This rule amends 14 CFR part 97 by establishing, amending, suspending, or removes SIAPS, Takeoff Minimums and/or ODPS. The complete regulatory description of each SIAP and its associated Takeoff Minimums or ODP for an identified airport is listed on FAA form documents which are incorporated by reference in this amendment under 5 U.S.C. 552(a), 1 CFR part 51, and 14 CFR 97.20. The applicable FAA Forms are 8260-3, 8260-4, 8260-5, 8260-15A, 8260-15B, when required by an entry on 8260-15A, and 8260-15C.

The large number of SIAPs, Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, their complex nature, and the need for a special format make publication in the Federal Register expensive and impractical. Further, pilots do not use the regulatory text of the SIAPs, Takeoff Minimums or ODPs, but instead refer to their graphic depiction on charts printed by publishers of aeronautical materials. Thus, the advantages of incorporation by reference are realized and publication of the complete description of each SIAP, Takeoff Minimums and ODP listed on FAA form documents is unnecessary. This amendment provides the affected CFR sections and specifies the types of SIAPS, Takeoff Minimums and ODPs with their applicable effective dates. This amendment also identifies the airport and its location, the procedure, and the amendment number.

The material incorporated by reference is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section.

The material incorporated by reference describes SIAPS, Takeoff Minimums and/or ODPs as identified in the amendatory language for part 97 of this final rule.

This amendment to 14 CFR part 97 is effective upon publication of each separate SIAP, Takeoff Minimums and ODP as amended in the transmittal. Some SIAP and Takeoff Minimums and textual ODP amendments may have been issued previously by the FAA in a Flight Data Center (FDC) Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) as an emergency action of immediate flights safety relating directly to published aeronautical charts.

The circumstances that created the need for some SIAP and Takeoff Minimums and ODP amendments may require making them effective in less than 30 days. For the remaining SIAPs and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, an effective date at least 30 days after publication is provided.

Further, the SIAPs and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs contained in this amendment are based on the criteria contained in the U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS). In developing these SIAPs and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, the TERPS criteria were applied to the conditions existing or anticipated at the affected airports. Because of the close and immediate relationship between these SIAPs, Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, and safety in air commerce, I find that notice and public procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are impracticable and contrary to the public interest and, where applicable, under 5 U.S.C. 553(d), good cause exists for making some SIAPs effective in less than 30 days.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore—(1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. For the same reason, the FAA certifies that this amendment will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, 14 CFR part 97 is amended by establishing, amending, suspending, or removing Standard Instrument Approach Procedures and/or Takeoff Minimums and Obstacle Departure Procedures effective at 0901 UTC on the dates specified, as follows:

This rule amends 14 CFR part 97 by amending the referenced SIAPs. The complete regulatory description of each SIAP is listed on the appropriate FAA Form 8260, as modified by the National Flight Data Center (NFDC)/Permanent Notice to Airmen (P-NOTAM), and is incorporated by reference under 5 U.S.C. 552(a), 1 CFR part 51, and 14 CFR 97.20. The large number of SIAPs, their complex nature, and the need for a special format make their verbatim publication in the Federal Register expensive and impractical. Further, pilots do not use the regulatory text of the SIAPs, but refer to their graphic depiction on charts printed by publishers of aeronautical materials. Thus, the advantages of incorporation by reference are realized and publication of the complete description of each SIAP contained on FAA form documents is unnecessary. This amendment provides the affected CFR sections, and specifies the SIAPs and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs with their applicable effective dates. This amendment also identifies the airport and its location, the procedure and the amendment number.

The material incorporated by reference is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section.

The material incorporated by reference describes SIAPs, Takeoff Minimums and ODPs as identified in the amendatory language for part 97 of this final rule.

This amendment to 14 CFR part 97 is effective upon publication of each separate SIAP and Takeoff Minimums and ODP as amended in the transmittal. For safety and timeliness of change considerations, this amendment incorporates only specific changes contained for each SIAP and Takeoff Minimums and ODP as modified by FDC permanent NOTAMs.

The SIAPs and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, as modified by FDC permanent NOTAM, and contained in this amendment are based on criteria contained in the U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS). In developing these changes to SIAPs and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, the TERPS criteria were applied only to specific conditions existing at the affected airports. All SIAP amendments in this rule have been previously issued by the FAA in a FDC NOTAM as an emergency action of immediate flight safety relating directly to published aeronautical charts.

The circumstances that created the need for these SIAP and Takeoff Minimums and ODP amendments require making them effective in less than 30 days.

Because of the close and immediate relationship between these SIAPs, Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, and safety in air commerce, I find that notice and public procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are impracticable and contrary to the public interest and, where applicable, under 5 U.S.C. 553(d), good cause exists for making these SIAPs effective in less than 30 days.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore—(1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. For the same reason, the FAA certifies that this amendment will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, 14 CFR part 97 is amended by amending Standard Instrument Approach Procedures and Takeoff Minimums and ODPs, effective at 0901 UTC on the dates specified, as follows:

This order sets forth FinCEN's finding that Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. (Vector), a Mexico-based brokerage firm, is a financial institution operating outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking—specifically, through its provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), including (1) the Sinaloa Cartel and (2) the Gulf Cartel—and imposes a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Vector by any covered financial institution. 1

In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, 2 which among other things, added 21 U.S.C. 2313a  3 (section 2313a). Section 2313a grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the authority to make a finding that “reasonable grounds exist for concluding” that any of the following is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking:

Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take certain “special measures,” which are safeguards that may be employed to defend the United States financial system from money laundering risks connected to illicit opioid trafficking. 5 The authority of the Secretary to administer section 2313a has been delegated to FinCEN. 6

Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose one or more of six special measures. 7 First, the Secretary may impose any of the five special measures provided for in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b), commonly known as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 8 Special measures one through four, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), describe additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting requirements. Through these special measures, the Secretary may impose such information collection and reporting requirements on covered domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies—collectively, “covered financial institutions.”  9 Special measure five, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), authorizes the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent or payable-through accounts by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for, or on behalf of, a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account or payable-through account involves one or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States that the Secretary has found to be of primary money laundering concern. 10 Special measure six, codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2), allows the Secretary to “prohibit, or impose conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (to be defined by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency, if such transmittal of funds involves any such institution, class of transaction, or type of accounts.”  11

Importantly, in connection with finding that a financial institution is of primary money laundering concern and imposing any special measure, section 2313a requires a finding that the relevant financial institution is “of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking ” (emphasis added). 21 U.S.C. 2302 provides the operative definition of “opioid trafficking” for purposes of section 2313a, as any illicit activity:

For purposes of this order, FinCEN interprets the term “synthetic opioid” to include fentanyl and fentanyl analogs, as well as precursors to fentanyl and precursors to fentanyl analogs. 13

The sustained influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into the United States has profound consequences, resulting in drug overdose becoming the leading cause of death for people aged 18 to 44 in the United States. 14 To address the synthetic opioid crisis, it is necessary to target the money laundering efforts of the Mexico-based DTOs that are the primary source of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids trafficked into the United States. These DTOs manufacture synthetic opioids in clandestine laboratories in Mexico using precursor chemicals sourced largely from the People's Republic of China (China), traffic these synthetic opioids into and throughout the United States, and launder the illicit profits back to Mexico. 15

These DTOs could not profit on trafficking fentanyl and other synthetic opioids if not for their ability to launder and remit the monetary proceeds back to Mexico. DTOs and third-party money launderers use a diverse array of methods to launder money, including using financial institutions, remittance payments, bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, mirror trades, and cryptocurrencies. 16 It is therefore critical to address the role that financial institutions operating outside the United States play in facilitating the money laundering that enables and facilitates the DTOs and their illicit opioid trafficking and related money laundering.

Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Vector, a financial institution operating outside the United States, is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking through its provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, including the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel. In making this finding, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B), taking into account the specific circumstances of money laundering activities in connection with illicit opioid trafficking and the protection of U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system. While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors when making a finding that a financial institution operating outside of the United States is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, it nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below. 17

Vector is a Mexico-based brokerage firm. By its own account, Vector offers a variety of financial services including, but not limited to, mutual fund management, money market, foreign exchange, investment banking, and fiduciary services. 18 According to commercially available banking information, Vector is headquartered in San Pedro Garza Garcia, Mexico, and provides U.S. dollar (USD) correspondent banking services through at least one U.S. financial institution. 19 Considering the services it provides, Vector is a financial institution within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2), and based on the foregoing, FinCEN has determined that Vector is a financial institution operating outside of the United States, as described in section 2313a.

