On July 14, 1999, the NRC received a petition for rulemaking submitted by the NEI, by letter dated July 13, 1999. On September 2, 1999 (64 FR 48117), the NRC published a notice of receipt of the petition (PRM-51-7). The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations to delete the requirement for the NRC to evaluate Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) as part of its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review associated with license renewal. The petitioner requests that the NRC take this action to achieve consistency in the scope of its regulatory requirements for environmental protection under NEPA, 10 CFR part 51, and its technical requirements for license renewal under the Atomic Energy Act, 10 CFR part 54.

The technical requirements for renewal of operating licenses are specified in 10 CFR part 54 (60 FR 22461; May 8, 1995). This regulation focuses the license renewal review on certain types of systems, structures, and components that the NRC has determined require evaluation to ensure that the effects of aging will be adequately managed in the period of extended operation. This regulation is based on two regulatory principles. The first principle of license renewal is that, with the possible exception of the detrimental effects of aging on the functionality of certain plant systems, structures, and components in the period of extended operation and possibly a few other issues related to safety only during extended operation, the ongoing regulatory process is adequate to ensure that the licensing bases of all currently operating plants provide and maintain an acceptable level of safety. The second principle of license renewal is that the plant-specific licensing basis must be maintained during the renewal term in the same manner and to the same extent as during the original licensing term. This principle is attained, in part, through a program of age-related degradation management for systems, structures, and components that are within the scope of license renewal. There is no requirement in 10 CFR part 54 for analysis of SAMAs.

The NRC's regulations implementing NEPA appear in 10 CFR part 51. The regulations contain specific provisions related to the requirements for the environmental review of applications to renew the operating licenses of nuclear power plants. See, for example, 10 CFR 51.53(c) and Subpart A, Appendix B. The regulations were developed to improve the efficiency of the process of environmental review for applicants seeking to renew a nuclear power plant operating license for up to an additional 20 years. The regulations are based on generic analyses reported in NUREG-1437, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants” (May 1996) and in part on NUREG-1437, Vol. 1, Addendum 1 (August 1999). Those environmental issues for which the NRC made generic findings that may be adopted in individual plant license renewal reviews are defined as Category 1 issues in the rule. Those environmental issues that require further site-specific review are defined as Category 2 issues in the rule. The regulations also provide for the consideration of “new and significant information” that might change a previous finding or introduce issues not previously reviewed and codified in the regulations.

With respect to the issue of environmental effects of severe accidents from license renewal, the NRC found that the probability weighted consequences are small. Specifically, the regulations state in Table B-1: “The probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe accidents are small for all plants.” Accordingly, the impacts of severe accidents are encoded in the rule and are not open for review in individual license renewal actions. However, one of the criteria for a Category 1 finding is, as stated in footnote 2 of Table B-1, Part 51, “Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue have been considered in the analysis, and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures are likely not to be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation.” At the time the final rule was promulgated in 1996, the NRC discussed the ongoing regulatory programs focused on individual plant vulnerabilities to severe accidents and cost-beneficial improvements for reducing severe accident frequency or consequences. For each plant, an individual plant examination (IPE) to look for plant vulnerabilities to internally initiated events and a separate IPE for externally initiated events (IPEEE) was performed (61 FR 28467; June 5, 1996). The NRC believed that it would be premature to reach a generic conclusion regarding severe accident mitigation alternatives before completing these programs. Therefore, even though the Commission has reached a generic conclusion on the magnitude of severe accident impacts, the issue is nevertheless designated as a Category 2 issue because of the unresolved questions regarding mitigation, and applicants for license renewal are subject to the following requirement at 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L): “If the staff has not previously considered severe accident mitigation alternatives for the applicant's plant in an environmental impact statement or in an environmental assessment, a consideration of alternatives to mitigate severe accidents must be provided.” The NRC stated, “* * * that upon completion of its IPE/IPEEE program, it may review the issue of severe accident mitigation for license renewal and consider, by separate rulemaking, reclassifying severe accidents as a Category 1 issue” (61 FR 28481; June 5, 1996).

The petition was submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) by letter dated July 13, 1999. Its receipt was noticed in the Federal Register on September 2, 1999 (64 FR 48117), with a full description of its content. The petitioner requested the NRC “* * * to delete 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) and, thereby, eliminate the requirement for NRC to evaluate SAMAs as part of the NEPA review associated with license renewal.” The rulemaking would include conforming changes to 10 CFR part 51, Appendix B and NUREG-1437.

The petitioner requests elimination of the requirement for SAMA reviews in 10 CFR part 51 on the belief that the requirement conflicts with the technical requirements for license renewal in 10 CFR part 54. The petitioner argues that actions to evaluate and address SAMAs are part of each licensee's current licensing basis and that 10 CFR part 54 is designed to separate matters related to maintaining the current licensing basis from those considered in a license renewal review. The petitioner's argument, briefly stated, is as follows. The petition makes reference to the two principles of license renewal, discussed in the Background section above. The first principle focuses the license renewal review on age-related degradation of plant systems, structures, and components. The second principle is continuation of the current licensing basis during the renewal term, in part, through a program of age-related degradation management of systems, structures, and components that are important to license renewal. The petitioner notes that 10 CFR 54.39, “Matters not subject to a renewal review,” specifically provides that deviations from the current licensing basis identified in the integrated plant assessment performed for license renewal will be corrected under the terms of the current license and are not within the scope of the license renewal review. The petitioner then states that actions to evaluate and address SAMAs are part of each licensee's current licensing basis, citing the IPE and IPEEE program to identify and evaluate plant-specific severe accident vulnerabilities and ways to mitigate those vulnerabilities.

Concluding that SAMAs are outside of the scope of a 10 CFR part 54 license renewal review, the petitioner then presents legal arguments for deleting SAMAs from the NEPA review. The essence of these arguments is that 10 CFR part 54 defines the scope of the proposed Federal action, and that Federal action establishes the scope of environmental consequences of license renewal that are to be reviewed under NEPA. Citing several court cases, the petitioner asserts that this approach is consistent with the “rule of reason” that generally governs environmental impact reviews under NEPA. The petitioner then states, “Thus, under the ‘rule of reason,’ the impacts appropriately considered under NEPA would be those that reasonably flow from the part 54 decision-making.” Next, the petitioner cites two cases to support the position that there should be no consideration of SAMAs for license renewal. In City of Aurora v. Hunt, the court ruled that a new procedure to use a specific airport runway in particular weather conditions involved “* * * no significant safety impact * * * to trigger further assessment or inquiry under NEPA.” 749 F.2d 1457, 1468 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992). In the second court case, Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, the court ruled that the Department of Interior did not have to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) to adjust the flow of water from a dam to accommodate drought conditions where the range of flow change was within the contemplation of the original project. 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1990). The petitioner concludes from these decisions that a NEPA review of SAMAs is not required in the license renewal review because, (1) the current licensing basis is not subject to evaluation in a license renewal review, and (2) by maintaining the current licensing basis in the renewal term, there will be no change in risk of a severe accident due to license renewal.

The petitioner goes on to assert that NRC's requirement to include SAMAs in NEPA license renewal reviews was based on an overly broad application of language in the Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1989), decision and that the decision “* * * leaves undisturbed the proposition that the ‘rule of reason’ defines whether the EIS has addressed the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences * * * that reasonably may flow from the proposed action—renewing a plant's license as that plant is currently designed and operated.” Finally, citing a number of court cases, the petitioner argues that “* * * judicial precedents allow the NRC to eliminate SAMAs from consideration in license renewal proceedings based on a determination, through proper rulemaking, that severe accidents are highly unlikely.”

The NRC received letters from 11 commenters. Ten of the comment letters supported the petition. Nine of those letters were from nuclear utilities and the tenth was from NEI, providing supplemental information to support the arguments made in the petition. Except for one comment, Comment 1 below, all of the comments made by supporters of the petition reiterated arguments made in the petition. Because those arguments are addressed in the NRC's reasons for denying the petition they are not addressed in the comment response below. A public interest group provided the one letter opposed to the petition, and NRC's responses to their comments are provided below.

Comment 1: A utility commented that the costs of performing the SAMA reviews required by Part 51 are not justified when compared to the small potential safety benefits that result from the reviews, when the costs associated with implementing changes to realize those benefits are evaluated, and when the fact that the reviews are largely duplicative of the previously completed Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) programs is considered.

Response: The NRC believes that it should continue to consider SAMAs for individual license renewal applications to continue to meet its responsibilities under NEPA. That statute requires NRC to analyze the environmental impacts of its actions and consider those impacts in its decisionmaking. In doing so, Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA implicitly requires agencies to consider measures to mitigate those impacts when preparing impact statements. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). NRC's obligation to consider mitigation exists whether or not mitigation is ultimately found to be cost-beneficial and whether or not mitigation ultimately will be implemented by the licensee. Id. The NRC understands that a SAMA analysis can be relatively expensive and is prepared to discuss ways in which SAMA analyses can be conducted efficiently while, at the same time, ensuring that NRC meets its NEPA responsibilities.

Comment 2: Granting the petition would continue the NRC's recent course of “regulatory subtraction” during which it has “methodically amputated and dismantled its statutory authority.” Further, numerous site-specific and generic challenges have precipitated “beyond design basis” events, and demonstrate that it is imperative to maintain Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives evaluations.

