[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 292 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 292

    To approve and encourage the use by the President of any means 
 necessary and appropriate, including diplomacy, economic sanctions, a 
blockade, and military force, to prevent the development, acquisition, 
          or use by North Korea of a nuclear explosive device.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 15, 1993

    Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. Murtha, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Hyde) 
 introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION


 
    To approve and encourage the use by the President of any means 
 necessary and appropriate, including diplomacy, economic sanctions, a 
blockade, and military force, to prevent the development, acquisition, 
          or use by North Korea of a nuclear explosive device.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Nuclear 
Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution''.

SEC. 2. NORTH KOREA'S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

    The Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (in this 
        joint resolution referred to as ``North Korea'') has for over a 
        decade pursued a program aimed at the development of a nuclear 
        explosive device.
            (2) Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey has 
        testified before the Congress that North Korea is the most 
        urgent threat to United States national security in East Asia, 
        that there is a real possibility that North Korea has produced 
        enough nuclear material to build at least 1 nuclear explosive 
        device, and that possession by North Korea of such a device 
        would threaten United States allies in all of Asia as well as 
        United States forces in the region.
            (3) On December 12, 1985, North Korea became a party to the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-
        nuclear-weapon state.
            (4) On December 30, 1991, North Korea and the Republic of 
        Korea reached a bilateral denuclearization agreement forbidding 
        the production, possession, or deployment of nuclear weapons, 
        reprocessing facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities on 
        the Korean Peninsula.
            (5) Although the bilateral denuclearization agreement 
        between North Korea and the Republic of Korea provided for 
        bilateral inspections of nuclear facilities, North Korea has 
        refused to permit any inspections pursuant to that agreement.
            (6) In belated compliance with its obligations under the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, North Korea 
        concluded a Fullscope Safeguards Agreement with the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency on January 30, 1992. This 
        agreement permits the International Atomic Energy Agency to 
        conduct both regular and special inspections of nuclear sites 
        in North Korea in order to verify compliance with the Treaty on 
        the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
            (7) While conducting inspections pursuant to the Fullscope 
        Safeguards Agreement in 1992, the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency uncovered evidence that North Korea has produced more 
        weapons-grade nuclear material than it has reported to the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency.
            (8) As part of its investigation of this matter, the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency requested special 
        inspections of two suspected nuclear sites on February 16, 
        1993.
            (9) In order to avoid International Atomic Energy Agency 
        inspection of these sites, North Korea on March 12, 1993, 
        announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
            (10) The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
        825 on May 11, 1993, which called upon North Korea to retract 
        its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and fully honor its 
        obligations under that treaty and the Fullscope Safeguards 
        Agreement. Resolution 825 also urged all member states of the 
        United Nations to encourage North Korea to respond positively 
        to the Security Council's action and to take all appropriate 
        steps vis-a-vis the North Korean government to facilitate 
        resolution of the matter.
            (11) As urged by Resolution 825, the United States has held 
        a series of meetings with representatives of the North Korean 
        government.
            (12) In the context of these meetings, North Korea agreed 
        on June 11, 1993, to suspend its announcement of withdrawal 
        from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        and to hold ``serious discussions'' with the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency regarding the resumption of inspections 
        pursuant to the Fullscope Safeguards Agreement, and with the 
        Republic of Korea regarding implementation of the bilateral 
        denuclearization agreement.
            (13) North Korea's discussions with the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency since June 11, 1993, have not resulted in 
        agreement regarding the resumption of inspections, and 
        discussions with the Republic of Korea have not resulted in 
        agreement regarding implementation of the bilateral 
        denuclearization agreement.
            (14) In the absence of agreement with the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency, no inspections are taking place at the 
        two North Korean nuclear facilities that were the subject of 
        the International Atomic Energy Agency's special inspections 
        request of February 16, 1993, and North Korea is, as a 
        practical matter, free to pursue the development of a nuclear 
        explosive device.
            (15) The current leadership of North Korea has, during the 
        more than 45 years that it has been in power, compiled a record 
        of aggression and lawlessness, including not only its invasion 
        of the Republic of Korea in 1950 triggering the Korean War, but 
        also countless acts of infiltration and subversion in the 
        Republic of Korea and international terrorism beyond the Korean 
        Peninsula.
            (16) Particularly in view of this history, the development 
        or acquisition by North Korea of a nuclear explosive device 
        would threaten international peace and security in Asia, not 
        least by requiring Japan and the Republic of Korea to consider 
        developing or acquiring nuclear devices of their own.
            (17) The United States is committed to the defense of the 
        Republic of Korea pursuant to the United States-Republic of 
        Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, and continues to station 
        approximately 37,000 members of the United States Armed Forces 
        in the Republic of Korea.
            (18) In view of the risks that would be associated with 
        development or acquisition by North Korea of a nuclear 
        explosive device, President Clinton on July 11, 1993, warned 
        that any use by North Korea of such a device would be met by 
        decisive United States retaliation.

SEC. 3. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW.

    The Congress finds and declares the following:
            (1) Self-defense is an inherent right of nations under 
        international law. This right was reaffirmed by Article 51 of 
        the Charter of the United Nations, which states ``Nothing in 
        the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
        individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
        against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
        Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
        peace and security.''.
            (2) President Kennedy's statement on October 22, 1962, 
        during the Cuban Missile Crisis, succinctly explains why the 
        term ``armed attack'' must be construed broadly with respect to 
        nuclear weapons:
                ``We no longer live in a world where only the actual 
                firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to 
                a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. 
                Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic 
                missiles are so swift that any substantially increased 
                possibility of their use or any sudden change in their 
                deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to 
                peace.''.
            (3) Many international legal scholars have recognized that 
        when a government begins making preparations to initiate 
        nuclear warfare, particularly when that government has a 
        history of committing unprovoked aggression, those preparations 
        may constitute an ``armed attack'' within the meaning of 
        Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. As President 
        Kennedy suggested, in the nuclear age ominous changes in the 
        availability or disposition of nuclear weapons can be as much 
        an armed attack as an army crossing a border. Such an armed 
        attack gives rise to the right of self-defense on the part of 
        those against whom the preparations to initiate nuclear warfare 
        are directed, including the right to use such force as may be 
        necessary and proportionate to eliminate the threat.
            (4) This principle of international law was the legal basis 
        for the naval blockade of Cuba ordered by President Kennedy 
        during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It also was the legal 
        basis for Israel's preemptive strike against the nuclear 
        reactor at Osirak, Iraq in 1981. Both actions defused serious 
        threats to international peace and security. Both illustrate 
        that no state will wait until it is too late to defend itself.
            (5) In view of the record of aggression and lawlessness 
        compiled by the current leadership of North Korea over the last 
        45 years and the determination with which North Korea is 
        pursuing the development of a nuclear explosive device, the 
        President may conclude that the threat posed by North Korea's 
        unsafeguarded nuclear program to such United States allies as 
        Japan and the Republic of Korea and to United States forces in 
        the region is so grave as to warrant unilateral United States 
        action to eliminate the threat.

SEC. 4. POLICY DECLARATIONS.

    The Congress approves and supports--
            (1) the determination of the President to prevent the 
        development or acquisition by North Korea of a nuclear 
        explosive device;
            (2) the President's efforts to induce North Korea to comply 
        fully with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the bilateral 
        denuclearization agreement with the Republic of Korea, 
        including the obligation to permit fullscope inspections of all 
        suspected nuclear weapons sites; and
            (3) the determination of the President to respond 
        appropriately should North Korea obtain a nuclear explosive 
        device and use such device against any ally of the United 
        States.

SEC. 5. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES.

    The Congress approves and encourages the use by the President of 
any means necessary and appropriate, including the use of diplomacy, 
economic sanctions, a blockade, and military force, to prevent--
            (1) the development or acquisition by North Korea of a 
        nuclear explosive device; or
            (2) the use by North Korea of such a device against United 
        States forces in the region or against any ally of the United 
        States.

SEC. 6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Requirement for Periodic Reports.--The President shall submit 
to the Congress periodic reports on the status of efforts to prevent 
the development or acquisition by North Korea of a nuclear explosive 
device. Each such report shall describe the actions taken by the United 
States pursuant to section 5.
    (b) When Reports Are To Be Submitted.--A report shall be submitted 
pursuant to subsection (a) within 60 days after the date of enactment 
of this joint resolution and every 6 months thereafter until the 
President certifies to the Congress that North Korea has ceased its 
efforts to develop or acquire a nuclear explosive device.

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