FinCEN has considered the extent to which Vector is used to promote money laundering including in connection with organized criminal groups associated with illicit opioid trafficking. 20 Based on information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has determined that Vector has a history of suspected ties to international DTOs and facilitation of transactions on their behalf. Vector's exposure to, and facilitation of, transactions associated with suspected illicit opioid trafficking-related activities is consistent with its long-standing pattern of associations with, and conduct of transactions for multiple actors operating on behalf of or in tandem with, DTOs, including both the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel, each of which have been designated by Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and, as of February 20, 2025, have also been designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. 21

Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has determined that Vector has a history of processing USD-denominated funds transfers that finance the importation of precursor chemicals used for the production of illicit synthetic opioids on behalf of DTOs.

In the United States, precursor chemicals are substances regulated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in order to prevent the illicit manufacture of controlled substances. As of December 2024, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl was produced in clandestine labs in Mexico, using precursor chemicals imported from China. 22 Although the Mexican and Chinese governments have established controls on multiple precursor chemicals, China-based suppliers remain the main source for precursor chemicals used by DTOs in Mexico to produce illicit opioids. 23

DTOs are known to employ transnational funds transfer services via various financial institutions and agencies, including, but not limited to, banks, money services businesses, and online payment processors to drive illicit opioid-related financial flows. 24 A common method employed by DTOs to obfuscate illicit opioid trafficking-related payments includes using shell and front companies in an effort to disguise the origin and destination of illicit funds. 25 Specifically, DTOs operate through shell companies—businesses that exist only as an entity through which money may be transferred—to hide beneficial ownership. Similarly, DTOs commingle drug proceeds with legitimate revenue from front companies—which operate partially as normal businesses—in an effort to disguise the illicit proceeds. 26 For example, according to public and non-public information available to FinCEN, Vector remitted over USD 17 million in suspicious wire transfers to multiple China-based companies in early 2021 on behalf of a company that was reportedly tied to an international drug trafficking organization. FinCEN assesses that these same methods are being used by DTOs to import precursor chemicals from China into Mexico under the guise of legitimate business transactions, which are facilitated by Vector through the clearance of payments between Mexico-based companies and China-based companies known to have engaged in the trade of precursor chemicals for the furtherance of illicit opioid trafficking as described below.

Based on non-public information, FinCEN also assesses that Vector has been instrumental in processing funds transfers to China-based companies known to have shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes. Since at least 2019, over 20 China-based companies, including the three with activity highlighted below, were known to have shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes—for instance:

• From 2018 through 2023, one China-based company received over 12 international funds transfers totaling over USD 300,000 from over four Mexico-based companies through Vector.

• From 2022 through 2023, a second China-based company received over 18 international funds transfers totaling over USD 700,000 from over five Mexico-based companies through Vector.

• From 2020 through 2023, a third China-based company received over 10 international funds transfers totaling over USD 70,000 from at least two Mexico-based companies through Vector.

Based on non-public information, as well as the volume and dollar amount of funds transfers that Vector processed over several years with these companies, FinCEN assesses that such transactions likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs.

In 2024, the DEA described the Sinaloa Cartel as being “at the heart” of the synthetic drug crisis, including opioids—using its global supply chain network to gain access to the pill presses and precursor chemicals needed to manufacture opioids in Mexico, distribute them in the United States, and then return laundered profits back to Mexico. 27 In 2009, the Sinaloa Cartel was found to be a significant foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act (Kingpin Act). 28

Based on non-public information, FinCEN has identified several transactions involving Vector and affiliates of the Sinaloa Cartel. For example, information available to FinCEN demonstrates that, between 2013 and 2016, a suspected Sinaloa Cartel money mule  29 transferred over USD 1.5 million to Vector. Further, from 2019 through 2021, the same money mule transferred over USD 500,000 to Vector through a U.S.-based company. As another example, Vector engaged in several transactions over several years that FinCEN assesses involved proceeds of bribes paid by the Sinaloa Cartel to Mexico's “top law enforcement official,” Genaro Garcia Luna. Garcia Luna, Mexico's former Secretary of Public Security and head of Mexico's Federal Investigative Agency, was convicted at trial in 2023 for abusing his positions between 2001 and 2012 to permit the Sinaloa Cartel to evade law enforcement in exchange for millions of dollars in bribes. 30 FinCEN has further determined that between 2013 and 2019, a business controlled by Garcia Luna conducted transactions with Vector totaling more than USD 40 million. FinCEN assesses that these transactions involved the proceeds of bribes to Garcia Luna, and along with the transactions conducted by the money mule described above, likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by the Sinaloa Cartel.

In 2021, the DEA stated that it considered the Cartel del Golfo (Gulf Cartel) to be one of the Mexican DTOs with the greatest drug trafficking impact on the United States. 31 When designating the Gulf Cartel in 2021, under E.O. 14059, OFAC similarly described the organization as one of Mexico's oldest and most powerful DTOs. 32 Moreover, in December 2024, the Department of Justice described the Gulf Cartel as “one of Mexico's oldest criminal syndicates, engaging in drug trafficking, violence, human smuggling, and more.”  33

The Gulf Cartel receives fentanyl produced by partner cartels and moves it into the United States. 34 In connection with those activities, numerous illicit opioid traffickers affiliated with the Gulf Cartel have been convicted in the United States. For example, in 2023, an individual operating on behalf of the Gulf Cartel pleaded guilty to international drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy charges stemming from a large-scale operation involving at least sixteen other participants trafficking six kilograms of fentanyl and other illicit narcotics. 35

Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has identified several transactions involving Vector and affiliates of the Gulf Cartel. For example, in the first half of 2023, a Gulf Cartel-affiliated money launderer purportedly used Vector as a guaranteed secured and reliable mechanism through which to transfer illicit funds. FinCEN assesses that these transactions likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by the Gulf Cartel.

In reaching its finding, FinCEN has considered the extent to which Vector is used for legitimate business purposes. 36 Vector is the ninth largest brokerage firm in Mexico, worth Mexican Pesos (MXN) 215.841 billion (USD 10.67 billion) in custodial assets, as of December 2024, and maintains one U.S. correspondent. 37 According to Mexico's National Banking Securities Commission (CNBV), as of February 2025, Vector was one of 37 registered brokerage houses in Mexico. 38 As of 2024, Vector's custodial assets represented 2.1 percent of brokerage firm custodial assets in Mexico. 39

According to Vector's 2023 Report on Sustainability and other public materials, Vector maintains an anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance program. Vector's AML/CFT program includes a risk-based approach to onboarding and is comprised of the following five pillars: (1) “Know Your Customer” (KYC); (2) analysis and monitoring; (3) training; (4) systems; and (5) auditing. 40 The AML/CFT compliance program is administered by a Compliance Officer who reports to the Communication and Oversight Committee—which in turn supports the Board of Directors—and whose duties include, but are not limited to, coordinating transaction monitoring and investigations, designing annual training for staff, serving as a resource on applicable regulations, verifying implementation of new or updated compliance guidance, and reporting violations of the Vector compliance manual to the Communication and Oversight Committee. 41

Notwithstanding Vector's AML/CFT compliance program, in light of public and non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN assesses that Vector's legitimate business activities do not outweigh the risk posed by its provision of services to facilitate illicit opioid trafficking activities by DTOs who seek to circumvent AML/CFT obligations and obfuscate the source of funds or their intended use. In particular, FinCEN analyzed references to regulated Mexican banks and brokerage houses in 2022-2024, from non-public information made available to FinCEN, and produced an asset-weighted ranking based on asset data published by Mexico's CNBV. Vector ranked second in the asset-weighted analysis of potentially illicit activity, and FinCEN assesses that a higher relative concentration of such activity amongst smaller market share financial institutions such as Vector in Mexico is likely indicative of weak AML/CFT controls within these institutions. Accordingly, given the extensive flows of illegitimate funds through Vector, FinCEN assesses that the need to protect U.S. financial institutions from the money laundering risks presented by Vector outweighs any potential legitimate utility its services may provide.

A finding that Vector is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking establishes—and emphasizes—the significant illicit finance risks posed by Vector's provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs. This finding will place U.S. and foreign financial institutions and regulators on notice to guard against those risks. 42 Moreover, such a finding—in combination with a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Vector by covered financial institutions—will safeguard the U.S. financial system, by severing Vector's access.

