This interim final rule is necessary to adapt the MSPB's regulations to recent amendments to Federal law contained in section 707 of the Veterans' Access to Care through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency Act of 2014, Public Law 113-146 (the Act). The Act was signed by the President on August 7, 2014, and took effect on that same date. These are technical corrections to definitions and citations.

Accordingly, 5 CFR part 1210 is corrected by making the following correcting amendments:

On August 25, 2008, Airbus applied for a type certificate for their new Model A350-900 series airplane. Later, Airbus requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the application for FAA type certification to November 15, 2009. The Model A350-900 series has a conventional layout with twin wing-mounted Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engines. It features a twin aisle, 9- abreast, economy-class layout, and accommodates side-by-side placement of LD-3 containers in the cargo compartment. The basic Model A350-900 series configuration accommodates 315 passengers in a standard two-class arrangement. The design cruise speed is Mach 0.85 with a maximum take-off weight of 602,000 lbs.

Existing airworthiness regulations did not anticipate the use of lithium-ion batteries and battery systems on aircraft. Lithium-ion batteries and battery systems have new hazards that were not contemplated when the existing regulations were issued. In Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1353, the FAA provided an airworthiness standard for lead-acid batteries and nickel-cadmium batteries. These special conditions provide an equivalent level of safety as that of the existing regulation. The current regulations are not adequate for rechargeable lithium-battery and battery system installations. Additional lithium-battery and battery system special conditions are required to ensure the same level of safety as set forth by the existing regulation intended for other battery technology.

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A350-900 series meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-129.

The FAA has determined that Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes must comply with the following sections: § 25.863(a) through (d), Amendment 25-61 and Amendment 25-66.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model A350-900 series because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model or series for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Airbus Model A350-900 airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36, and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

The Airbus Model A350-900 airplane will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: Permanently installed rechargeable lithium batteries and lithium battery systems.

The current regulations governing installation of batteries in large transport-category airplanes were derived from Civil Air Regulations (CAR) part 4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification of CAR 4b that established 14 CFR part 25 in February 1965. The new battery requirements, § 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), basically reworded the CAR requirements.

Increased use of nickel-cadmium batteries in small airplanes resulted in increased incidents of battery fires and failures which led to additional rulemaking affecting large transport-category airplanes as well as small airplanes. On September 1, 1977 and March 1, 1978, the FAA issued § 25.1353(c)(5) and (c)(6), respectively, governing nickel-cadmium battery installations on large transport-category airplanes.

The proposed use of lithium-ion batteries and battery systems for equipment and systems on Airbus Model A350 airplanes has prompted the FAA to review the adequacy of these existing regulations. Our review indicates that the existing regulations do not adequately address several failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics of lithium-ion batteries and battery systems that could affect the safety and reliability of the Airbus model A350-900 airplane rechargeable lithium batteries and rechargeable lithium-battery-system installations.

At present, commercial aviation has limited experience with use of rechargeable lithium-ion batteries and battery systems in applications involving commercial aviation. However, other users of this technology, ranging from wireless telephone manufacturers to the electric-vehicle industry, have noted potential hazards with lithium-ion batteries and battery systems. These problems include overcharging, over-discharging, and flammability of cell components.

In general, lithium-ion batteries and battery systems are significantly more susceptible to internal failures that can result in self-sustaining increases in temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. This condition is especially true for overcharging, which causes heating and destabilization of the components of the cell, leading to the formation (by plating) of highly unstable metallic lithium. The metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining fire or explosion. Finally, the severity of thermal runaway, due to overcharging, increases with increasing battery capacity due to the higher amount of electrolyte in large batteries.

Discharge of some types of lithium-ion batteries and battery systems, beyond a certain voltage (typically 2.4 volts), can cause corrosion of the electrodes of the cell, resulting in loss of battery capacity that cannot be reversed by recharging. This loss of capacity may not be detected by the simple voltage measurements commonly available to flightcrews as a means of checking battery status—a problem shared with nickel-cadmium batteries.

Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid batteries, some types of lithium-ion batteries and battery systems use liquid electrolytes that are flammable. The electrolyte can serve as a source of fuel for an external fire if there is a breach of the battery container.

The problems lithium-ion battery and battery-system users experience raise concern about the use of these batteries in commercial aviation. The intent of the proposed special conditions is to establish appropriate airworthiness standards for lithium-ion battery installations in Airbus Model A350-900 airplanes and to ensure, as required by §§ 25.1309 and 25.601, that these lithium-ion batteries and battery systems will not result in an unsafe condition. To address these concerns, these special conditions adopt the following requirements:

• Those sections of 14 CFR 25.1353 that are applicable to lithium ion batteries.

• The flammable fluid fire protection requirements of 14 CFR 25.863. In the past, this rule was not applied to batteries of transport category airplanes, since the electrolytes used in lead-acid and nickel-cadmium batteries are not flammable.

• New requirements to address the hazards of overcharging and over-discharging that are unique to lithium ion batteries.

• New maintenance requirements to ensure that batteries used as spares are maintained in an appropriate state of charge.

These special conditions are similar to lithium-ion batteries and battery systems special conditions adopted for the Boeing Model 787 (72FR57842; October 11, 2007).

These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25-13-41-SC for the Airbus Model A350-900 series airplane was published in the Federal Register on December 19, 2013 (78 FR 76772). No comments were received, and the special conditions are adopted as proposed.

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes. Should Airbus apply later for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well.

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

On August 25, 2008, Airbus applied for a type certificate for their new Model A350-900 airplane. Later, Airbus requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the application for FAA type certification to November 15, 2009. The Model A350-900 airplane has a conventional layout with twin wing-mounted Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engines. It features a twin-aisle, 9-abreast, economy-class layout, and accommodates side-by-side placement of LD-3 containers in the cargo compartment. The basic Model A350-900 airplane configuration accommodates 315 passengers in a standard two-class arrangement. The design cruise speed is Mach 0.85 with a maximum take-off weight of 602,000 lbs.

The longitudinal-control law design of the Airbus Model A350-900 airplane incorporates an overspeed protection system in the normal mode, which prevents the pilot from inadvertently or intentionally exceeding a speed approximately equivalent to V FC or attaining V DF . Current Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 sections do not relate to a high-speed-limiting protection system that might preclude or modify flying-qualities assessments in the overspeed region. However, the requirements of § 25.253 (high-speed characteristics) and its related policy are applicable to the Model A350-900 airplane and are not affected by this special condition.

Under 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A350-900 airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-129.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus Model A350-900 airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model A350-900 airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

The Model A350-900 airplane incorporates the following novel or unusual design features: an overspeed protection system that prevents the pilot from inadvertently or intentionally exceeding a speed approximately equivalent to V FC , or attaining V DF .

At V MO + 10 knots or M MO + 0.02 knots, an automatic nose-up pitch is applied with phase advance in the event of high acceleration. The speed stabilizes at V D -10kts/M D -0.02 if the stick is full forward, or the speed will return below V MO /M MO if the stick is released.

This special condition establishes requirements to ensure that operation of the high-speed-limiting protection system does not impede normal attainment of speeds up to the overspeed warning. Its main features are:

1. It protects the airplane against high-speed/high Mach-number flight conditions beyond V MO /M MO .

2. It does not interfere with flight at V MO /M MO , even in turbulent air.

3. It still provides load-factor limitation through the “pitch limiting” function described below.

4. It restores positive static stability beyond V MO /M MO .

These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25-13-23-SC for the Airbus Model A350-900 airplane was published in the Federal Register on January 8, 2014 (79 FR 1336). An anonymous comment was received January 16, 2014. The commenter was concerned about high-level windshears, and the potential violation of Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM) airspace restrictions that might accompany a nose-up input of a high-speed protection system. In addition, the commenter was concerned about system failures or malfunctions leading to unintended control consequences and the pilot's ability to appropriately counteract those control anomalies.

The FAA would like to clarify that this special condition only addresses one aspect of high-speed limiting designs. Many other regulations, such as 14 CFR 25.1301 and 25.1309, address the proper intended function and failure scenarios of such a system. Therefore, the anonymous comment is beyond the scope of this special condition, and is already accounted for and considered in the basic regulatory-compliance process.

As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Airbus Model A350-900 airplanes. Should Airbus apply later for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well.

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

On August 25, 2008, Airbus applied for a type certificate for their new Model A350-900 airplane. Later, Airbus requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the application for FAA type certification to November 15, 2009. The Model A350-900 airplane has a conventional layout with twin wing-mounted Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engines. It features a twin-aisle, 9-abreast, economy-class layout, and accommodates side-by-side placement of LD-3 containers in the cargo compartment. The basic Model A350-900 airplane configuration accommodates 315 passengers in a standard two-class arrangement. The design cruise speed is Mach 0.85 with a maximum take-off weight of 602,000 lbs.

