The regulations in 9 CFR part 94 (referred to below as the regulations) govern the importation into the United States of specified animals and animal products in order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including exotic Newcastle disease (END). END is a contagious, infectious, and communicable disease of birds and poultry. Section 94.6 of the regulations provides that END is considered to exist in all regions of the world except those listed in § 94.6(a)(2), which are considered to be free of END.

The Government of Argentina has requested that APHIS evaluate Argentina's animal health status with respect to END and provided information in support of that request in accordance with 9 CFR part 92, “Importation of Animals and Animal Products: Procedures for Requesting Recognition of Regions.”

Using information submitted to us by the Government of Argentina through the animal health officials of the National Health and Agrifood Quality Service (El Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria, SENASA), as well as information gathered during site visits by APHIS staff to Argentina in June and December of 2003, we have reviewed and analyzed the animal health status of Argentina relative to END. The review and analysis were conducted in light of the factors identified in § 92.2, “Application for recognition of the animal health status of a region,” which are used to evaluate the risk associated with importing animals or animal products into the United States from a given region. Based on the information submitted to us, we have concluded the following:

All animal disease and control programs in Argentina operate under the General Animal Health Enforcement Law (Law No. 3959/1903). Under this law, SENASA has passed several resolutions specifically pertaining to the control and surveillance of END, including SENASA's resolutions to secure Argentina's compliance with the European Union (EU) requirements for the importation of poultry. SENASA is divided into several sections, four of which focus on animal health issues. In 2003, SENASA had a budget of approximately $39 million U.S. dollars and employed 572 veterinarians.

In 2001 and 2002, SENASA was reorganized to increase the agency's quality of response to animal disease control and eradication. This reorganization, which occurred after the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in 2001, involved centralizing authority, examining international standards and certification requirements, and increasing efficiency and transparency through internal monitoring, accountability, and increased compliance with national policies. The new structure of SENASA includes 25 regional offices and 316 field offices throughout Argentina. The regional offices are responsible for overseeing the field offices, which monitor local prevention and control measures, census information, eradication, compliance, emergency actions, health actions, premises identification, movement controls, and recordkeeping.

In order to monitor poultry in Argentina, SENASA requires that all premises with commercial poultry register with SENASA and obtain a unique alphanumeric identifier called a RENSPA (Regestrio Nacional Sanitario de Productores Agropecuarios, National Sanitary Registry of Ag-Producers) number. The RENSPA number identifies the province, municipality, premises, and certain characteristics of the facility from which the animal came, such as facility ownership. The RENSPA number is used to maintain a database that includes census information, animal movement permit information, and the END status of the premises. SENASA reports that compliance with RENSPA registration is high. Although RENSPA registration is not specifically required for backyard poultry flocks, SENASA believes that these flocks do not pose a major threat of END as these birds are intended primarily for home consumption rather than for exportation.

RENSPA applications also must include the name of the veterinarian who serves the premises. This veterinarian is required by law to report any animal health problems occurring on the premises. If the veterinarian or the owner fails to report, the owner can be disqualified from collecting indemnity under the indemnity program explained in the “Passive Surveillance” section below. Also, a fine may be collected from either the veterinarian or the premises owner.

The results of our evaluation indicate that animal health officials in Argentina have the legal authority to enforce Federal and State regulations pertaining to END and the necessary veterinary infrastructure to carry out END surveillance and control activities.

The first diagnosis of END in Argentina occurred in 1961. Since that time, there have been four additional outbreaks—one in 1966, one in 1970, and two in 1987. In 1967, the Argentine Government made END reporting mandatory. Argentina has not recorded an outbreak of END in domestic poultry flocks since October 1987; however, in 1999 a virulent strain of paramyxovirus type-1 was isolated from wild pigeons. This discovery in the wild pigeon population was not considered to be an imminent threat to commercial poultry flocks as general industry practice includes vaccinating commercial birds against END (as described below in the “Vaccination Status” section) and keeping these birds in enclosed buildings that separate them from wild birds.

The August 1987 outbreak occurred in four backyard premises and affected approximately 300 hens. This infection was discovered when unvaccinated backyard birds were at an exhibition and began to show END symptoms. Other birds at the exhibition site became infected, but the Argentine Government controlled the spread through slaughter and disinfection. The outbreak in October 1987, the origin of which is unknown, affected 180,000 commercial broiler birds housed at 9 poultry farms. In addition to slaughter and disinfection, the government also used vaccination, collection of blood samples for serum testing, necropsy of all animals dying on neighboring premises within a radius of 25 km for the following 35 days, and the application of stringent biosecurity measures such as access controls at farms and testing of wild birds.

Argentina has had an active sampling program in place since 1996. This program is evaluated yearly and modifications to the plan are based on an annual risk assessment, the prior year's test results, and practicalities of testing such as cost and personnel availability. From 1996 through 2001, SENASA biannually tested both commercial flocks and noncommercial flocks and took a large number of samples, which all were either negative for END or were positive with vaccine strains. For the 2002-2004 active surveillance program, SENASA tested two target populations. The first population consisted of noncommercial bird flocks, including imported birds, birds found in the wild, and birds in zoos and backyards. The second group covered by the surveillance program consisted of testing commercial bird flocks including heavy and light breeding grandmother and parent birds, high-yielding hens, and commercial broilers.

Currently, SENASA is working to update and expand its surveillance and control programs, including adding new standards for parent and grandparent facilities.

SENASA has a system in place through which government officials, veterinarians, producers, and the public can notify SENASA officials of potential outbreaks. After a potential or verified outbreak has been reported, SENASA officials must immediately investigate. SENASA also has the authority to inspect suspected premises or, if a search is refused, set up a quarantine on that particular premises. SENASA can then obtain a court order to inspect the premises. Finally, SENASA has emergency response mechanisms for health and sanitary measures, as well as ante-mortem and postmortem sanitary inspection of birds for slaughter. Minimum biosecurity and hygiene standards for poultry farms and treatment of poultry waste also exist.

In addition, SENASA also compensates Argentine citizens when they report a case of END in their own flocks. Therefore, if an animal is found to have END and destroyed, the owner is entitled to indemnity for the fair market value of the animal. If an individual fails to report a case of END that is later discovered, indemnity is not paid. Although the indemnity program provides individuals with an incentive to report END, there is little communication with the public about this program and the site visit team discovered that producers were not aware of the program. Therefore, APHIS recommended that SENASA attempt to enhance public awareness of the program.

Results of our evaluation indicate that authorities in Argentina are conducting an adequate level of END surveillance to detect the disease if it were present.

In Argentina, the main laboratory conducting END testing is the central SENASA laboratory in Buenos Aires, which is supplemented by five network laboratories and the National Farming Technology Institute (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria, INTA). In addition, SENASA has indicated that additional experts or staff from various organizations could assist during outbreaks. The Coordinating Department of Quarantine, Borders, and Certifications sends import/export samples to the laboratories between 1 and 3 days after the birds arrive in Argentina. The diagnostic process typically takes 15 to 20 days.

The central SENASA laboratory develops official testing protocols for the network laboratories, performs official tests of suspect END cases, conducts virus characterization studies on suspect isolates from the network laboratories, evaluates serological testing done by network laboratories, and oversees the use of avian vaccines. The laboratory has a barcoding system in place to track samples accurately and to allow for blind, unbiased testing. This laboratory is in the final stages of a $3 million renovation and new construction project. The food sections of the central laboratory, including residues and food control, are accredited by the Argentine Accreditation Organization (Organismo Argentino de Acreditación, OAA) under International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 17025 standards. During 2005, the laboratory is considering pursuing ISO 17025 accreditation for the biological tests and analytical methods used for disease testing. Although training at this facility appears to be sporadic, the personnel assigned to the avian section are technically proficient and knowledgeable about END.

The five network laboratories were developed in 1997 to conduct virus isolation for END to meet export requirements to the EU. The network laboratories are inspected yearly and must pass an annual proficiency test involving virus isolation in samples. The five network laboratories currently are suspended from official testing until they become accredited under ISO 17025 standards, but can continue to carry out certain tests that later can be validated by the central laboratory. In addition, the current demand for END testing is low enough that all testing can be performed at the central laboratory. If an emergency were to arise and additional testing was required, the network laboratories would assist the central laboratory with such tests.

The INTA is a laboratory administered and funded separately from SENASA. The INTA provides technical services to SENASA for specific types of tests and is involved in testing wild birds for END and avian influenza virus. This lab also does all of the molecular tests needed by SENASA, which expects to perform these tests at network laboratories in the future.

APHIS concluded that the laboratory capabilities and infrastructure in Argentina are sufficient to support the END surveillance activities.

END vaccination in Argentina is mandatory for messenger pigeons only; all other END vaccinations are voluntary. SENASA estimates that approximately 80 percent of the poultry in Argentina is vaccinated based on vaccination schedules that have been put into place for production birds, breeding birds, and ornamental birds in markets and exhibitions. The 2003 site visit indicated that these schedules are identical or very similar to producers' vaccination regimens observed in farm records. This vaccination schedule leaves 20 percent of the poultry population to serve as sentinel birds along with certain broilers that are vaccinated only once in their first 14 days, which reduces their immunity to END later in life.

Although backyard domestic fowl and exhibition birds usually are not vaccinated unless they participate in exhibitions or fairs, Argentina has tested this population and the results showed that all of the birds tested were either negative for END or tested positive for a vaccination strain of END.

APHIS concluded that these vaccinated birds do not constitute a significant risk factor for introducing END into the United States.

Argentina is bordered by Paraguay in the north, Bolivia in the northwest, Uruguay and Brazil in the northeast, and Chile in the west. Chile is recognized by both APHIS and Argentina as END-free. Argentina also recognizes Uruguay as END-free. Brazil and Bolivia reported END outbreaks in 2001 and 2002, respectively, and therefore are not recognized as END-free by either the United States or Argentina.

Because there have been recent END outbreaks in Brazil and Bolivia, APHIS proposes to add Argentina to the list in § 94.26 of regions that, although declared free of END, supplement their meat supply by the importation of fresh (chilled or frozen) poultry meat from regions designated in § 94.6(a) as regions where END is considered to exist, have a common land border with regions where END is considered to exist, or import live poultry from regions where END is considered to exist under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. Therefore, poultry and poultry products from Argentina would have to meet the additional certification requirements of § 94.26 to be eligible for importation into the United States. These certification requirements are explained later in this document under the heading “Certification Requirements.”

Argentina's western and southern borders are with Chile and are composed entirely of the Andean Mountain Range. The northern border of Argentina is shared with Bolivia and Paraguay. Approximately half of the Bolivian portion of the border runs along river coastlines, while the other half has no natural barriers. The border with Paraguay is comprised mostly of rivers; however, a small portion of the border has no natural barrier. Finally, the eastern border of Argentina is shared with Uruguay and Brazil. The border with Brazil consists mostly of river coastlines, with approximately 30 km of border with no natural barriers. The border with Uruguay is composed entirely of river coastlines.

Although most of the Argentine border has adequate protection from adjacent countries through natural barriers, large areas on the borders with Bolivia and Paraguay and a small area on the border with Brazil may create the potential for END-infected animals to enter into Argentina from adjacent areas of high risk. In order to prevent this movement, effective movement controls must be in place.

All importations of live animals, genetic material, animal products, and animal byproducts into Argentina are allowed only under permits issued by SENASA. In order for other countries to export poultry and poultry products to Argentina, the potential exporting country must complete a review by SENASA consisting of a questionnaire and a site visit. Based on the results of the review, SENASA officials determine the types of animals and animal products that can enter Argentina and whether certain restrictions, such as a quarantine or testing, should be applied. Argentina also has limited or banned certain types of poultry from entering the country. Import procedures differ depending on the life stage of the poultry, and records are kept for all imported materials.

Although Argentina does have a permit system, some importers attempt to bring poultry or poultry products into the country without a permit. Most of the permitting problems are associated with importation of ornamental pet birds. Commercial shipments of exotic birds are usually handled by five or six legitimate importers, all of whom are known to SENASA. That relationship enables SENASA to be aware of when permitted shipments are due to arrive; thus, when SENASA receives information concerning unscheduled shipments, it is in a better position to act on those shipments.

Argentina's export requirements for poultry are based in large part on Argentina's compliance with the EU standards for exporting poultry. In order for poultry to be exported, it must come directly from commercial farms that have chemical or drug withdrawal protocols and are held to strict sanitary and vaccination rules. These farms must be registered with various organizations and are subject to inspection by a veterinarian or by his or her appointed personnel. Any poultry taken to slaughterhouses for export must be identified properly and accompanied by proper health and movement certificates. Poultry must then be slaughtered at a slaughterhouse approved for export to the particular country of destination.

SENASA does not control biosecurity at commercial facilities, which are likely to be the main source of poultry shipped to the United States. However, SENASA regulations address biosecurity standards and hygiene for avian establishments. Although these regulations do not appear to have an enforcement mechanism, compliance seems to be high. In addition, commercial birds are not likely to mix with other potentially infected birds as SENASA has indicated that Argentina does not have live markets with birds for sale for consumption. Also, in both urban and rural areas, backyard and non-commercial flocks are typically raised for home consumption only. These birds are considered unlikely to stray far from the home in rural areas because of carancho (local predator birds), and free-roaming birds in urban areas are likely to be picked up by other residents for consumption or sale.

Argentina's main export to the United States would likely be poultry meat rather than live birds. Previous experience with END in the United States suggests that the importation of live birds presents a far more likely initial exposure pathway than poultry meat or products. However, if Argentina did choose to export live birds to the United States, these birds would have to be placed in a mandatory 30-day quarantine upon their arrival. During this time, live birds would be tested for END and may be destroyed if the disease is found. The 30-day time frame exceeds the incubation period for END, making it very unlikely that birds with END would enter into the United States undetected. In addition, these birds would have to meet the additional certification requirements as described below in the “Certification Requirements” section, further ensuring that birds entering the United States would be free of END.