Having found that Vector is a financial institution operating outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN has determined that the imposition of a special measure prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector is warranted. 43 In making this determination and assessing which special measures may be appropriate, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B). While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors in selecting one or more special measures, it nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below. 44

FinCEN has considered the effect this action will have on U.S. national security and foreign policy, as well as the extent to which multilateral groups or other nations have taken similar actions. 45 Given Vector's association with DTOs and other actors engaged in illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN assesses that imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Vector is necessary to safeguard U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system, as well as to serve key U.S. national security objectives. 46 In particular, prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector will further ongoing U.S. efforts to curtail illicit opioid trafficking—including the manufacture of synthetic opioids—and related financial transactions that facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of their distribution. Targeting the illicit proceeds of drug traffickers and DTOs, especially those with a nexus to illicit opioids—like the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels—is a high priority for the United States. And, for that reason, recent actions by OFAC and the Department of State have focused on DTOs affiliated with opioid-related illicit finance threats, including the February 20, 2025, designation of certain DTOs—including the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels—as FTOs. 47 Publicly countering a financing mechanism used by these illicit entities by prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector will serve the national security and financial system of the United States by further deterring and curtailing illicit opioid trafficking, along with the activities of DTOs and FTOs. Similarly, such a prohibition would sever a pathway that may facilitate circumvention of U.S. economic sanctions, increasing the efficacy of those sanctions and complementing previous actions taken by the U.S. government.

Moreover, this action reinforces the expectations of AML/CFT compliance in the financial system, highlighting the importance of identifying and reporting suspicious activity by financial institutions around the world. With respect to the illicit finance risks posed by Vector, that is of particular importance, as no multilateral groups and no other nations have yet acted to address those risks.

FinCEN has considered whether prohibiting certain transmittals of funds would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial institutions organized or licensed in the United States, as well as the extent to which the action could have a significant adverse systemic impact on legitimate business activities involving Vector. 48 FinCEN assesses that prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector may impose a burden on legitimate activities currently transacted through Vector or the legitimate activities of third parties impacted by this order; however any burden and disruption should be relatively minimal, as similar services are offered by other financial institutions in Mexico, and third parties will have sufficient time and capability to ensure compliance.

As noted above, Vector is the ninth largest brokerage firm in Mexico, worth Mexican Pesos (MXN) 215.841 billion (USD 10.67 billion) in custodial assets, as of December 2024, and maintains one U.S. correspondent. 49 As of 2024, Vector's custodial assets represented 2.1 percent of brokerage firm custodial assets in Mexico. 50 By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based brokerage firms in 2024 represented 26.6 percent with MXN 2.706 trillion (USD 133.72 billion) and 22.9 percent with MXN 2.329 trillion (USD 115.11 billion), respectively, of brokerage firm custodial assets in Mexico. 51 FinCEN assesses that given Vector's size compared to the largest financial institutions in Mexico and the array of correspondent relationships between U.S. and Mexican financial institutions, the macroeconomic impact of prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector would be negligible. Vector has one recorded location—its head office located in Monterrey—and no identified offices outside of Mexico. 52 Indeed, although Vector offers services used by licit actors, the legitimate business services that it offers would be readily available through other regulated institutions, and those financial institutions would do so with the appropriate transparency necessary to support international efforts to protect the integrity of the international financial system.

Although this order represents one of the first issuances of an order under section 2313a, FinCEN has afforded financial institutions an additional 21 days to prepare for the prohibition and, regardless, assesses that this action would not impose any undue cost or burden for financial institutions, as covered financial institutions would be positioned to readily incorporate the requirements of this order into their compliance programs. FinCEN does anticipate that, although any Vector affiliates outside of Mexico from this order would not be subject to the restrictions set out in this order, there may yet be challenges associated with transactions involving such entities. However, the burden associated with any such challenges remains outweighed by the benefits to national security from this action, and, again, FinCEN assesses that covered financial institutions' existing compliance programs and process will be sufficient to navigate those challenges and mitigate associated burden. FinCEN further assesses that the implementation period of this order will appropriately ensure compliance while mitigating burden and unintended consequences on licit businesses and customers.

In imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, FinCEN considered other available special measures  53 and, after due consideration, has determined that special measure six—prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector—is the appropriate means to adequately address the illicit finance risks that Vector poses.

None of the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A—special measures one through five—would effectively address the illicit finance threat posed by Vector. Any additional recordkeeping, information collection, or reporting requirements, as described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be insufficient to guard against the risks posed by covered financial institutions processing transmittals of funds involving Vector. Those special measures would allow such transfers to continue to the benefit of illicit actors connected to illicit opioid trafficking. Further, merely prohibiting and/or placing conditions upon the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of Vector, as described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), would be similarly inadequate. Neither prohibiting nor imposing conditions on such accounts would safeguard the U.S. financial system to the same degree as prohibiting transmittals of funds, as such a special measure would not address the movement of funds outside of a strict correspondent or payable-through relationship, for example, through the movement of funds outside the traditional banking relationship, which may permit Vector to access USD through indirect correspondent relationships via other foreign financial institutions.

Given Vector's longstanding facilitation of illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs and because transmittals of funds involving Vector do not necessarily have to go through a correspondent account, FinCEN assesses that it is appropriate to more broadly prohibit any transmittals of funds. Because such a prohibition would cut off any transmittal of funds, and not just those conducted through a correspondent or payable-through account, the prohibition on any transmittal of funds involving Vector would more effectively prevent Vector from accessing the U.S. financial system. FinCEN therefore assesses that such a prohibition is the most appropriate special measure to protect the U.S. financial system.

Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose specified special measures, including a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, “by order, regulation or otherwise as permitted by law.” In determining the appropriate approach in this instance, FinCEN considered imposing special measures by order or regulation, taking into account the nature of the underlying threat, and determined that proceeding by an order is the most appropriate course of action given the imminent threats posed by the illicit actors whose transactions and access to funds Vector facilitates, as well as the ongoing transactions associated with suspected activity related to illicit opioid trafficking that continue to be processed through Vector. Further, FinCEN has assessed that this order will not be unduly burdensome or impose new or unique compliance costs on financial institutions.

A copy of this order will be published in the Federal Register . To the extent Vector or other parties have information relevant to this order, they may submit it to FinCEN at frc@fincen.gov.

The order defines Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. (Vector) as Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. and its branches, subsidiaries, and offices located in Mexico. Any branches, subsidiaries, and offices of Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. operating outside of Mexico, including any such branches, subsidiaries, and offices located in the United States, are expressly excluded from the definition of “Vector” for purposes of this order.

The order defines covered financial institution as having the same meaning as “financial institution” in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).

The order defines transmittals of funds as the sending and receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.

All terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X, 31 U.S.C. 5312, and 21 U.S.C. 2302.

A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any transmittal of funds from or to Vector.

The terms of this order are effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER ], with no cessation date.

FinCEN reserves authority to impose conditions on certain transmittals of funds from or to Vector and to grant appropriate exemptions from the requirements of this order.

Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), or other applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

The covered financial institution, and any of its officers, directors, employees, and agents, may be liable for civil or criminal penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for violating any of the terms of this order.

Any judicial determination that any provision of this order is invalid shall not affect the validity of any other provision of this order, and each other provision shall thereafter remain in full force and effect.

This order sets forth FinCEN's finding that CIBanco S.A., Institución De Banca Multiple (CIBanco), a Mexico-based commercial bank, is a financial institution operating outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking—specifically, through its provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), including (1) the Gulf Cartel, (2) the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO) Cartel, and (3) Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—and imposes a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving CIBanco by any covered financial institution. 1

In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, 2 which among other things, added 21 U.S.C. 2313a  3 (section 2313a). Section 2313a grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the authority to make a finding that “reasonable grounds exist for concluding” that any of the following is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking:

(1) One or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States;

(2) One or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States; or

(3) One or more types of accounts within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States. 4

Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take certain “special measures,” which are safeguards that may be employed to defend the United States financial system from money laundering risks connected to illicit opioid trafficking. 5 The authority of the Secretary to administer section 2313a has been delegated to FinCEN. 6

Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose one or more of six special measures. 7 First, the Secretary may impose any of the five special measures provided for in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b), commonly known as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 8 Special measures one through four, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), describe additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting requirements. Through these special measures, the Secretary may impose such information collection and reporting requirements on covered domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies—collectively, “covered financial institutions.”  9 Special measure five, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), authorizes the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent or payable-through accounts by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for, or on behalf of, a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account or payable-through account involves one or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States that the Secretary has found to be of primary money laundering concern. 10 Special measure six, codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2), allows the Secretary to “prohibit, or impose conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (to be defined by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency, if such transmittal of funds involves any such institution, class of transaction, or type of accounts.”  11