The Model A350-900 airplane, like Airbus Model A320, A330, A340 and A380 series airplanes, has a high-speed protection system that limits nose-down pilot authority at speeds above V C /M C , and prevents the airplane from actually performing the maneuver required under § 25.335(b)(1). Special conditions are necessary to address the Model A350-900 airplane high-speed protection system. These special conditions identify various symmetric and non-symmetric maneuvers that will ensure that an appropriate design dive speed, V D /M D , is established.

Under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A350-900 airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-129.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model A350-900 airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model A350-900 airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model A350-900 airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

The Airbus Model A350-900 airplane will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features:

A high-speed protection system that limits nose-down pilot authority at speeds above V C /M C , and prevents the airplane from actually performing the maneuver required under § 25.335(b)(1). The special conditions identify various symmetric and non-symmetric maneuvers that will ensure that an appropriate design dive speed, V D /M D , is established.

Section 25.335(b)(1) is an analytical envelope condition originally adopted in Part 4b of the Civil Air Regulations to provide an acceptable speed margin between design cruise speed and design dive speed. Flutter-clearance design speeds and airframe design loads are impacted by the design dive speed. While the initial condition for the upset specified in the rule is 1g level flight, protection is afforded for other inadvertent overspeed conditions as well. Section 25.335(b)(1) is intended as a conservative enveloping condition for potential overspeed conditions, including non-symmetric conditions.

To establish that potential overspeed conditions are enveloped, Airbus should demonstrate that any reduced speed margin, based on the high-speed protection system in the Model A350-900 airplane, will not be exceeded in inadvertent, or gust-induced, upsets resulting in initiation of the dive from non-symmetric attitudes; or that the airplane is protected, by the flight-control laws, from getting into non-symmetric upset conditions. The special conditions identify various symmetric and non-symmetric maneuvers that will ensure that an appropriate design dive speed, V D /M D , is established.

These special conditions are in lieu of § 25.335(b)(1). Section 25.335(b)(2), which also addresses the design dive speed, is applied separately (Advisory Circular (AC) 25.335-1A provides an acceptable means of compliance to § 25.335(b)(2)). The applicant should conduct a demonstration that includes a comprehensive set of conditions, as described below.

Special conditions (3) and (4) indicate that failures of the high-speed protection system must be improbable and must be annunciated to the pilots. If these two criteria are not met, then the probability that the established dive speed will be exceeded, and the resulting risk to the airplane, is too great. On the other hand, if the high-speed protection system is known to be inoperative, then dispatch of the airplane could be acceptable under an approved minimum-equipment list (MEL) containing language similar to special condition (5). Dispatch under an MEL would require that appropriate reduced operating speeds, V MO /M MO , are provided in the airplane flight manual (AFM), and the cockpit display of those reduced speeds, as well as the overspeed warning for exceeding those speeds, are equivalent to that of the normal airplane with the high-speed protection system operative.

We do not believe that application of the Interaction of Systems and Structures special conditions (docket no. FAA-2013-0894), or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification (CS) 25.302, is appropriate in this case because design dive speed is, in and of itself, part of the design criteria. Stability and control, flight loads, and flutter evaluations all depend on the design dive speed. Therefore, a single design dive speed should be established that will not be exceeded, taking into account the performance of the high-speed protection system as well as its failure modes, failure indications, and accompanying AFM instructions.

These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25-13-35-SC for Airbus Model A350-900 airplanes was published in the Federal Register on December 24, 2013 (78 FR 77611). No comments were received and the special conditions are adopted as proposed.

As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Airbus Model A350-900 airplanes. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another airplane series incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that series as well.

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on the Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type-certification basis for Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes.

1. In lieu of compliance with § 25.335(b)(1), if the flight-control system includes functions that act automatically to initiate recovery before the end of the 20-second period specified in § 25.335(b)(1), V D /M D must be determined from the greater of the speeds resulting from conditions (a) and (b), below. The speed increase occurring in these maneuvers may be calculated if reliable or conservative aerodynamic data are used.

a. From an initial condition of stabilized flight at V C /M C , the airplane is upset so as to travel a new flight path 7.5 degrees below the initial path. Control application, up to full authority, is made to try to maintain this new flight path. Twenty seconds after initiating the upset, manual recovery is made at a load factor of 1.5 g (0.5 acceleration increment), or such greater load factor that is automatically applied by the system with the pilot's pitch control set to neutral. Power, as specified in § 25.175(b)(1)(iv), is assumed until recovery is initiated, at which time power reduction and the use of pilot-controlled drag devices may be used.

b. From a speed below V C /M C , with power to maintain stabilized level flight at this speed, the airplane is upset so as to accelerate through V C /M C at a flight path 15 degrees below the initial path (or at the steepest nose-down attitude that the system will permit with full control authority, if less than 15 degrees). The pilot's controls may be in the neutral position after reaching V C /M C and before recovery is initiated. Recovery may be initiated three seconds after operation of the high-speed warning system by application of a load of 1.5g (0.5 acceleration increment), or such greater load factor that is automatically applied by the system with the pilot's pitch control set to neutral. Power may be reduced simultaneously. All other means of decelerating the airplane, the use of which is authorized up to the highest speed reached in the maneuver, may be used. The interval between successive pilot actions must not be less than one second.

2. The applicant must also demonstrate that the speed margin, established as above, will not be exceeded in inadvertent, or gust-induced, upsets resulting in initiation of the dive from non-symmetric attitudes, unless the airplane is protected by the flight-control laws from getting into non-symmetric upset conditions. The upset maneuvers described in AC 25-7C, Chapter 2, Section 8, Paragraph 32c.(3)(a) and (c), may be used to comply with this requirement.

3. Detected loss of the high-speed protection function must be less than 10 −3 per flight hour.

4. Failures of the system must be annunciated to the pilots. The Operating Limitations Section of the AFM must contain instructions that reduce the maximum operating speeds, V max /M max , to a value that maintains a speed margin between these speeds and V D /M D that is consistent with showing compliance to § 25.335(b), without the benefit of the high-speed protection system.

5. Dispatch of the airplane with the high-speed protection system inoperative is prohibited except under an approved MEL that requires AFM instructions to indicate reduced maximum operating speeds, as described in special condition (4), above. In addition, the cockpit display of the reduced operating speeds, as well as the overspeed warning for exceeding those speeds, must be equivalent to that of the normal airplane with the high-speed protection system operative. Also, it must be shown that no additional hazards are introduced with the high-speed protection system inoperative.

On August 25, 2008, Airbus applied for a type certificate for their new Model A350-900 series airplane. Later, Airbus requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the application for FAA type certification to November 15, 2009. The Model A350-900 series airplane has a conventional layout with twin wing-mounted Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engines. It features a twin-aisle, 9-abreast, economy-class layout, and accommodates side-by-side placement of LD-3 containers in the cargo compartment. The basic Model A350-900 series airplane configuration accommodates 315 passengers in a standard two-class arrangement. The design cruise speed is Mach 0.85 with a maximum take-off weight of 602,000 lbs.

The Model A350-900 series airplane will be the second large, transport-category airplane certificated with composite wing and fuel-tank structure that may be exposed to the direct effects of post-crash ground, or under-wing, fuel-fed fires. Although the FAA has previously approved fuel tanks made of composite materials located in the horizontal stabilizer of some airplanes, the composite wing structure of the Model A350-900 series airplane will incorporate a new fuel-tank construction into service.

Advisory Circular (AC) 20-107A, Composite Aircraft Structure, under the topic of flammability, states:

The existing requirements for flammability and fire protection of aircraft structure attempt to minimize the hazard to the occupants in the event ignition of flammable fluids or vapors occurs. The use of composite structure should not decrease this existing level of safety.

Pertinent to the wing structure, post-crash-fire passenger survivability is dependent on the time available for passenger evacuation prior to fuel-tank breach or structural failure. Structural failure can be a result of degradation in load-carrying capability in the upper or lower wing surface caused by a fuel-fed ground fire. Structural failure can also be a result of over-pressurization caused by ignition of fuel vapors inside the fuel tank.

The inherent capability of aluminum to resist fire has been considered by the FAA in development of the current regulations. Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 Chapter 1, Section 1.1, General Definitions, defines “fire resistant” to mean, with respect to sheet or structural members, the capacity to withstand heat associated with fire at least as well as aluminum alloy does in dimensions appropriate for the purpose for which those materials are used.

Note that aluminum alloy is identified as the performance standard for fire resistance, although no thickness or heat intensities are defined. Based on the performance of aluminum alloy, the definition of “fire resistance” was later defined, for testing of other materials in AC 20-135, as the capability to withstand a 2000 °F flame for five minutes.