Given this information, APHIS did not identify any significant risk pathways to consider commercial poultry operations as a likely source for introducing END into the United States.

There are 45 authorized border stations in Argentina, including terrestrial stations, maritime and fluvial ports, and airports. These border stations are managed by SENASA's Quarantine, Borders, and Certifications unit. Each station is staffed by various security forces, who cooperate with SENASA under official agreements. Because these forces are the primary identifiers of illegal material, SENASA works to ensure that these individuals are trained to perform these duties. In addition, there are 394 permanent SENASA employees at border stations throughout Argentina.

For air-based transportation of poultry and poultry products, the site visit team toured two airports: Ezeiza Airport in Buenos Aires, which is the only airport through which live birds are transported, and Aeroparque Airport. Ezeiza is open 24 hours a day and has at least three to five veterinarians on staff during peak hours. If shipments arrive when the veterinarians are not present, the shipment must either wait until the veterinarians arrive or arrangements must be made in advance for a veterinarian to be present. Since 1999, Argentina has scanned all luggage entering the airports. In addition, beagle dogs have been trained to inspect luggage for both plant and animal products. To the extent possible, the dogs are scheduled to work when the riskiest flights are likely to arrive.

When passengers arrive at an Argentine airport, they first must pass through immigration where signs listing prohibited items are conspicuously posted. The beagles are used while the passengers are collecting their luggage and if a beagle identifies a bag, the bag is marked for further inspection. Passengers then proceed to customs where they must declare any items on a form provided by customs officials. The bags are then scanned and any suspicious or marked bags are inspected by hand. Any confiscated avian material is chemically treated to inactivate the END virus and is buried in a landfill. Approximately 2 tons of plant and animal material are confiscated at Ezeiza per month.

There are 21 land ports in Argentina: 6 on the border with Chile, 3 on the border with Uruguay, 6 on the border with Brazil, 3 on the border with Paraguay, and 3 on the border with Bolivia. Permanent SENASA personnel are stationed at each port along with the other officials described above. Usually, bags are searched manually; however, some of the land-based ports have scanners capable of detecting organic material for use during high traffic hours. For large shipments through Iguazú, SENASA officials must be notified 15 days in advance and can reject the shipment if the documentation is incomplete or appears to be fraudulent. All exporters and importers must be registered with SENASA, and the shipment must be accompanied by a permit. The shipment information is then entered into a database. During the November 2003 site visit, the APHIS team visited several potentially risky border stations, such as the crossings between Argentina and Bolivia. There is heavy local traffic between these ports with many individuals carrying personal food supplies between countries, which are not likely to pose a significant risk to aviculture.

Any illegal items found at border crossings are confiscated, sprayed with methylene blue or a similar solution to denature them, and incinerated. Each local office keeps records of interceptions for 2 years. A review of records at several local offices indicated that there had been no interceptions of live birds and that avian products had been limited to eggs intended for local sale across the border or small amounts of chicken meat.

After the land-based border checkpoints, there are also additional control points where vehicles, including passenger buses, are stopped and inspected. Only some of these checkpoints employ SENASA personnel, but all have some type of border surveillance personnel. Many of the border control points visited by APHIS staff have facilities to spray-treat vehicles. These points are also located on roads where there are no alternative routes into the country, therefore ensuring that all vehicles would have to pass through these stations.

For boat crossings, all of the crossings are staffed by customs officials and land forces, but not all have permanent SENASA staff. However, the workers are instructed to look for prohibited animal and plant substances.

Smuggling is also a potential problem in Argentina. The amount of smuggling fluctuates depending on the local economy and the exchange rates between neighboring countries. Additionally, much of the material smuggled through ports such as Iguazú and the Bolivian border stations is likely to be for local use instead of commercial trade and sale. In the past, SENASA officials have been able to discover illegal shipments and either destroy the animals or test them for END and release them once they were diagnosed as clean.

Officials in Argentina have the authority, procedures, and infrastructure to enforce effectively the system of permits, inspection, quarantines, and treatments that the country has in place to control animals and animal products. APHIS did not identify any specific limitations in the system that might pose an END risk to the United States.

Aviculture is Argentina's second largest livestock production industry with 521,766 tons (over 260 million birds) of poultry meat production in 2002 and 687,653 tons (over 343 million birds) of production in 2001. The most recent census, which only covers the first months of 2003, indicate that there are over 96 million birds in Argentina, with most of the commercial poultry population (90 percent) contained in the Buenos Aires and Entre Ríos provinces. This number is expected to increase as more broilers are hatched and raised for meat production throughout the year. These numbers are taken from RENSPA, the National Livestock Census, and information gathered from the poultry industry. Argentina has been exporting meat to the EU for several years. Disease control and surveillance programs are in place for poultry that specifically target END.

Registration for farms and properties with birds fall into two categories: Commercial production farms or premises with birds. The commercial production farm category is further divided into reproduction farms, broilers, hatcheries, layers, other commercial bird farms (e.g. turkey, quail, etc.), and farms of organically raised chickens. For premises with birds, the category is divided into house birds kept mainly for consumption of meat or eggs by families, purebred birds routinely gathered at bird shows (including fighting birds, messenger pigeons, ornamental birds), and field birds produced semi-intensively for consumption by their owners.

For commercial birds, the number of birds per type of production is laid out in table 1. The commercial farms in Argentina typically are operated under a vertical integration system so that breeding flocks, incubating farms, broilers, feed mills, slaughter plants, and diagnostic laboratories all operate under the same company name. Commercial broiler production farms have an average of 4 to 5 barns, each with a bird population density of 10 to 12 birds per square meter. The birds are the same age at the farm so that when the birds are sent to slaughter, the barn is empty. Breeding farms have an average of 2 to 3 barns, each with 4 to 5 females per male and 4 to 5 female birds per square meter. Again, the birds at the farm are the same age.

APHIS did not identify any factors in this category that might pose an animal health risk to the United States if poultry or poultry products were to be imported from Argentina.

END has been effectively controlled and eradicated from commercial poultry populations in Argentina. Although END still exists in the wild pigeon population, adequate controls are in place to ensure that spread to commercial flocks does not occur. The Argentine Government also has taken precautions following the END outbreaks in the 1980s and more recent FMD outbreaks to better protect the country from the introduction of animal diseases. Given the above information, APHIS considers the likelihood of an END outbreak occurring in Argentina to be low.

As noted previously, we are proposing to add Argentina to the list of regions in § 94.26 and therefore require further certification of the END-free status of any poultry or poultry products imported into the United States from Argentina. An END-free region may be added to this list when it supplements its meat supply with imports of fresh (chilled or frozen) poultry meat from a region where END is considered to exist; has a common land border with an END-affected region; or imports live poultry from an END-affected region under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. As previously noted, Argentina shares land borders with Brazil and Bolivia, both of which have experienced recent END outbreaks. Thus, even though we are proposing to declare Argentina free of END, there is a risk that poultry or poultry products originating in Argentina may be commingled with poultry or poultry products originating in an END-affected region.

Adding Argentina to the list of regions in § 94.26 would mean that live poultry, poultry meat and other poultry products, and ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing such meat or animal products originating in Argentina could not be imported into the United States unless the requirements described below were met. For all poultry and poultry products, each shipment would have to be accompanied by a certification by a full-time salaried veterinary officer of the Government of Argentina that would have to be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival in the United States. The certification for live poultry would have to state that:

• The poultry have not been in contact with poultry or poultry products from any region where END is considered to exist;

• The poultry have not lived in a region where END is considered to exist; and

• The poultry have not transited through a region where END is considered to exist unless moved directly through the region in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal intact upon arrival at the point of destination.

The certification accompanying poultry meat or other poultry products would have to state that:

• The poultry meat or other poultry products are derived from poultry that meet all requirements of § 94.26 and that have been slaughtered in a region designated in § 94.6 as free of END at a federally inspected slaughter plant that is under the direct supervision of a full-time salaried veterinarian of the national government of the exporting region and that is approved to export poultry meat and other poultry products to the United States in accordance with the regulations of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in 9 CFR 381.196;

• The poultry meat or other poultry products have not been in contact with poultry meat or other poultry products from any region where END is considered to exist;

• The poultry meat or other poultry products have not transited through a region where END is considered to exist unless moved directly through the region in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal intact upon arrival at the point of destination; and

• If processed, the poultry meat or other poultry products were processed in a region designated in § 94.6 as free of END in a federally inspected processing plant that is under the direct supervision of a full-time salaried veterinarian of the Government of Argentina.

Adding Argentina to the list of regions in § 94.26 would necessitate several editorial changes to that section. Currently, § 94.26 focuses exclusively on END-free regions within Mexico and has language specifically tailored to address those regions. In order to include Argentina in § 94.26, it would be necessary to remove specific references to the Government of Mexico and replace them with more general references to the national government of the exporting region.

Results of our evaluation indicate that the Argentine Government has the laws, policies, and infrastructure to detect, respond to, and eliminate any reoccurrence of END.

These findings are described in further detail in a qualitative evaluation that may be obtained from the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT and may be viewed on the Internet at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/reg-request.html by following the link for current requests and supporting documentation. The evaluation documents the factors that have led us to conclude that commercial poultry in Argentina are END-free. Therefore, we are proposing to recognize Argentina as free of END, add that country to the list in § 94.6 of regions where END is not known to exist, and amend § 94.26 to include Argentina in the list of regions that must provide further certification of the END-free status of any poultry or poultry products exported to the United States.

This proposed rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12866. The rule has been determined to be not significant for the purposes of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

Under the regulations in 9 CFR part 94, the importation into the United States of poultry and poultry products that originate in or transit any region where END exists is generally prohibited. Furthermore, even if a region is considered free of END, the importation of poultry and poultry products from that region may be restricted depending on the region's proximity to or trading relationships with countries or regions where END is present.

This proposed rule would amend the regulations by adding Argentina to the list of regions considered free of END. However, since Argentina shares borders with regions that the United States does not recognize as free of END, we are also proposing that Argentina meet additional certification requirements for live poultry and poultry products imported into the United States to ensure that the imports are free from END.

Over the past several years, Argentina's poultry industry has increased substantially as shown in table 2. Although Argentina exports eggs, which typically are destined to Denmark, the main export for Argentina is poultry meat. Argentina exports poultry meat and products to 34 countries, with Chile expected to be the largest importer. In 2003, Argentina exported $22 million of poultry meat including whole broilers (36 percent), chicken paws (30 percent), processed meat from layers (5 percent), and other products and byproducts such as wings, nuggets, burgers, offal, and breasts (29 percent). Exports for poultry meat in 2004 are projected at 70,000 tons, almost twice the amount exported in 2003. In 2005, exports are projected to reach 110,000 metric tons.

In 2003, poultry production in the United States totaled 38.5 billion pounds for a total value of $23.3 billion. Broiler meat accounted for $15.2 billion (65 percent) of this value in 2003. The remaining worth was comprised of the value of eggs ($5.3 billion), turkey ($2.7 billion), and other chicken products ($48 million). The United States is also the world's largest exporter of broilers, with broiler exports totaling 4.93 billion pounds, the equivalent of $1.5 billion, in 2003. Imports of broiler products into the United States in 2003 totaled 12 million pounds, or less than 1 percent of the domestic production.

In 2002, there were approximately 32,006 broiler and other meat producing chicken farms in the United States, as shown in table 3. Under the Small Business Administration's size standards, broiler and other meat production chicken farms with less than $750,000 in annual sales, which is the equivalent of 300,000 birds, qualify as small businesses. Given this information, about 20,949, or 64.5 percent of all broiler operations, qualify as small businesses.

Broiler production in the United States is concentrated in a group of States stretching from Delaware south along the Atlantic coast to Georgia, then westward through Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas. These States accounted for over 70 percent of broilers in the United States in 2003. The top five broiler producing States are Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina, whose 2002 broiler sales are listed below in table 4.

Poultry meat imported from Argentina could potentially affect the United States poultry industry. Consumers would benefit from any price decreases for poultry and poultry products, while producers would potentially be negatively affected by more competitive prices. However, the amount of poultry or poultry products that may be imported from Argentina is not expected to have a significant impact on poultry consumers or producers in the United States. In 2003, Argentina exported a total of $22 million worth of poultry and poultry products while the United States produced $15.2 billion worth of broilers. Given these numbers, any exports from Argentina are not likely to be in quantities sufficient to have a significant impact on U.S. poultry producers, and we do not anticipate that any U.S. entities, small or otherwise, would experience any significant economic effects as a result of this proposed action. It should also be noted that Argentina is not currently eligible to export poultry products to the United States under the FSIS regulations cited earlier in this document; there would, therefore, be no economic effects on U.S. entities until establishments in Argentina were approved to export poultry meat and other poultry products to the United States.

Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This proposed rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. If this proposed rule is adopted: (1) All State and local laws and regulations that are inconsistent with this rule will be preempted; (2) no retroactive effect will be given to this rule; and (3) administrative proceedings will not be required before parties may file suit in court challenging this rule.

This proposed rule contains no information collection or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ).

Accordingly, we propose to amend 9 CFR part 94 as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification ( e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2001-NM-213-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2001-NM-213-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to add an airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 747SP, 747SR, 747-100, -100B, -100B SUD, -200B, -200C, -200F, and -300 series airplanes, was published as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (hereafter referred to as the “original NPRM”) in the Federal Register on September 10, 2003 (68 FR 53309). That NPRM would have required modification of the escape slide/raft pack assembly and cable release sliders. The original NPRM was prompted by improper escape slide/raft deployment and passenger/crew door blockage during slide deployment tests. That condition, if not corrected, could result in injury to passengers or crewmembers.

Due consideration has been given to the comments received in response to the original NPRM.