Importantly, in connection with finding that a financial institution is of primary money laundering concern and imposing any special measure, section 2313a requires a finding that the relevant financial institution is “of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking ” (emphasis added). 21 U.S.C. 2302 provides the operative definition of “opioid trafficking” for purposes of section 2313a, as any illicit activity:

(1) to produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, or knowingly finance or transport—(a) synthetic opioids, including controlled substances that are synthetic opioids and listed chemicals that are synthetic opioids; or (b) active pharmaceutical ingredients or chemicals that are used in the production of controlled substances that are synthetic opioids;

(2) to attempt to carry out an activity described above; or

(3) to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with other persons to carry out such an activity. 12 For purposes of this order, FinCEN interprets the term “synthetic opioid” to include fentanyl and fentanyl analogs, as well as precursors to fentanyl and precursors to fentanyl analogs. 13

The sustained influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into the United States has profound consequences, resulting in drug overdose becoming the leading cause of death for people aged 18 to 44 in the United States. 14 To address the synthetic opioid crisis, it is necessary to target the money laundering efforts of the Mexico-based DTOs that are the primary source of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids trafficked into the United States. These DTOs manufacture synthetic opioids in clandestine laboratories in Mexico using precursor chemicals sourced largely from the People's Republic of China (China), traffic these synthetic opioids into and throughout the United States, and launder the illicit profits back to Mexico. 15

These DTOs could not profit on trafficking fentanyl and other synthetic opioids if not for their ability to launder and remit the monetary proceeds back to Mexico. DTOs and third-party money launderers use a diverse array of methods to launder money, including using financial institutions, remittance payments, bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, mirror trades, and cryptocurrencies. 16 It is therefore critical to address the role that financial institutions operating outside the United States play in facilitating the money laundering that enables and facilitates the DTOs and their illicit opioid trafficking and related money laundering.

Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that CIBanco, a financial institution operating outside of the United States, is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking through its provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, including the Gulf Cartel, the BLO Cartel, and CJNG. In making this finding, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B), taking into account the specific circumstances of money laundering activities in connection with illicit opioid trafficking and the protection of U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system. While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors when making a finding that a financial institution operating outside of the United States is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, it nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below. 17

This order sets forth FinCEN's finding that Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple (Intercam), a Mexico-based commercial bank, is a financial institution operating outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking—specifically, through its provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), including the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)—and imposes a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam by any covered financial institution. 1

In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, 2 which among other things, added 21 U.S.C. 2313a  3 (section 2313a). Section 2313a grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the authority to make a finding that “reasonable grounds exist for concluding” that any of the following is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking:

Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take certain “special measures,” which are safeguards that may be employed to defend the United States financial system from money laundering risks connected to illicit opioid trafficking. 5 The authority of the Secretary to administer section 2313a has been delegated to FinCEN. 6

Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose one or more of six special measures. 7 First, the Secretary may impose any of the five special measures provided for in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b), commonly known as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 8 Special measures one through four, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), describe additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting requirements. Through these special measures, the Secretary may impose such information collection and reporting requirements on covered domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies—collectively, “covered financial institutions.”  9 Special measure five, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), authorizes the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent or payable-through accounts by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for, or on behalf of, a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account or payable-through account involves one or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States that the Secretary has found to be of primary money laundering concern. 10 Special measure six, codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2), allows the Secretary to “prohibit, or impose conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (to be defined by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency, if such transmittal of funds involves any such institution, class of transaction, or type of accounts.”  11

Importantly, in connection with finding that a financial institution is of primary money laundering concern and imposing any special measure, section 2313a requires a finding that the relevant financial institution is “of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking” (emphasis added). 21 U.S.C. 2302 provides the operative definition of “opioid trafficking” for purposes of section 2313a, as any illicit activity:

(1) to produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, or knowingly finance or transport—(a) synthetic opioids, including controlled substances that are synthetic opioids and listed chemicals that are synthetic opioids; or (b) active pharmaceutical ingredients or chemicals that are used in the production of controlled substances that are synthetic opioids;

(2) to attempt to carry out an activity described above; or

(3) to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with other persons to carry out such an activity. 12

For purposes of this order, FinCEN interprets the term “synthetic opioid” to include fentanyl and fentanyl analogs, as well as precursors to fentanyl and precursors to fentanyl analogs. 13

The sustained influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into the United States has profound consequences, resulting in drug overdose becoming the leading cause of death for people aged 18 to 44 in the United States. 14 To address the synthetic opioid crisis, it is necessary to target the money laundering efforts of the Mexico-based DTOs that are the primary source of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids trafficked into the United States. These DTOs manufacture synthetic opioids in clandestine laboratories in Mexico using precursor chemicals sourced largely from the People's Republic of China (China), traffic these synthetic opioids into and throughout the United States, and launder the illicit profits back to Mexico. 15

These DTOs could not profit on trafficking fentanyl and other synthetic opioids if not for their ability to launder and remit the monetary proceeds back to Mexico. DTOs and third-party money launderers use a diverse array of methods to launder money, including using financial institutions, remittance payments, bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, mirror trades, and cryptocurrencies. 16 It is therefore critical to address the role that financial institutions operating outside the United States play in facilitating the money laundering that enables and facilitates the DTOs and their illicit opioid trafficking and related money laundering.

Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Intercam, a financial institution operating outside of the United States, is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking through its provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, including CJNG. In making this finding, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B), taking into account the specific circumstances of money laundering activities in connection with illicit opioid trafficking and the protection of U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system. While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors when making a finding that a financial institution operating outside of the United States is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, it nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below. 17

Intercam is a Mexico-based commercial bank. By its own account, Intercam offers multiple financial services, including international banking, foreign exchange, insurance, investment services, and import and export services. 18 According to commercially available information, Intercam is headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico, has over 70 branches across Mexico, and provides U.S. dollar (USD) correspondent banking services through at least two U.S. financial institutions. 19 Considering the services it provides, Intercam is a financial institution within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2), and based on the foregoing, FinCEN has determined that Intercam is a financial institution operating outside of the United States, as described in section 2313a.

Intercam has a wholly owned U.S.-based subsidiary bank—Intercam Banco Internacional, Inc., which is headquartered in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, and is a registered international financial entity in Puerto Rico. 20 Intercam also owns other U.S.-based financial services companies—Intercam Futures, Inc. (d/b/a Intercam FX) and Intercam Wealth Management Group, including its affiliates Intercam Advisors, Inc., and Intercam Securities, Inc. 21 This order expressly excludes all of Intercam's U.S.-based subsidiaries from the definition of “Intercam,” and, accordingly, Intercam's U.S.-based subsidiaries are outside the scope of this order.

FinCEN has considered the extent to which accounts at Intercam are used to “facilitate or promote money laundering,” including in connection with organized criminal groups associated with illicit opioid trafficking. 22 Based on information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has determined that Intercam has a history of suspected ties to international DTOs and facilitation of transactions on their behalf. Intercam's exposure to, and facilitation of, transactions associated with suspected illicit opioid trafficking-related activities is consistent with its long-standing pattern of associations with, and conduct of transactions for, multiple actors operating on behalf of or in tandem with, DTOs, including CJNG, which has been designated by OFAC and, as of February 20, 2025, was also designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. 23

Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has determined that Intercam has a history of processing USD-denominated funds transfers that finance the importation of precursor chemicals used for the production of illicit synthetic opioids on behalf of DTOs.

In the United States, precursor chemicals are substances regulated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in order to prevent the illicit manufacture of controlled substances. As of December 2024, most U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl was produced in clandestine labs in Mexico, using precursor chemicals imported from China. 24 Although the Mexican and Chinese governments have established controls on multiple precursor chemicals, China-based suppliers remain the main source for precursor chemicals used by DTOs in Mexico to produce illicit opioids. 25

DTOs are known to employ transnational funds transfer services via various financial institutions and agencies, including, but not limited to, banks, money services businesses, and online payment processors to facilitate illicit opioid-related financial flows. 26 A common method employed by DTOs to obfuscate illicit opioids trafficking-related payments includes using shell and front companies to disguise the origin and destination of illicit funds. 27

Based on non-public information, FinCEN assesses that Intercam has been instrumental in facilitating payments on behalf of Mexico-based companies involved in the procurement of precursor chemicals for illicit purposes. Examples of Intercam's likely facilitation of payments in furtherance of illicit opioid trafficking include, but are not limited to, the transactions listed below:

• In late 2019, Germany- and China-based precursor chemical brokers likely facilitated a shipment of hydroxylamine hydrochloride through a Mexico-based company for a CJNG-affiliated precursor chemical broker based on prior similar arrangements. From 2021 through 2024, this Mexico-based company sent over 1,000 funds transfers totaling over USD 8 million to shipping companies in countries, including Singapore and Hong Kong, through Intercam.