The FAA has historically issued rules with the assumption that the material of construction for wing and fuselage would be aluminum. As a representative case, 14 CFR 25.963 was issued as a result of a large, fuel-fed fire following the failures of fuel-tank access doors caused by uncontained engine failures. During the subsequent Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) harmonization process, the structures group attempted to harmonize § 25.963 regarding the impact-and-fire resistance of the fuel-tank access panels. Discussions between the FAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), formerly the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), ensued regarding the need for fire resistance of the fuel-tank access panels. The EASA position was that the FAA requirement for the access panels to be fire resistant, when the surrounding wing structure was not required to be fire resistant, was inconsistent, and that the access panels only needed to be as fire resistant as the surrounding tank structure. The FAA position stated that the fuel-tank access-panel fire-resistance requirement should be retained, and that, long-term, a minimum requirement should be created for the wing skin itself. Both authorities recognized that existing aluminum wing structure provided an acceptable level of safety. Further rulemaking has not yet been pursued.

As with previous Airbus airplane designs with under-wing-mounted engines, the wing tanks and center tanks are located in proximity to the passengers and near the engines. Past experience indicates that post-crash survivability is greatly influenced by the size and intensity of any fire that occurs. The ability of aluminum wing surfaces, wetted by fuel on their interior surface, to withstand post-crash fire conditions, has been demonstrated by tests conducted at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center. 1 Results of these tests have verified adequate dissipation of heat across wetted aluminum fuel-tank surfaces so that localized hot spots do not occur, thus minimizing the threat of explosion. This inherent capability of aluminum to dissipate heat also allows the wing lower surface to retain its load-carrying characteristics during a fuel-fed ground fire, and significantly delay wing collapse or burn-through for a time interval that usually exceeds evacuation times. In addition, as an aluminum fuel tank is heated with significant quantities of fuel inside, fuel vapor accumulates in the ullage space, exceeding the upper flammability limit relatively quickly and thus reducing the threat of a fuel-tank explosion prior to fuel-tank burn-through. Service history of conventional aluminum airplanes has shown that fuel-tank explosions caused by ground fires have been rare on airplanes configured with flame arrestors in the fuel-tank vent lines. Fuel tanks constructed with composite materials may or may not have equivalent capability.

Due to the inherent properties provided by aluminum skin and structure, current regulations may not be adequate as they were developed, and have evolved under the assumption that wing construction would be of aluminum materials. Inherent properties of aluminum, with respect to fuel tanks and fuel-fed fires, are as follows:

• Aluminum is highly thermally conductive and readily transmits the heat of a fuel-fed external fire to fuel in the tank. This has the benefit of rapidly driving the fuel-tank ullage to exceed the upper flammability limit prior to burn-through of the fuel-tank skin, or heating of the wing upper surface above the auto-ignition temperature, thus greatly reducing the threat of fuel-tank explosion.

• Aluminum panels at thicknesses previously used in wing lower surfaces of large, transport-category airplanes have been fire resistant as defined in 14 CFR 1.1 and AC 20-135.

• Heat capacity of aluminum and fuel prevents burn-through or wing collapse for a time interval that generally exceeds the passenger evacuation time.

Under 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the Model A350-900 series airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-129.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model A350-900 series airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under § 21.101.

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model A350-900 series airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

The Airbus Model A350-900 series airplane will incorporate the following novel or unusual design feature: Composite fuel tanks.

The extensive use of composite materials in the design of the A350-900 airplane wing and fuel-tank structure is considered a major change from conventional and traditional methods of construction, as this will be only the second large, transport-category airplane design to be certificated with this level of composite material for these purposes. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain specific standards for post-crash fire-safety performance of wing and fuel-tank skin or structure.

To provide the same level of safety as exists with conventional airplane construction, Airbus must demonstrate that the Model A350-900 series airplane has sufficient post-crash survivability to enable occupants to safely evacuate in the event that the wings are exposed to a large, fuel-fed fire. Factors in fuel-tank survivability are the structural integrity of the wing and tank; flammability of the tank; burn-through resistance of the wing skin; and the presence of auto-ignition threats during exposure to a fire. The FAA assessed post-crash survival time during the adoption of Amendment 25-111 for fuselage burn-through protection. Studies conducted by, and on behalf of, the FAA indicated that, following a survivable accident, prevention of fuselage burn-through for approximately 5 minutes can significantly enhance survivability. 2

There is little benefit in requiring the design to prevent wing-skin burn-through beyond five minutes, due to the effects of the fuel fire itself on the rest of the airplane. That assessment was carried out based on accidents involving airplanes with conventional fuel tanks, and considering the ability of ground personnel to rescue occupants. In addition, AC 20-135 indicates that, when aluminum is used for fuel tanks, the tank should withstand the effects of fire for 5 minutes without failure. Therefore, to be consistent with existing capability and related requirements, the Model A350-900 series airplane fuel tanks must be capable of resisting a post-crash fire for at least 5 minutes. In demonstrating compliance, Airbus must address a range of fuel loads from minimum to maximum, as well as any other critical fuel load.

These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-13-24-SC for Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on January 8, 2014 (79 FR 1334). No comments were received, and the special conditions are adopted as proposed.

As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Airbus Model A350-900 series airplanes. Should Airbus apply later for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

In addition to complying with 14 CFR part 25 regulations governing the fire-safety performance of the fuel tanks, wings, and nacelle, the Airbus Model A350-900 series airplane must demonstrate acceptable post-crash survivability in the event the wings are exposed to a large fuel-fed ground fire. Airbus must demonstrate that the wing and fuel-tank design can endure an external fuel-fed pool fire for at least five minutes. This must be demonstrated for minimum fuel loads (not less than reserve fuel levels) and maximum fuel loads (maximum-range fuel quantities), and other identified critical fuel loads. Considerations must include fuel-tank flammability, burn-through resistance, wing structural-strength retention properties, and auto-ignition threats during a ground-fire event for the required time duration.

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all Airbus Model A300 series airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 28, 2014 (79 FR 11358). The NPRM was prompted by an analysis of the impacts of extended service goal activities on Airbus Model A300 series airplanes. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance program. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of flight critical systems.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2012-0233, dated November 7, 2012 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition on all Airbus Model A300 series airplanes. The MCAI states:

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0124-0002.

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM (79 FR 11358, February 28, 2014) or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Since late 2006, we have included a standard paragraph titled “Airworthy Product” in all MCAI ADs in which the FAA develops an AD based on a foreign authority's AD.

The MCAI or referenced service information in an FAA AD often directs the owner/operator to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions, such as a repair. Briefly, the Airworthy Product paragraph allowed owners/operators to use corrective actions provided by the manufacturer if those actions were FAA-approved. In addition, the paragraph stated that any actions approved by the State of Design Authority (or its delegated agent) are considered to be FAA-approved.

In the NPRM (79 FR 11358, February 28, 2014), we proposed to prevent the use of repairs that were not specifically developed to correct the unsafe condition, by requiring that the repair approval provided by the State of Design Authority or its delegated agent specifically refer to this FAA AD. This change was intended to clarify the method of compliance and to provide operators with better visibility of repairs that are specifically developed and approved to correct the unsafe condition. In addition, we proposed to change the phrase “its delegated agent” to include a design approval holder (DAH) with State of Design Authority design organization approval (DOA), as applicable, to refer to a DAH authorized to approve required repairs for the proposed AD.

No comments were provided to the NPRM (79 FR 11358, February 28, 2014) about these proposed changes. However, a comment was provided for an NPRM having Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-101-AD (78 FR 78285, December 26, 2013). The commenter stated the following: “The proposed wording, being specific to repairs, eliminates the interpretation that Airbus messages are acceptable for approving minor deviations (corrective actions) needed during accomplishment of an AD mandated Airbus service bulletin.”

This comment has made the FAA aware that some operators have misunderstood or misinterpreted the Airworthy Product paragraph to allow the owner/operator to use messages provided by the manufacturer as approval of deviations during the accomplishment of an AD-mandated action. The Airworthy Product paragraph does not approve messages or other information provided by the manufacturer for deviations to the requirements of the AD-mandated actions. The Airworthy Product paragraph only addresses the requirement to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions for the identified unsafe condition and does not cover deviations from other AD requirements. However, deviations to AD-required actions are addressed in 14 CFR 39.17, and anyone may request the approval for an alternative method of compliance to the AD-required actions using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

To address this misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Airworthy Product paragraph, we have changed the paragraph and retitled it “Contacting the Manufacturer.” This paragraph now clarifies that for any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the actions must be accomplished using a method approved by the FAA, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), or Airbus's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA).