One commenter asks that Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-25-3274, Revision 2, dated August 26, 2004, be added to the first paragraph of the “Explanation of Relevant Service Information” section of the original NPRM. Revision 1 of the service bulletin was referenced in the original NPRM as the source of service information for modifying the slide/raft pack assembly. The commenter also asks that the following be added to that paragraph: “Note: Revision 2 will revise work instructions to move two airplane effectivities to a different group to reflect conversion from passenger configuration to special freighter configuration and will add a note that no work needs to be done at Door 3 left-hand and right-hand if Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2666, Revision 2, dated April 24, 2003, has previously been incorporated.”

The commenter asks that the term “pulley guard bracket” be changed to “cable guard bracket” in that same section and in the paragraph following “modification” of the original NPRM. The commenter provides no reason for these changes.

The commenter also asks that Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-25-3307, Revision 1, dated February 12, 2004, be added to the second paragraph of the “Explanation of Relevant Service Information” section of the original NPRM. The original issue of the service bulletin was referenced in the original NPRM as the source of service information for modifying the cable release sliders. The commenter also asks that the following be added to that paragraph: “Note: Revision 1 will add airplanes to service bulletin effectivities, combine Groups 2 and 3, and revise work instructions and Figure 2 to provide airlines with an alternate, easier modification.”

The commenter asks that the phrase “of the escape slide/raft pack assembly” be changed to “of the floor-mounted upper deck slide pack assembly.” The commenter provides no reason for these changes.

We acknowledge and agree with the commenter's remarks on the preamble of the original NPRM as these descriptions provide clarification; however, the “Explanation of Relevant Service Information” section is not restated in this supplemental NPRM. We have changed the term “pulley guard bracket” to “cable guard bracket” in paragraph (a)(2) of the supplemental NPRM, which is the only paragraph where the term is used. We have also changed the phrase “of the escape slide/raft pack assembly” to “of the floor-mounted upper deck slide pack assembly” in paragraph (b) of the supplemental NPRM.

Since issuance of the original NPRM, Boeing has issued, and we have reviewed, Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-25-3274, Revision 2, dated August 26, 2004; and Revision 3, dated December 16, 2004. Revision 2 contains the changes described previously by the commenter. Revision 2 also clarifies the airplanes on which certain actions must be done. Revision 3 is essentially the same as Revision 2, but the work hours and parts cost for the modification are reduced and Revision 3 provides further clarification of certain actions. Revision 3 specifies that no more work is necessary on airplanes changed as shown in Revision 2, except that certain cable assemblies must be replaced with new cable assemblies for airplanes on which Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2666, Revision 2, dated April 24, 2003; and Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-092, Revision 3, dated December 8, 1986 (superseded by Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-238, Revision 1, dated January 31, 2003); have been incorporated at Door 3 of the emergency exit. Service Bulletin 747-25-2666 describes procedures for installation of a one-piece ramp/slide at Door 3 of the emergency exit. Service Bulletins 25-092 and 25-238 describe procedures for modification of the escape slide raft assembly. We have added the new requirement specified in Service Bulletin 25-238 to paragraph (a)(2) of the supplemental NPRM.

In addition, as specified in Revision 3 of Service Bulletin 747-25-3274, no further action is required if corrective actions were performed in accordance with previous revisions, except as specified in paragraph 1.D., “Description”, of the service bulletin. That paragraph, in part, specifies that no more work is necessary on airplanes changed per Revision 1 of the service bulletin, except airplanes RD103 or RD104 that have incorporated Service Bulletin 747-25-2258 and have stored gas upper deck slides that should be modified by the instructions for Group 1 and Group 13 airplanes, as specified in Revision 3 of Service Bulletin 747-25-3274. Therefore, we have added Revision 3 of the service bulletin for accomplishing the modification specified in paragraph (a) of this supplemental NPRM, except as specified in paragraph 1.D. of the service bulletin.

We have also reviewed Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-25-3307, Revision 1, dated February 12, 2004; and Revision 2, dated July 8, 2004. Revision 1 contains the changes described previously. Revision 2 is essentially the same as Revision 1, and specifies that no more work is necessary on airplanes changed as shown in Revision 1. We have referenced Revision 2 of the service bulletin as the appropriate source of service information for accomplishing the modification required by paragraph (b) of this supplemental NPRM.

One commenter, the airplane manufacturer, asks that paragraph (c) of the original NPRM be changed. The commenter states that, as written, paragraph (c) would not allow installation of certain parts on any airplane after the effective date of the AD. The commenter adds that it finds the requirements in this paragraph excessively restrictive because those requirements would not allow slides to be moved from one airplane to another, or installation of an overhauled slide during the next 36 months if an old part number cable is installed. The commenter states that, since the original NPRM affects slide/raft pack assemblies rather than airplanes, installing old cables after the effective date of the AD should be restricted to include the slide/raft pack assemblies only. The commenter suggests that paragraph (c) be changed as follows: “As of the effective date of this AD, no one may install, on any slide/raft pack assembly, a pin cable assembly with a part number listed.”

In light of the rationale provided by the commenter, we agree with the remark that the proposed requirements of paragraph (c) are too restrictive. Operators must comply with the requirements of this AD by the compliance time specified in paragraph (a) of the supplemental NPRM. If an operator must install an escape slide, it is their responsibility to ensure that all affected parts of that slide conform to the requirements of this supplemental NPRM by the compliance deadline. Accordingly, paragraph (c) of the proposed rule has not been included in this supplemental NPRM. (Operators should note, however, that once an airplane has been modified according to this AD, the airplane cannot be modified in any way that negates accomplishment of the actions in this AD— i.e. , an escape slide with a modified cable assembly cannot be replaced with an escape slide with an unmodified cable assembly.)

The same commenter states that it does not agree that modification/replacement of the cable release sliders on the floor-mounted upper deck escape slide (as specified in paragraph (b) of the original NPRM) warrants an AD. Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-25-3307, Revision 2, dated July 8, 2004, is referenced as the appropriate source of service information for the concurrent modification required by paragraph (b). The commenter notes that although deployment forces can be higher than normal if the modification/replacement is not accomplished, the commenter is not aware of any non-deployment due to this condition.

We partially agree with the commenter. We agree that certain concurrent actions specified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-25-3307, Revision 2, are not necessary. We have determined that the concurrent modification specified in Figure 1 of the service bulletin is not required; however, the concurrent modification of the outboard cover panel, as specified in Figure 2 of the service bulletin, must be accomplished on Groups 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 airplanes. We have changed paragraph (b) of this supplemental NPRM accordingly.

One commenter asks that the applicability specified in the original NPRM be changed to specify a component (appliance), rather than airplanes, and suggests that the AD apply only to airplanes with floor-mounted upper deck slide pack assemblies having the part numbers identified in the referenced service information. The commenter states that the applicability specified can be misleading and has the potential to cause compliance and record-keeping errors. The commenter adds that the original NPRM should not be applicable to airplanes because the actions are required for a removable component; the component can be removed, repaired, and/or overhauled separately from the airplane, moved to another airplane, or stored until installation. The commenter notes that it operates several Model 747-100 series airplanes that do not have the affected floor-mounted upper deck slide pack assemblies installed, although the airplanes are included in the applicability. In addition, the commenter states that it operates one Model 747SR series airplane that is equipped with an affected assembly, but is not included in the effectivity specified in the referenced service information.

We do not agree with the commenter. Our general policy, when an unsafe condition results from an appliance or other item that is, or could be, installed on multiple airplane models, is that the AD is issued so that it is applicable to all of those airplane models, rather than to the item. The applicability of the original NPRM states “all” and takes precedence over the service bulletin effectivity. By making the AD applicable to the airplane models on which the appliance or other item is installed, we ensure that operators of those airplanes will be notified directly of the unsafe condition and the action required to correct it. While we assume that an operator will know the models of airplanes that it operates, there is a potential that the operator will not know or be aware of specific items that are installed on its airplanes. Therefore, calling out the airplane model as the subject of the AD prevents “unknowing non-compliance” on the part of the operator.

Additionally, there have been reports of non-deployments of escape slides that were delivered by Boeing with the airplane, as well as those that were installed post-delivery by the supplemental type certification (STC) process. After reviewing the in-service incidents, we found that all of the escape slides installed per the STC used the packboards that were delivered with the airplane. We then determined that specifying the airplane model in the applicability of the NPRM instead of the escape slide itself ensures that all discrepant cable assemblies are replaced on all Model 747 escape slide packboards, regardless of which airplane the escape slide is installed on. Therefore, components on airplanes not affected would not be overlooked. We have made no change to the supplemental NPRM in this regard.

Another commenter states that in the applicability of the original NPRM, Model 747-400F series airplanes are missing. The commenter notes that the upper deck slides on Model 747-400F series airplanes are the same as the slides installed on Model 747-200 series airplanes.

Although no specific request was made, we infer that the commenter wants us to add Model 747-400F series airplanes to the applicability of the supplemental NPRM. Although the slides for Model 747-200 and 747-400F series airplanes are similar, they are not interchangeable. When the Model 747-400F series airplanes were built, the escape slides that were installed had newer cover release cables which changed the configuration; therefore, the actions specified in the supplemental NPRM are not required for Model 747-400F series airplanes. We have made no change to the supplemental NPRM in this regard.

Since a certain change, discussed above, expands the scope of the original NPRM, we have determined that it is necessary to reopen the comment period to provide additional opportunity for public comment on this supplemental NPRM.

On July 10, 2002, the FAA issued a new version of 14 CFR part 39 (67 FR 47997, July 22, 2002), which governs the FAA's airworthiness directives system. The regulation now includes material that relates to altered products, special flight permits, and alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs). These changes are reflected in this supplemental NPRM.

There are approximately 592 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. We estimate that 187 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

It would take approximately 2 work hours per escape slide to accomplish the new proposed modification of the escape slide/raft pack assembly, at an average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Required parts would cost between $8,354 and $30,688 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the modification of the escape slide/raft pack assembly proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be between $1,586,508 and $5,762,966, or between $8,484 and $30,818 per airplane.

Should an operator be required to accomplish the overhaul of the cable release sliders, it would take approximately 2 work hours to accomplish the proposed overhaul, at an average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Required parts cost would be negligible. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the overhaul of the cable release sliders proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $130 per escape slide and $260 per airplane.

Should an operator be required to accomplish the replacement of the cable release sliders, it would take approximately 1 work hour to accomplish the proposed replacement, at an average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $2,940 per escape slide. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the replacement of the cable release sliders proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $3,005 per escape slide or $6,010 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES .

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES . Include “Docket No. FAA-2005-22169; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-094-AD” in the subject line of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments submitted by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov , including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of that website, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You can review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you can visit http://dms.dot.gov .

You can examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov , or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System (DMS) receives them.

We have received a report indicating that two failures of thrust reverser accumulators occurred, and inspections have found four thrust reverser accumulators with fatigue cracks. One failure occurred during flight on a Learjet Model 25B airplane and led to an emergency landing. The second failure occurred during bench testing and resulted in injury to a person. Detailed inspections of four thrust reverser accumulators found fatigue cracks on the inner threads that hold the two halves of the accumulator together. The spherical accumulator used for the main airplane hydraulic system is similar to the spherical accumulator used for the thrust reverser hydraulic system. Therefore, these spherical accumulators may be subject to the same unsafe condition. This fatigue cracking, if not corrected, could result in the failure of the accumulator, which could cause loss of hydraulic fluid and the hydraulic systems, resulting in a loss of airplane control. The failure of the accumulator could also result in damage to the surrounding airplane structure and injury to any persons in the surrounding area. The loss of hydraulic fluid could also leak onto a potential source of ignition and result in a consequent fire.

We have published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register on April 14, 2005 (70 FR 19718), applicable to Learjet Model 23, 24, 24A, 24B, 24B-A, 24D, 24D-A, 24E, 24F, 25, 25A, 25B, 25C, 25D, and 25F airplanes modified by Supplemental Type Certificate SA1731SW, SA1669SW, or SA1670SW; equipped with certain Nordam thrust reversers. That NPRM proposed to require removing the thrust reverser accumulator, and making the thrust reverser hydraulic system and the thrust reversers inoperable. The actions proposed in that NPRM are intended to prevent failure of the thrust reverser accumulators, due to fatigue cracking on the female threads, which could result in the loss of hydraulic power and damage to the surrounding airplane structure.

We have reviewed Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A23/24/25-29-4, Revision 1, dated January 17, 2005. The service bulletin describes procedures for replacing certain spherical accumulators with new cylindrical accumulators, and reporting accomplishment of the service bulletin to the manufacturer. Replacing the accumulators may involve replacing the supports and attachment hardware.

For certain airplanes, Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A23/24/25-29-4 recommends prior or concurrent accomplishment of Learjet Service Kit SK23-215, dated April 4, 1966. The concurrent service bulletin describes procedures for relocating the accumulator pressure gauge.

Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design. Therefore, we are proposing this AD, which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as discussed under “Differences Between the Proposed AD and the Service Bulletin.”

Although Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A23/24/25-29-4, Revision 1, dated January 17, 2005, recommends replacing the spherical accumulator for the main hydraulic system within 25 flight hours after the receipt of the service bulletin, this proposed AD specifies a compliance time of 60 days after the effective date of the AD. In developing an appropriate compliance time for this AD, we considered the manufacturer's recommendation, the degree of urgency associated with the subject unsafe condition, the average utilization of the affected fleet, and the time necessary to perform the actions required by the proposed AD. In light of all of these factors, we find that a longer compliance time represents an appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. This difference has been coordinated with Learjet.

Operators should also note that, although the Accomplishment Instructions of the referenced service bulletin describe procedures for submitting a comment sheet related to service bulletin quality and a sheet recording compliance with the service bulletin, this proposed AD would not require those actions. We do not need this information from operators.

