[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 170 Introduced in House (IH)]







105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 170

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to 
negotiate a new base rights agreement with the Government of Panama to 
   permit the United States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond 
December 31, 1999, and to permit the United States to act independently 
 to continue to protect the Panama Canal and to guarantee its regular 
                               operation.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 9, 1997

Mr. Crane (for himself, Mr. Stump, Mr. Hostettler, Mr. Barr of Georgia, 
  Mr. Gibbons, and Mr. Snowbarger) submitted the following concurrent 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to 
negotiate a new base rights agreement with the Government of Panama to 
   permit the United States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond 
December 31, 1999, and to permit the United States to act independently 
 to continue to protect the Panama Canal and to guarantee its regular 
                               operation.

Whereas the Panama Canal is a vital strategic asset to the United States and its 
        allies;
Whereas the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the 
        Panama Canal and the Panama Canal Treaty, both signed on September 7, 
        1977, mandates that (1) no United States troops are to remain in Panama 
        after December 31, 1999; (2) the Canal Zone is to be incorporated into 
        Panama; (3) United States Panama-based communications facilities are to 
        be phased out; (4) all United States training in Panama of Latin 
        American soldiers is to be halted; and (5) management and operational 
        control of the Canal is to be turned over to Panamanian authorities;
Whereas friendly cooperative relations currently exist between the United States 
        and the Republic of Panama;
Whereas the region has a history of unstable governments which pose a threat to 
        the future operation of the Panama Canal, and the United States must 
        have the discretion and the means to defend the Canal and ensure its 
        continuous operation and availability to the military and commercial 
        shipping of the United States and its allies in times of crisis;
Whereas the Panama Canal is vulnerable to disruption and closure by unforeseen 
        events in Panama, by terrorist attack, and by air strikes or other 
        attack by foreign powers;
Whereas the United States fleet depends upon the Panama Canal for rapid transit 
        ocean to ocean in times of emergency, as demonstrated during World War 
        II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 
        Persian Gulf War, thereby saving 13,000 miles and three weeks steaming 
        effort around Cape Horn;
Whereas nearly 15 percent of all United States trade, approximately 10 percent 
        of Latin America's trade, and almost 5 percent of the world's trade 
        transit the Panama Canal;
Whereas the Republic of Panama has dissolved its defense forces and has no 
        standing army, or other defense forces, capable of defending the Panama 
        Canal from aggressors and, therefore, remains vulnerable to attack from 
        both inside and outside of Panama and this may impair or interrupt the 
        operation and accessibility of the Panama Canal;
Whereas the presence of the United States Armed Forces offers the best defense 
        against sabotage or other threat to the Panama Canal; and
Whereas the 10,000 United States military personnel now based in the Canal Zone, 
        including the headquarters of the United States Southern Command, cannot 
        remain there beyond December 31, 1999, without a new agreement with 
        Panama: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should--
            (1) negotiate a new base rights agreement with the 
        Government of Panama--
                    (A) to allow the permanent stationing of United 
                States military forces in Panama beyond December 31, 
                1999, and
                    (B) to ensure that the United States will be able 
                to act independently after December 31, 1999, to 
                maintain the security of the Panama Canal and to 
                guarantee its regular operation; and
            (2) consult with the Congress throughout the negotiations 
        described in paragraph (1).
                                 <all>