The Contacting the Manufacturer paragraph also clarifies that, if approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature. The DOA signature indicates that the data and information contained in the document are EASA-approved, which is also FAA-approved. Messages and other information provided by the manufacturer that do not contain the DOA-authorized signature approval are not EASA-approved, unless EASA directly approves the manufacturer's message or other information.

This clarification does not remove flexibility previously afforded by the Airworthy Product paragraph. Consistent with long-standing FAA policy, such flexibility was never intended for required actions. This is also consistent with the recommendation of the Airworthiness Directive Implementation Aviation Rulemaking Committee to increase flexibility in complying with ADs by identifying those actions in manufacturers' service instructions that are “Required for Compliance” with ADs. We continue to work with manufacturers to implement this recommendation. But once we determine that an action is required, any deviation from the requirement must be approved as an alternative method of compliance.

Other commenters to the NPRM having Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-101-AD (78 FR 78285, December 26, 2013) pointed out that in many cases the foreign manufacturer's service bulletin and the foreign authority's MCAI might have been issued some time before the FAA AD. Therefore, the DOA might have provided U.S. operators with an approved repair, developed with full awareness of the unsafe condition, before the FAA AD is issued. Under these circumstances, to comply with the FAA AD, the operator would be required to go back to the manufacturer's DOA and obtain a new approval document, adding time and expense to the compliance process with no safety benefit.

Based on these comments, we removed the requirement that the DAH-provided repair specifically refer to this AD. Before adopting such a requirement, the FAA will coordinate with affected DAHs and verify they are prepared to implement means to ensure that their repair approvals consider the unsafe condition addressed in this AD. Any such requirements will be adopted through the normal AD rulemaking process, including notice-and-comment procedures, when appropriate.

We also have decided not to include a generic reference to either the “delegated agent” or “DAH with State of Design Authority design organization approval,” but instead we have provided the specific delegation approval granted by the State of Design Authority for the DAH throughout this AD.

We reviewed the relevant data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 11358, February 28, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 11358, February 28, 2014).

We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

We estimate that this AD affects 7 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We also estimate that it will take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $0 per product. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be $595, or $85 per product.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. “Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0124; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to supersede AD 2005-15-04, Amendment 39-14193 (70 FR 43032, July 26, 2005). AD 2005-15-04 applied to certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600-2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604 Variants) airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on December 30, 2013 (78 FR 79329). The NPRM was prompted by reports that landing gear parts that have safe-life limits but do not have serial numbers or part numbers can be removed from one landing gear and re-installed on another, making tracking difficult. The NPRM proposed to add airplanes to the applicability, require operators to assign serial numbers or part numbers to certain additional landing gear parts to establish the number of landings on the parts if necessary, and requires operators to record in all required airplane technical records and manuals the new part numbers, serial numbers, and landings assigned to these parts. We are issuing this AD to prevent life-limited landing gear parts from being used beyond their safe-life limits, which could lead to collapse of the landing gear.

Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the airworthiness authority for Canada, has issued Canadian Airworthiness Directives CF-2003-18R2, dated September 28, 2011; CF-2003-20R1, dated September 28, 2011; and CF-2003-21R2, dated September 28, 2011 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”); to correct an unsafe condition for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600-2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604 Variants) airplanes. The MCAI states:

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM (78 FR 79329, December 30, 2013) or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Since late 2006, we have included a standard paragraph titled “Airworthy Product” in all MCAI ADs in which the FAA develops an AD based on a foreign authority's AD.

We have become aware that some operators have misunderstood or misinterpreted the Airworthy Product paragraph to allow the owner/operator to use messages provided by the manufacturer as approval of deviations during the accomplishment of an AD-mandated action. The Airworthy Product paragraph does not approve messages or other information provided by the manufacturer for deviations to the requirements of the AD-mandated actions. The Airworthy Product paragraph only addresses the requirement to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions for the identified unsafe condition and does not cover deviations from other AD requirements. However, deviations to AD-required actions are addressed in 14 CFR 39.17, and anyone may request the approval for an alternative method of compliance to the AD-required actions using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

To address this misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Airworthy Product paragraph, we have changed the paragraph and retitled it “Contacting the Manufacturer.” This paragraph now clarifies that for any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the actions must be accomplished using a method approved by the FAA, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), or Bombardier's TCCA Design Approval Organization (DAO).

The Contacting the Manufacturer paragraph also clarifies that, if approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature. The DAO signature indicates that the data and information contained in the document are TCCA-approved, which is also FAA-approved. Messages and other information provided by the manufacturer that do not contain the DAO-authorized signature approval are not TCCA-approved, unless TCCA directly approves the manufacturer's message or other information.

This clarification does not remove flexibility previously afforded by the Airworthy Product paragraph. Consistent with long-standing FAA policy, such flexibility was never intended for required actions. This is also consistent with the recommendation of the Airworthiness Directive Implementation Aviation Rulemaking Committee to increase flexibility in complying with ADs by identifying those actions in manufacturers' service instructions that are “Required for Compliance” with ADs. We continue to work with manufacturers to implement this recommendation. But once we determine that an action is required, any deviation from the requirement must be approved as an alternative method of compliance.

We also have decided not to include a generic reference to either the “delegated agent” or “design approval holder (DAH) with State of Design Authority design organization approval,” but instead we have provided the specific delegation approval granted by the State of Design Authority for the DAH throughout this AD.

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (78 FR 79329, December 30, 2013) for correcting the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (78 FR 79329, December 30, 2013).

We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

We estimate that this AD affects 419 airplanes of U.S. registry.

The actions that were required by AD 2005-15-04, Amendment 39-14193 (70 FR 43032, July 26, 2005), that are retained in this AD take up to 13 work-hours per product, at an average labor rate of $85 per work hour. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the currently required actions is up to $1,105 per product.

We estimate that it would take about 9 work-hours per product to comply with the new basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be $320,535, or $765 per product.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2013-1065 ; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

On July 25, 2014, we issued Emergency AD 2014-15-51, which requires inspection and replacement as necessary of the barrel nuts at the horizontal stabilizer to vertical stabilizer attachment joint on Embraer S.A. Model EMB-500 airplanes. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This action was prompted the Agencia Nacional De Aviacao Civil (ANAC), which is the aviation authority for Brazil, issuing emergency AD No.: 2014-07-02, dated July 25, 2014 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for Embraer S.A. Model EMB-500 airplanes. The MCAI states:

Embraer S.A. has issued Phenom Alert Service Bulletin No. 500-55-A004, Revision 02, dated July 25, 2014. The actions described in this service bulletin are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, they have notified us of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by the State of Design Authority and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

This AD requires an inspection and replacement as necessary of the barrel nuts at the horizontal stabilizer to vertical stabilizer attachment joint. This AD also requires sending the inspection results to Embraer.

An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because of a report of cracking in the barrel nuts at the horizontal stabilizer-to-vertical stabilizer attachment joint found during an inspection at the assembly line. This condition could result in reduced structural integrity of the affected part and consequent detachment of the horizontal stabilizer from the airplane. Since this condition may exist in other airplanes of the same type and affects flight safety, an immediate corrective action is required. Therefore, we determined that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in fewer than 30 days.

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number FAA-2014-0511 and Directorate Identifier 2014-CE-023-AD at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

We estimate that this AD will affect 45 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 2.5 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour.

Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the AD on U.S. operators to be $9,562.50 or $212.50 per product.

In addition, we estimate that any necessary follow-on actions would take about 2 work-hours and require parts costing $150, for a cost of $320 per product. We have no way of determining the number of products that may need these actions.

According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost estimate.

A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB control number. The control number for the collection of information required by this AD is 2120-0056. The paperwork cost associated with this AD has been detailed in the Costs of Compliance section of this document and includes time for reviewing instructions, as well as completing and reviewing the collection of information. Therefore, all reporting associated with this AD is mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to the FAA at 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591. ATTN: Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, A330-200, A330-300, and A340-200, A340-300, A340-500, and A340-600 series airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 15, 2014 (79 FR 27814).

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2013-0201, dated September 4, 2013 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information to correct an unsafe condition on all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, A330-200, A330-300, and A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. The MCAI states:

Exceeding the service life limits of the CPCS safety valve, in the event of a failure, could result in excessive positive or negative differential pressure in the fuselage, and consequent incapacitation or injuries to airplane occupants.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0251-0002.

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM (79 FR 27814, May 15, 2014) or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Since late 2006, we have included a standard paragraph titled “Airworthy Product” in all MCAI ADs in which the FAA develops an AD based on a foreign authority's AD.

The MCAI or referenced service information in an FAA AD often directs the owner/operator to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions, such as a repair. Briefly, the Airworthy Product paragraph allowed owners/operators to use corrective actions provided by the manufacturer if those actions were FAA-approved. In addition, the paragraph stated that any actions approved by the State of Design Authority (or its delegated agent) are considered to be FAA-approved.