• Another Mexico-based company facilitated methamphetamine and fentanyl production in Mexico by importing precursor chemicals through U.S. ports. Since 2022, over 300 tons of precursor chemicals have been seized from shipping containers enroute to this company. Notably, from 2023 through 2024, this second Mexico-based company received over 25 funds transfers totaling over USD 700,000 from other Mexico-based companies involved in the trade of chemicals, through Intercam.

Furthermore, based on non-public information, FinCEN also assesses that Intercam has been instrumental in processing funds transfers to China-based companies known to have shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes. Since at least 2019, over 20 China-based companies, including the three highlighted below, were known to have shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes. For instance:

• Between 2016 and 2024, one China-based company known or suspected of having shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico was tied to over 50 international funds transfers totaling over USD 850,000 through Intercam.

• Between 2022 and 2024, a second China-based company was tied to over 12 international funds transfers totaling over USD 925,000 through Intercam.

• Between 2018 and 2024, a third China-based company was tied to over 120 international funds transfers totaling over USD 4 million through Intercam.

Separately, a China-based company was associated with Manu Gupta, who was arrested in 2019 for manufacturing and trafficking fentanyl from India to Mexico, as well as moving precursor chemicals from China to Mexico. From 2021 through 2024, this China-based company received over 40 funds transfers totaling over USD 1.5 million from at least three Mexico-based companies involved in the trade of chemicals through Intercam.

Given the conduct of these various entities and based on the volume and dollar amounts of funds transfers that Intercam processed over a number of years with these entities, FinCEN assesses that such transactions likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs.

Based upon non-public information, FinCEN assesses that Intercam facilitated money laundering by suspected money mules on behalf of DTOs. For example, between 2021 and 2024, a suspected money mule opened accounts at multiple banks in Southern California and made 627 ATM deposits, totaling approximately USD 2.6 million. During the same period, the suspected money mule sent 125 wires, totaling approximately USD 1.9 million, from their United States-based accounts to an Intercam account in Mexico. Between 2022 and 2024, a different suspected money mule opened accounts at multiple banks in Southern California and made 431 ATM deposits, totaling approximately USD 1.4 million. During the same period, the suspected money mule sent 81 wires, totaling approximately USD 1.2 million, to Intercam accounts in Mexico. FinCEN assesses that such activity is consistent with current DTO money laundering techniques and supports FinCEN's assessment that Intercam was integral in money mules' operations to repatriate illicit funds to Mexico on behalf of DTOs.

In 2024, the DEA stated that CJNG, along with the Sinaloa Cartel, was “at the heart” of the synthetic opioid crisis, using its global supply chain network to gain access to the pill presses and precursor chemicals needed to manufacture synthetic opioids in Mexico for distribution in the United States. 28 The DEA described the CJNG Cartel as “one of the largest producers and traffickers of illicit fentanyl, in both powder and pill form, to the United States.” 29 DEA further stated:

Indeed, the DEA reports that CJNG traffics a significant proportion of the fentanyl and other deadly drugs that enter the United States and uses extreme violence against rivals and Mexican authorities to expand and maintain territory in strategic drug trafficking corridors. 31 As such, according to the DEA's 2024 National Drug Threat Assessment, CJNG is a “key driver of fatal drug poisonings in the United States” and reaps billions of dollars in profit from the manufacture of methamphetamine and illicit fentanyl. 32

In 2015, OFAC designated CJNG pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and later designated the cartel under E.O. 14059 in 2021. 33 In 2021, OFAC described the cartel as “one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico and one of the five most dangerous transnational criminal organizations in the world, according to the Department of Justice.” Furthermore, as previously noted, as of February 20, 2025, CJNG was also designated as an FTO pursuant to section 219 of the INA, as amended. 34

CJNG uses its vast financial resources, violence, and bribery of corrupt officials to maintain its dominance in Mexico's illicit drug trade. FinCEN assesses that Intercam helped finance such illicit activity by facilitating funds transfers for CJNG. For example, lntercam mid-level leadership has been involved in corrupt practices. In the latter part of 2022, Intercam executives met directly with suspected CJNG members to discuss money laundering schemes, including transferring funds from China. FinCEN assesses that such direct engagement with CJNG by Intercam leadership creates a significant risk of Intercam's services being used for future money laundering or other illicit financial activity.

Notwithstanding the specific information presented by this order, both FinCEN and certain financial institutions have previously flagged certain perceived compliance concerns and other indicia of Intercam's potential facilitation of illicit financial activity. In 2015, FinCEN made Mexico's bank regulator, CNBV, aware of the bank's facilitation of a variety of activities that constituted money laundering, including transactions processed by Intercam involving suspicious purchases of cashier's checks along the United States-Mexican border, possible funnel account activity, and possible trade-based money laundering. CNBV imposed fines on Intercam for inadequate anti-money laundering controls, including failures to report suspicious transactions, for 14 offenses occurring from 2013 to 2017. 35

Certain financial institutions have identified similar activity and compliance deficiencies. According to information available to FinCEN, Intercam previously maintained accounts at several U.S.-based financial institutions that exited their relationships with Intercam for compliance concerns. These concerns included Intercam facilitating wire transfers lacking beneficiary information, processing checks funded by cash deposits, and using a trading account primarily for conducting same-name wire transfers.

This history of deficient compliance underscores the ongoing threat that Intercam poses as a facilitator of illicit financial activity. Despite being previously cited by regulators, as set out in this order, Intercam continues to facilitate illicit transactions related to illicit opioid trafficking. As such, these historical examples support FinCEN's finding that Intercam is a financial institution of primary money laundering concern.

In reaching its finding, FinCEN has considered the extent to which Intercam is used for legitimate business purposes. 36 Intercam is the 25th largest financial institution in Mexico, worth Mexican Pesos (MXN) 81.692 billion (USD 4.04 billion) in total assets as of December 2024, and maintains at least two U.S. correspondents. 37 According to CNBV, as of February 2025, Intercam is one of 51 registered banking institutions in Mexico. 38 As of December 2024, Intercam constituted 0.5 percent of commercial bank assets in Mexico. By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based banks in December 2024 represented 22.25 percent with MXN 3.384 trillion (USD 167.22 billion) and 13.19 percent with MXN 2.006 trillion (USD 99.15 billion), respectively, of commercial assets in Mexico.

FinCEN has also assessed Intercam's statements and other public information about Intercam's anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies. According to Intercam's money-laundering prevention summary, protecting the bank from money laundering and illicit finance activity is a priority and staff receive constant training and evaluation for compliance with the bank's internal code of ethics and conduct. 39 In addition to policies and procedures and hosting an annual Money-Laundering Prevention Convention attended by more than 100 compliance officers across industries, Intercam purports to prioritize Know Your Customer efforts via regular in-person visits to clients for verification purposes and the development of monitoring controls. 40 FinCEN has not independently examined Intercam's AML policies or programs or otherwise corroborated the existence or efficacy of such programs. However, in light of the evidence presented elsewhere in this order, FinCEN concludes that even if such programs exist, they have not proven effective at detecting or preventing the illicit financial activity described herein. FinCEN therefore concludes that given the totality of the circumstances, Intercam's AML program does not alter FinCEN's overall determination that Intercam is of primary money laundering concern.

Moreover, FinCEN assesses that Intercam's legitimate business activities do not outweigh the risk posed by its provision of services to facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by DTOs that seek to circumvent AML/CFT obligations and obfuscate the source of funds or their intended use. In particular, FinCEN analyzed references to regulated Mexican banks and brokerage houses in 2022-2024, from non-public information made available to FinCEN, and produced an asset-weighted ranking based on asset data published by Mexico's National Banking and Securities Commission. Intercam ranked first in the asset-weighted analysis of potentially illicit activity, and FinCEN assesses that a higher relative concentration of such activity amongst smaller market share financial institutions such as Intercam in Mexico is likely indicative of weak AML/CFT controls within these institutions. Accordingly, given the extensive flows of illegitimate funds through Intercam, FinCEN assesses that the need to protect U.S. financial institutions from the money laundering risks presented by Intercam outweighs any potential legitimate utility its services may provide.