There are about 434 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. This proposed AD would affect about 242 airplanes of U.S. registry. The proposed actions would take about 9 to 13 work hours per airplane, at an average labor rate of $65 per work hour. Required parts would cost about $1,336 to $1,363 per airplane. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the proposed AD for U.S. operators is $464,882 to $534,336, or $1,921 to $2,208 per airplane.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Include the docket number “Docket No. FAA-2005-22170; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-073-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of our docket Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in recent fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled “Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements” (67 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (“SFAR 88,” Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design ( i.e. , type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with another latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

The Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for France, notified us that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Airbus Model A320-111, -211, -212, and -231 airplanes. The DGAC advises that a design review of the electrical cables and structure around the access holes to the inner tank fuel pumps revealed that cables could be damaged by chafing against sharp edges of the fuel pump access holes. This condition, if not prevented, could result in electrical arcing and possible ignition of fuel vapors and consequent explosion of the fuel tank.

Airbus has issued, for certain Model A320-111, -211, and -231 airplanes, Service Bulletin A320-28-1008, Revision 1, dated April 10, 1989, which describes procedures for modifying the cables and access holes to the inner tank fuel pumps. The modification includes chamfering the edges of the fuel pump access holes, applying protective material to the chamfered areas, installing backshells to the cable connectors, and securing the cables to the backshells.

Airbus has also issued, for certain Model A320-211, -212, and -231 airplanes, Service Bulletin A320-28-1054, dated August 23, 1993, which describes procedures for performing a visual inspection for correct radius of the fuel pump access holes and, as applicable, modifying the fuel pump access holes. The modification includes chamfering the edges of all access holes to the inner tank fuel pumps and applying protective material to the chamfered areas. The service bulletin also describes procedures for reporting all findings to Airbus.

Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

The DGAC mandated accomplishment of the service bulletins and issued French airworthiness directive F-2005-031, dated February 16, 2005, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in France.

These airplane models are manufactured in France and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. We have examined the DGAC's findings, evaluated all pertinent information, and determined that we need to issue an AD for airplanes of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Therefore, we are proposing this AD, which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as discussed under “Difference Between Service Information and the Proposed AD.”

The applicability of French airworthiness directive F-2005-031 excludes airplanes that accomplished Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1008, Revision 1, in service and airplanes that accomplished Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1054 in service. However, we have not excluded those airplanes from the applicability of this proposed AD; rather, this proposed AD includes a requirement to accomplish the actions specified in those service bulletins. This requirement would ensure that the actions specified in the service bulletins and required by this proposed AD are accomplished on all affected airplanes. Operators must continue to operate the airplane in the configuration required by this proposed AD unless an alternative method of compliance is approved.

Although Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1054 describes procedures for reporting all findings to Airbus, this proposed AD would not require this report. The FAA does not need this information from operators.

While Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1054 specifies a “visual inspection,” this proposed AD would require a “general visual inspection” to avoid any confusion about the proper type of inspection. We have included a definition of this type of inspection in the proposed AD.

This proposed AD would affect about 17 airplanes of U.S. registry. The proposed actions would be performed at an average labor rate of $65 per work hour, and any needed parts would be supplied from operator inventory.

For about 7 U.S.-registered airplanes subject to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1008, Revision 1, dated April 10, 1989, the proposed modification would take about 3 work hours. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of this proposed modification for U.S. operators is $1,365, or $195 per airplane.

For about 10 U.S.-registered airplanes subject to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-28-1054, dated August 23, 1993, the proposed inspection would take about 1 work hour. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of this proposed inspection for U.S. operators is $650, or $65 per airplane.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include “AD Docket No. 2000-NE-42-AD” in the subject line of your comments. If you want us to acknowledge receipt of your mailed comments, send us a self-addressed, stamped postcard with the docket number written on it; we will date-stamp your postcard and mail it back to you. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. If a person contacts us verbally, and that contact relates to a substantive part of this proposed AD, we will summarize the contact and place the summary in the docket. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

You may examine the AD Docket (including any comments and service information), by appointment, between 8 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. See ADDRESSES for the location.

On May 7, 2001, the FAA issued AD 2001-10-13, Amendment 39-12229 (66 FR 27017, May 16, 2001). That AD requires a onetime inspection, and if necessary replacing certain fan disks for electrical arc-out indications. That AD also reduces the life limit of certain fan disks. That AD resulted from a report of a crack that was found during a visual inspection as part of routine engine maintenance. That condition, if not corrected, could result in rupture of the fan disk due to cracks that initiate at an electrical arc-out, which could result in an uncontained failure of the engine.

Since we issued that AD, we discovered that the first fan disk part number and the first fan disk serial number listed in Table 1, Fan Disks that Require Removal Based on Blended Callouts are incorrect. This proposed AD would correct those numbers. In all other respects, the proposed AD remains the same as AD 2001-10-03.

We have reviewed and approved the technical contents of GE Aircraft Engines (GEAE) Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) CF34-BJ 72-A0088, Revision 1, dated October 30, 2000; and ASB CF34-AL 72-A0103, dated August 4, 2000. These ASB's provide procedures for inspections of certain disks for electrical arc-out indications, and if necessary, replacement of the disk with a serviceable disk.

Although fan disk part number (P/N) 5922T01G02 is not specified by ASB CF34-BJ 72-A0088, Revision 1, dated October 30, 2000, fan disk P/N 5922T01G02 is subject to the requirements specified in this AD.

We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design. We are proposing this AD, which would require requires an inspection of fan disks, P/N's 5921T18G01, 5921T18G09, 5921T18G10, 5921T54G01, 5922T01G02, 5922T01G04, 5922T01G05, 6020T62G04, 6020T62G05, 6078T00G01, 6078T57G01, 6078T57G02, 6078T57G03, 6078T57G04, 6078T57G05, and 6078T57G06, for electrical arc-out indications and, if necessary, replacement of the fan disk with a serviceable disk. This AD would also require replacing certain fan disks with blended callouts and listed byP/N and serial number (SN) in this AD before achieving a new reduced life limit. The proposed AD would require that you do these actions using the service information described previously.

We estimate that one General Electric Company (GE) CF34-1A, -3A, -3A1, -3A2, -3B, and -3B1 turbofan engine of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD. We also estimate that it would take approximately six work hours per engine to perform the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $65 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $140,000 per engine. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the proposed AD to U.S. operators to be $140,390.

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

3. Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this proposal and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary by sending a request to us at the address listed under ADDRESSES. Include “AD Docket No. 2000-NE-42-AD” in your request.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

How do I comment on this proposed AD? We invite you to submit any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include the docket number, “FAA-2005-20712; Directorate Identifier 2005-CE-15-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Using the search function of our docket web site, anyone can find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). This is docket number FAA-2005-20712; Directorate Identifier 2005-CE-15-AD. You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Are there any specific portions of this proposed AD I should pay attention to? We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. If you contact us through a nonwritten communication and that contact relates to a substantive part of this proposed AD, we will summarize the contact and place the summary in the docket. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD in light of those comments and contacts.

Where can I go to view the docket information? You may view the AD docket that contains the proposal, any comments received, and any final disposition in person at the DMS Docket Offices between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. (eastern time), Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Office (telephone 1-800-647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Department of Transportation NASSIF Building at the street address stated in ADDRESSES. You may also view the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. The comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the DMS receives them.

What events have caused this proposed AD? The FAA has received reports that the plastic cover over the air conditioning motor module for certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon), Model 390, Premier 1 airplanes was found melted or burned. The overheating of the electromagnetic interference-radio frequency interference (EMI-RFI) filter assembly located under the plastic cover caused this damage.

Raytheon has developed two partial fixes that together remedy the problem. In February 2005, Raytheon implemented a partial fix to the problem with a service bulletin for the replacement of the plastic cover with a manufactured or a field fabricated metal cover. Raytheon, in June 2005, issued a service bulletin for the modification of the EMI-RFI filter assembly.

What is the potential impact if FAA took no action? The burning of the plastic cover could result in a fire.

Is there service information that applies to this subject? Raytheon has issued:

What has FAA decided? We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing AD action.

What would this proposed AD require? This proposed AD would require you to:

How does the revision to 14 CFR part 39 affect this proposed AD? On July 10, 2002, we published a new version of 14 CFR part 39 (67 FR 47997, July 22, 2002), which governs FAA's AD system. This regulation now includes material that relates to altered products, special flight permits, and alternative methods of compliance. This material previously was included in each individual AD. Since this material is included in 14 CFR part 39, we will not include it in future AD actions.

How many airplanes would this proposed AD impact? We estimate that this proposed AD affects 100 airplanes in the U.S. registry.

What would be the cost impact of this proposed AD on owners/operators of the affected airplanes? We estimate the following costs to do this proposed replacement of the plastic cover with a new manufactured metallic cover (P/N 390-555015-0001, or FAA-approved equivalent part number) that you buy:

(a) These meetings will be informal in nature and will be conducted by one or more representatives of the FAA Central Region. A representative from the FAA will present a formal briefing on the planned modification of the Class B airspace area at the Lambert-St. Louis International Airport. Participants will be given an opportunity to deliver comments or make a presentation. Only comments concerning the plan to modify the Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, Class B airspace area will be accepted.

(b) These meetings will be open to all persons on a space-available basis. There will be no admission fee or other charge to attend and participate.

(c) Any person wishing to make a presentation to the FAA panel will be asked to sign in and estimate the amount of time needed for such presentation. This will permit the panel to allocate an appropriate amount of time for each presenter. These meetings will not be adjourned until everyone on the list has had an opportunity to address the panel.

(d) Position papers or other handout material relating to the substance of these meetings will be accepted. Participants wishing to submit handout material should present an original and two copies (3 copies total) to the presiding officer. There should be additional copies of each handout available for other attendees.

(e) These meetings will not be formally recorded.

Interested parties are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments that provide the factual basis supporting the views and suggestions presented are particularly helpful in developing reasoned regulatory decisions on the proposal. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal. Communications should identify the airspace docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address listed above. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments on this notice must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Airspace Docket No. FAA-2005-22100/Airspace Docket No. 05-AEA-16”. The postcard will be date/time stamped and returned to the commenter.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded through the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. Recently published rulemaking documents can also be accessed through the FAA's Web page at http://www.faa.gov or the Superintendent of Documents Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara. Additionally, any person may obtain a copy of this notice by submitting a request to the Office of Air Traffic Airspace Management, ATA-400, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591 or by calling (202) 267-8783. Communications must identify both the docket numbers for this notice. Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRMs should contact the FAA Office of Rulemaking, (202) 267-9677 to request a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, which describes the application procedure.

The FAA is considering an amendment to Part 71 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 71) to amend the Class E airspace within the Binghamton, NY area. The proposal would consolidate the following airport Class E-5 airspace designations into the Binghamton, NY designation: Cortland, NY, Cortland County-Chase Field Airport (N03); Ithaca, NY, Tompkins County Airport (ITH); Elmira, NY, Elmira/Corning Regional Airport (ELM); Endicott, NY, Tri-Cities Airport (CZG); and Sayre, PA, Robert Parker Hospital Heliport. This action would result in the rescission of five Class E-5 designations under a separate docket. The affected airspace would subsequently be incorporated into the Binghamton, NY description. The airspace will be defined to accommodate the approaches and contain IFR operations to and from those airports. This change would have no impact on aircraft operations since the type of airspace designation is not changing. Furthermore, the IFR approach procedures for the individual airports within the are would not be affected. Class E airspace designations for airspace areas extending upward from 700 ft. or more above the surface are published in Paragraph 6005 of FAA Order 7400.9M, dated August 30, 2004, and effective September 16, 2004, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The Class E airspace designation listed in this document would be published subsequently in the Order.

The FAA has determined that this proposed regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. Therefore, this proposed regulation—(1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that would only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this proposed rule would not have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR Part 71 as follows:

Interested parties are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire. Comments that provide the factual basis supporting the views and suggestions presented are particularly helpful in developing reasoned regulatory decisions on the proposal. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, aeronautical, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal.

Communications should identify both docket numbers (FAA Docket No. FAA-2005-22047 and Airspace Docket No. 05-ANM-10) and be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Management System (see ADDRESSES section for address and phone number). You may also submit comments through the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments on this action must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket No. FAA-2005-22047 and Airspace Docket No. 05-ANM-10.” The postcard will be date/time stamped and returned to the commenter.

All communications received on or before the specified closing date for comments will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposal contained in this action may be changed in light of comments received. All comments submitted will be available for examination in the public docket both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded through the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. Recently published rulemaking documents can also be accessed through the FAA's Web page at http://www.faa.gov or the Federal Register 's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.

You may review the public docket containing the proposal, any comments received, and any final disposition in person in the Dockets Office (see ADDRESSES section for address and phone number) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. An informal docket may also be examined during normal business hours at the office of the Regional Air Traffic Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 98055-4056.

Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRM's should contact the FAA's Office of Rulemaking, (202) 267-9677, for a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which describes the application procedure.

On June 29, 2005, the Salt Lake City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) requested Federal Airway V-343 be extended to accommodate arriving instrument air traffic at BTM. This action responds to this request.

The FAA is proposing an amendment to Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 71 to modify Federal Airway V-343 by extending the airway from the Bozeman, MT, VORTAC to the initial approach fix for the RNAV runway 15 approach to the BTM, MT.

The FAA has determined that this proposed regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. Therefore, this proposed regulation: (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under Department of Transportation (DOT) Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this proposed rule, when promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the risk of death and serious injury from rollover crashes, this notice proposes to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance. This standard, which seeks to reduce deaths and serious injuries resulting from crushing of the roof into the occupant compartment as a result of ground contact during rollover crashes, currently applies to passenger cars, and to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less. The standard requires that when a large steel test plate is forced down onto the roof of a vehicle, simulating contact with the ground in rollover crashes, the vehicle roof structure must withstand a force equivalent to 1.5 times the unloaded weight of the vehicle, without the test plate moving more than 127 mm (5 inches). Under S5 of the standard, the application of force is limited to 22,240 Newtons (5,000 pounds) for passenger cars.