In the NPRM (79 FR 11016, February 27, 2014), we proposed to prevent the use of repairs that were not specifically developed to correct the unsafe condition, by requiring that the repair approval provided by the State of Design Authority or its delegated agent specifically refer to this FAA AD. This change was intended to clarify the method of compliance and to provide operators with better visibility of repairs that are specifically developed and approved to correct the unsafe condition. In addition, we proposed to change the phrase “its delegated agent” to include a design approval holder (DAH) with State of Design Authority design organization approval (DOA), as applicable, to refer to a DAH authorized to approve required repairs for the proposed AD.

No comments were provided to the NPRM (79 FR 11016, February 27, 2014) about these proposed changes. However, a comment was provided for an NPRM having Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-101-AD (78 FR 78285, December 26, 2013). The commenter stated the following: “The proposed wording, being specific to repairs, eliminates the interpretation that Airbus messages are acceptable for approving minor deviations (corrective actions) needed during accomplishment of an AD mandated Airbus service bulletin.”

This comment has made the FAA aware that some operators have misunderstood or misinterpreted the Airworthy Product paragraph to allow the owner/operator to use messages provided by the manufacturer as approval of deviations during the accomplishment of an AD-mandated action. The Airworthy Product paragraph does not approve messages or other information provided by the manufacturer for deviations to the requirements of the AD-mandated actions. The Airworthy Product paragraph only addresses the requirement to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions for the identified unsafe condition and does not cover deviations from other AD requirements. However, deviations to AD-required actions are addressed in 14 CFR 39.17, and anyone may request the approval for an alternative method of compliance to the AD-required actions using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

To address this misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Airworthy Product paragraph, we have changed the paragraph and retitled it “Contacting the Manufacturer.” This paragraph now clarifies that for any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the actions must be accomplished using a method approved by the FAA, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), or Airbus's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA).

The Contacting the Manufacturer paragraph also clarifies that, if approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature. The DOA signature indicates that the data and information contained in the document are EASA-approved, which is also FAA-approved. Messages and other information provided by the manufacturer that do not contain the DOA-authorized signature approval are not EASA-approved, unless EASA directly approves the manufacturer's message or other information.

This clarification does not remove flexibility previously afforded by the Airworthy Product paragraph. Consistent with long-standing FAA policy, such flexibility was never intended for required actions. This is also consistent with the recommendation of the Airworthiness Directive Implementation Aviation Rulemaking Committee to increase flexibility in complying with ADs by identifying those actions in manufacturers' service instructions that are “Required for Compliance” with ADs. We continue to work with manufacturers to implement this recommendation. But once we determine that an action is required, any deviation from the requirement must be approved as an alternative method of compliance.

Other commenters to the NPRM having Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-101-AD (78 FR 78285, December 26, 2013) pointed out that in many cases the foreign manufacturer's service bulletin and the foreign authority's MCAI might have been issued some time before the FAA AD. Therefore, the DOA might have provided U.S. operators with an approved repair, developed with full awareness of the unsafe condition, before the FAA AD is issued. Under these circumstances, to comply with the FAA AD, the operator would be required to go back to the manufacturer's DOA and obtain a new approval document, adding time and expense to the compliance process with no safety benefit.

Based on these comments, we removed the requirement that the DAH-provided repair specifically refer to this AD. Before adopting such a requirement, the FAA will coordinate with affected DAHs and verify they are prepared to implement means to ensure that their repair approvals consider the unsafe condition addressed in this AD. Any such requirements will be adopted through the normal AD rulemaking process, including notice-and-comment procedures, when appropriate.

We reviewed the relevant data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 27814, May 15, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 27814, May 15, 2014).

We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

We estimate that this AD affects 77 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We also estimate that it takes about 25 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $9,784 per product. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be $916,993, or $11,909 per product, per replacement cycle.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0251; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

On May 18, 2012, we issued Emergency AD 2012-10-53, which superseded Emergency AD 2012-10-51. Emergency AD 2012-10-53 was published in the Federal Register as a Final rule; request for comments on November 20, 2012, at 77 FR 69558. AD 2012-10-53 required a repetitive pilot check of the lower MRH shaft flange for a crack, a repetitive inspection of the upper and lower MRH shaft flanges and bolt attachment areas for a crack, and replacing the MRH shaft if there is a crack. AD 2012-10-53 was prompted by three reported incidents of cracking on the lower hub-shaft flanges of EC135 model helicopters.

After we issued AD 2012-10-53, Eurocopter revised Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. EC135-62A-029, now at Revision 7, dated October 22, 2012, which contains the procedures for the repetitive pilot checks and inspections. The inspection interval for the visual inspection of the MRH shaft flanges was increased to 50 flight hours based on results from full scale component testing. The note regarding the preflight check states that the time between two preflight checks must not exceed 6 flight hours, and clarifies that one flight may comprise of multiple take-offs and landings and a flight starts when the helicopter takes off and ends when the helicopter is on the ground with the engines shut off. Eurocopter also removed the visual inspection of the blade bolt attachment areas from the ASB.

EASA also revised its AD, now at EASA AD 2012-0085R5, dated October 30, 2012, to correct this unsafe condition. EASA advises that based on results of the further full scale component testing, it has been determined that the interval for the repetitive visual inspections of the upper and lower hub shaft flanges can be extended to 50 flight hours. EASA AD No. 2012-0085R5 also references ECD ASB No. EC135-62A-029, Revision 7, dated October 22, 2012, for related information. EASA considers AD 2012-0085R5 to be interim AD action and further AD action may follow.

On January 16, 2014, we issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to supersede AD 2012-10-53. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on January 31, 2014 (79 FR 5325). The NPRM proposed to continue to require the repetitive visual pilot check and inspection of the upper and lower MRH shaft flanges, as well as the replacement requirements of AD 2012-10-53. An owner/operator (pilot) may perform the required visual check and must enter compliance with the applicable paragraph of the AD into the helicopter maintenance records in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9(a)(1) through (4) and 91.417(a)(2)(v). A pilot may perform this check because it involves only looking at the visible area of the MRH shaft flanges and can be performed equally well by a pilot or a mechanic. This check is an exception to our standard maintenance regulations. Further, the NPRM proposed to increase the repetitive visual inspection interval for MRH shafts with 400 hours or more TIS from 10 hours TIS to 50 hours TIS. Any alternative method of compliance (AMOC) previously approved in accordance with AD 2012-10-53 would continue to be considered approved as an AMOC for the corresponding requirements in this AD.

Since we issued the NPRM, Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH changed its name to Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH. This AD reflects that change and updates the contact information to obtain service documentation.

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD, but we did not receive any comments on the NPRM (79 FR 5325, January 31, 2014).

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of Germany and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with Germany, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA ADs. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs and that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD requirements as proposed except for the name change previously described and a minor editorial change to meet current publishing requirements. The reference to “the applicability of this AD” in paragraph (f)(3) of this AD has been changed to reference “paragraph (a) of this AD.” These changes are consistent with the intent of the proposals in the NPRM (79 FR 5325, January 31, 2014) and will not increase the economic burden on any operator.

EASA considers its AD action to be an interim action; we do not consider this AD to be an interim AD action because the requirements for the applicable part-numbered MRH shafts are not expected to change. The EASA AD requires you to report the findings and send the removed MRH to ECD (now Airbus Helicopters), while this AD does not. The EASA AD requires the initial visual check within 3 days, while this AD requires the initial visual check before further flight. The EASA AD does not specify affected MRH shaft part numbers; this AD does because the FAA anticipates Airbus Helicopters will produce new part-numbered MRH shafts without the same unsafe condition.

We reviewed Eurocopter ASB No. EC135-62A-029, Revision 7, dated October 22, 2012, which describes procedures for preflight checking the visible area of the upper and lower MRH shaft flanges and performing a repetitive visual inspection of the upper and lower MRH shaft for cracks. EASA classified this ASB as mandatory and issued AD No. 2012-0085R5 to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters.

We estimate that this AD affects 244 helicopters of U.S. Registry. We estimate inspecting the MRH shaft flanges requires 2.5 work-hours at an average labor rate of $85 per work-hour, for a total cost per helicopter of $212 and a total cost to U.S. operators of $51,728 per inspection cycle. Replacing an MRH shaft requires about 8 work-hours and required parts cost $55,715, for a total cost per helicopter of $56,395.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction, and

(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to supersede the ADs listed below:

• Airworthiness Directive AD 2006-21-08, Amendment 39-14793 (71 FR 61639, October 19, 2006);

• AD 2007-14-01, Amendment 39-15123 (72 FR 38006, July 12, 2007);

• AD 2008-25-02, Amendment 39-15760 (73 FR 75307, December 11, 2008);

• AD 2010-04-09, Amendment 39-16202 (75 FR 7940, February 23, 2010; corrected March 3, 2010 (75 FR 9515));

• AD 2011-01-02, Amendment 39-16555 (76 FR 432, January 5, 2011); and

• AD 2012-16-05, Amendment 39-17152 (77 FR 48425, August 14, 2012).