A finding that Intercam is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking establishes—and emphasizes—the significant illicit finance risks posed by Intercam's provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs. This finding will place U.S. and foreign financial institutions and regulators on notice to guard against those risks. 41 Moreover, such a finding—in combination with a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam by covered financial institutions—will safeguard the U.S. financial system by severing Intercam's access.

Having found that Intercam is a financial institution operating outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN has determined that the imposition of a special measure prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam is warranted. 42 In making this determination and assessing which special measures may be appropriate, FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B). While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors in selecting one or more special measures, it nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below. 43

FinCEN has considered the effect this action will have on U.S. national security and foreign policy, as well as the extent to which multilateral groups or other nations have taken similar actions. 44 Given Intercam's association with DTOs and other actors engaged in illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN assesses that imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam is necessary to safeguard U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system, as well as serve key U.S. national security objectives. 45 In particular, prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam will further ongoing U.S. efforts to curtail illicit opioid trafficking—including the manufacture of synthetic opioids—and related financial transactions that facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of their distribution. Targeting the illicit proceeds of drug traffickers and DTOs, especially those with a nexus to illicit opioids—like CJNG—is a high priority for the United States. For that reason, recent actions by OFAC and the Department of State have focused on DTOs affiliated with opioid-related illicit finance threats, including the February 20, 2025, designation of certain DTOs, including CJNG. 46 Publicly countering a financing mechanism used by these illicit entities by prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam will serve the national security and protect the financial system of the United States by further deterring and curtailing illicit opioid trafficking, along with the activities of such DTOs and FTOs. Similarly, such a prohibition would sever a pathway that may facilitate circumvention of U.S. economic sanctions, increasing the efficacy of those sanctions and complementing previous actions taken by the U.S. government.

Moreover, this action reinforces the expectations of AML/CFT compliance in the financial system, highlighting the importance of identifying and reporting suspicious activity by financial institutions around the world. With respect to the illicit finance risks posed by Intercam, that is of particular importance, as no multilateral groups and no other nations have yet acted to address those risks.

FinCEN has considered whether the imposition of special measure six would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial institutions organized or licensed in the United States, as well as the extent to which the action could have a significant adverse systemic impact on legitimate business activities involving Intercam. 47 FinCEN assesses that prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam would impose a relatively limited burden on legitimate activities currently transacted through Intercam or the legitimate activities of third parties impacted by this order, as similar services are offered by other financial institutions in Mexico and third parties will have sufficient capability to ensure compliance.

As noted above, Intercam is the 25th largest financial institution in Mexico, with MXN 81.692 billion (USD 4.04 billion) in assets as of December 2024, and holds correspondent banking relationships with at least two U.S. financial institutions. 48 As of December 2024, Intercam represented 0.5 percent of commercial bank assets in Mexico. By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based banks in December 2024 represented 22.25 percent with MXN 3.384 trillion (USD 167.22 billion) and 13.19 percent with MXN 2.006 trillion (USD 99.15 billion), respectively, of commercial assets in Mexico. FinCEN assesses that given Intercam's size compared to the largest financial institutions in Mexico and the array of correspondent relationships between U.S. and Mexican financial institutions, the macroeconomic impact of prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam would be negligible.

Indeed, the legitimate services that Intercam offers would be readily available through other regulated institutions, and those financial institutions would do so with the appropriate transparency necessary to support international efforts to protect the integrity of the international financial system.

Although this order represents one of the first issuances of an order under section 2313a, FinCEN has afforded financial institutions an additional 21 days to prepare for the prohibition and, regardless, assesses that this action would not impose any undue cost or burden for financial institutions, as covered financial institutions would be positioned to readily incorporate the requirements of this order into their compliance programs. FinCEN does anticipate that, although any Intercam affiliates outside of Mexico would not be subject to the restrictions set out in this order, there may yet be challenges associated with transactions involving such entities. However, the burden associated with any such challenges remains outweighed by the benefits to national security from this action, and, again, FinCEN assesses that covered financial institutions' existing compliance programs and process will be sufficient in both navigating those challenges and mitigating any associated burden and unintended consequences on licit businesses and customers.

In imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, FinCEN considered other available special measures  49 and, after due consideration, has determined that a special measure prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Intercam is the appropriate means to adequately address the illicit finance risks that Intercam poses.

None of the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A—special measures one through five—would effectively address the illicit finance threat posed by Intercam. Any additional recordkeeping, information collection, or reporting requirements, as described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be insufficient to guard against the risks posed by covered financial institutions processing transmittals of funds involving Intercam. Those special measures would allow such transfers to continue to the benefit of illicit actors connected to illicit opioid trafficking. Further, prohibiting or placing conditions upon the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of Intercam, as described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(5), would be similarly inadequate. Neither prohibiting nor imposing conditions on such accounts would safeguard the U.S. financial system to the same degree as prohibiting transmittals of funds, as such a special measure would not address the movement of funds outside of a strict correspondent or payable-through relationship, for example, through the movement of funds outside the traditional banking relationship, which may permit Intercam to access USD through indirect correspondent relationships via other foreign financial institutions.

Given Intercam's longstanding facilitation of illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, and because transmittals of funds involving Intercam do not necessarily have to go through a correspondent account, FinCEN assesses that it is appropriate to more broadly prohibit any transmittals of funds. Because such a prohibition would cut off any transmittal of funds, and not just those conducted through a correspondent or payable-through account, the prohibition on any transmittal of funds involving Intercam would more effectively prevent Intercam from accessing the U.S. financial system. FinCEN therefore assesses that such a prohibition is the most appropriate special measure to protect the U.S. financial system.

Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose specified special measures, including a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, “by order, regulation or otherwise as permitted by law.” In determining the appropriate approach in this instance, FinCEN considered imposing special measures by order or regulation, taking into account the nature of the underlying threat, and determined that proceeding by an order is the most appropriate course of action given the imminent threats posed by the illicit actors whose transactions and access to funds Intercam facilitates, as well as the ongoing transactions associated with suspected activity related to illicit opioid trafficking that continue to be processed through Intercam. Further, FinCEN has assessed that this order will not be unduly burdensome or impose new or unique compliance costs on financial institutions.

A copy of this order will be published in the Federal Register . To the extent that Intercam or parties have information relevant to this order, they may submit it to FinCEN at http://www.fincen.gov/contact.

The order defines Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple (Intercam), a commercial bank licensed by the government of the Republic of Mexico, to mean all of its subsidiaries, branches, and offices located in Mexico and operating pursuant to Mexican financial laws and regulations. Any branches, subsidiaries, and offices of Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple, operating outside of Mexico, including any such branches, subsidiaries, and offices located in the United States, are expressly excluded from the definition of “Intercam” for the purposes of this order.

The order defines a covered financial institution as having the same meaning as “financial institution” in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).

The order defines transmittals of funds as the sending and receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.

All terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X, 31 U.S.C. 5312, and 21 U.S.C. 2302.

A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any transmittal of funds from or to Intercam.

The terms of this order are effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER ], with no cessation date.

FinCEN reserves authority to impose conditions on certain transmittals of funds from or to Intercam and to grant appropriate exemptions from the requirements of this order.

Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports, or other applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Any covered financial institution, and any of its partners, directors, officers, or employees may be liable for civil or criminal penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for willfully violating any of the terms of this order.

Any judicial determination that any provision of this order is invalid shall not affect the validity of any other provision of this order, and each other provision shall thereafter remain in full force and effect.

The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zones listed in 33 CFR 165.941, Table 1, at the following dates and times for the following events:

Algonac Fireworks Festival, Algonac, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (7), will be enforced from 8:30 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 8:30 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

Bay City Fireworks Festival, Bay City, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (8), will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 3, July 4, and July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on any scheduled day, this safety zone will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

Caseville Fireworks Festival, Caseville, MI: The safety zone listed in the § 165.941 Table 1, item (9) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

Grosse Ile Fireworks, Grosse Ile, MI: The safety zone listed in the § 165.941 Table 1, item (11) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

Grosse Pointe Farms, Grosse Pointe Farms, MI: The safety zone listed in the § 165.941 Table 1, item (12) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Grosse Pointe Yacht Club Fireworks, Grosse Pointe Shores, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (13), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Harbor Beach Fireworks, Harbor Beach, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (14), will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 12, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 12, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 13, 2025.

