 
        funds that are available--
                    (A) during any fiscal year under the NATO 
                Participation Act of 1994 with respect to countries 
                eligible for assistance under that Act; or
                    (B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry 
                out the Warsaw Initiative.
    (d) Extension of Authority Regarding Excess Defense Articles.--
Section 105 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1427) is amended by 
striking ``1996 and 1997'' and inserting ``1997, 1998, and 1999''.
    (e) Conforming Amendments to the NATO Participation Act of 1994.--
Section 203(c) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``, without regard to the 
        restrictions'' and all that follows and inserting a period;
            (2) by striking paragraph (2);
            (3) in paragraph (6), by striking ``appropriated under the 
        `Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund' account'' and inserting 
``made available for the `Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund''';
            (4) in paragraph (8)--
                    (A) by striking ``any restrictions in sections 516 
                and 519'' and inserting ``section 516(e)'';
                    (B) by striking ``as amended,''; and
                    (C) by striking ``paragraphs (1) and (2)'' and 
                inserting ``paragraph (1)''; and
            (5) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as 
        paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively.

SEC. 4. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 
              IN EUROPE.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(2).
    (b) Authority To Approve the CFE Flank Agreement.--The President is 
authorized to approve on behalf of the United States the Document 
Agreed Among States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe of November 19, 1990, adopted in Vienna, Austria on May 31, 
1996, concerning the resolution of issues related to the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank zone.
    (c) Sense of Congress With Respect to CFE Adaptation.--It is the 
sense of Congress that any revisions to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe that may be agreed in the ongoing CFE adaptation 
negotiations can enter into force only if those revisions are 
specifically approved in a manner described in section 33(b) of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)), and no such 
approval will be provided to any revisions to that Treaty that 
jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in Europe or 
the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance by--
            (1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new 
        NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO 
        members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear 
        weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other 
        NATO members;
            (2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of 
        new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction 
        of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to 
        deploy necessary reinforcements;
            (3) providing any international organization, or any 
        country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to review, 
        delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of 
        the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such 
        decisions, including with respect to the deployment of NATO 
        forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; or
            (4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between 
        NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the 
        Alliance by, for example, recognizing spheres of influence in 
        Europe.

SEC. 5. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH RUSSIA.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(A).
    (b) Establishment of Program of Ballistic Missile Defense 
Cooperation With Russia.--The Secretary of Defense is authorized to 
carry out a program of cooperative ballistic missile defense-related 
projects with the Russian Federation.
    (c) Conduct of Program.--The program of cooperative ballistic 
missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation under 
subsection (b) may include (but is not limited to) projects in the 
following areas:
            (1) Cooperation between the United States and the Russian 
        Federation with respect to early warning of ballistic missile 
        launches, including the sharing of information on ballistic 
        missile launches detected by either the United States or the 
        Russian Federation, formalization of an international launch 
        notification regime, and development of a joint global warning 
        center.
            (2) Technical cooperation in research, development, test, 
        and production of technology and systems for ballistic missile 
        defense.
            (3) Conduct of joint ballistic missile defense exercises.
            (4) Planning for cooperation in defense against ballistic 
        missile threats aimed at either the United States or the 
        Russian Federation.
    (d) Dialogue With Russia.--The President should seek to initiate a 
dialogue with the Russian Federation aimed at exploring the potential 
for mutual accommodation of outstanding issues between the two nations 
on matters relating to ballistic missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possibility of developing a 
strategic relationship not based on mutual nuclear threats.
    (e) Annual Report.--Not later than January 1, 1998, January 1, 
1999, and January 1, 2000, the President shall submit to the Congress a 
report on the cooperative program under this section. Each such report 
shall include the following:
            (1) A description of the conduct of the program during the 
        preceding fiscal year, including a description of the projects 
        carried out under the program.
            (2) A description of the status of the dialogue under 
        subsection (d) during the preceding fiscal year.
            (3) A description of the funding for the program during the 
        preceding fiscal year and the year during which the report is 
        submitted and the proposed funding for the program for the next 
        fiscal year.

SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ABM/TMD DEMARCATION 
              AGREEMENTS.

    (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(B).
    (b) Restriction.--An ABM/TMD demarcation agreement shall not be 
binding on the United States, and shall not enter into force with 
respect to the United States, unless, after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, that agreement is specifically approved in a manner 
described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
U.S.C. 2573(b)).
    (c) Sense of Congress With Respect to Demarcation Agreements.--
            (1) Opposition to multilateralization of abm treaty.--It is 
        the sense of the Congress that until the United States has 
        taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains 
        a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian 
        Federation (such state being the only successor state of the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed or 
        realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense 
        system) no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered for 
        approval for entry into force with respect to the United States 
        (any such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be 
        effective only if provided in a manner described in section 
        33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2573(b))).
            (2) Preservation of u.s. theater ballistic missile defense 
        potential.--It is the sense of the Congress that no ABM/TMD 
        demarcation agreement that would reduce the potential of United 
        States theater missile defense systems to defend the Armed 
        Forces of the United States abroad or the armed forces or 
        population of allies of the United States will be approved for 
        entry into force with respect to the United States (any such 
        approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be effective only if 
        provided in a manner described in section 33(b) of the Arms 
        Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).
    (d) ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreement Defined.--For the purposes of 
this section, the term ``ABM/TMD demarcation agreement'' means an 
agreement that establishes a demarcation between theater ballistic 
missile defense systems and strategic anti-ballistic missile defense 
systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty, including the following:
            (1) The agreement concluded by the Standing Consultative 
        Commission on June 24, 1996, concerning lower velocity theater 
        missile defense systems.
            (2) The agreement concluded (or to be concluded) by the 
        Standing Consultative Commission concerning higher velocity 
        theater missile defense systems, based on the Joint Statement 
        Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issued on March 
        21, 1997, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit.
            (3) Any agreement similar to the agreements identified in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2).
    (e) ABM Treaty Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term 
``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23 UST 
3435), and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on 
July 3, 1974 (27 UST 1645).
                                 <all>