Airworthiness Directives AD 2006-21-08, AD 2007-14-01, AD 2008-25-02, AD 2010-04-09, AD 2011-01-02, and AD 2012-16-05 applied to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 27, 2014 (79 FR 11019).

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2012-0168, dated August 31, 2012 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. The MCAI states:

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM (79 FR 11019, February 27, 2014) or on the determination of the cost to the public.

We have revised paragraph (i) of this AD by removing a reference to a paragraph that was not needed.

Since late 2006, we have included a standard paragraph titled “Airworthy Product” in all MCAI ADs in which the FAA develops an AD based on a foreign authority's AD.

We have become aware that some operators have misunderstood or misinterpreted the Airworthy Product paragraph to allow the owner/operator to use messages provided by the manufacturer as approval of deviations during the accomplishment of an AD-mandated action. The Airworthy Product paragraph does not approve messages or other information provided by the manufacturer for deviations to the requirements of the AD-mandated actions. The Airworthy Product paragraph only addresses the requirement to contact the manufacturer for corrective actions for the identified unsafe condition and does not cover deviations from other AD requirements. However, deviations to AD-required actions are addressed in 14 CFR 39.17, and anyone may request the approval for an alternative method of compliance to the AD-required actions using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

To address this misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Airworthy Product paragraph, we have changed the paragraph and retitled it “Contacting the Manufacturer.” This paragraph now clarifies that for any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the actions must be accomplished using a method approved by the FAA, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), or Airbus's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA).

The Contacting the Manufacturer paragraph also clarifies that, if approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature. The DOA signature indicates that the data and information contained in the document are EASA-approved, which is also FAA-approved. Messages and other information provided by the manufacturer that do not contain the DOA-authorized signature approval are not EASA-approved, unless EASA directly approves the manufacturer's message or other information.

This clarification does not remove flexibility previously afforded by the Airworthy Product paragraph. Consistent with long-standing FAA policy, such flexibility was never intended for required actions. This is also consistent with the recommendation of the Airworthiness Directive Implementation Aviation Rulemaking Committee to increase flexibility in complying with ADs by identifying those actions in manufacturers' service instructions that are “Required for Compliance” with ADs. We continue to work with manufacturers to implement this recommendation. But once we determine that an action is required, any deviation from the requirement must be approved as an alternative method of compliance.

We also have decided not to include a generic reference to either the “delegated agent” or “design approval holder (DAH) with State of Design Authority design organization approval,” but instead we have provided the specific delegation approval granted by the State of Design Authority for the DAH throughout this AD.

We reviewed the relevant data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 11019, February 27, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 11019, February 27, 2014).

We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

We estimate that this AD affects 80 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We also estimate that it will take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the new basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Required parts will cost $0 per product. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be $6,800, or $85 per product.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0060; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

NARA is updating addresses and contact information for Presidential libraries, records centers, and archival research facilities outside of the Washington, DC area to reflect a newly-opened Presidential library, an agency-wide reorganization, and facility changes. The proposed changes reflect current contact information and include Web site addresses for additional information. These changes will affect all customers who do business with NARA.

This rule is effective upon publication for good cause as permitted by the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3)). NARA believes that a public comment period is unnecessary as this rule makes only minor changes to the list of current NARA's facilities and their contact information. This rule also does not have any Federalism implications.

This direct final rule is not a significant regulatory action for the purposes of E.O. 12866 and has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The rule is also not a major rule as defined in 5 U.S.C. Chapter 8, Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, we certify that this rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities because it makes updates only to the list of current NARA facilities and their contact information.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, NARA amends Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 1253, as follows:

In a direct final rule published on May 10, 2010, 75 FR 25772, amendatory instruction number 2 for § 52.320(c)(114) was incorrectly stated. This document corrects this amendatory instruction and set-out text to read as follows:

As published, the final regulations contain an error in the amendatory instruction and set-out text:

Accordingly, 40 CFR part 52 is corrected by making the following correcting amendment:

Throughout this document whenever “we,” “us,” or “our” is used, we mean EPA.

The following outline is provided to aid in locating information in this preamble.

On March 31, 2011, the State of New Hampshire submitted a formal request for a revision to its State Implementation Plan (SIP). The requested SIP revision consists of updates to and a renumbering of its existing regulation establishing reasonably available control technology (RACT) for sources of nitrogen oxides (NO X ). Additionally, New Hampshire submitted facility specific VOC or NO X RACT orders for the following four facilities on the dates noted: Concord Litho Group, submitted December 31, 2013; Gorham Paper and Tissue, LLC, submitted October 19, 2012; Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., submitted February 4, 2013; and Textile Tapes Corporation, submitted November 16, 2012. Of final note, on December 16, 2013, New Hampshire submitted a request to withdraw a previously approved NO X RACT order for Plymouth State College from the SIP. For background on the Clean Air Act requirement for RACT and how it relates to New Hampshire, see 77 FR 66388, November 5, 2012.

EPA has approved previous versions of New Hampshire's NO X RACT rule for both the 1-hour ozone and 1997 8-hour ozone standards into the New Hampshire SIP. Our initial approval of New Hampshire's NO X RACT rule occurred on April 9, 1997 (see 62 FR 17092), and we approved an update to that rule in the Federal Register on November 5, 2012 (see 77 FR 66388). Today's action approves the minor updates described below, and also incorporates a renumbering of this regulation from Part Env-A 1211, as it was formerly identified in our two previous actions, to Chapter Env-A 1300. New Hampshire did not submit Env-A 1300, NO X RACT, on March 31, 2011 to meet its RACT obligation under the national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for ozone revised by EPA in 2008.

In relation to the renumbering, we also note that on November 8, 2012 (see 77 FR 66921), we approved into the New Hampshire SIP the State's VOC RACT rule, a portion of which, at the time of our approval, was codified at Part Env-A 1211 (the same codification associated with our November 5, 2012 and earlier NO X RACT approvals). Our approval of New Hampshire's VOC RACT regulation on November 8, 2012, therefore had the inadvertent effect of “overwriting” New Hampshire's NO X RACT SIP regulations in the official compilation of the SIP maintained by EPA and the Office of the Federal Register. In accordance with our error correction authority under CAA section 110(k)(6), we are correcting the error caused by our inadvertent “overwriting” of New Hampshire's NO X RACT regulations by revising the official compilation of the New Hampshire SIP to include Part Env-A 1300, NO X RACT. Apart from the recodification and error correction described above, the substantive changes being made to New Hampshire's NO X RACT rule are described below.

New Hampshire's original regulation had required all internal combustion engines to undergo a manual timing adjustment, but experience gained through implementation of that requirement indicated that manual adjustments to units equipped with electronic timing were not feasible. Additionally, most new engines were equipped with electronic timing. Therefore, New Hampshire has removed the requirement for manual timing adjustments for units equipped with electronic timing, but retained the requirement for units that are not equipped with electronic timing.

New Hampshire's air pollution control regulations include Part Env-A 800, Testing and Monitoring Procedures, and Part Env-A 900, Owner or Operator Recordkeeping and Reporting Obligations. These rules have been approved into the New Hampshire SIP. See 77 FR 66388, November 5, 2012. New Hampshire's updated NO X RACT regulation clarifies and updates the cross-referencing to these two rules.

Part Env-A 1315.03(a) was added to clarify that sources subject to the state's NO X RACT rule could comply by the purchase or generation of discrete emission reduction credits pursuant to Env-A 3100, Discrete Emission Reduction Trading Program. However, as noted within our approval of New Hampshire's RACT certification for the 1997 8-Hour ozone standard (77 FR 66388; November 5, 2012), Env-A 3100 has not been approved into the New Hampshire SIP. Therefore, any order issued by the New Hampshire DES that provides for compliance with NO X RACT by use of Env-A 3100 will need to be approved into the New Hampshire SIP.

Part Env-A 1316, NO X RACT Orders, was amended to clarify for the regulated community the steps that must be taken to request a NO X RACT order containing a NO X RACT limit that differs from those found within Env-A 1300. This section was also expanded to describe the actions that the New Hampshire DES will take upon receipt of such a request, including submitting the order to EPA as a SIP revision, and the maximum amount of time the state agency will take to complete these actions.