Recent agency data show that nearly 24,000 occupants are seriously injured and 10,000 occupants are fatally injured in approximately 273,000 non-convertible light vehicle rollover crashes that occur each year. In order to identify how many of these occupants might benefit from this proposal, the agency analyzed real-world injury data in order to determine the number of occupant injuries that could be attributed to roof intrusion. The agency examined only front outboard occupants who were belted, not fully ejected from their vehicles, whose most severe injury was associated with roof contact, and whose seating position was located below a roof component that experienced vertical intrusion as a result of a rollover crash. NHTSA estimates that there are about 807 seriously and approximately 596 fatally injured occupants that fit these criteria. The agency believes that some of these occupants would benefit from this proposal.

To better address fatalities and injuries occurring in roof-involved rollover crashes, we are proposing to extend the application of the standard to vehicles with a GVWR of up to 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds), and to strengthen the requirements of FMVSS No. 216 by mandating that the vehicle roof structures withstand a force equivalent to 2.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight, and eliminating the 22,240 Newtons (5,000 pounds) force limit for passenger cars. Further, we are proposing a new direct limit on headroom reduction, which would replace the current limit of test plate movement. This new limit would prohibit any roof component from contacting a seated 50th percentile male dummy under the application of a force equivalent to 2.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight. For vehicles built in two or more stages, the agency is proposing an option of certifying to the roof crush requirements of FMVSS No. 220, “School bus rollover protection,” instead of FMVSS No. 216. Finally, in response to several petitions, we reexamined the current testing procedures and are proposing certain modifications to the vehicle tie-down procedure and test plate positioning for raised or altered roof vehicles.

Consistent with the agency's continuing effort to reduce rollover-related injuries and fatalities, this document requests additional comments on certain other countermeasures that could further this initiative. Specifically, we ask for comments related to seat belt pretensioners that could limit vertical head excursion in a rollover event.

The agency used two alternative methods to estimate the benefits of this proposal. Under the first alternative, we estimate that this proposal would prevent 793 non-fatal injuries and 13 fatalities. Under the second alternative, we estimate that this proposal would prevent 498 non-fatal injuries and 44 fatalities. The annual equivalent lives saved are estimated at 39 and 55, respectively.

The estimated average cost in 2003 dollars, per vehicle, of meeting the proposed requirements would be $10.67 per affected vehicle. Added weight from design changes is estimated to increase lifetime fuel costs by $5.33 to $6.69 per vehicle. The cost per year for the vehicle fleet is estimated to be $88-$95 million. The cost per equivalent life saved is estimated to range from $2.1 to $3.4 million.

FMVSS No. 216 currently applies to passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), trucks, and buses  1 with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less. The standard requires that the “roof over the front seat area”  2 must withstand a force equivalent to 1.5 times the unloaded weight of the vehicle. For passenger cars, this force is limited to a maximum of 22,240 N (5,000 pounds). Specifically, the vehicle's roof must prevent the test plate from moving more than 127 mm (5 inches) in the specified test.

To test compliance, a vehicle is secured on a rigid horizontal surface, and a steel rectangular plate is angled and positioned on the roof to simulate vehicle-to-ground contact over the front seat area. This plate is used to apply the specified force to the roof structure. Currently, no test device is used to simulate an occupant in the front seat area.

In order to simulate vehicle-to-ground contact, the plate is tilted forward at a 5-degree angle, along its longitudinal axis, and rotated outward at a 25-degree angle, along its lateral axis, so that the plate's outboard side is lower than its inboard side. The edges of the test plate are positioned based on fixed points on the vehicle's roof.

For vehicles with conventional roofs, the forward edge of the plate is positioned 254 mm (10 inches) forward of the forwardmost point on the roof, including the windshield trim. This same position is required for vehicles with raised  3 or altered  4 roofs, unless the initial point of contact with the plate is rearward of the front seat area. In those instances, the plate is moved forward until its rearward edge is tangent to the rear of the front seat area.

In an effort to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from roof crush into the passenger compartment area in rollover crashes, the agency established FMVSS No. 216, “Roof crush resistance.” Specifically, the agency sought to address the strength of roof structures located over the front seat area of passenger cars. Compliance with the standard was first required on September 1, 1973.

On April 17, 1991, NHTSA published a final rule amending FMVSS No. 216 to extend its application to MPVs, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less. 5 The final rule adopted the same requirements and test procedures as those applicable to passenger cars, except for the 22,240 Newton (5,000 pound) limit on the applied force. Compliance with the final rule was required on September 1, 1994.

Subsequently, NHTSA published a final rule (1999 final rule) responding to several petitions for rulemaking seeking to revise the test plate positioning procedure. 6 Prior to the 1999 final rule, the test plate was positioned based on initial point of contact with the roof. After establishing the initial point of contact, the test plate was moved forward until its forwardmost edge was positioned 254 mm (10 inches) in front of the initial point of contact. For certain vehicles with aerodynamically sloped roofs, this procedure resulted in the test plate being positioned rearward of the roof over the front seat area. 7 Consequently, the plate did not apply the force in the location contemplated by the standard, i.e. , over the front occupants. In some instances, the test plate was positioned such that the edge of the plate was in contact with the roof, which resulted in excessive and unrealistic deformation during testing. Similar problems occurred in testing vehicles with raised or altered roofs.

The 1999 final rule addressed the difficulty in testing aerodynamically sloped roofs by specifying that the test plate be positioned 254 mm (10 inches) forward of the forwardmost point of the roof (including the windshield trim). This ensured that the leading edge of the plate did not contact the roof and that the test plate applied the force over the front seat area.

Certain vehicles with raised or altered roofs experienced plate positioning difficulties similar to those in vehicles with aerodynamically sloped roofs because the initial contact point on the roof occurred not over the front seat area, but on the raised rear portion of the roof. Consequently, the 1999 final rule provided for a secondary test procedure intended for vehicles with raised or altered roofs. Under this new test procedure, the test plate is moved forward until the rearward edge is tangent to the transverse vertical plane located at the rear of the roof over the front seat area.

On June 11, 1999, the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association (RVIA) and Ford Motor Company (Ford) submitted petitions for reconsideration to amend the 1999 final rule. 8 Petitioners argued that the secondary plate positioning test procedure produced rear edge plate loading onto the roof of some raised and altered roof vehicles that caused excessive deformation uncharacteristic of real-world rollover crashes. Specifically, petitioners argued that positioning the test plate such that the rear edge of the plate is at the rearmost point of the front occupant area resulted in stress concentration, which produced excessive deformation and even roof penetration. Petitioners argued that this type of loading is uncommon to real-world rollovers. Consequently, petitioners asked the agency to reconsider adopting the secondary plate positioning procedure for raised or altered roof vehicles. 9 The agency responds to these petitions for reconsideration in Section VIII(B) of this document.

On May 6, 1996, the agency received a petition for rulemaking from Hogan, Smith & Alspaugh, P.C. (Hogan). 10 Hogan argued that the current static requirements in FMVSS No. 216 bear no relationship to real-world rollover crash conditions and therefore should be replaced with a more realistic test such as the inverted vehicle drop test defined in the Society of Automotive Engineers Recommended Practice J996 (SAE J996), “Inverted Vehicle Drop Test Procedure.” The petitioner also requested that NHTSA require “roll cages” to be standard in all cars. NHTSA granted this petition on January 8, 1997, believing that the inverted drop test had merit for further agency consideration. The agency addresses the issues raised in this petition in Section VIII(A) of this document.

On October 22, 2001, NHTSA published a Request for Comments (RFC) to assist in an upgrade of FMVSS No. 216 and in addressing issues raised by the Hogan petition requesting that the agency adopt dynamic testing. 11 In the RFC, the agency posed questions related to (1) current FMVSS No. 216 test requirements and procedures; (2) the viability of introducing dynamic testing; and (3) ways to limit headroom reduction. The agency received over 50 comments from the public. The agency used the information gathered from these responses in preparing this NPRM. A summary of comments is provided in Section VI of this document.

In 1991, Congress instructed NHTSA to assess rollover occupant protection as a part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). ISTEA required the agency to initiate rulemaking to address the injuries and fatalities associated with rollover crashes. In response to that mandate, NHTSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) that summarized statistics and research in rollover crashes, sought answers to several questions about vehicle stability and rollover crashes, and outlined possible regulatory and other approaches to reduce rollover fatalities. 12 NHTSA also published a report to Congress that detailed the agency's efforts on rollover occupant protection. 13

In 1994, the agency proposed a new consumer information regulation to require that passenger cars and light multipurpose passenger vehicles and trucks be labeled with information about their resistance to rollover. 14 However, after issuing the notice of proposed rulemaking, Congress directed NHTSA not to issue a final rule on vehicle rollover labeling until the agency had reviewed a study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on how to most effectively communicate motor vehicle safety information to consumers. 15

After the agency reviewed the NAS study, we issued a Request for Comments proposing to use Static Stability Factor to indicate rollover risk in single-vehicle crashes, as a part of NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). That program provides consumers with vehicle safety information, including crash test results, to aid consumers in their vehicle purchase decisions. 16 In 2001, the agency issued a final decision to use the Static Stability Factor to indicate rollover risk in single-vehicle crashes and to incorporate the new rating into NCAP. 17

Section 12 of the Transportation Recall, Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act of November 2000 mandated that NHTSA develop a dynamic rollover resistance test for the purposes of aiding consumer information. On October 14, 2003, NHTSA modified the New Car Assessment Program to include dynamic rollover tests. 18 NHTSA's rollover resistance rating information is available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/ncap/ .

In 2002, the agency formed an Integrated Project Team (IPT) to examine the rollover problem and make recommendations on how to reduce rollovers and improve safety when rollovers nevertheless occur. In June 2003, based on the work of the team, the agency published a report entitled, “Initiatives to Address the Mitigation of Vehicle Rollover.”  19 The report recommended improving vehicle stability, ejection mitigation, roof crush resistance, as well as road improvement and behavioral strategies aimed at consumer education.

This proposal to upgrade our safety standard on roof crush resistance is one part of a comprehensive agency plan for reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury when rollover crashes do occur.

Rollovers are especially lethal crashes. While rollovers comprise just 3% of all light passenger vehicle crashes, they account for almost one- third of all occupant fatalities in light vehicles, and more than 60 percent of occupant deaths in the SUV segment of the light vehicle population. 20

Rollover fatalities are strongly associated with the following factors: A single vehicle crash (83 percent), a rural crash location (60 percent), a high-speed (55 mph or higher) road (72 percent), nighttime (66 percent), off-road tripping/tipping mechanism (60 percent), young (under 30 years old) driver (46 percent), male driver (73 percent), alcohol-related (40 percent), and/or speed-related (40 percent). 21

The agency previously estimated that approximately 64 percent of about 10,000 occupants fatally injured in rollovers each year are injured when they are either partially or completely ejected during the rollover. Approximately 53 percent of the fatally injured are completely ejected, and 72 percent are unbelted. 22 Most of the fatally injured are ejected through side windows  23 or side doors. 24 Those who are not ejected, including belted occupants, are fatally injured as a result of impact with the vehicle interior.

Approximately 273,000 non-convertible light vehicles were towed after a police-reported rollover crash each year. Of these 273,000 light vehicle rollover crashes, 223,000 were single-vehicle rollover crashes. Previous agency data indicate that in ninety-five (95) percent of single-vehicle rollover crashes, the vehicles were tripped, either by on-road mechanisms such as potholes and wheel rims digging into the pavement or by off-road mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, and guardrails. 25 Eighty-three (83) percent of single-vehicle rollover crashes occurred after the vehicle left the roadway. 26 Five (5) percent of single vehicle rollovers were untripped rollovers. They occurred as a result of tire and/or road interface friction.

NHTSA estimates that 23,793 serious injuries  27 and 9,942 fatalities occur in 272,925 non-convertible light duty vehicle  28 rollover crashes each year. In evaluating the risks of fatalities and serious injuries associated with rollover crashes, NHTSA has concluded that rollover crashes involving light duty vehicles present a higher risk of injury compared to frontal, side, and rear impacts. 29

In arriving at our conclusions, NHTSA used (1) the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) from 1997 through 2002 to determine the annual average number of fatalities in non-convertible light duty vehicles, and (2) the National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS) from 1997 through 2002 to determine the annual average number of seriously injured survivors of towaway crashes. These estimates were combined to produce the results in Table 1. 30

The estimates in Table 1 show that compared to other crash events, such as frontal, side, and rear impacts, rollover crashes present a greater risk of fatal or serious injury. However, the higher injury risks in rollover crashes may largely result from greater likelihood of full ejection from the vehicle, compared to other crash modes. Further, younger drivers, who may be more likely to become involved in rollovers, might also be less likely to use a safety restraint. 31

Accordingly, to refine further the injury risk estimates more relevant to this proposal, we examined the rollover injury risks experienced by belted vehicle occupants, and vehicle occupants that had not been fully ejected. Although the injury risk estimates for belted occupants are lower, they remain higher for rollover crashes than for other crash modes.

The agency has published a comprehensive plan to reduce rollover related fatalities and injuries. It is clear that the most effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover crashes is to prevent the rollover crash from occurring. Countermeasures to help reduce rollover occurrence include:

Countermeasures are also needed to mitigate injuries and fatalities when rollovers do occur. Such countermeasures include:

All of these countermeasures must work together to help create a driving environment in which rollovers can be avoided and rollover-related fatalities and injuries minimized. States legislatures, the enforcement community (including police officers, prosecutors and judges), vehicle makers and their suppliers and the driving public all play critical parts in eliminating the 10,000 rollover-related fatalities suffered each year. Government also plays a role in ensuring that safety requirements are mandated when the benefits of doing so are established. This proposal to upgrade our roof crush standard is only one such effort by the agency to address the rollover hazard.