Belle Maer Harbor Fireworks, Harrison Township, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (15), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Harrisville Fireworks, Harrisville, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (16) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

Lexington Fireworks, Lexington, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (17) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Oscoda Township Fireworks, Oscoda, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (18) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Port Austin Fireworks, Port Austin, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (19), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Port Sanilac Fireworks, Port Sanilac, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (20), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

St. Clair Fireworks, St. Clair, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (21), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:45 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:45 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

St. Clair Shores Fireworks, St. Clair Shores, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (22), will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 10:15 p.m. on June 27, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on June 27, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 10:15 p.m. on June 28, 2025.

Tawas Fireworks, Tawas, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (23), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 4, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 4, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 5, 2025.

Old Club Fireworks, Harsens Island, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (26), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

Marine City Maritime Days Fireworks Marine City, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (33), will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on August 1, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on August 1, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on August 2, 2025.

Put-In-Bay 4th of July Fireworks Put-In-Bay, OH: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (36) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 11 p.m. on July 4, 2025.

Lakeside Chautauqua July 4th Fireworks, Lakeside, OH: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (40) will be enforced from 9:30 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 4, 2025.

Harrisville Fireworks, Harrisville, MI: The safety zone listed in Table 1 to § 165.941, item (16) will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 5, 2025. In the case of inclement weather on July 5, 2025, this safety zone will be enforced from 10 p.m. through 10:30 p.m. on July 6, 2025.

The locations for these events are in Table 1 to § 165.941. Under the provisions of 33 CFR 165.23, entry into, transiting, or anchoring within these safety zones during the enforcement period is prohibited unless authorized by the Captain of the Port Detroit or his designated representative. Vessels that wish to transit through the safety zones may request permission from the Captain of the Port Detroit or his designated representative. Requests must be made in advance and approved by the Captain of Port Detroit before transits will be authorized. Approval will be granted on a case-by-case basis. The Captain of the Port Detroit may be contacted via U.S. Coast Guard Sector Detroit on channel 16, VHF-FM or by calling (313) 568-9564. The Coast Guard will give notice to the public via Local Notice to Mariners and VHF radio broadcasts that the regulation is in effect.

This notice of enforcement is issued under authority of 33 CFR 165.941 and 5 U.S.C. 552(a). If the Captain of the Port Detroit determines that any of these safety zones need not be enforced for the full duration stated in this notice, he may suspend such enforcement and notify the public of the suspension via a Broadcast Notice to Mariners.

This action, which consolidates publicly available information about OMB approval of certain information collections without affecting any related activities or requirements, is directed to the public in general. Although this action may be of particular interest to those who would follow the EPA listing of OMB Control Numbers in 40 CFR part 9, the Agency has not attempted to describe all the specific entities that may be interested.

This document updates the OMB Control Numbers listed in 40 CFR part 9 for various actions published in the Federal Register that were issued under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. ), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (7 U.S.C. 136 et seq. ), the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) (21 U.S.C. 408), and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) (42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq. ). With this technical amendment, EPA is updating the table in 40 CFR 9.1 to reflect changes to the OMB Control Numbers assigned to the information collection activities contained in the EPA regulations in title 40 of the CFR. The activities or their corresponding OMB Control Numbers may have changed due to the publication of a final rule without a corresponding amendment to 40 CFR part 9, or due to other implementation activities that resulted in the subsequent issuance of a new OMB Control Number under the PRA ( e.g., the consolidation of activities, or transfer of activities to another ICR). This final rule simply updates the table to reflect the currently valid OMB Control Numbers.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information that requires OMB approval under the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ) unless it displays a currently valid OMB Control Number. To satisfy the display requirements of the PRA and OMB's implementing regulations at 5 CFR part 1320, the Agency displays the OMB Control Numbers for certain EPA regulations in 40 CFR part 9, in related documents that publish in the Federal Register , or by other appropriate means, such as on a related collection instrument or form, reporting system or as part of the instructions and guidance given to respondents, as applicable.

Section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), provides that, when an agency for good cause finds that public notice and comment procedures are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest, the agency may issue a rule without providing notice and an opportunity for public comment.

The information collection activities referenced in this document were previously subject to public notice and comment as part of the rulemaking process and submission of the related requests for OMB review and approval of the information collection activities contained in those rulemakings. EPA is not making any substantive changes to the information collection activities listed in 40 CFR 9.1. The Agency is only amending the list of information collections to align it with OMB approved collection activities that underwent public notice and comment process under the APA for the information collection activities associated with rulemakings, as well as consolidations of ongoing collection activities announced through the public notice and comment process per the PRA, because this action only updates the CFR to reflect changes and additions that have already occurred and for which EPA previously provided an opportunity for notice and comment. As such, EPA is not exercising any discretion in this action, but is instead making a ministerial update to the CFR. EPA thus has determined that there is good cause for making this rule final without prior proposal and opportunity comment because such notice and opportunity for comment is unnecessary. In addition, as they are ministerial updates, these revisions do not alter any regulatory requirements. For the reasons discussed in this unit, the Agency also finds that good cause exists under APA section 553(d) to make this rule effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register . EPA is not exercising discretion in this action, but is instead making an administrative change to the CFR.

EPA is updating the table at 40 CFR 9.1 to correctly reflect OMB's approval of the information collection activities contained in the final rules listed in 40 CFR parts 150 through 190, part 372, and parts 700 through 799, and the ICRs identified in this unit. You may access the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICRs and any OMB Terms of Clearance online at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRASearch by searching for the record using the identified ICR Reference Number.

• Labeling Change for Certain Minimum Risk Pesticides under FIFRA Section 25(b) (OMB Control No. 2070-0187, EPA ICR No. 2475). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of December 18, 2015 (80 FR 80653; FRL-9934-44) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201512-2070-001.

• Agricultural Worker Protection Standard Training, Notification and Recordkeeping (OMB Control No. 2070-0190, EPA ICR No. 2491). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of November 11, 2015 (80 FR 67496; FRL-9931-81) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201510-2070-001.

• Pesticides; Certification of Pesticide Applicators (OMB Control No. 2070-0196; EPA ICR No. 2499). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 4, 2017 (82 FR 952; FRL-9956-70) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201508-2070-002.

• Exemptions of Certain Plant-Incorporated Protectants (PIPs) Derived from Newer Technologies Rulemaking (OMB Control No. 2070-0214; EPA ICR No. 2619). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of May 31, 2023 (88 FR 34756; FRL-7261-04-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202305-2070-003.

• Changes to Reporting Requirements for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances and to Supplier Notifications for Chemicals of Special Concern; Community Right-to-Know Toxic Chemical Release Reporting (OMB Control No. 2070-0226; EPA ICR No.2724). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of October 31, 2023 (88 FR 74360; FRL-8741-04-OCSPP) and the record of the OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202212-2070-001.

• Parent Company Definition for Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Reporting (OMB Control No. 2070-0216; EPA ICR No.2597). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of October 21, 2022 (87 FR 63950; FRL-6004-02-OCSPP) and the record of the OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202109-2070-001.

• User Fees for the Administration of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0208, EPA ICR No. 2567). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of October 17, 2018 (83 FR 52694; FRL-9984-41-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201810-2070-001.

• Procedures for Requesting a Chemical Risk Evaluation under TSCA (OMB Control No. 2070-0231, EPA ICR No. 2781). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of May 3, 2024 (89 FR 37028; FRL-8259-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202405-2070-001.

• Confidential Business Information Claims Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0223; EPA ICR No. 2706). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of June 7, 2023 (88 FR 37155; FRL-8223-02-OCSPP) and the recored of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR reference No. 202205-2070-003.

• Chemical Substances When Manufactured or Processed as Nanoscale Materials; TSCA Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements (OMB Control No. 2070-0194; EPA ICR No. 2517). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 12, 2017 (82 FR 3641; FRL-9957-81) and the recored of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR reference No. 201503-2070-004.

• TSCA Section 8(a) Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for Asbestos (OMB Control No. 2070-0222; EPA ICR No. 2711). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of July 25, 2023 (88 FR 47782; FRL-8632-01-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202307-2070-002.

• Toxic Substances Control Act Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements for Perfluoroalkyl and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (OMB Control No. 2070-0217; EPA ICR No. 2682). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of October 11, 2023 (88 FR 47782; FRL-7902-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202106-2070-002.

• TSCA Section 8(b) Reporting Requirements for TSCA Inventory Notification (Active-Inactive) Requirements (OMB Control No. 2070-0201, EPA ICR No. 2565). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of August 11, 2017 (82 FR 37520; FRL-9964-22) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201708-2070-004.