Part Env-A 1301.02, Applicability, was amended by inserting language in certain subsections to clarify for the regulated community the universe of sources subject to NO X RACT. The language in question, “and the permitting applicability levels specified in Env-A 607.01 are met,” was added to Env-A 1301.02(b), for example. Env-A 1301.02(b) is the provision of New Hampshire's NO X RACT regulations defining the universe of utility boilers subject to NO X RACT. Env-A 607.01, referenced in Env-A 1301.02(b), is the section of New Hampshire's statewide permit regulations containing preconstruction (or temporary) permit requirements for new and modified sources. 1 In the “Response to Comments” document included in the March 31, 2011 SIP submittal, New Hampshire DES explained that the new language is intended only to indicate that the permitting applicability levels (i.e., source “sizes”) contained in Env-607.01 must also be met before NO X RACT applies. Furthermore, New Hampshire clarified that the new language is not intended to suggest that only new or modified emissions units are subject to NO X RACT, i.e. that the added language is consistent with a requirement that existing sources are also subject to NO X RACT under New Hampshire's regulation. EPA is therefore approving the added language because it is consistent with CAA requirements for NO X RACT applicability.

On June 30, 2014, New Hampshire submitted a letter requesting that a phrase within Env-A 1311.03(a)(5) not be incorporated into the SIP because it cross-references a New Hampshire state regulation, Env-A 2000, that is not a part of the SIP. Therefore, as requested, we are not approving the phrase “or any opacity standard specified in Env-A 2000” in subparagraph Env-A 1311.03(a)(5).

On October 19, 2012, New Hampshire submitted NO X RACT Order No. ARD-97-003 for the Gorham Paper and Tissue facility located in Gorham, New Hampshire, as a revision to the SIP. The premises was formerly owned and operated by the Crown Vantage Company, and New Hampshire DES originally issued RACT Order No. ARD-97-003 on September 24, 1997. New Hampshire DES submitted that original order to EPA as a SIP revision request, and we approved it into the New Hampshire SIP on May 13, 1998. See 63 FR 26455. On May 13, 2011, Gorham Paper and Tissue acquired ownership of the facility, and on January 20, 2012, submitted a NO X RACT Analysis and RACT Order Application for a new tissue dryer machine. On October 19, 2012, New Hampshire DES issued an update of Order No. ARD-97-003 to the facility, and submitted the order to EPA as a SIP revision request on that same day.

The updated order establishes NO X RACT for the tissue drying machine, requiring the installation and operation of ultra low NO X burners, and an emission limitation of 0.035 lbs/mmBTU on a 24-hour calendar day average. The order also requires that initial and periodic stack tests be conducted. Additionally, the updated order adds a NO X RACT emission limit of 0.25 lbs/mmBTU based on a 24-hour calendar day average for Boilers 1 and 2 at the facility when these boilers combust natural gas, and also provides testing requirements for these units. Lastly, a number of RACT requirements applicable to equipment that has been removed from the facility were deleted from the RACT order. EPA is approving this revised order because it is consistent with CAA requirements for NO X RACT and with New Hampshire's NO X RACT regulation.

On December 16, 2013, New Hampshire DES submitted a request to withdraw from the SIP a NO X RACT order previously issued to Plymouth State College. Prior to 2013, Plymouth State routinely operated two electrical generators to provide power to the facility. During 2013, a decision was made to purchase all of the College's electricity from the grid, and to keep the two electrical generators as emergency backup generators. While functioning as a primary source of electricity for Plymouth State, operation of the generators was regulated by the requirements of NO X RACT order ARD-95-002, issued to Plymouth Cogeneration Limited Partnership, which was approved into the New Hampshire SIP on April 9, 1997. See 62 FR 17087. As emergency generators, the operation of these units are now governed by New Hampshire regulation Env-A 1311, Emergency Generators, thus obviating the need for NO X RACT order ARD-95-002. Accordingly, New Hampshire DES issued rescission of Final RACT Order No. ARD-95-002, dated December 16, 2013. EPA is therefore approving New Hampshire's request to withdraw the facility's NO X RACT order from the SIP.

On December 31, 2013, New Hampshire DES submitted an updated VOC RACT order for the Concord Litho Group located in Concord, New Hampshire. The primary cause for updating the order was to remove specific set point temperatures for the two regenerative thermal oxidizers used by the facility to reduce VOC emissions. In place of these defined set points, New Hampshire has updated the order with a requirement that the temperature set points be determined by the most recently approved stack test that successfully demonstrated at least a 90% destruction efficiency. This update was made in light of the facility's periodic stack testing requirement, and the unique temperature set points that these tests produce. EPA is approving this revised order because it is consistent with CAA requirements for VOC RACT and with New Hampshire's Chapter Env-A 1200, VOC RACT regulation.

On February 4, 2013, New Hampshire DES submitted an updated VOC RACT order for the Sturm, Ruger & Company facility located in Newport, New Hampshire. Previously, EPA approved VOC RACT Order No. ARD-03-001 into the New Hampshire SIP within a final rule published in the Federal Register on November 15, 2012. See 77 FR 66388. The updated order contains VOC limits for two new processes at the facility, a stainless steel bluing line, and a camouflage image transfer and coating line.

The bluing line uses a rustproofing fluid with a low vapor pressure referred to as “Pen Dip Super.” This fluid has a low vapor pressure which is less than 1.0 millimeter (mm) of mercury, and New Hampshire DES indicates within the updated Order that use of this low vapor pressure fluid represents RACT for this process. Regarding this vapor pressure limit, as a point of reference the Ozone Transport Commission's model rule for solvent cleaning uses this threshold to distinguish between acceptable (less than 1.0 mm mercury), and unacceptable (1.0 mm mercury or higher) vapor pressures for cold cleaning solvents.

The camouflage image transfer and coating process uses a solvent based activator-release agent to prepare the camouflage image for transfer to a gun. Use of the activator-release agent produces approximately 0.05 lbs VOC per gun produced. This amount was significantly lower than other coatings available for this process, which ranged from 0.09 to 0.20 lbs VOC per gun produced, and therefore New Hampshire DES determined that use of the activator-release agent represented RACT for this process. EPA is approving this revised order because it is consistent with CAA requirements for VOC RACT and with New Hampshire's VOC RACT regulation.

On November 16, 2012, New Hampshire DES submitted an amendment to a previously issued VOC RACT order for the Textile Tapes Corporation in Gonic, New Hampshire, as a SIP revision request. EPA had previously approved VOC RACT order ARD-96-001 for this facility into the New Hampshire SIP in a final rule published in the Federal Register on November 5, 2012. See 77 FR 66388. The updated order contains VOC destruction efficiency requirements, minimum operating temperature requirements, and testing requirements for a new recuperative thermal oxidizer that replaced an existing unit previously used at the facility. EPA is approving this revised order because it is consistent with CAA requirements for VOC RACT and with New Hampshire's VOC RACT regulation.

We have reviewed New Hampshire's revised NO X RACT regulation, the four single-source RACT orders the State requested be approved into the SIP, and the NO X RACT order the State requested be withdrawn from the SIP. We agree with the State's rationale for determining that these actions are consistent with CAA requirements and with New Hampshire's RACT regulations, and we are therefore approving each of New Hampshire's requested SIP revisions.

In summary, today's action approves minor clarifications and/or updates to New Hampshire's previously approved NO X RACT regulations and to certain VOC and NO X RACT orders. New Hampshire will need to address VOC and NO X RACT requirements arising from the 2008 ozone NAAQS in a future SIP submittal to EPA. As explained earlier in this notice, today's action approving Env-A 1300, NO X RACT, into the New Hampshire SIP also corrects an inadvertent error, which we are correcting pursuant to CAA section 110(k)(6). As a final note, New Hampshire's re-numbered NO X RACT rule is no less stringent than its previously adopted rule, thus satisfying the anti-backsliding requirements of section 110( l ) of the CAA.

EPA is approving and incorporating into the New Hampshire SIP Env-A 1300, NO X RACT, as well as source-specific VOC and NO X RACT orders for the following four facilities: Concord Litho Group; Gorham Paper and Tissue, LLC; Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc.; and Textile Tapes Corporation. We are also approving New Hampshire's request to withdraw from the New Hampshire SIP a previously approved NO X RACT order for Plymouth Cogeneration Limited Partnership.

The EPA is publishing this action without prior proposal because the Agency views this as a noncontroversial amendment and anticipates no adverse comments. However, in the proposed rules section of this Federal Register publication, EPA is publishing a separate document that will serve as the proposal to approve the SIP revision should relevant adverse comments be filed. This rule will be effective October 20, 2014 without further notice unless the Agency receives relevant adverse comments by September 22, 2014.

If the EPA receives such comments, then EPA will publish a notice withdrawing the final rule and informing the public that the rule will not take effect. All public comments received will then be addressed in a subsequent final rule based on the proposed rule. The EPA will not institute a second comment period on the proposed rule. All parties interested in commenting on the proposed rule should do so at this time. If no such comments are received, the public is advised that this rule will be effective on October 20, 2014 and no further action will be taken on the proposed rule. Please note that if EPA receives adverse comment on an amendment, paragraph, or section of this rule and if that provision may be severed from the remainder of the rule, EPA may adopt as final those provisions of the rule that are not the subject of an adverse comment.

Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP submission that complies with the provisions of the Act and applicable Federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in reviewing SIP submissions, EPA's role is to approve state choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, this action merely approves state law as meeting Federal requirements and does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by state law. For that reason, this action:

• Is not a “significant regulatory action” subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993);

• Does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. );

• Is certified as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. );

• Does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);

• Does not have Federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);

• Is not an economically significant regulatory action based on health or safety risks subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997);

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001);

• Is not subject to requirements of Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent with the Clean Air Act; and

• Does not provide EPA with the discretionary authority to address, as appropriate, disproportionate human health or environmental effects, using practicable and legally permissible methods, under Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. EPA will submit a report containing this action and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . A major rule cannot take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register . This action is not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit by October 20, 2014. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action. Parties with objections to this direct final rule are encouraged to file a comment in response to the parallel notice of proposed rulemaking for this action published in the proposed rules section of today's Federal Register , rather than file an immediate petition for judicial review of this direct final rule, so that EPA can withdraw this direct final rule and address the comment in the proposed rulemaking. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to enforce its requirements. (See section 307(b)(2).)

Part 52 of chapter I, title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

Federal regulations at § 648.82(n)(2)(ii) require the Regional Administrator to close a common pool Trimester Total Allowable Catch (TAC) Area for a stock when 90 percent of the Trimester TAC is projected to be caught. In such cases, the Trimester TAC Area for a stock closes to all common pool vessels fishing with gear capable of catching that stock for the remainder of the trimester. The fishing year 2014 (May 1, 2014, through April 30, 2015) common pool sub-annual catch limit (sub-ACL) for Georges Bank (GB) cod is 31.0 mt and the Trimester 1 (May 1, 2014, through August 31, 2014) TAC is 8.3 mt. Based on the most recent data and information, which include vessel trip reports, dealer-reported landings, and vessel monitoring system information, we have determined that 118 percent of the Trimester 1 TAC was caught as of August 14, 2014. Because of the low trimester catch limit and the rate at which common pool vessel can harvest GB cod, it was not possible to initiate this action closer to the point at this 90 percent of the catch limit was harvested. Therefore, effective August 18, 2014, the GB cod Trimester TAC Area is closed for the remainder of Trimester 1, through August 31, 2014, to all common pool vessels fishing with trawl gear, sink gillnet gear, and longline/hook gear. Effective August 21, 2014, it is unlawful for common pool vessels to fish for, harvest, possess, or land regulated species or ocean pout in or from the GB cod Trimester TAC Area. The GB cod Trimester TAC Area includes statistical areas 521, 522, 525, and 561. The GB cod Trimester TAC Area will reopen to common pool vessels fishing with trawl, sink gillnet, and longline/hook gear at the beginning of Trimester 2, on September 1, 2014.

Any overages of a trimester TAC will be deducted from Trimester 3, and any overages of the common pool's sub-ACL at the end of the fishing year will be deducted from the common pool's sub-ACL the following fishing year. Any uncaught portion of the Trimester 1 and Trimester 2 TAC will be carried over into the next trimester. Any uncaught portion of the common pool's sub-ACL may not be carried over into the following fishing year. Weekly quota monitoring reports for the common pool fishery can be found on our Web site at: http://www.nero.noaa.gov/ro/fso/MultiMonReports.htm. We will continue to monitor common pool catch through vessel trip reports, dealer-reported landings, vessel monitoring system catch reports, and other available information and, if necessary, we will make additional adjustments to common pool management measures.

This action is required by 50 CFR part 648 and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

The Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA, finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) and 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to waive prior notice and the opportunity for public comment and the 30-day delayed effectiveness period because it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest.

The Trimester TAC Area closure is required by regulation in order to reduce the probability of the common pool fishery exceeding its sub-ACL of GB cod. Any overages of the common pool's sub-ACLs would undermine conservation objectives and trigger the implementation of accountability measures that would have negative economic impacts on common pool vessels. The data and information showing that GB cod had exceeded 90 percent of the Trimester 1 TAC for the stock only became available recently. The time necessary to provide for prior notice and comment, and a 30-day delay in effectiveness, would prevent NMFS from implementing the necessary Trimester TAC Area closure for GB cod in a timely manner, which could undermine management objectives of the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, and cause negative economic impacts to the common pool fishery.

NMFS manages the groundfish fishery in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) according to the Fishery Management Plan for Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area (FMP) prepared by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council under authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Regulations governing fishing by U.S. vessels in accordance with the FMP appear at subpart H of 50 CFR part 600 and 50 CFR part 679.

The 2014 Pacific cod total allowable catch (TAC) specified for vessels using jig gear in the BSAI is 1,474 metric tons (mt) as established by the final 2014 and 2015 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (79 FR 12108, March 4, 2014) and one inseason adjustment (79 FR 6837, February 5, 2014).

The Administrator, Alaska Region, NMFS, (Regional Administrator) has determined that jig vessels will not be able to harvest 1,373 mt of the remaining 2014 Pacific cod TAC allocated to those vessels under § 679.20(a)(7)(ii)(A)( 1 ). Therefore, in accordance with § 679.20(a)(7)(ii)(A), NMFS apportions 1,373 mt of Pacific cod to the annual amount specified for catcher vessels less than 60 feet LOA using hook-and-line or pot gear.

The 2014 Pacific cod TAC specified for catcher vessels greater than or equal to 60 feet LOA using hook-and-line gear in the BSAI is 452 mt as established by the final 2014 and 2015 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (79 FR 12108, March 4, 2014). The Regional Administrator has determined that catcher vessels greater than or equal to 60 feet LOA using hook-and-line gear will not be able to harvest 427 mt of the remaining 2014 Pacific cod TAC allocated to those vessels under § 679.20(a)(7)(ii)(A)( 3 ). Therefore, in accordance with § 679.20(a)(7)(iii)(A), NMFS apportions 427 mt of Pacific cod to catcher vessels less than 60 feet LOA using hook-and-line or pot gear.

The 2014 Pacific cod TAC specified for catcher vessels using trawl gear in the BSAI is 50,107 mt as established by the final 2014 and 2015 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (79 FR 12108, March 4, 2014). The Regional Administrator has determined that catcher vessels using trawl gear will not be able to harvest 2,000 mt of the 2014 Pacific cod TAC allocated to those vessels under § 679.20(a)(7)(ii)(A)( 9 ). Therefore, in accordance with § 679.20(a)(7)(iii)(A), NMFS reallocates 2,000 mt of Pacific cod from catcher vessels using trawl gear to catcher vessels less than 60 feet LOA using hook-and-line or pot gear.

The harvest specifications for Pacific cod included in the final 2014 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (79 FR 12108, March 4, 2014) and inseason adjustment (79 FR 6837, February 5, 2014) are revised as follows: 101 mt for vessels using jig gear, 25 mt for catcher vessels greater than or equal to 60 feet (18.3 m) LOA using hook-and-line gear, 48,107 mt for catcher vessels using trawl gear, and 10,018 mt to catcher vessels less than 60 feet (18.3 m) LOA using hook-and-line or pot gear.

This action responds to the best available information recently obtained from the fishery. The Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA (AA), finds good cause to waive the requirement to provide prior notice and opportunity for public comment pursuant to the authority set forth at 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) as such requirement is impracticable and contrary to the public interest. This requirement is impracticable and contrary to the public interest as it would prevent NMFS from responding to the most recent fisheries data in a timely fashion and would delay the reallocation of Pacific cod specified from other sectors to catcher vessels less than 60 feet (18.3 m) LOA using hook-and-line or pot gear. Since the fishery is currently open, it is important to immediately inform the industry as to the revised allocations. Immediate notification is necessary to allow for the orderly conduct and efficient operation of this fishery, to allow the industry to plan for the fishing season, and to avoid potential disruption to the fishing fleet as well as processors. NMFS was unable to publish a notice providing time for public comment because the most recent, relevant data only became available as of August 15, 2014.

The AA also finds good cause to waive the 30-day delay in the effective date of this action under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3). This finding is based upon the reasons provided above for waiver of prior notice and opportunity for public comment.

This action is required by § 679.20 and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.