The agency has examined data on vehicle rollovers resulting in roof damage. 34 This information was derived from NASS-CDS (1997 to 2002). Vertical roof intrusion is recorded in NASS-CDS when it exceeds 2 cm (0.8 inches).

Using the NASS-CDS data from 1997 to 2002, we conclude that out of the total of 272,925 light duty vehicle rollovers in towaway crashes, 220,452 rolled more than one-quarter turn. 35 The 52,473 vehicles that experienced only a one-quarter turn were excluded from the analysis because one-quarter turn rollovers usually do not result in vertical roof intrusion since they do not experience roof-to-ground contact. We found that out of the 220,452 vehicles that rolled more than one-quarter turn, 175,253 experienced vertical intrusion of some roof component. We estimate that in 82 percent (142,954) of these cases, the most severe roof intrusion occurred over the front seat positions. Approximately 92 percent of the fatally or seriously injured belted occupants who were not fully ejected were in front seats.

In addition, NHTSA examined how vertical roof intrusion relates to a vehicle's body type and GVWR. We compared passenger cars, light trucks currently subject to the standard, and light trucks with a GVWR greater than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) but less than or equal to 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds). The estimates in Table 3 show that light trucks not subject to the current standard experienced patterns of roof intrusion which were slightly greater than vehicles already subject to the requirements of FMVSS No. 216. Further, the heavier vehicles above 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) experienced a greater maximum vertical roof intrusion.

In addition to examining the risk of injuries associated with rollover events, and the prevalence of roof intrusions resulting from rollover, the agency examined actual occupant injuries and fatalities resulting from roof intrusions that occurred after the vehicle rolled more than one-quarter turn or end-over-end. Some occupants sustaining these injuries could potentially benefit from upgrading the roof crush resistance requirements.

Again, the agency limited this injury analysis to belted occupants who were not fully ejected from their vehicles. In order to determine the number of occupant injuries that could be attributed to roof intrusion, the injury data were further limited to only front outboard occupants. 36 Further, NHTSA excluded rollover crashes producing roof intrusion as a result of a collision with a fixed object such as a tree or a pole. Using NASS-CDS (1997—2002) data, NHTSA estimates that 4 percent of vehicles involved in rollovers collided with fixed objects in a way that caused roof damage. The agency excluded these vehicles in assessing potential benefits of this proposal because we found that roof damage observed from fixed object collisions was often catastrophic in nature and exhibited different deformation patterns than roof-to-ground impacts due to the localization of the force. The agency believes that this proposal is not likely to have appreciable benefits for these types of collisions. Finally, the occupant MAIS injury must have resulted from contact with a roof component. 37

Our refined analysis shows that annually, there are an estimated 807 seriously and 596 fatally injured belted occupants (1,403 total) involved in rollovers resulting in roof intrusion that suffered MAIS injury from roof contact. The rollover injury distributions according to belt use, MAIS source, and roof intrusion is illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, although the number of serious and fatal injuries resulting from rollovers is very high, the number of occupants who could potentially benefit from upgraded roof crush resistance requirements is considerably more limited. However, despite the relatively small number of rollover occupants who may directly benefit from this proposal, the agency believes that roof crush resistance is an integral part of the occupant protection system, necessary to ensure benefits can be obtained from designing other rollover mitigation tools (such as padding and the restraint system) to provide better protection against injuries resulting from rollover. We note that seriously and fatally injured occupants who had a non-MAIS roof contact injury may also derive some benefit from decreased roof intrusion.

Prior to issuing the October 2001 RFC, NHTSA conducted a research program to examine potential methods for improving the roof crush resistance performance requirements. This program included vehicle testing and analytical research.

The agency vehicle testing program has consisted of: (1) Full vehicle dynamic rollover testing; (2) inverted vehicle drop testing; and (3) comparing inverted drop testing to a modified FMVSS No. 216 test.

The agency conducted over 25 full-scale dynamic rollover tests to evaluate roof integrity and failure modes in rollover crashes. These tests were expected to produce severe roof intrusion in order to help the agency investigate possible roof crush countermeasures and compare roof strengths. NHTSA designed a rollover test cart that was similar to the dolly rollover cart (as defined in FMVSS No. 208, “Occupant crash protection”), and vertically elevated it 1.2 meters. Pneumatic cylinders were used to initiate the vehicle's angular momentum. However, these test conditions proved so severe it was difficult to identify which vehicles had better performing roof structures and which had the worse performing roof structures. 38 Due to severity of roof crush and demonstrated lack of repeatability of results, this test procedure did not provide a reliable performance measure for roof crush resistance. Based on these tests, the agency determined that the development of an improved roof crush standard based on dynamic rollover testing was not feasible, so we proceeded to investigate alternatives.

NHTSA then evaluated the inverted drop test procedure based on the SAE J996 procedure. Previous research had suggested that the inverted drop test produced deformation patterns similar to those observed in real-world crashes. 39 NHTSA conducted a series of inverted drop tests and concluded that they were not necessarily better than quasi-static tests in representing vehicle-to-ground interaction occurring during rollover. Further, the inverted drop test procedure was significantly more difficult to conduct because it required a cumbersome procedure for suspending and inverting the vehicle. The agency concluded that the quasi-static test procedure is simpler and produces more repeatable results.

Further, the agency found that both the inverted drop and quasi-static tests produced loading and crush patterns comparable to those of the dynamic rollover test. 40 Although the roof crush loading sequence in real-world crashes differs from that of the quasi-static procedure, we determined that the roof crush patterns observed in quasi-static tests provide a good representation of the real-world roof deformations. This finding, coupled with the better consistency and repeatability of the quasi-static procedure, led the agency to conclude that the quasi-static procedure provides a suitable representation of the real-world dynamic loading conditions, and the most appropriate one on which to focus our upgrade efforts.

In 1994, NHTSA conducted an analytical study to explore the relationship between roof intrusion and the severity of occupant injury. To determine the extent of the correlation between roof intrusion and occupant injury, the agency conducted a comparative study using NASS-CDS. 41

The study evaluated two sets of belted occupants involved in rollover events to determine if headroom reduction was related to the risk of head injury in rollover crashes. One set of occupants had received head injuries from roof contact, the second set of occupants had not.

We observed the following: (1) Headroom reduction (pre-crash versus post-crash) of more than 70 percent substantially increased the risk of head injury from roof contact; (2) as the severity of the injury increased, the percentage of cases with no remaining headroom increased; (3) when the intrusion exceeded the original headroom, the percentage of injured occupants was 1.8 times the percentage of uninjured occupants; and (4) the average percent of headroom reduction for injured occupants was more than twice that of uninjured occupants. In sum, the agency believes that there is a relationship between the amount of roof intrusion and the risk of injury to belted occupants in rollover events.

Recently, the agency conducted roof crush tests to ascertain roof strength of more recent model year (MY) vehicles.

First, the agency conducted testing on ten vehicles equipped with string potentiometers to measure the relationship between external plate movement and available occupant headroom. 42 All ten vehicles withstood an applied force of 1.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight before the occupant headroom was exhausted. Six out of ten vehicles attained a peak force greater than 2.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight before the occupant headroom was exhausted. The detailed summary and analysis of testing and simulation research is contained in the document entitled “Roof Crush Research: Load Plate Angle Determination and Initial Fleet Evaluation.”  43

Subsequently, NHTSA conducted further testing on another set of ten vehicles with a seated 50th percentile Hybrid III dummy. 44 All ten vehicles withstood an applied force of 1.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight before the occupant headroom was exhausted. 45 Seven out of ten vehicles exceeded an applied force of 2.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight before the occupant headroom was exhausted. One vehicle, a Subaru Forester, withstood an applied force of 4.0 times the unloaded vehicle weight before the occupant headroom was exhausted.

The agency also tested 10 vehicles as a part of NHTSA's compliance program. 46 These vehicles were tested in a manner similar to the 20 vehicles described above. However, these vehicles were only crushed to approximately 127 mm (5 inches) of plate displacement. The data gathered from these tests were useful in evaluating the roof crush performance of the fleet under the current requirements, which is discussed in greater detail in other sections of this notice. 47

As previously discussed, in 1999, the agency issued a final rule revising the test plate positioning procedures. 48 In response to the NPRM which preceded the 1999 final rule, Ford commented that different laboratories employ various methods to secure the vehicle for FMVSS No. 216 testing. Ford stated that the initial point of contact of the test plate varied between laboratories, which resulted in different roof crush resistance. Ford attributed the variation in initial contact point to the variation in tie-down methodologies. 49 In response to the Ford comment, the agency indicated it would address the variability in tie-down procedures separately. 50

Improving occupant protection in frontal crashes is a major goal of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Frontal crashes are the most frequent cause of motor vehicle fatalities. In 1972, NHTSA promulgated FMVSS No. 208 to improve the frontal crash protection provided to motor vehicle occupants. The dynamic performance requirements of the standard include frontal rigid barrier crash tests, at angles between perpendicular and ±30 degrees with belted and unbelted dummies. 1 Occupant protection is evaluated based on data acquired from anthropomorphic test dummies positioned in the driver and right front passenger seats. Data collection instrumentation is mounted in the head, neck, chest, and femurs of the test dummies.

NHTSA initiated research in the early 1990s to develop performance tests not currently included in FMVSS No. 208, such as high severity frontal offset crashes that involve only partial engagement of a vehicle's front structure. Such performance tests result in large amounts of occupant compartment intrusion and increased potential for intrusion-related injury. The agency also instrumented the dummies in these tests with advanced lower leg instrumentation, not currently required in FMVSS No. 208, to assess the potential for lower extremity injury, specifically, to the knee, tibia, and ankle.

During the same time period, considerable international research focused on the development of a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test procedure. In December 1996, the European Union (EU) adopted the EU Directive 96/79 EC for frontal crash protection. This directive required vehicle compliance with a 56 km/h, 40 percent offset, fixed deformable barrier crash test. In 1998, Australia introduced a similar regulation for new passenger car model approvals. In addition to these regulations, several consumer information programs also began to utilize the EU Directive 96/79 EC crash test procedure, but raised the impact speed to 64 km/h. These programs included the European New Car Assessment Program (EuroNCAP), Australia NCAP (ANCAP), Japan NCAP and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) Crashworthiness Evaluation program in the U.S.

Given the world-wide focus on the fixed offset deformable barrier crash test procedure, the conferees on the appropriations legislation for the Department of Transportation for FY 1997 directed NHTSA to work “toward establishing a Federal motor vehicle safety standard for frontal offset crash testing” in fiscal year 1997. 2 NHTSA was further directed to consider the harmonization potential with other countries and to work with interested parties, including the automotive industry, under standard rulemaking procedures. In 1997, NHTSA submitted a Report to Congress  3 on the status of the agency's efforts toward establishing a high speed frontal offset crash test requirement. The agency made a preliminary assessment that the adoption of the EU 96/79 EC frontal offset test procedure, in addition to the current requirements of FMVSS No. 208, could result in substantial benefits, since lower leg injuries were typically associated with long-term recovery and significant economic cost. However, the Report to Congress also made note of NHTSA's concerns relative to the potential for exacerbating small and large car incompatibility, as a result of adopting a frontal offset crash test procedure.

During 1998-2002, NHTSA completed over 25 frontal offset crash tests in an attempt to answer a number of research questions. Specifically, what are the merits of a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test procedure and what is the most appropriate dummy size, lower leg instrumentation and impact speed? Dummy injury measures from the fixed offset deformable barrier crash tests demonstrated the potential for injury reductions over and above the full frontal rigid barrier test configuration. 4 The results demonstrated that the 5th percentile female dummy generally produced higher normalized lower leg injury measurements than the 50th percentile male dummy under comparable frontal offset crash test conditions. 5 Crash tests comparing lower leg instrumentation showed that the Thor-Lx/HIIIr lower leg instrumentation predicted a higher incidence of foot and ankle injury than the Denton/Hybrid III lower leg. 6 Finally, fixed offset deformable barrier crash tests conducted at a range of impact speeds, including 56 km/h, 60 km/h, and 64 km/h, demonstrated notable differences in the pass/fail rates, with the 56 km/h impact speed being the most benign.

In the 2000 and 2001 Regulatory Plans published in the Federal Register , NHTSA indicated that it was considering a rulemaking to establish a high speed frontal offset test. In response, the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget, wrote a letter dated December 7, 2001, asking the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA to consider giving greater priority to modifying its frontal occupant protection standard by establishing a high speed, frontal offset crash test requirement. The letter suggested that if the agency were to give this matter greater priority, the agency would need to refine its estimates of the specific safety benefits that a new offset test would generate. It said that this assessment would also need to include potential losses in existing safety benefits due to possible changes in vehicle structure and design. This reinforced the agency's intent to look at both the benefits and disbenefits from adoption of a high speed frontal offset crash test requirement.

In 2002, the agency initiated a vehicle-to-vehicle crash test program to assess the potential disbenefits of adopting a high speed frontal offset requirement. 7 NHTSA used the vehicle-to-vehicle crash test configuration from the agency's vehicle compatibility program  8 and test vehicles selected from vehicle models that had improved ratings in the IIHS frontal crashworthiness evaluation program. 9 The tests were configured to simulate both vehicles moving at 56.3 km/h, such that the subject vehicle impacted the left front corner of its collision partner at an offset of 50 percent and an impact angle of 30 degrees. Two vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests were conducted for each vehicle model under study, one using an older model and the other using a later redesign. Both vehicles struck a model year 1997 Honda Accord. The two sets of injury measurements for the driver dummy of the Honda Accord were compared to determine which version of the subject vehicle ( i.e. , the older model or the redesign) imparted higher injury numbers.

The results of the testing suggested that, for some sport utility vehicles (SUVs), design changes that improved their performance in high speed frontal offset crash tests may also result in adverse effects to occupants of their collision partners. The results raised questions about whether or not these results are representative of the effects on collision partner protection in the current fleet, and the extent to which disbenefits to crash partners are associated with design changes made to improve performance in a high speed frontal offset crash test.

Because of our concern, the agency published a request for comments in the Federal Register (February 3, 2004, 69 FR 5108). 10,   11 The notice informed the public about the crash tests conducted to date, and sought comments on its findings and on alternative strategies that could be coupled with a frontal offset crash test requirement. The agency also planned to study the performance of four additional vehicle models, from different vehicle classes, that improved IIHS crashworthiness ratings as the result of a vehicle redesign.

Shortly after publication of the Request for Comments, the agency completed the four additional pairs of vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests. 12 The combined results showed that in five of the six vehicle pairs, the head injury criteria of the Honda Accord driver dummy increased when struck by the redesigned vehicle compared to when struck by the older model. Similarly, in four of the six vehicle pairs, the chest acceleration of the Honda Accord driver dummy increased when struck by the redesigned vehicle compared to when struck by the older model. Overall, the earlier trends observed in the SUV vehicle model testing were generally exhibited in the other vehicle classes tested, but to a lesser extent for passenger cars.

A total of seventeen organizations and private individuals submitted comments in response to the February 3, 2004, request for comments notice on frontal offset crash testing. Comments were submitted by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance), the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. (AIAM), American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda), General Motors Corporation (GM), DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (DaimlerChrysler), Ford Motor Company (Ford), the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America (PIA), the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), and eight comments from private individuals.

Vehicle manufacturers and vehicle manufacturer associations supported the overall goal of reducing lower extremity injuries in frontal crashes, but did not support the agency's pursuing a rulemaking at this time. They recommended that NHTSA conduct additional research on the sources of lower extremity injury, as well as determine the appropriate anthropomorphic test device and injury criteria. Vehicle manufacturers also generally shared NHTSA's concern that some design changes that improve a vehicle's performance in a high speed frontal offset crash test may also result in adverse effects on their collision partner occupants. Consequently, some strongly advocated linking a vehicle compatibility strategy to any frontal offset crash test.

Conversely, the IIHS, PIA, the Advocates, and the majority of the private citizen comments supported the immediate adoption of a frontal offset crash test requirement. The IIHS stated that such a requirement would ensure all vehicle types are designed with state-of-the-art frontal crash protection; however, it believes that NHTSA should not delay the implementation of an offset crash test requirement because of unsubstantiated fears of compatibility disbenefits. The IIHS also stated that such a requirement could not be effective without specifically addressing occupant compartment integrity. PIA generally supported the IIHS's position and noted that frontal offset crash testing simulates a crash scenario that current Federal testing does not address. The Advocates further stated that it represents a majority of real world crashes and its adoption would complement full frontal crash tests.

The main comments raised in response to the Request for Comments involved the projected benefits and potential disbenefits of a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test, the effect of industry's voluntary compatibility commitments, and consideration of alternative approaches. The following sections briefly analyze each issue.

A. Underestimated the benefits of improved frontal offset crash protection: The IIHS suggested that NHTSA greatly underestimated the benefits of improved frontal offset crash protection. It stated that NHTSA's analysis is inconsistent with real-world crash experience, which it said increasingly shows the benefits of improved frontal offset crash test performance for reducing serious and fatal injuries. The IIHS cited a study  13 indicating that drivers of vehicles with good frontal offset crash test ratings involved in fatal head-on crashes with poor-rated vehicles were 74 percent less likely to be the fatally injured driver. The IIHS also cited a Scandinavian study  14 that found that cars with better performance in EuroNCAP had much lower rates of serious injury than cars with worse performance.

The agency reviewed the two publications cited by the IIHS. The IIHS publication showed that drivers of good-rated vehicles involved in fatal head-on crashes with poor-rated vehicles were significantly less likely to be the fatally injured driver. However, since the inter-dependent relationship between frontal offset ratings and important factors such as vehicle age, vehicle weight, driver age, and driver gender were not examined, we question whether the fatality risk for better-rated vehicles might be overstated compared to the poor-rated vehicles. For example, the poor-rated vehicles might be consistently older than the good-rated vehicles, or the good-rated vehicles might tend to be heavier vehicles within a particular rating class. These inter-dependencies could decrease the fatality risk reduction estimated in the study.

We also note that the fatality reductions were only significant for head-on crashes of similar vehicles rated good and poor. Other estimated fatality risk reductions for acceptably and marginally-rated vehicles were inconclusive. In addition, we found that certain statistics were counter-intuitive. For example, for cars (the largest data set in the study), it showed that good-rated cars had higher frontal fatality rates than acceptably- and marginally-rated cars. Finally, the paper did not address the benefits of the frontal offset rating when two potentially incompatible vehicles collided ( i.e., car-to-SUV, car-to-pickup, etc.) Therefore, the magnitude of the overall benefit is not clear.

With respect to the Scandinavian field study cited by the IIHS, we are concerned that the comparison of EuroNCAP performance to real-world experience may not apply to the U.S., due to differences in mass distribution between the fleets and greater percentage of unbelted occupants in the U.S. We also observed a number of limitations in the study that raise questions as to whether it is appropriate to attribute life-saving benefits to a fixed offset deformable barrier test. First, the study stated there were insufficient data to separate the frontal impact rating from the side impact rating, so the analysis included both frontal and side impacts together. Consequently, it is unclear to what extent the front or side impact ratings were contributing to the correlation. Second, the paper used the Swedish injury classification of “severe” (or “typically admitted to the hospital”). The resulting correlation to “severe” injury may have been driven by lower limb injuries (maximum AIS 3 injuries), rather than life-threatening head or chest injuries. Also, due to insufficient data, the study combined all vehicle categories with similar EuroNCAP ratings together, regardless of mass. This may be problematic in providing meaningful real world results since frontal NCAP ratings (both full and offset) are only comparable within a given weight class. Finally, we found it noteworthy that the paper itself suggested that the results should not be seen as proof that there is a predictive value in the EuroNCAP system, especially not for individual car model scores. Thus, based on our concerns regarding these two studies, we believe more definitive analyses are needed to attribute lifesaving benefits to a fixed frontal offset deformable barrier crash test procedure.

In response to the Request for Comments, the IIHS also stated that NHTSA inappropriately relied solely on injury measures recorded by test dummies and discounted important information about occupant compartment integrity in the agency's tests. The IIHS stated that if the compartment is significantly damaged, good dummy injury measures offer no assurance of effective protection for the range of occupants who sit in different positions and may have different crash kinematics. It also stated that NHTSA's analysis is inconsistent with real-world crash experience, which increasingly shows that improved frontal offset crash test performance reduces serious and fatal injuries. 15

NHTSA has monitored toe pan and other intrusion measurements in its frontal offset crash tests. While the IIHS strongly advocated that intrusion measurement be included in a future requirement, we have not seen how to express this measurement as a performance requirement that could provide objective results and be used to compute benefits. Ideally, dummy instrumentation should provide an objective and direct assessment of injury risk to a human occupant. However, the IIHS noted that good dummy injury measures, from a test with a single-sized dummy in a single seating position, offer no assurance of effective protection for the range of occupants who sit in different positions and may have different crash kinematics. While we acknowledge that a minimum performance requirement cannot account for every intrusion scenario that occurs in the real world, there needs to be an objective method for converting post-crash intrusion measurements in a particular location, of a particular vehicle, to the number of injuries it might cause for the range of occupants who sit in different positions and have different crash kinematics. Until further analysis can provide guidance on an intrusion-based approach, the agency will continue to consider using two regulated dummy sizes in its frontal offset crash tests to capture the injury spectrum associated with the most vulnerable and average-sized occupants. However, we are exploring development of a performance requirement approach to compartment intrusion, and plan to revisit its potential during the course of future research.

B. Increased vehicle aggressivity from improved frontal offset crash protection: Some commenters shared the agency's concern that vehicle design changes that improve performance in high speed frontal offset crash tests may also result in increased aggressivity toward the occupants of their collision partners. As previously discussed, the agency's vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests demonstrated a trend in increased vehicle aggressivity towards collision partners in five of the six redesigned vehicle models tested. The AIAM and the Alliance concurred that the results justify a cautious approach in considering a frontal offset crash test requirement. The AIAM noted that there were instances of injury measures increasing in the struck vehicle, for every type of striking vehicle tested (passenger car, minivan, SUV, and pickup), when comparing the older and newer designs of the striking vehicle. The AIAM stated that the results raise questions regarding possible safety disbenefits resulting from design measures that are intended to improve frontal offset crash performance.

Conversely, the IIHS disagreed with the results of the agency's crash tests and concluded that the agency should ignore these test results in deciding whether to move ahead with a frontal offset crash test. The IIHS stated that, in theory, such tests could isolate the effects on driver dummy injury risk with changes in vehicle stiffness associated with improved crash test performance. However, it stated that most tests confounded changes in vehicle stiffness with changes in other important vehicle characteristics, such as mass and ride height. The IIHS cited this finding because it considers NHTSA's 30-degree frontal oblique test to be more characteristic of a side impact test with respect to the timing of the Honda Accord driver peak injury measures. It stated that injury measures reported by the Hybrid III dummy are unlikely to capture the full injury threat to a human occupant from such an impact because the lateral loading conditions are inconsistent with dummy design and sensor orientation.

We agree that some of the vehicle-to-vehicle tests confounded changes in vehicle stiffness with changes in mass, ride height, and other factors. However, our study was not targeted at solely examining vehicle stiffness. Whether the changes were increases in mass, stiffness, ride height, or combinations of these or other factors, the fact remains that five out of six redesigned vehicles that demonstrated improved performance in a frontal offset crash test indicated increased aggressivity toward its collision partner. Consequently, we do not agree that the tests should be ignored. The vehicle-to-vehicle test configuration was identified by field data as representing frontal crashes with a high risk of serious injury or fatality. 16 Additionally, NHTSA's research has shown that the test configuration is able to show a good correlation between target vehicle driver injury measures and bullet vehicle aggressivity metrics. 17 We further believe the Hybrid III dummy is the most-appropriate surrogate to evaluate injury risk in this frontal crash test configuration, with an 11 o'clock principle direction of force. Since the same dummy type was used in each of the vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests, we believe the relative differences in results should be reasonable for comparative purposes.

Furthermore, our concerns were reinforced by vehicle manufacturers' comments that suggested vehicles might become more aggressive as a result of a frontal offset crash test requirement. GM provided examples of crash test data from vehicle models designed with countermeasures to enable them to perform well in a high speed frontal offset crash test. According to GM, the data shows that vehicle structure has gotten stiffer in order to perform well in offset testing. Honda referenced its 1998 study  18 where it predicted the occurrence of a potential increased stiffness trend, based on vehicle weight, if a high speed offset crash test were added to other frontal crash tests. Ford similarly stated that countermeasures intended to reduce lower extremity injury risk could potentially increase the injury risk for occupants, including collision partner occupants, in other crash scenarios, such as front-to-front and/or front-to-side impacts. The Alliance stated that design approaches that lead to increases in vehicle front-end stiffness could degrade full frontal crash protection, rear seat occupant protection, particularly child safety performance, and might increase the frequency of acceleration-based injuries.

Conversely, the IIHS stated that the assumption that manufacturers simply make vehicle front ends stiffer to perform well in the offset test is incorrect. It cited a 2001 study where stiffness, as determined by U.S. New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) tests, was unrelated to the IIHS's structural ratings. 19 Although it acknowledged that some vehicles with improved frontal offset test ratings were “stiffer” than their predecessors, it said that stiffness typically was evident only after about 50 cm of vehicle deformation, when the crash deformation had neared the occupant compartment. According to the IIHS, this increased stiffness is necessary if the overall safety of the vehicle fleet is to improve. To further this point, the IIHS conducted a second field data analysis  20 to determine whether their good-rated vehicles contribute to increased vehicle aggressivity toward their collision partners. Although the relationships across all rating levels were not uniform, it reported that a consistent pattern emerged. Driver fatality rates were higher in both the rated vehicle and its collision partner when the rated vehicle had a poor rating than when it had a good rating. It concluded that this pattern contradicts NHTSA's concern that improved frontal offset test performance might lead to increased vehicle aggressivity.

The agency reviewed the IIHS's study and observed that the opposing vehicles' fatality risks appear to have been derived without controlling for factors such as vehicle make/models, vehicle weights, and model years. In our analyses, we have found that these factors could dramatically affect the fatality rate estimates. For example, if opposing vehicles for one rated group had a different vehicle profile ( i.e. , make-up of make, model and weight) from another rated group, we believe that vehicle design may not completely explain the discrepancy in opposing vehicle fatality risks. Furthermore, if the weight profile of the opposing vehicles for a particular rated group were different from that of their rated collision partners, the risk adjustment formula for rated vehicles might not be applicable to their opposing vehicles. Therefore, we believe it may be misleading to judge aggressiveness by directly comparing fatality rates of opposing vehicles without controlling for these factors.

While we do not dispute the suggestion by IIHS and other commenters that there are countermeasures other than stiffening a vehicle's front-end for achieving good performance in a frontal offset crash test, we are cognizant that some potential countermeasures could have adverse implications on vehicle weight, aerodynamics, braking effectiveness, and fuel economy, making it difficult for vehicle manufacturers to pursue them. GM noted that the vehicles with the most constraints are full size trucks, due to the breadth of product line, and small/economy size vehicles, due to their reduced compartment space/crush room. GM stated that additional crush space could only be achieved by adding extra length to the front of heavier vehicles; however, it stated that such complete engine compartment and front suspension repackaging are impracticable. While Honda commented that a forthcoming vehicle model employed its new Advanced Compatibility Engineering front structure, 21 Honda stated that it considers this type of structural countermeasure when its vehicles undergo a complete redesign. Therefore, additional lead-time may be needed to accommodate such strategies.

C. Effect of voluntary compatibility commitments on disbenefits concerns: When discussing the agency's compatibility concerns, several commenters referred to the Technical Working Group on Front-to-Front Compatibility. 22 The IIHS, a participant in the working group, reported that improved structural interaction is the immediate focus of the working group for improving vehicle incompatibility. To achieve this, vehicle manufacturers have committed to having all light trucks' primary energy-absorbing structures overlap the bumper zone of passenger cars by September 2009, or, alternatively, have all light trucks incorporate a secondary energy absorbing structure. 23 The AIAM noted that further commitments include assessing dynamic test protocols for enhanced structural interaction, and evaluating methods for determining an appropriate balance between small vehicle interior compartment strength and large vehicle energy absorption characteristics. The AIAM stated that over time these efforts could be expected to reduce aggressivity concerns and achieve significant reductions in lower extremity injuries in frontal crashes.

The Alliance and GM recommended that both NHTSA's and the industry's compatibility efforts attain a level of maturity before regulatory requirements are proposed. GM stated that each would contribute considerable insight toward improved lower leg protection, and improved occupant crash protection in vehicles and their collision partners. Other commenters stated that addressing vehicle aggressivity should be treated separately from the frontal offset crash test requirement. The IIHS stated that there is nothing to suggest that the incorporation of a frontal offset crash test into a standard depends on addressing vehicle aggressivity; however, it acknowledged that the incompatibility of vehicle structures is an important issue on its own.

The agency is monitoring the research efforts of the Technical Working Group on Front-to-Front Compatibility. We have been informed of their objectives, plans and timing for implementation. The potential for these efforts to reduce vehicle incompatibility in the fleet, and lower extremity injuries in frontal crashes, is dependent upon their effective implementation. We also believe that vehicle compatibility initiatives and any future frontal offset crash test proposal should be closely coordinated and not treated independently, as suggested by the IIHS. Our field data studies on vehicle aggressivity and vehicle crash test findings have persuaded us to proceed in conjunction with compatibility efforts when considering the adoption of a frontal offset crash test requirement, particularly for heavier vehicles. Since mass, stiffness, and geometric alignment have been identified as vehicle parameters that influence partner protection outcomes in our field data studies, our frontal offset strategy needs to be cognizant of the implications of these factors, so as to not promote countermeasures that may adversely affect safety.

However, we do not necessarily agree with commenters who suggested that the compatibility research efforts need to be completed before implementing a high speed frontal offset crash test requirement. While the industry has been working to develop a set of commitments to reduce vehicle aggressivity, the implementation of its first phase of efforts ( i.e. , increased geometric alignment) will not be complete until September 1, 2009. The remaining commitments (assessing dynamic test protocols for enhanced structural interaction, and test procedures for measuring and controlling front-end stiffness characteristics) are only commitments for research at this point. In the long term, it is unclear what type of lower extremity injury benefits will be promoted by the research efforts. In the interim, NHTSA believes that numerous lower extremity injuries will continue to occur, and can be addressed through a restricted offset test.

D. Alternative approaches: The Request for Comments sought comments on alternative strategies that the agency should consider in conjunction with a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test requirement. Several vehicle manufacturers suggested strategies aimed at improving frontal offset crash protection, while controlling for vehicle aggressivity. Honda recommended simultaneously introducing a 64 km/h frontal offset deformable barrier crash test and a full-width deformable barrier crash test into NCAP  24 to evaluate a vehicle's partner protection. Honda stated that this strategy would help match the vehicle's principle force and stiffness at the specific interaction area where NHTSA, and other countries, require bumpers be located. Alternatively, for the long term, Honda and GM supported a moving deformable barrier (MDB) frontal offset crash test procedure for managing energy and stiffness, while DaimlerChrysler supported a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test with a mass-dependent impact speed. 25, 26 While the IIHS acknowledged that many metrics were under consideration by the research community to assess vehicle aggressivity and limit incompatibility, it stated that presently there are not sufficient data available on which to base a decision.

In consideration of these proposals, we believe both the MDB and fixed offset deformable barrier crash test with a mass-dependent impact speed approach require extensive research to determine the appropriate energy balance (mass and velocity) for which to balance the self and partner protection of the fleet. The strategy of combining an offset deformable barrier crash test with a full-width deformable barrier has merit for consideration; however, we also agree with Honda's belief that its approach is not mature enough and/or the fleet-wide effects are not understood well enough to include them in a standard at this time.

Several vehicle manufacturers alternatively suggested the use of existing FMVSS No. 208 tests to reduce lower extremity injuries. GM suggested adding the Denton/HIII lower leg instrumentation to the 0-40 km/h offset deformable barrier crash test in FMVSS No. 208. However, based on our testing experience in this crash configuration, 27 we are not persuaded that this proposal would drive the design of effective countermeasures that would reduce lower leg injuries. DaimlerChrysler also suggested adding lower leg instrumentation to the unbelted full frontal barrier crash tests of FMVSS No. 208. NHTSA has conducted 16 unbelted rigid barrier crash tests at 40 km/h with Hybrid III dummies having instrumented lower legs. Seven out of 16 vehicles exceeded the provisional injury criteria for the lower leg instrumentation. While DaimlerChrysler's suggestion may have more potential for reducing lower extremity injuries, further testing would be needed to evaluate the benefits of this approach, as well as investigate the lower leg performance in other crash tests prescribed by FMVSS No. 208.

In the Request for Comments, the agency also discussed limiting the vehicle classes or gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of the vehicles to which a frontal offset crash test requirement would apply as one strategy to reduce the potential disbenefits. The example provided was to limit the applicability of the frontal offset test requirement to passenger cars. NHTSA estimated that approximately 77 percent of the benefits of a high speed frontal offset requirement would accrue to passenger car occupants since their vehicles would be required to maintain compartment integrity and provide improved lower leg protection. It was noted that passenger car occupants may also benefit from the exclusion of LTVs, since the LTVs striking them may not be designed to be as stiff.

Several commenters on the Request for Comments were conceptually supportive of this alternative approach. Ford supported the European frontal offset crash test procedure for compact and subcompact passenger cars, because it said doing so would harmonize U.S. standards with those of the rest of the world. Ford stated that for larger, heavier vehicles, a deformable element that can absorb added kinetic energy must be developed to provide realistic test results, and vehicle design changes that would improve safety. GM and DaimlerChrysler  28 also supported the concept of an offset deformable barrier crash test with a mass limitation. GM and DaimlerChrysler suggested that up to some mass level, an offset deformable barrier crash test could be beneficial to a vehicle without increasing its aggressivity to a partner vehicle. Furthermore, the Alliance suggested that the potential disbenefits of a high speed frontal offset crash test might be reduced if the configuration were harmonized with the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE R94) 56 km/h frontal offset crash test, since higher test speeds were more prone to partner protection issues in heavier vehicles, such as LTVs. Other commenters, however, were against creating a distinction between passenger cars and LTVs. The Advocates strongly believed that since LTVs are predominantly designed and marketed as family vehicles, safety standards should apply to all passenger vehicle types, so that benefits to LTV occupants would not be discarded.

NHTSA believes that a mass exclusion approach addressing lighter vehicles would be an intermediate step to address lower extremity injury protection, while solutions to aggressivity issues related to heavier vehicles are being sought. We agree with Ford's observation that applying a frontal offset crash test requirement to compact and subcompact classes of passenger cars would be comparable to approaches taken in other countries. The results from our 56 km/h offset deformable barrier crash test results are also in agreement with the Alliance's suggestion that the potential disbenefits may be reduced at a lower impact speed. In response to the Advocates, we believe that occupant protection for heavier vehicles would still be provided. FMVSS No. 208 requires full frontal barrier requirements up to 56 km/h, and a fixed offset deformable barrier test up to 40 km/h for vehicles up to a loaded GVWR of 3,856 kg. Therefore, we believe concerns regarding crash protection to LTV occupants may be partially addressed through existing requirements until such time that the agency is ready to move forward with a more comprehensive approach.

Although the agency testing and analyses completed thus far have provided a good understanding of the issues associated with frontal offset crashes, lower extremity injuries, and dummy instrumentation, further studies are needed to allow NHTSA to develop a proposed upgrade to FMVSS No. 208 that would effectively provide occupant protection in frontal offset crashes without adversely affecting the occupant protection of its collision partners. In the agency's Request for Comments, NHTSA used data from the 1995-2001 National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS) in estimating that approximately 84,811 front seat vehicle occupants annually experience AIS 2+ skeletal and joint injuries to the lower extremities and hip in frontal offset crashes. Based on the agency's fixed offset deformable barrier crash tests conducted to date, and those from the IIHS, the agency preliminarily determined that such a test requirement would have the potential of annually reducing 1,300 to 8,000 MAIS 2+ lower extremity injuries.

Some aspects of these preliminary benefit projections were based on a very limited number of crash tests, as noted by some commenters to the request for comments notice. The testing of some crash configurations had been limited, to some extent, by the number of different research alternatives that the agency had explored ( i.e. , lower leg instrumentation, dummy size, impact speed, etc. ). The agency also did not have the opportunity to test any advanced air bag vehicles, as noted by other commenters. To accumulate the necessary data to refine and complete our benefits analysis, we believe that additional testing is needed, particularly of newer vehicles reflective of those in the current fleet.

We also remain concerned about increasing vehicle aggressivity and fleet incompatibility as a result of adopting a high-speed frontal offset crash test, particularly for heavier LTVs. In making our decision to withdraw this rulemaking, the agency had also considered other alternative approaches suggested by commenters. Energy management approaches (MDB and fixed offset deformable barrier tests with a mass-dependent impact speed), force application limits, NCAP strategies, and lower leg applications in existing FMVSS No. 208 tests were among those considered. However, we believe each of these alternative approaches needs some degree of research and testing prior to consideration for rulemaking.

Despite this, we are concerned with the large number of lower extremity injuries associated with offset frontal crashes, since they are the second most costly long-term injuries, after brain injuries. Based upon our initial benefit analyses, we have tentatively determined that the most effective way to address these injuries while balancing the concerns with increased aggressivity is to pursue development of requirements in a two-step approach. The first step would be to develop offset frontal requirements for a limited segment of the vehicle fleet. Our initial cost/benefit estimates indicate that we would be able to maximize lower extremity benefits without creating disbenefits due to incompatibility by limiting applicability to a segment of the vehicle fleet. The second, longer-term step would be to develop requirements for those vehicles that are prone to increased aggressivity, perhaps in conjunction with compatibility requirements.

Based upon testing the agency has completed thus far, we believe that a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test in the range of 56-60 km/h using advanced dummy instrumented legs would provide the best opportunity to reduce lower extremity injuries without exacerbating vehicle incompatibility. However, focused testing under these conditions is needed to provide a sufficient basis to develop an offset frontal rulemaking proposal. We will examine the number of tests needed, including using two dummy sizes and requiring left/right side impacts. We also plan to explore new approaches to developing a performance metric for compartment intrusion, and its correlation to injury during the course of this testing and development.

The agency will also continue its efforts toward federalization  29 of retrofit instrumented lower legs for both the 5th and 50th percentile Hybrid III dummies. On May 3, 2002, the agency published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) (67 FR 22381) on the adoption of the two potential types of lower leg instrumentation for assessing lower leg injury in full and offset-frontal crashes. In support of the notice, the agency published a technical report  30 describing the leg assemblies and documenting the lab, sled, and vehicle test experiences with the two pairs of lower leg instrumentation. Based on the ANPRM and subsequent testing, we have tentatively decided that the Thor-Lx/HIIIr and Thor-Flx/HIIIr lower leg instrumentation appear to have the greatest potential to assess lower extremity injuries. The agency is currently moving forward with the federalization of these two sets of lower leg instrumentation.

The agency also needs to conduct additional frontal high-speed offset crash tests to gather sufficient data for fleet representation and refined benefit estimates. These crash tests will be conducted with vehicle models certified to the advanced air bag requirements of FMVSS No. 208. Both 5th percentile female and 50th percentile male Hybrid III dummies will be instrumented with Thor-Lx/HIIIr and Thor-Flx/HIIIr lower leg instrumentation in the driver and right front passenger seating positions. Dummy and intrusion measurements from the tests will be compared to the field data experience. With this information, better estimates for the injury reduction rates associated with the proposed offset frontal requirement will be developed.

Finally, the agency will conduct an optimization study to determine the appropriate applicability limit for which the frontal offset crash test requirement should apply in order to maximize self protection, while minimizing the amount of risk associated with partner protection.

In sum, we believe that a fixed offset deformable barrier crash test, with applicability limited to a segment of the vehicle fleet and in the range of 56-60 km/h using advanced dummy instrumented legs, would provide the best opportunity to reduce lower extremity injuries without exacerbating vehicle incompatibility. However, focused testing under these conditions is needed to develop a sufficient basis for an offset frontal rulemaking proposal. Since this additional testing will not be completed within a year, we have decided to withdraw rulemaking for offset frontal requirements until completion of the testing and analysis, and then re-initiate rulemaking when it is completed.

Based on our evaluation of available information, we have concluded that further study is needed to have sufficient data to establish the appropriate number of tests and dummies, and to refine cost/benefit estimates for a definitive rulemaking proposal. Accordingly, we have decided that we should remove the frontal offset and lower leg instrumentation rulemakings from the Semi-Annual Regulatory Agenda (Unified Agenda) because rulemaking action is not anticipated in the immediate future. However, during the next year, we will continue the testing and analyses necessary to develop a proposal for occupant lower extremity protection in offset frontal crashes, and again place it in the Unified Agenda when a proposal is imminent.