• Partial Update of the TSCA Section 8(a) Inventory Data Base, Production and Site Reports (Chemical Data Reporting) (OMB Control No. 2070-0162, EPA ICR No. 1884). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of August 16, 2011 (76 FR 50815; FRL-8872-9) and amended final rule TSCA Inventory Update Reporting Modifications; Chemical Data Reporting on September 6, 2011 (76 FR 54932; FRL-8872-9) (OMB Control No. 2070-0162, EPA ICR No. 1884) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 200905-2070-001.

• Partial Exemption of Certain Chemical Substances from Reporting Additional Chemical Data (OMB Control No. 2070-0162; EPA ICR No. 1884). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of June 19, 2014 (79 FR 35096; FRL-9910-84) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201108-2070-002.

• Partial Exemption of Certain Chemical Substances from Reporting Additional Chemical Data (OMB Control No. 2070-0162; EPA ICR No. 1884). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of March 29, 2016 (81 FR 17392; FRL-9941-19) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201603-2070-002.

• Small Manufacturer Definition Update for Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Section 8(a) (OMB Control No. 2070-0162; EPA ICR No. 1884). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of May 8, 2020 (85 FR 31986; FRL-10008-14) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201904-2070-006.

• Mercury; Reporting Requirements for TSCA Mercury Inventory (OMB Control No. 2070-0207, EPA ICR No. 2567). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of June 27, 2018, (83 FR 30054; FRL-9979-74), as amended by a final rule issued in the Federal Register of November 8, 2021 (86 FR 61708; FRL-8523-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201806-2070-003.

• Reconsideration of the Dust-Lead Hazard Standards and Dust-Lead Post-Abatement Clearance Levels (OMB Control No. 2070-0227; EPA ICR No. 2760). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of November 11, 2024 (89 FR 89416; FRL-8524-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202308-2070-001.

• Methylene Chloride; Regulation of Paint and Coating Removal for Consumer Use Under TSCA Section 6(a) (OMB Control No. 2070-0204, EPA ICR No. 2556). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of March 27, 2019 (84 FR 11420; FRL-9989-29) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201903-2070-003.

• Methylene Chloride; Regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act (OMB Control No. 2070-0204, EPA ICR No. 2735). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of May 8, 2024 (89 FR 39254; FRL-8155-01-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202305-2070-001.

• Trichloroethylene (TCE); Regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0232, EPA ICR No. 2775). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of December 17, 2024 (89 FR 102568; FRL-8317-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202311-2070-001.

• Hexachlorobutadiene (HCBD); Regulation of Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals under TSCA Section 6(h) (OMB Control No. 2070-0213, EPA ICR No. 2599). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 6, 2021 (86 FR 922; FRL-10018-90) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202005-2070-001.

• 2,4,6-tris(tert-butyl)phenol (2,4,6-TTBP); Regulation of Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals under TSCA Section 6(h) (OMB Control No. 2070-0213, EPA ICR No. 2599). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 6, 2021 (86 FR 866; FRL-10018-90) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202005-2070-001.

• Pentachlorothiophenol (PCTP); Regulation of Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals under TSCA Section 6(h) (OMB Control No. 2070-0213, EPA ICR No. 2599). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 6, 2021 (86 FR 911; FRL-10018-89) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202005-2070-001.

• Phenol, Isopropylated Phosphate (3:1) (PIP 3:1); Regulation of Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals under TSCA Section 6(h) (OMB Control No. 2070-0213, EPA ICR No. 2599). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 6, 2021 (86 FR 894; FRL-10018-88) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202005-2070-001.

• Decabromodiphenyl Ether and Phenol, Isopropylated Phosphate (3:1); Revision to the Regulation of Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0213, EPA ICR No. 2599). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of January 6, 2021 (86 FR 866; FRL-10018-90) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202005-2070-001.

• Decabromodiphenyl Ether and Phenol, Isopropylated Phosphate (3:1); Revision to the Regulation of PBT Chemicals under TSCA (Final Rule) (OMB Control No. 2070-0230, EPA ICR No. 2779). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of November 19, 2024 (89 FR 91486; FRL-9145-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202401-2070-001.

• Asbestos Part 1; Chrysotile Asbestos; Regulation of Certain Conditions of Use Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0220 EPA ICR No. 2707). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of March 28, 2024, (89 FR 21970; FRL-8332-01-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202204-2070-002.

• Perchloroethylene (PCE); Regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0233, EPA ICR No. 2740). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of December 18, 2024 (89 FR 103560; FRL-8329-01-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202501-2070-002.

• Carbon Tetrachloride (CTC); Regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (OMB Control No. 2070-0228, EPA ICR No. 2744). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of December 18, 2024 (89 FR 103512; FRL-8206-02-OCSPP) and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 202308-2070-003.

• Formaldehyde Emissions Standards for Composite Wood Products Act (OMB Control No. 2070-0185, EPA ICR No. 2446). See the corresponding final rule issued in the Federal Register of December 12, 2016 (81 FR 89674; FRL-9949-90), and the record of OMB's approval of the rule-related ICR under ICR Reference No. 201611-2070-003.

EPA is also amending the OMB Control Numbers of several existing entries to reflect changes to the OMB Control Numbers since the table was last updated. For example, EPA consolidated the activities that were approved under OMB Control Number 2070-0038 (EPA ICR No. 1188.13) and OMB Control Number 2070-0012 (EPA ICR No. 0574.18) into a single OMB Control Number ICR approved under OMB control number 2070-0038 as announced in the Federal Register on June 29, 2022 (87 FR 38745 (FRL-9980-01-OMS)). EPA also consolidated the information collection activities for the following OMB control numbers: 2070-0004 (EPA ICR No. 0575.16); 2070-0017 (EPA ICR No. 1031.12); 2070-0054 (EPA ICR No. 0586.14); and 2070-0067 (EPA ICR No. 1198.10) into a single ICR approved under OMB control number 2070-0224 (EPA ICR No. 2703.01) as announced in the Federal Register on August 30, 2022 (87 FR 52967 (FRL-10179 01-OMS)). Finally, the Agency consolidated the following OMB control numbers: 2070-0024 (EPA ICR No. 0597.13); 2070-0039 (EPA ICR No. 1204.14); 2070-0040 (EPA ICR No. 0276.17); 2070-0044 (EPA ICR No. 0278.13); 2070-0052 (EPA ICR No. 0616.13); 2070-0060 (EPA ICR No. 0277.21); 2070-0142 (EPA ICR No. 1693.10); and 2070-0182 (EPA ICR No. 2311.04) into a single ICR approved under OMB control number 2070-0226 (EPA ICR No. 2642.01) as announced in the Federal Register on June 30, 2023 (88 FR 42358 (FRL-11117-01-OMS)).

EPA is modifying the table through technical corrections to the text. as well as the consolidation of several listings. Specifically, in some cases the table listing for several sections that now share the same OMB control number have been consolidated into a single listing for the part or subpart when every section shares the same OMB Control Number, and the headings have also been amended to align with redesignations in the CFR that occurred through rulemakings.

Additional information about these statutes and Executive Orders can be found at https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders.

This action is not a significant regulatory action and was therefore not submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993).

Executive Order 14192 (90 FR 9065, February 6, 2025) does not apply because this action is exempted from review under Executive Order 12866.

This action does not contain or amend an information collection burden under the PRA, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. because it is a technical amendment to 40 CFR 9.1.

This action is not subject to the RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. The RFA applies only to rules subject to notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553, or any other statute. This rule is not subject to notice and comment requirements under the APA because the Agency has invoked the APA “good cause” exemption (see Unit I.).

This action does not contain an unfunded mandate of $100 million (in 1995 dollars and adjusted annually for inflation) or more as described in UMRA, 2. U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. The action imposes no enforceable duty on any State, local or Tribal governments or the private sector.

This action does not have federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999), because it will not have substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

This action will not have tribal implications as defined in Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000) because this action will not have substantial direct effects on tribal governments, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

This action is not subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997), because it does not address environmental health or safety risks disproportionately affecting children. Since this action does not concern human health, EPA's 2021 Policy on Children's Health also does not apply.

This action is not a “significant energy action” as defined in Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001), because it is not likely to have any adverse effect on the supply, distribution or use of energy.

This action does not involve technical standards under the NTTAA section 12(d), 15 U.S.C. 272.

This action is subject to the CRA, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and EPA will submit a rule report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. This does not meet the criteria set forth in 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

For the reasons stated in the preamble, 40 CFR chapter I is amended as follows:

This rule increases the fees for search and processing time from $38 per hour to $50 per hour, to better align with the average fees set by other federal agencies. This rule also updates the addresses for mailing as the offices moved and changed addresses. Finally, this rule adds the link for the FOIA portals for submitting requests.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation amends 49 CFR part 701 as follows: