[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1776 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1776

    To amend the Revised Statutes to restore standards for proving 
                      intentional discrimination.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 22, 1993

 Mr. Metzenbaum (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Wofford,  Mrs. Murray, 
and Mr. Simon) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
         referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To amend the Revised Statutes to restore standards for proving 
                      intentional discrimination.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Civil Rights Standards Restoration 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--
            (1) the Supreme Court enunciated a method of proving 
        intentional discrimination under Federal law in McDonnell 
        Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas 
        Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
        (1981);
            (2) such method has been applied to establish intentional 
        discrimination in cases and proceedings under title VII of the 
        Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), title VIII 
        of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), the 
        Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et 
        seq.), and other Federal laws; and
            (3) the standards established in St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
        Hicks, No. 92-602 (1993), regarding the effect of a finding of 
        pretext on proof of unlawful intentional discrimination, are 
        contrary to--
                    (A) such method established by the Supreme Court in 
                McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Department 
                of Community Affairs v. Burdine; and
                    (B) congressional intent regarding such Federal 
                laws.

SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

    The purposes of this Act are--
            (1) to restore the standards (regarding the effect of a 
        finding of pretext on proof of unlawful intentional 
        discrimination) enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
        Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Department of Community 
        Affairs v. Burdine as part of a method of proving intentional 
        discrimination; and
            (2) to ensure the application of such restored standards in 
        all cases and proceedings under Federal law (including title 
        VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VIII of the Civil 
        Rights Act of 1968, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
        1967, and other Federal laws) to which such method applies.

SEC. 4. STANDARDS FOR PROVING INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN CERTAIN 
              CIRCUMSTANCES.

    The Revised Statutes are amended by inserting after section 1979 
(42 U.S.C. 1983) the following new section:

``SEC. 1979A. STANDARDS FOR PROVING INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
              CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

    ``(a) Standards.--In a case or proceeding brought under Federal law 
in which a complaining party meets its burden of proving a prima facie 
case of unlawful intentional discrimination and the respondent meets 
its burden of clearly and specifically articulating a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory explanation for the conduct at issue through the 
introduction of admissible evidence, unlawful intentional 
discrimination shall be established where the complaining party 
persuades a trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that--
            ``(1) a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
        respondent; or
            ``(2) the respondent's proffered explanation is unworthy of 
        credence.
    ``(b) Rule of Construction.--This section shall apply only to those 
cases and proceedings in which the method of proof articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), 
applies and shall not be construed to specify the exclusive means by 
which the complaining party may establish unlawful intentional 
discrimination under Federal law.''.

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