Response: The NRC has denied the petition because it believes that the legal arguments presented are insufficient to demonstrate that a license renewal NEPA review need not consider alternatives to mitigate the potential for and consequences of severe accidents.

Comment 3: Given the NRC's shrinking budget, “this type of frivolous legal action must be indexed to punitive damages.” NEI “must be held accountable, and reimburse the NRC for all legal and administrative costs associated with this malicious petition.”

Response: While NRC has denied the petition, NRC does not believe that there are any aspects of the submittal that would suggest an abuse of the petition process. Accordingly, whether or not reimbursement measures are even available to the Commission, no Commission action is warranted in this regard.

The Commission is denying the petition for the following reasons:

The petitioner's principal argument for the elimination of SAMAs as part of the NEPA review associated with individual license renewal reviews is that the scope of license renewal establishes a basis for deleting SAMAs from associated NEPA reviews. In particular, the petitioner believes that because the NRC's safety review under Part 54 does not require consideration of all aspects of plant operation and administration, the agency's review of environmental impacts under NEPA should be similarly limited. In its petition and subsequent comments, NEI identified several Federal court cases and NRC decisions to support its position.1 The petitioner believes that the primary thrust of these cases is that no consideration of impacts is necessary where the proposed Federal action would not change the status quo. In its comments, the petitioner indicated that “[t]he line of cases using the status quo analysis does not turn on maintaining the level of safety per se, but on whether the major federal action will change the operation of the facility sufficient to warrant an inquiry into the changes in environmental effect.”

The Commission does not find the petitioner's arguments here compelling. By approving a license renewal application under Part 54, the Commission authorizes operation of the entire plant for an additional 20 years beyond the initial licensing term. Thus, the review of the environmental impacts of this Federal action under the provisions of Part 51 appropriately involves the consideration of environmental impacts caused by 20 additional years of operation. The petitioner is correct in stating that the Commission, in promulgating 10 CFR part 54, has limited its safety review under the Atomic Energy Act to certain aspects of the plant that are directly related to aging and other issues specific to the license renewal. The petitioner is also correct in pointing out that many environmental impact issues, such as SAMAs, are not addressed in the NRC's safety review under Part 54. In fact, the vast majority of environmental impacts from license renewal required to be considered by the NRC under its NEPA review (in accordance with Part 51) are not included in the analysis conducted in fulfilling the NRC's Atomic Energy Act responsibilities under Part 54 (see, 10 CFR part 51 Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1).

However, under NEPA the NRC is charged with considering all of the environmental impacts of its actions, not just the impacts of specific technical matters that may need to be reviewed to support the action. These impacts may involve matters outside of the NRC's jurisdiction or matters within its jurisdiction that, for sound reasons, are not otherwise addressed in the NRC's safety review during the licensing process. In the case of license renewal, it is the Commission's responsibility under NEPA to consider all environmental impacts stemming from its decision to allow the continued operation of the entire plant for an additional 20 years. The fact that the NRC has determined that it is not necessary to consider a specific matter in conducting its safety review under Part 54 does not excuse it from considering the impact in meeting its NEPA obligations.

The Commission does not believe that the various cases offered by the petitioner provide convincing support for the elimination of the review of SAMAs. It would appear that the logical extension of many of the petitioner's arguments go far beyond the mere elimination of SAMAs consideration from license renewal reviews. Indeed, to the extent that license renewal involves a continuation of impacts already experienced at the site under the current operating license, the arguments made by the petitioner would appear to call for the elimination of almost the entire environmental review of impacts from operation during the license renewal term, a position clearly at odds with the Commission's approach to the matter and also, as discussed below, inconsistent with case law related to relicensing.

The Commission does not dispute that a line of cases exists under NEPA law which excuses agencies from preparing EISs (or considering certain environmental impacts) where the Federal action does not change existing environmental conditions. See, for example, State of North Carolina v. Federal Aviation Administration, 957 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992); Cronin v. Department of Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990). In most of these cases, the Federal action taken does not itself create any additional impacts to activities that are ongoing and will continue with or without the Federal action. None of these cases appears to provide firm support for the petitioner's argument that the NRC can ignore the impacts of its actions in the context of license renewal. In fact, at least one circuit court squarely addressed the issue of relicensing and concluded that there is the need to consider environmental impacts in that context.

In Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was required to prepare an EIS for its relicensing decision for the Rock Island Dam. In response to the FERC's argument that there had been “no change in the status quo” and thus no EIS was necessary, the court found:

The court's statements here are consistent with NRC's position and its practice in promulgating and implementing the license renewal rule. The cases offered in support of the petitioner's arguments offer no compelling reasons to alter this approach.

In City of Aurora v. Hunt,3 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), through a rulemaking, approved a new approach procedure for the Stapleton airport in order to reduce delays caused by the use of the existing procedure during periods of low visibility. The City of Aurora challenged the rule claiming, among other things, that the FAA failed to discuss the safety risks of the new procedure in its environmental assessment. In ruling against the City's claim, the Court pointed out that the FAA was required by law to issue the new procedure only if it did not involve a change in safety risk. The FAA considered and responded to a vast number of safety concerns as part of the rulemaking process. Accordingly, the Court found that the agency's approval of the procedure, in itself, was adequate to fulfill the agency's responsibility under NEPA. In a footnote, the Court explained that “[w]hile an agency may be required to consider the effects that will occur if a risk is realized, where no increase in risk is permitted, as here, no significant safety impact exists to trigger further assessment or inquiry under NEPA.” 749 F.2d at 1468, n. 8.

While certain aspects in the City of Aurora decision provide some general support for the petitioner's argument, the facts in that case do not appear to be sufficiently analogous to support the elimination of SAMAs reviews for license renewal. First of all, the Court found the FAA's decision to permit the new procedure, in essence, served as a finding of an equivalent level of flight safety and thus allowed the FAA to meet its NEPA obligations even though safety was not explicitly considered in the EA itself. Under NRC's license renewal process, NRC's review under Part 54 does not itself meet the agency's NEPA obligations. Environmental issues such as the potential impacts of severe accidents during the license renewal term do not fall under the Part 54 review. Accordingly, unlike the FAA in City of Aurora, NRC cannot use the Part 54 process as the vehicle for meeting its NEPA responsibilities for considering SAMAs in the license renewal context in the same way that the FAA was allowed to use its procedure approval process in City of Aurora. Secondly, it should be noted that, absent the NRC's decision to approve a license renewal application, the licensee's plant will not operate an additional 20 years. Accordingly, the NRC's action is a “but for” cause of those additional impacts and NRC has the responsibility to consider those impacts under NEPA. In City of Aurora, the FAA's rule permitted the use of a new landing procedure at the airport. While there is no explicit discussion in the decision, it appears that the current landing procedures at the airport would have continued whether or not FAA had issued the new procedure. Accordingly, the status quo in the context of the City of Aurora decision appears to have been the continued operation of the airport, whereas the status quo in the context of license renewal is the expiration of the facility's operating license.

Similarly, the decision in Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel 4 does not appear to provide strong support for the petitioner's proposal. In that case, the court found that the reduction in river flows approved by Federal agencies was not a major Federal action within the meaning of NEPA. The court held that, in allowing the flow reductions, the Federal defendants were “simply operating the facility in the manner intended” and that they were doing “nothing new, nor more extensive, nor other than that contemplated when the project was first operational.” 921 F.2d at 235. In other words, the flow reductions were part of the normal operations originally approved by the agencies in that case. Conversely, in the license renewal context, the additional 20 years of operation authorized by a renewed license were not considered during the initial licensing of the facility. Thus, the reasoning in Upper Snake River Chapter does not appear to be applicable to NRC's license renewal decisions. The Commission believes, and has stated before, that a license renewal decision by NRC is a major Federal action that warrants the preparation of an environmental impact statement (61 FR 55637, 66541; December 18, 1996).

In submitting comments on its petition, NEI identified several NRC decisions which it believes support its position. The first, Consumers Power Company (Big Rock Nuclear Plant) ALAB 636, 13 NRC 312 (1982), involved a license amendment request to expand the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant's spent fuel pool. As NEI indicates, the Appeal Board emphasized the limited scope of the request in rejecting claims that aspects of the plant's continued operation should also be considered in the EA. As quoted by the petitioner, the Appeal Board found that “there are no environmental changes to evaluate” with the secondary or indirect effects (e.g., the plant's continued operation) of the spent fuel pool licensing decision. 13 NRC at 328. The petitioner's comments indicate that:

Finally, petitioners have also cited General Electric (Morris Operation Spent Fuel Storage Facility) LBP-82-14, 15 NRC 530 (1982). In that case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ruled that NRC did not have to issue an EIS for the license renewal of a storage facility. However, in that case, the NRC staff did issue an environmental impact appraisal (referred to under current NRC regulations as an environmental assessment (EA)) for the action. There is no suggestion that the NRC staff was free to eliminate or ignore consideration of the impacts of the action. Rather, the Board agreed with the NRC staff that the impacts of the action were not significant enough to warrant the preparation of a full EIS and, instead, an environmental impact appraisal was sufficient. The Commission believes that the preparation of EISs, not EAs, are appropriate in the context of license renewal. However, whether an EIS or an EA is prepared for a particular action, the Commission still is responsible for considering the environmental impacts of the action. Accordingly, this case seems to provide little support for the petitioner's position.

The petitioner is correct in stating that the 3rd Circuit's holding in Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC does not itself preclude NRC from ever eliminating SAMA reviews from its licensing actions. Specifically, the court held that the NRC could not generically dispense with the consideration of SAMAs through a policy statement. Instead, the NRC would need to do so through a generic rulemaking similar to the one completed for Table S-3 (10 CFR 51.51) and upheld by the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas and Electric v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 464 U.S. 87 (1983). Despite the limited nature of its holding, the court in the Limerick decision identified a variety of issues that NRC would have to address in order to eliminate the consideration of SAMAs. In addition to holding that the NRC could not eliminate consideration of these SAMAs through a policy statement, the court also suggested that the generic consideration of SAMAs may be difficult to accomplish given differences in individual plants. 869 F.2d at 733-739. In addition, as the petitioner has indicated, the court rejected NRC's argument that severe accidents were remote and speculative because there was no basis for this conclusion in the agency's record. Id. at 739-741.

Despite the adverse ruling handed to NRC, the Limerick decision outlines several paths the Commission could attempt to follow in order to eliminate the requirements to analyze both severe accidents and associated mitigation alternatives in individual license renewal reviews. First of all, the Commission could attempt to conclude generically through rulemaking that it has considered these matters and that further consideration in individual license renewal actions is not warranted. In other words, the NRC would change the designation of the severe accident issue to “Category 1” for license renewal in Appendix B of 10 CFR part 51. Secondly, as discussed in Section 3 of this notice, the Commission could eliminate consideration of SAMAs for license renewal based on a finding that severe accidents, in the context of plant operation during the license renewal term, are remote and speculative.

The Commission believes that insufficient information is available to conclude generically that a SAMA analysis is not warranted for individual plant license renewal reviews. In promulgating the license renewal rule in 1996, the Commission indicated that it “may review the issue of severe accident mitigation for license renewal and consider, by separate rulemaking, reclassifying severe accidents as a Category 1 issue” (61 FR 66537; 66540; December 18, 1996). In early 1999, in anticipation of completion of the IPE and IPEEE programs, the NRC staff began considering the actions needed to fulfill the commitment made in the Federal Register notice. The IPE program has been completed and the findings of the program are summarized in NUREG-1560, “Individual Plant Examination Program: Perspective on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance,” December 1997. The IPEEE program is nearing completion. The current target for completing the reviews of the balance of the individual submittals is January 2001. A draft insights report will be issued for public comment in April 2001 and the final report is scheduled to be completed in October 2001.

Over the past year, the staff has considered the scope of the analysis that would be required to reach generic technical conclusions supporting a rulemaking to reclassify severe accidents as a Category 1 issue. While the information developed in the IPE/IPEEE program provides a valuable starting point, considerable staff and contractor effort would be required to extend the conclusions resulting from the IPE/IPEEE reviews to draw generic conclusions regarding SAMAs. This would include the need to evaluate changes in plant design and procedures since the IPEs/IPEEEs were completed, incorporate changes in the state of knowledge regarding certain severe accident issues, and to extend the IPE/IPEEE analyses to include offsite consequences. In addition, both benefit and cost considerations of potential plant improvements would need to be developed. Further, there is uncertainty whether, at the conclusion of this effort, the staff would be successful in developing a sufficient technical basis to reclassify severe accidents as a Category 1 issue. Given the resources that would be required and the uncertainty in achieving a successful outcome, the staff does not believe it would be cost beneficial to pursue rulemaking at this time.

In September 2000, the staff issued Supplement 1 to Regulatory Guide 4.2, “Preparation of Supplemental Environmental Reports for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses,” which includes guidance on information and analysis content on SAMAs for environmental reports submitted as part of license renewal applications. Its use is intended to ensure the completeness of the information provided, to assist the NRC staff and others in locating the information, and to shorten the review process. The staff will continue to work with stakeholders to determine if additional efficiencies in the conduct of SAMA analyses for environmental reviews can be realized. Furthermore, if new information becomes available that indicates it is feasible to reclassify SAMAs to Category 1, the staff will notify the Commission and provide a recommendation as to a course of action.

Accordingly, the Commission believes that there is an inadequate basis for a rulemaking to change severe accidents from a Category 2 to Category 1 issue at this time. Applicants should continue to refer to the guidance set out for SAMA analyses in the Statements of Consideration for the license renewal rule (61 FR 28467, 28480-28482; June 5, 1996). The NRC staff will continue to work with stakeholders to discuss the process by which SAMA reviews are done and to determine if efficiencies are possible while ensuring compliance with NRC's NEPA responsibilities to consider the environmental impacts of its licensing decisions.

The Commission agrees with the petitioner that there is support in the case law for the proposition that NEPA does not require the consideration of remote and speculative risks.5 The court in the Limerick proceeding rejected the NRC's argument that severe accidents were remote and speculative because the court could find no basis for the conclusion in the NRC record. Id. at 739-741. The Commission is not prepared to reach the conclusion that the risks of all severe accidents in the context of license renewal are so unlikely as to warrant their elimination from consideration in our NEPA reviews. Even though there is a low probability of a severe accident, the NRC has invested considerable resources toward understanding potential severe accident sequences and alternatives for further reducing the probability of and mitigating the consequences of severe accidents, but has not yet established an agency record that severe accidents may be eliminated from NRC's NEPA reviews. In reviewing licensing actions outside of the license renewal context, it may be possible for the NRC to conclude that certain severe accident scenarios are remote and speculative and do not warrant detailed consideration for the purposes of the NEPA review for that particular NRC action. However, for the purposes of consideration of severe accidents in the context of license renewal NEPA reviews, the NRC staff has not developed the necessary basis for concluding that such occurrences are remote and speculative, and thus inappropriate for NRC review under NEPA. This position does not alter the conclusion that, in light of margins of safety and defense-in-depth, the likelihood of radiological offsite consequences is small.

In its comments, the petitioner cited two cases which, in its view, demonstrate that NEPA's requirements are satisfied where potential impacts to the environment are remote and difficult to quantify and ongoing regulatory safeguards are in place to protect against potential risks of impacts into the future. Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980) reh'g en banc denied; and Citizens for Environmental Quality v. Lyng, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989). While these cases may provide more support for the general proposition that remote and speculative impacts need not be considered under NEPA, they do not displace the Commission's responsibility to make the threshold determination based on the NRC record that severe accidents are remote and speculative for the purpose of license renewal reviews. As discussed, the Commission is unable to reach that conclusion.

For the reasons cited in this document, the Commission denies the petition.

On May 10, 2000 (65 FR 30018), the NRC published a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking filed by the United Plant Guard Workers of America. The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations concerning security at the gaseous diffusion plants to address sites that have both special nuclear material security concerns and protection of classified matter concerns; to require that these facilities be able to detect, respond to, and mitigate threats of a sabotage event; and to require that the security force be armed and empowered to make arrests in limited situations. The petitioner believes that these amendments are necessary to address the protection of classified information, equipment and materials, and special nuclear material at the gaseous diffusion plants.

First, the petitioner asserted that the regulations do not adequately address sites that have both nuclear material security concerns and classified matter concerns. The petitioner believes that the applicable regulations were not appropriately merged in the regulations governing gaseous diffusion plants to address a site that covers the protection of classified information, equipment and materials, and special nuclear material.

As an example, the petitioner stated that the Controlled Area Fence Line does provide a minimum level of protection against the unauthorized removal of special nuclear material contained in 10- and 20-ton cylinders. However, the petitioner questioned whether the fence line adequately protects against the unauthorized removal of restricted information, equipment, and other materials or the unauthorized access to these types of materials.

The petitioner asserted that other facilities that possess Category III quantities of special nuclear material regulated by the NRC do not share the level of concern for classified matter, equipment, and technology that exists at the gaseous diffusion plants. The petitioner suggested that the regulations concerning security programs at the gaseous diffusion plants, such as escort requirements and physical security measures, should be amended to be made more stringent to protect this technology. The petitioner did not offer any specifics as to how the regulations should be amended.

Second, according to the petitioner, the NRC typically relies on local law enforcement agencies to respond to incidents of workplace violence or sabotage at material licensee facilities. The petitioner stated that the scope and complexity of a gaseous diffusion plant makes it far different from other types of NRC-licensed materials facilities. Furthermore, the petitioner believes that these differences result in unique problems in relying on local law enforcement agencies to protect such a facility from violent incidents. The petitioner indicated that local law enforcement agencies in the vicinity of the Paducah plant have stated, for the record, that they should not be viewed as a replacement for on-site security because of their lack of knowledge of the plant site, the types of hazards contained in the plant, and their limited resources. The petitioner presented two letters, attached to the petition, from law enforcement agencies in the vicinity of the Paducah plant that support this contention.

Because of the unique nature of gaseous diffusion plants and the importance of their operation, the petitioner believes that a violent incident or an act of sabotage would affect national security. The petitioner also asserted that, because of the many radiological and toxicological hazards associated with these plants, an act of sabotage could adversely affect the safety of plant workers and the public.

The petitioner believes that these dangers were not addressed as part of the certification process. According to the petitioner, current NRC standards do not require a security force that is capable of preventing a sabotage event. The petitioner requested that the regulations be amended to require that security forces at the gaseous diffusion plants be able to detect, respond to, and mitigate violent incidents or acts of sabotage.

Last, the petitioner noted that current regulations do not require that the security force be armed or empowered to enforce the Atomic Energy Act. The petitioner requested that security officers at the gaseous diffusion plants be armed and empowered to make arrests in limited situations, such as for violations of the Atomic Energy Act.

The notice of receipt of the petition for rulemaking invited interested persons to submit comments. The comment period closed on July 24, 2000. NRC received one comment letter from the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the operator of the gaseous diffusion plants. The commenter was opposed to the petition. The commenter believes that the petitioner does not provide a solid and specific basis for revising the regulations to increase security at the gaseous diffusion plants. The commenter points out that the petitioner has not provided specific recommendations regarding what revisions should be made to current security regulatory requirements to address the concerns outlined in the petition. The commenter states that the security program at the gaseous diffusion plants exceeds NRC requirements for the protection of classified matter and special nuclear material of low strategic significance. The commenter asserts that research by the NRC, United States Department of Energy (DOE), and United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) does not indicate a higher potential threat level for the gaseous diffusion plants than for other fuel cycle facilities with similar nuclear materials. The commenter states that the requested changes would also affect other similar facilities and that implementation of the protective strategies described by the petitioner would result in an increase in cost for all subject facilities and that the cost is not justified based on the lack of increased associated threat. The commenter believes that the level of security is adequate to protect classified matter and special nuclear material at the gaseous diffusion plants.

The NRC is denying the petition because we have determined that current NRC regulations and certificate conditions governing the gaseous diffusion plants provide adequate protection for both classified matter and special nuclear material at these plants. The gaseous diffusion plants operate under certificates of compliance issued under the provisions of 10 CFR part 76. Furthermore, they are subject to the physical protection provisions of 10 CFR part 73 and the security provisions of 10 CFR part 95. The gaseous diffusion plants process Category III levels of special nuclear material as described in 10 CFR 73.2. Category III levels require a minimum level of security, as specified in 10 CFR 73.67, to minimize the possibility for the unauthorized removal of special nuclear material. The specified level of security is intended to be consistent with the potential consequences of such an action. The regulations in Part 95 establish security requirements for the protection of classified matter up to and including SECRET-Restricted Data and are consistent with national policy. The gaseous diffusion plants are also required to follow the security plans approved by the NRC.

The petitioner suggested three separate areas for changing the regulations: (1) Require more stringent regulations concerning security programs at the gaseous diffusion plants, such as escort requirements and physical security measures; (2) require that these facilities be able to detect, respond to, and mitigate threats of a sabotage event; and (3) require that the security force be armed and empowered to make arrests in limited situations.

NRC believes that the petitioner is incorrect in asserting that the regulations do not adequately address sites with requirements for both physical protection of special nuclear material and protection of classified matter. The NRC staff was not able to identify any conflict with the provisions of Parts 73 and 95, nor was the staff able to identify any gaps in coverage. The combination of special nuclear material of low strategic significance (SNM-LSS) and classified material does not create any new threat to the protection of classified material. Part 95 requires that access to classified matter be limited to authorized persons who have an appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know for the classified matter. Individuals without the appropriate level of clearance and/or need-to-know must be escorted at all times by an authorized individual. Part 95 requires that all cleared employees be provided with security training. Part 95 also requires that classified matter be stored in locked vaults or safes and requires a watchman to check the safes on an established frequency. The escort of uncleared individuals is already required by Part 95. The provisions of Part 95 provide adequate protection of classified matter and are consistent with national policy (i.e., National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual.)

As an example, the petitioner suggested that the security fence does not provide adequate protection of restricted information. (The NRC assumes that the petitioner is actually referring to restricted data or national security information as there is no category called restricted information.) The petitioner does concede that unauthorized removal of SNM-LSS is not an issue. The security fence is not required by Part 95, although it does provide some protection since it prevents unauthorized individuals from gaining access to the facility. Only employees and authorized individuals are allowed access to the facility. All employees and visitors are required to enter and exit the facility through portals manned by security personnel. Security personnel do have the right to search items entering and leaving the facility. These provisions, as well as others, ensure that classified matter is used, stored, processed, reproduced, transmitted, transported, and destroyed only under conditions that will provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons. The petitioner did not provide any information demonstrating that more stringent escort requirements or other security measures were necessary for the gaseous diffusion plants. The increased burden that would be imposed by any new regulations would not appear to be warranted. The provisions of Parts 73 and 95, coupled with the approved security plans for the protection of classified matter and for physical protection, will continue to provide the basis for adequate protection of classified matter and SNM-LSS possessed by the gaseous diffusion plants.

In Part 73, the requirements do reflect the need for addressing radiological sabotage for Category I facilities. A Category I facility is a facility that possesses a formula quantity of special nuclear material of strategic significance (e.g., 5 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the uranium-235 isotope) and a Category III facility is one that possesses special nuclear material of low strategic significance (uranium enriched to less than 10 percent in the uranium-235 isotope, with limited quantities at higher enrichments). The gaseous diffusion plants are classified as Category III facilities. When the regulations in Part 73 were promulgated, the NRC did not consider that a potential threat for radiological sabotage existed for Category III facilities. Therefore, Part 73 does not require that these facilities protect against radiological sabotage other than ensuring the security of radioactive material under 10 CFR part 20. The NRC is not aware of any changes in the threat environment that would warrant a change in this conclusion and, therefore, would warrant a change in the physical protection requirements for Category III facilities. Additionally, during the promulgation of Part 76, sabotage was not considered to be a credible threat and, therefore, was not addressed in the regulations. The staff evaluated whether the classification of the gaseous diffusion plants as Category III facilities was appropriate since the requested change to the rules would result in imposing the equivalent of Category I physical protection requirements on the gaseous diffusion plants. Currently, the gaseous diffusion plants do not have a national defense role. The production from these plants supports the commercial nuclear industry. The material is unattractive from a proliferation standpoint because of its low enrichment and its storage configuration (e.g., 14-ton cylinders) reduces the likelihood of theft or diversion compared to Category I material. The staff has not identified any change in the threat environment that would warrant a change to the requirements for the gaseous diffusion plants. The staff concluded that the classification of the gaseous diffusion plants as Category III facilities was appropriate.

The petitioner also expressed concern that local law enforcement is viewed as a replacement for on-site security response capability. On-site security would be the first to respond; local law enforcement would be contacted to provide backup if deemed necessary. Both gaseous diffusion plants have agreements in place with local law enforcement agencies. The local sheriff, State police, and FBI have also participated in emergency exercises at the plants. In addition, if a specific threat were to be uncovered, the facility would be provided with the information and could increase security as necessary. State and Federal law enforcement officials would be available to respond in case of a serious threat.

The petitioner has not provided any new information for NRC consideration that could form an adequate basis to require that the plants be able to detect, respond to, and mitigate violent incidents or acts of sabotage. There is no known change in the threat environment that would warrant a change to the regulations or a change in classification for the gaseous diffusion plants from Category III to Category I. The increased burden that would be imposed on the certificate holder, the NRC staff, and other stakeholders is not warranted based on current information.

NRC physical security requirements vary according to the risk posed by the radioactive material possessed and do not require armed guards for the operations under NRC regulation at the gaseous diffusion plants. There is no known threat that would warrant requiring armed guards at Category III facilities, including the gaseous diffusion plants. The operations at the gaseous diffusion plants under NRC regulation involve SNM-LSS, and NRC regulations do not require the presence of armed guards for the adequate protection of SNM-LSS. However, NRC regulations do not prohibit carrying of firearms. In fact, the guards at the gaseous diffusion plants do carry firearms. USEC has committed to the presence of armed guards in its NRC-approved physical protection plans. The NRC currently does not have the authority to authorize certificate holders and their employers and contractors to have arrest authority for protection of common defense and security. However, DOE does have the authority and has now completed issuance of weapons authorization cards for the guard forces at the gaseous diffusion plants. The remedy requested by the petition (i.e., rulemaking) would appear to be unnecessary as the desired outcome (armed guards and arrest authority) has been achieved by means other than rulemaking.

In conclusion, no new information has been provided by the petitioner that calls into question the classified information and physical protection requirements. Existing NRC regulations provide the basis for reasonable assurance that the common defense and security is adequately protected. Additional rulemaking would impose unnecessary regulatory burden and does not appear to be warranted for the adequate protection of the common defense and security.

For the reasons cited in this document, the NRC denies this petition.

Public Law 100-656, enacted on November 15, 1988, incorporated into the Small Business Act the previously existing regulation that recipients of Federal contracts set-aside for small businesses or the SBA 8(a) Program procurement must provide the product of a small business manufacturer or processor, if the recipient is other than the actual manufacturer or processor. This requirement is commonly referred to as the Nonmanufacturer Rule. The SBA regulations imposing this requirement are found at 13 CFR 121.406(b). Section 303(h) of the law provides for waiver of this requirement by SBA for any “class of products” for which there are no small business manufacturers or processors in the Federal market. To be considered available to participate in the Federal market on these classes of products, a small business manufacturer must have submitted a proposal for a contract solicitation or received a contract from the Federal Government within the last 24 months. The SBA defines “class of products” based on two coding systems. The first is the Office of Management and Budget North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The second is the Product and Service Code (PSC) established by the Federal Procurement Data System.

The Small Business Administration is currently processing a request for a waiver of the Nonmanufacturer Rule for Ball and Roller Bearing Manufacturing (SIC 3562, NAICS 332991), roller bearings consists of, but not limited to, annular ball bearings, ball bearings, cylindrical ball bearings, linear ball bearings, linear roller bearings, needle roller bearings, ball or roller bearings races, roller bearings, tapered roller bearings and thrust roller bearings, and invites the public to comment or provide information on potential small business manufacturers for these products.

In an effort to identify potential small business manufacturers, the SBA has searched Procurement Marketing & Access Network (PRO-Net) and the SBA will publish a notice in the Commerce Business Daily. The public is invited to comment or provide source information to SBA on the proposed waiver of the Nonmanufacturer Rule for these classes of products.

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-193-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-193-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

On February 10, 2000, the FAA issued AD 2000-03-12, amendment 39-11571 (65 FR 8030, February 17, 2000), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, to require replacement of the air driven generator (ADG) wire assembly with a new, increased length wire assembly. That action was prompted by a report of loose terminal attachment hardware on the ADG power monitor relay due to a stress condition on the terminal attachment points. The requirements of that AD are intended to prevent loss of the charging capability of the airplane battery. Loss of the charging capability of the airplane battery, coupled with a loss of all normal electrical power, could prevent continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

The incident that prompted AD 2000-03-12 is not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

Since the issuance of AD 2000-03-12, an investigation revealed that the length of the new wire assembly installed per that AD is too long and causes the assembly to chafe against the left emergency alternating current bus of the airplane battery. This condition, if not corrected, could result in the loss of the charging capability of the ADG, which, when coupled with a loss of all normal electrical power, could consequently prevent continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

In addition, Model MD-11 series airplanes, manufacturer's fuselage numbers 0633 through 0646, inclusive, which were not subject to the requirements of AD 2000-03-12, had a modification accomplished in production that is similar to the replacement required by AD 2000-03-12. Therefore, the FAA finds that these additional airplanes are also subject to the identified unsafe condition.

Also, the original issue and Revision 01 of Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) Service Bulletin MD11-24-128 (which were referenced in AD 2000-03-12 as the appropriate sources of service information for accomplishing the required actions) contained an error, which resulted in the misidentification of a wire assembly and the omission of an existing wire on an illustration.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin MD11-24-128, Revision 02, dated October 31, 2000, which describes procedures for replacement of the existing ADG wire assembly located on the transformer panel at station Y=568.333 in the right air conditioning compartment with a certain new wire assembly. The service bulletin also describes procedures for replacing the associated clamps and screws of the ADG wire assembly with new clamps and screws, and torque tightening the terminal hardware to certain limits. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would supersede AD 2000-03-12 to require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

There are approximately 191 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 60 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

The new actions that are proposed in this AD action would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish, at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $810 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed requirements of this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $52,200, or $870 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the current or proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-192-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-192-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of an incident in which arcing occurred between the power feeder cables and support bracket of the terminal strips on a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. Investigation revealed that inadequate clearance exists between the terminal strips and support brackets of the wing areas inboard of the pylons 1 and 3 and the No. 2 engine. This condition, if not corrected, could result in arcing damage to the terminal strips and damage to the adjacent structure of the wing areas inboard of the pylons 1 and 3 and the No. 2 engine, which could result in a fire inboard of the pylons 1 and 3 or the No. 2 engine.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A187, dated October 4, 2000, which describes procedures for a general visual inspection to detect arcing damage of the electrical cables leading to the terminal strip and the surrounding structure in the wing areas inboard of the pylons 1 and 3 and the No. 2 engine; and corrective actions, if necessary. The corrective actions include replacing any damaged terminal strip with a like part and sealing the screw heads of any replaced terminal strip; repairing any arcing or structure damage; and replacing any damaged cable with a new cable. The service bulletin also describes procedures for revising the cable connection stackup of the terminal strips on the left and right wings and the No. 2 engine (including performing a general visual inspection for damaged cable assemblies; repairing of any damaged cable assembly; and tightening terminal lug hardware). Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously; except as discussed below.

Operators should note that the service bulletin specifies to repair damaged structure per the Structural Repair Manual (SRM). However, the SRM does not provide adequate procedures for repair of certain structural material. Therefore, this proposal would require the repair of damaged structure that is not covered in the SRM to be accomplished per a method approved by the FAA.

There are approximately 153 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 57 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 5 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $60 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $20,520, or $360 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-191-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-191-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of an incident in which arcing occurred between the power feeder cables and support bracket of the terminal strips on a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. Investigation revealed that inadequate clearance exists between the terminal strips and associated support brackets. This condition, if not corrected, could result in arcing damage to the terminal strips and damage to the adjacent structure of the wheel well area of the right main landing gear (MLG), which could result in a fire in the wheel well of the right MLG.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A186, dated October 4, 2000, which describes procedures for a general visual inspection to detect arcing damage of the electrical cables leading to the terminal strip and the surrounding structure in the wheel well area of the right MLG; and corrective actions, if necessary. The corrective actions include replacing any damaged terminal strip with a like part, and sealing the screw heads of any replaced terminal strip; repairing any arcing or structure damage; and replacing any damaged cable with a new cable. The service bulletin also describes procedures for replacement of a certain terminal strip with a new terminal strip, and removal of the applicable nameplate in the wheel well of the right MLG. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously; except as discussed below.

Operators should note that the service bulletin specifies to repair damaged structure per the Structural Repair Manual (SRM). However, the SRM does not provide adequate procedures for repair of certain structural material. Therefore, this proposal would require the repair of damaged structure that is not covered in the SRM to be accomplished per a method approved by the FAA.

There are approximately 191 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 60 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $25 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $5,100, or $85 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-190-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-190-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

On May 5, 1997, the FAA issued AD 97-10-12, amendment 39-10024 (62 FR 25839, May 12, 1997), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, to require a one-time inspection to detect riding, chafing, or damage of the wire bundles adjacent to the disconnect panel bracket of the observer's station. That AD also requires repair or replacement of damaged wires with new or serviceable wires; installation of anti-chafing sleeving on the wire bundles, if necessary; and installation of a grommet along the entire upper aft edge of the disconnect panel bracket. That action was prompted by a report indicating that the circuit breakers tripped on a Model MD-11 series airplane due to inflight arcing behind the avionics circuit breaker panel as a result of chafing of the wire bundles adjacent to the disconnect panel bracket assembly. The requirements of that AD are intended to detect and correct such chafing, which could result in a fire in the wire bundles and smoke in the cockpit.

The incident that prompted AD 97-10-12 is not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

Since the issuance of AD 97-10-12, the FAA has determined that installation of anti-chafing sleeving on all wire bundles in the subject area, regardless if the wire bundle appears to riding or chafing, is necessary. Riding or chafing of the wire bundles adjacent to the disconnect panel bracket assembly, if not detected and corrected, could result in a fire in the wire bundles and smoke in the cockpit.

The FAA has reviewed and approved McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A111, Revision 01, dated July 27, 2000. The service bulletin describes, for certain airplanes, procedures for a one-time general visual inspection to detect riding, chafing, or damage of the wire bundles adjacent to the disconnect panel bracket. The service bulletin also describes, for certain airplanes, procedures for repair of damaged wires; installation of anti-chafing sleeving on the wire bundles; and installation of a protective grommet along the edge of the disconnect panel bracket. Accomplishment of these actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would supersede AD 97-10-12 to require, for certain airplanes, accomplishment of the additional actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

Operators should note that the Revision Transmittal Sheet of the service bulletin incorrectly reads “Additional work is required for airplanes previously modified by Service Bulletin MD11-24-111. Additional work requirement is to be accomplished as outlined under Group 2. An additional 0.8 man-hour is required.” The FAA has consulted with the airplane manufacturer and determined that additional work is NOT required for Group 2 airplanes. The term “modified,” as described above and in Group 1 and Group 2 listing in the effectivity of the service bulletin, refers to installation of anti-chafing sleeving on the wire bundles. Therefore, the proposed AD affects McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A111, Revision 01, dated July 27, 2000; certificated in any category; except those airplanes on which anti-chafing sleeving was installed on the wire bundles per paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of AD 97-10-12.

There are approximately 195 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 60 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

The inspection and installation that are proposed in this AD action would take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish, at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. The cost of required parts would be nominal. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed inspection and installation of this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to $7,200, or $120 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the current or proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-189-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-189-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of an incident of wiring chafing in the upper avionics circuit breaker panel of the main observer's station on a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. Investigation revealed that the chafed wiring was due to friction between the wires and the edge of the panel, which occurs during the opening and closing of the panel. Such chafing, if not corrected, could result in arcing in the upper avionics circuit breaker panel, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the cockpit.

This incident is not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A179, Revision 01, dated October 31, 2000. The service bulletin describes procedures for a general visual inspection of the upper avionics circuit breaker panel at the main observer's station to detect damage of the wires and to verify the correct routing of the wire bundles, and corrective actions, if necessary; and installation of a new clamp to the AES9101 wire bundle and wire support bar, and a new spacer and sta-straps. The corrective actions involve repairing damaged wiring; replacing damaged wiring with new wiring; loosening clamps; and replacing the sta-straps with new sta-straps. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

There are approximately 185 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 59 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 5 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would be supplied by the airplane manufacturer at no cost to the operators. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $17,700, or $300 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-188-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-188-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of an incident in which smoke permeated the right aft galley area and an electrical power generator system fault alert occurred on a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. Investigation revealed that the parallel power feeder cable of the number 2 integrated drive generator (IDG) burned 30 percent through due to it chafing against the R4 aft track of the door. This condition, if not corrected, could result in chafing and arcing of the parallel feeder cables, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the right aft galley area.

These incidents are not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A157, dated August 10, 2000. The service bulletin describes procedures for performing a general visual inspection to detect chafing or damage of the parallel power feeder cables of the number 2 IDG; repairing any chafed cable and damaged structure; and repositioning the parallel power feeder cables of the number 2 IDG. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

There are approximately 64 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 14 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 4 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $3,360, or $240 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-187-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-187-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of two incidents in which electrical failures in the cargo control units (CCU) caused sparks or flame in the CCU container, which resulted in scorching of the insulation blankets. These incidents occurred on McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This condition, if not corrected, could result in sparks or flame in the CCU container and lead to fire in the insulation blanket or adjacent equipment.

These incidents are not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-25A244, dated August 10, 2000, and Revision 01, dated October 31, 2000, which describe procedures for replacement of the insulation blankets of the forward and center cargo compartments in the area of the cargo control units with new insulation blankets. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletins is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in either of the service bulletins described previously.

There are approximately 91 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 22 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 3 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would be supplied by the airplane manufacturer at no cost to the operators. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $3,960, or $180 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-186-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-186-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of incidents of electrical failures in the cargo control unit (CCU) that have resulted in sparks or flame exiting the CCU container and scorching the insulation blankets. These incidents occurred on McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. Investigation revealed that the circuit breaker rating of the CCU is too large to protect the CCU circuitry. This condition, if not corrected, could result in possible overheating of the CCU components, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the cargo compartment.

This incident is not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This airworthiness directive (AD) is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-21A189, dated June 22, 2000, which describes procedures for replacement of 10 amp cargo roller circuit breakers with new 5 amp circuit breakers, and reidentification of the aft circuit breaker panel; as applicable. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

There are approximately 104 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 24 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would be supplied by the airplane manufacturer at no cost to the operators. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $2,880, or $120 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in light of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a request to change the compliance time and a request to change the service bulletin reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed AD is being requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-185-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-185-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

As part of its practice of re-examining all aspects of the service experience of a particular aircraft whenever an accident occurs, the FAA has become aware of an incident in which, during an inspection, electrical wires were found chafing on the right side of the cockpit against the observer station. This incident occurred on a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. Investigation revealed that the wires were routed improperly during production of the airplane. This condition, if not corrected, could result in chafing and damage to electrical wires of the cockpit and consequent electrical arcing, which could result in fire and smoke in the airplane.

This incident is not considered to be related to an accident that occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. The cause of that accident is still under investigation.

The FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of Model MD-11 series airplanes, is continuing to review all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to identify potential unsafe conditions and to take appropriate corrective actions. This proposed airworthiness directive (AD) is one of a series of actions identified during that process. The process is continuing and the FAA may consider additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A117, dated May 18, 2000, which describes procedures for a one-time general visual inspection of the electrical wiring of the right side of the cockpit to determine if the electrical wiring is chafing against the observer station and to detect damaged wires; and corrective actions, if necessary. The corrective actions include loosening wire clamps; repositioning wires; tightening wire clamps; repairing damaged insulation; and replacing damaged wires with new wires. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

There are approximately 148 Model MD-11 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 43 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the proposed inspection, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the inspection proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $2,580, or $60 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other administrative actions.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested parties are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments that provide the factual basis supporting the views and suggestions presented are particularly helpful in developing reasoned regulatory decisions on the proposal. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal. Communications should identify the airspace docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address listed above. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments on this notice must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Airspace Docket No. 00-AEA-16”. The postcard will be date/time stamped and returned to the commenter. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposal contained in this notice may be changed in light of comments received. All comments submitted will be available for examination in the Rules Docket both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with the FAA personnel concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket.

Any person may obtain a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by submitting a request to the Office of the Regional Counsel, AEA-7, F.A.A. Eastern Region, 1 Aviation Plaza, Jamaica, NY 11434-4809. Communications must identify the notice number of this NPRM. Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRMs should also request a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, which describes the application procedure.

The FAA is considering an amendment to Part 71 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 71) to establish Class E airspace area at South Albany Airport. An RNAV (GPS) Approach has been established for the South Albany Airport, South Bethelem, NY. Controlled airspace extending upward from 700 feet AGL is needed to accommodate the approach. Class E airspace designations for airspace areas extending upward from 700 feet or more above the surface are published in Paragraph 6005 of FAA Order 7400.9H, dated September 1, 2000, and effective September 16, 2000, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 The Class E airspace designation listed in this document would be published subsequently in the Order.

The FAA has determined that this proposed regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. Therefore, this proposed regulation—(1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979) and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that would only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this proposed rule would not have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR Part 71 as follows:

Interested parties are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments that provide the factual basis supporting the views and suggestions presented are particularly helpful in developing reasoned regulatory decisions on the proposal. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, aeronautical, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal. Communications should identify the airspace docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address listed above. Commentors wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments on this notice must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Airspace Docket No. 00-AAL-20.” The postcard will be date/time stamped and returned to the commentor. All communications received on or before the specified closing date for comments will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposal contained in this notice may be changed in light of comments received. All comments submitted will be available for examination in the Operations Branch, Air Traffic Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 222 West 7th Avenue, Box 14, Anchorage, AK, both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded, using a modem and suitable communications software, from the FAA regulations section of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-3339) or the Federal Register's electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 202-512-1661).

Internet users may reach the Federal Register's web page for access to recently published rulemaking documents at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the Operations Branch, AAL-530, Federal Aviation Administration, 222 West 7th Avenue, Box 14, Anchorage, AK 99513-7587. Communications must identify the notice number of this NPRM. Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRM's should contact the individual(s) identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

On November 11, 2000, the FAA initiated Airspace Study Number 00-AAL-077NR, Notice of Proposed Revocation of the VOR RWY 36 Approach Procedure at Bethel, Alaska. Comments during several meetings over the last year with airspace users in the Bethel area indicated that they would like to have Napakiak Airport (WNA) excluded from the Class E (surface area extension) airspace at Bethel, AK. The Bethel Airport has four approaches to RWY 36: (1) Localizer (LOC)/Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) Back Course (BC) RWY 36, (2) VOR/DME RWY 36, (3) Global Positioning System (GPS) RWY 36, and (4) the VOR RWY 36. The Bethel VOR RWY 36 instrument approach, with a procedure turn at 1,600 feet, allows aircraft to descend to 700 feet after the procedure turn is completed. The FAA protects airspace from the point an aircraft may legally descend below 1,000 feet with Class E (surface area) airspace. For aircraft going to Bethel Airport, the Napakiak Airport, located 7.1 nautical miles on a 200° true bearing from Bethel VORTAC, is an alternate place to land and wait for weather to improve when the Bethel surface area is restricted due to weather.

The FAA received favorable comments from Craig Air Incorporated, US Coast Guard District 17, Kusko Aviation Incorporated, Alaska Airlines, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service—Bethel. With the adoption of this proposal, the FAA intends to simultaneously cancel the VOR RWY 36 instrument approach and shorten the Class E airspace to the southwest of Bethel. There would be three remaining instrument approaches to the Bethel RWY 36: (1) LOC/DME BC RWY 36, (2) VOR/DME RWY 36, and (3) GPS RWY 36. This proposal would allow Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations to continue at Napakiak Airport during Special VFR operations at Bethel Airport, AK.

Additionally, this proposal would fix an administrative oversight by including an exclusion area for the Hanger Lake seaplane base operations to the Class E (surface area) airspace description. Changes to the Bethel airspace would incorporate an exclusion below 1,100 feet MSL between the 061° radial and the 081° radial from 2.9 nautical miles northeast of the Bethel VORTAC.

This amendment to 14 CFR part 71 proposes to revise the Class E airspace at Bethel, AK, in two ways: (1) reduce the amount of controlled airspace required southwest of the Bethel airport; and (2) modify the Class E (surface area) airspace description to exclude the Hanger Lake seaplane base operations. The intended effects of this proposal are: (1) to reduce the controlled airspace for IFR operations at Bethel, AK, thus allowing for VFR operations at Napakiak Airport during Special VFR operations at Bethel Airport and (2) fix an administrative oversight by adding the Hanger Lake exclusion area to the Class E airspace description.

The area would be depicted on aeronautical charts for pilot reference. The coordinates for this airspace docket are based on North American Datum 83. The Class E airspace areas designated as surface areas are published in paragraph 6002 and the Class E airspace areas designated as an extension to a Class D or Class E surface area are published in paragraph 6004 in FAA Order 7400.9H, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, dated September 1, 2000, and effective September 16, 2000, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The Class E airspace designations listed in this document would be published subsequently in the Order.

The FAA has determined that this proposed regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore —(1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

On March 17, 2000, the CPSC collectively docketed as a petition under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) petitions received from Public Citizen and jointly from the National Apartment Association and the National Multi Housing Council, all of which requested that the Commission ban lead-containing candles and wicks sold for candle-making that contain lead (Petition No. HP 00-3). 65 FR 19742 (April 12, 2000).

A candlewick containing lead is a wick with a metallic core that contains lead. The metallic core may be primarily lead or may be primarily zinc or tin with a lesser lead content. Such metallic cores are used to provide structural rigidity to the wick to keep it straight during candle production and to provide an upright wick during burning.

Information obtained from the petitions and subsequent Commission staff investigations indicates that burning candles containing metallic-cored wicks with a lead content exceeding 0.06% by weight may result in potentially toxic levels of air emissions of lead.

The scientific community recognizes a level of 10 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood (10 μg/dL) as a threshold level of concern with respect to lead poisoning in children. The most current national survey shows that nearly 1 million children have elevated blood lead levels (greater than (10 μg/dL). This figure represents approximately 4.4% of children under 6 years of age.

The adverse health effects of lead poisoning in children are well-documented and may have long-lasting or permanent consequences. These effects include neurological damage, delayed mental and physical development, attention and learning deficiencies, and hearing problems. Because lead accumulates in the body, even exposure to small amounts can contribute to the subsequent risk of adverse health effects.

Investigations by the CPSC laboratory staff and other laboratories indicate that lead-cored candles can emit up to 2,200 μg of lead per hour during candle burning. These investigations also indicate that the rate at which lead might be emitted from burning a particular candle cannot reliably be predicted based on the lead content of the wick in question. CPSC staff believes that, under some use conditions, these lead emissions present a risk to consumers through inhalation of airborne lead and through contact with lead deposited onto surfaces in the room.

This proceeding is conducted pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 15 U.S.C. 1261 et seq. Section 2(f)(1)(A) of the FHSA defines “hazardous substance” to include any substance or mixture of substances which is toxic and may cause substantial illness as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use. 15 U.S.C. 1261(f)(1)(A).

Under section 2(q)(1)(B) of the FHSA, if the Commission determines that, “notwithstanding such cautionary labeling as is or may be required under this Act for that substance, the degree or nature of the hazard involved in the presence or use of such [hazardous] substance in households is such that the objective of the protection of the public health and safety can be adequately served only by keeping such substance, when so intended or packaged, out of the channels of interstate commerce,” then such substance is a “banned hazardous substance.” 15 U.S.C. 1261(q)(1)(B).

Section 3(b) of the FHSA provides authority for the Commission to establish additional labeling requirements for hazardous substances beyond those prescribed by section 2(p)(1) of the Act if necessary for protection of the public health and safety. 15 U.S.C. 1262(b). Once such additional requirements are established by regulation, a product intended, or packaged in a form suitable, for use in the household or by children that is not so labeled is a “misbranded” hazardous substance. Id.

Section 3(a) of the FHSA governs a Commission proceeding to declare a substance a “hazardous substance.” 15 U.S.C 1262(a). Sections 3(f) through 3(i), 15 U.S.C. 1262(f)-(i), govern a proceeding to promulgate a regulation declaring a hazardous substance to be a banned hazardous substance.

As provided in sections 3(a)(2) and 3(f), this proceeding is commenced by issuance of this ANPR. After considering any comments submitted in response to this ANPR, the Commission will decide whether to issue a proposed rule and a preliminary regulatory analysis in accordance with section 3(h) of the FHSA. If a proposed rule is issued, the Commission would then consider the comments received in response to the proposed rule in deciding whether to issue a final rule and a final regulatory analysis. 15 U.S.C. 1262(i).

One or more of the following alternatives could be used to reduce the identified risks associated with candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks.

1. Mandatory rule. The Commission could issue a rule declaring certain candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks to be banned hazardous substances. This rule could define the banned products in terms of physical or performance characteristics, or both.

2. Labeling rule. The Commission could issue a special labeling rule for candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks requiring that they contain specified warnings and instructions.

3. Voluntary standard. If the industry developed, adopted, and substantially conformed to an adequate voluntary standard, the Commission could defer to the voluntary standard in lieu of issuing a mandatory rule.

In 1974, the Candle Manufacturers Association trade group made a voluntary commitment to eliminate lead from candle wicks. However, analyses by CPSC and by Public Citizen of the lead content of recently-purchased metallic wick candles show that wicks in some candles currently on the market continue to contain substantial amounts of lead.

In September 1999 the Australian Minister for Financial Services and Regulation banned the sale of candles with lead wicks in that country. In June 2000 the New Zealand Minister of Consumer Affairs banned the importation or sale of lead wick candles in that country. According to Commission staff, neither of these bans are based on a standard for maximum allowable lead level. The Commission is not aware of any other promulgated state, voluntary, foreign, international, or other standard dealing with the described risk of illness.

Retail sales of candles in the U.S. for 1999 are estimated to be $2.3 billion, and are expected to rise to $3.2 billion in 2001. U.S. imports of candles in 1999 amounted to about $484 million, about half from the Far East, about one third from the Americas (mostly Canada and Mexico), and less than 10 percent from Europe and Great Britain.

Based on information gathered by CPSC staff, there are at least 200 and possibly over 350 commercial, institutional, and religious manufacturers of candles in the U.S. Most of these manufacturers are apparently small businesses.

There are only a few manufacturers of candle wicks in the U.S. The leading domestic firm indicates to CPSC staff that it supplies the majority of candle wicks to the U.S. candle industry.

CPSC staff believes that substitutes for lead wicks are readily available. Staff also believes that substituting non-lead materials for lead in wicks will not increase costs to candle manufacturers or consumers. Comments on both of these issues are specifically solicited.

This ANPR is an initial step in a proceeding that could result in a mandatory rule for candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks to address the described risk of illness. All interested persons are invited to submit to the Commission their comments on any aspect of the alternatives discussed above. In particular, CPSC solicits the following additional information:

1. The types and numbers of candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks produced for sale in the U.S. each year from 1990 to the present;

2. The names and addresses of manufacturers and distributors of candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks;

3. Comparisons of the utility obtained from candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks versus any available substitute products;

4. An explanation of substitutes for candle wicks containing lead and candles with such wicks that could reduce the described risk of illness;

5. Physical or performance characteristics of the wick and candle products that could or should not be used to define which products might be subject to a rule;

6. The costs to wick and candle manufacturers involved in either substituting materials for lead in metallic-cored wicks to remove the risk or removing candles with such wicks from the market;

7. The costs to wick manufacturers/importers/distributors of testing or other efforts to ensure that wicks are in compliance.

8. Other information on the potential costs and benefits of potential rules;

9. Information on any potentially significant environmental impacts of any of the regulatory alternatives identified in this ANPR, including a ban on candles and candle wicks containing more that 0.06% lead by weight;

10. Steps that have been taken by industry or others to reduce the risk of illness from the products;

11. The likelihood and nature of any significant economic impact of a rule on small entities;

12. The costs and benefits of mandating a banning, labeling, or instructions requirement.

Also, in accordance with section 3(f) of the FHSA, the Commission solicits:

1. Written comments with respect to the risk of illness identified by the Commission, the regulatory alternatives being considered, and other possible alternatives for addressing the risk.

2. Any existing standard or portion of a standard which could be issued as a proposed regulation.

3. A statement of intention to modify or develop a voluntary standard to address the risk of illness discussed in this notice, along with a description of a plan (including a schedule) to do so.

Comments should be mailed, preferably in five copies, to the Office of the Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207-0001, or delivered to the Office of the Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Room 502, 4330 East-West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland 20814; telephone (301) 504-0800. Comments also may be filed by telefacsimile to (301) 504-0127 or by e-mail to cpsc-os@cpsc.gov. Comments should be captioned “ANPR for Candle Wicks Containing Lead.” All comments and submissions should be received no later than April 23, 2001.

On December 20, 2000, the Department published an Interim Final Rule (65 FR 80110) (“IFR”), following a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which was published on January 5, 1999 (64 FR 628) (“NPRM”). The IFR revised the Department's regulations relating to the employment of H-1B nonimmigrants as necessitated by the enactment of the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (“ACWIA”). The IFR also revised certain provisions of the regulations which had been published for comment as a Proposed Rule on October 31, 1995 as well as in the NPRM of January 5, 1999. The IFR sought comments on all provisions of the regulatory revisions, as well as on other matters which were proposed for the first time in the IFR. Interested parties were requested to submitted written comments on or before February 20, 2001.

Because of the continuing interest in the revisions and new proposals made in the IFR, the Department believes that it is desirable to extend the comment period for all interested parties. Therefore, the comment period for the IFR is extended through April 23, 2001.

On January 21, 1981, the Secretary of the Interior conditionally approved the Utah program. You can find background information on the Utah program, including the Secretary's findings, the disposition of comments, and the conditions of approval of the Utah program in the January 21, 1981, Federal Register (46 FR 5899). You can also find later actions concerning Utah's program and program amendments at 30 CFR 944.15 and 944.30.

By letter dated March 20, 1998 (administrative record No. 1103), Utah sent to us a proposed amendment (UT-037-FOR) to its program under SMCRA (30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq.). It sent the proposed amendment in response to a June 5, 1996, letter (administrative record No. UT-1083) that we sent to the State under 30 CFR 732.17(c) and at its own initiative.

Changes to the Utah Administrative Rules (Utah Admin. R.) that the State originally proposed included: Adding definitions for “material damage,” “non-commercial building,” “occupied residential dwelling and structures related thereto,” “replacement of water supply,” and “State-appropriated water supply” at Utah Admin. R. 645-100-200; adding requirements at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.100 through -525.130 for pre-subsidence surveys; removing existing requirements for subsidence control plans at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525 through -525.170; recodifying rules at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.200 through -525.240 pertaining to protected areas; removing existing requirements for subsidence control at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.200 through -525.232; adding requirements at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.300 through -525.490 for subsidence control and subsidence control plans; adding requirements for subsidence damage repair at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.500 through -525.530; adding a rebuttable presumption of causation by subsidence at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.540 through -525.545; adding provisions at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.550 for adjusting bond amounts for subsidence damage; recodifying rules at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.600 and 645-301-525.700 that require compliance with approved subsidence control plans and public notice of proposed mining, respectively; removing existing provisions for surveys of renewable resource lands at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-724.600; adding a provision at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-728.350 for finding whether underground coal mining and reclamation activities might contaminate, diminish or interrupt State-appropriated water; and adding a requirement at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-731.530 for replacing State-appropriated water supplies that are contaminated, diminished, or interrupted by underground coal mining activities.

We announced receipt of the proposed amendment in the April 8, 1998, Federal Register (63 FR 17138; administrative record No. UT-1108), provided an opportunity for a public hearing or meeting, and invited public comment on its adequacy. We did not hold a public hearing or meeting because nobody requested either one. The public comment period ended on May 8, 1998.

During our review of the amendment, we identified concerns relating to the provisions for pre-subsidence surveys at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.130 and for the content of subsistence control plans at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.490. We also asked Utah to provide additional clarification on: The scope of the terms “State-appropriated water” and the proposed definition of “State-appropriated water supply” as used in the amendment; the scope of water replacement with respect to “developed” water supplies; and clarification of Utah's proposed definition of the term “replacement of water supply.” We notified Utah of our concerns and the need for additional clarification by letter dated October 1, 1998 (administrative record No. UT-1125). Utah responded in a letter dated October 31, 2000 (administrative record No. 1145).

Utah now proposes two specific changes in its amendment. First, it proposes to change Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.130 to cross-reference Utah Admin. R. R645-301-525.543. That referenced rule specifically states that there will be no presumption that subsidence caused damage to structures if the owners deny applicants access to perform pre-subsidence surveys. Second, at Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.490, the State proposes to add references to Utah Admin. R. 645-301-525.200, -525.500, and -525.600. Those rules cover the range of information Utah requires to be included in subsidence control plans to demonstrate that an operation will be conducted in accordance with all applicable provisions for subsidence control.

Utah's response also provided additional explanation of the scope of the term “State-appropriated water” and the definition of “State-appropriated water supply,” the scope of water replacement under its proposed rules with respect to “developed” water supplies, and its proposed definition of the term “replacement of water supply.”

Send your written comments to OSM at the address given above. Your written comments should be specific, pertain only to the issues proposed in this rulemaking, and include explanations in support of your recommendations. In the final rulemaking, we will not necessarily consider or include in the administrative record any comments received after the time indicated under Dates or at locations other than the Denver Field Division.

Please submit Internet comments as an ASCII file and do not use special characters or any form of encryption. Please also include “Attn: SPATS No. UT-037-FOR” and your name and return address in your Internet message. If you do not receive a confirmation that we have received your Internet message, contact the Denver Field Division at telephone number (303) 844-1400, extension 1424.

We will make comments, including names and addresses of respondents, available for public review during normal business hours. We will not consider anonymous comments. If individual respondents request confidentiality, we will honor their request to the extent allowable by law. Individual respondents who wish to withhold their name or address from public review, except for the city or town, must state this prominently at the beginning of their comments. We will make all submissions from organizations or businesses, and from individuals identifying themselves as representatives or officials of organizations or businesses, available for public review in their entirety.

This rule does not have takings implications. This determination is based on the analysis performed for the counterpart Federal regulations.

This rule is exempted from review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under Executive Order 12866.

The Department of the Interior conducted the reviews required by section 3 of Executive Order 12988 and determined that, to the extent allowable by law, this rule meets the applicable standards of subsections (a) and (b) of that section. However, these standards are not applicable to the actual language of State regulatory programs and program amendments since each such program is drafted and promulgated by a specific State, not by OSM. Under sections 503 and 505 of SMCRA (30 U.S.C. 1253 and 1255) and the Federal regulations at 30 CFR 730.11, 732.15, and 732.17(h)(10), decisions on proposed State regulatory programs and program amendments submitted by the States must be based solely on a determination of whether the submittal is consistent with SMCRA and its implementing Federal regulations and whether the other requirements of 30 CFR parts 730, 731, and 732 have been met.

This rule does not have Federalism implications. SMCRA delineates the roles of the Federal and State governments with regard to the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations. One of the purposes of SMCRA is to “establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.” Section 503(a)(1) of SMCRA requires that State laws regulating surface coal mining and reclamation operations be “in accordance with” the requirements of SMCRA. Section 503(a)(7) requires that State programs contain rules and regulations “consistent with” regulations issued by the Secretary pursuant to SMCRA

Section 702(d) of SMCRA (30 U.S.C. 1292(d)) provides that a decision on a proposed State regulatory program provision does not constitute a major Federal action within the meaning of section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)). A determination has been made that such decisions are categorically excluded from the NEPA process (516 DM 8.4.A).

This rule does not contain information collection requirements that require approval by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507 et seq.).

The Department of the Interior has determined that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). The State submittal that is the subject of this rule is based on counterpart Federal regulations for which an economic analysis was prepared and certification made that such regulations would not have a significant economic effect on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, this rule will ensure that existing requirements previously promulgated by OSM will be implemented by the State. In making the determination as to where this rule would have a significant economic impact, the Department relied upon the data and assumptions for the counterpart Federal regulations.

This rule is not a major rule under 5 U.S.C. 804(2), the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act. This rule: (a) Does not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million; (b) will not cause a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, geographic regions, or Federal, State or local governmental agencies; and (c) does not have significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of U.S. based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises. This determination is based on the fact that the State submittal which is the subject of this rule is based on counterpart Federal regulations for which an analysis was prepared and a determination made that the Federal regulation was not considered a major rule.

This rule will not impose a cost of $100 million or more in any given year on any governmental entity or the private sector.

Many packages of Periodicals and Standard Mail tendered to the Postal Service on pallets or in sacks do not maintain their integrity during transportation to postal facilities and during postal processing. The Postal Service must redirect the resulting loose packages or broken packages (individual pieces) to higher-cost operations. If packages lose their integrity while being processed on small parcel and bundle sorters (SPBSs), the result can be machine slowdowns and stoppages as well as postal employees manually processing these packages. The increased costs of labor to process loose or broken packages is reflected in higher rates paid by mailers. In addition to rate implications, package breakage also damages mailpieces and has a negative impact on service, results that the mailing industry and the Postal Service would like to avoid.

Data collected by the Mailers' Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC) Package Integrity Work Group, comprising Postal Service and mailing industry representatives, revealed that, during the first handling, packages of Periodicals and Standard Mail in sacks break at a much greater rate than packages on pallets. This data also disclosed that packages of pieces with glossy (coated) cover stock break at higher rates than packages of pieces with covers of uncoated stock. An analysis of the data indicates that additional standards are necessary to improve the integrity of Periodicals and Standard Mail packages prepared in sacks and that some current standards for packages in sacks and on pallets also require clarification to improve packaging in general. Currently, with the exception of Standard Mail and Package Services Mail placed on bulk mail center (BMC) pallets, DMM M020 does not differentiate between packaging standards for mail placed on pallets and mail placed in sacks. Unlike palletized packages, which have maximum weight limits prescribed in DMM M045, there are no existing standards for Periodicals and Standard Mail that limit the size or weight of packages in sacks. Consequently, mailers of Periodicals and Standard Mail may prepare packages that weigh more than 20 pounds and are, as a result, incompatible with processing on SPBSs. Heavier packages are also subject to more breakage if not properly secured. This is particularly true of sacked mail due to the additional handling it receives compared with palletized mail. Under the proposed rules, DMM M020 prescribes general standards for preparing and securing packages of all classes of mail and revises and incorporates standards that pertain individually to packages on pallets and packages in sacks.

Proposed new standards limit the weight of sacked packages of Periodicals and Standard Mail to a maximum of 20 pounds and the height of these packages to a maximum of 8 inches for pieces of uncoated stock and to maximums ranging from 3 inches to 6 inches, depending on the securing method, for pieces with coated cover stock. As information, new mail preparation standards for Bound Printed Matter flats implemented January 7, 2001, limit the weight of packages in sacks and on pallets to 20 pounds, except that packages placed in 5-digit sacks or on 5-digit/scheme pallets may weigh up to 40 pounds. It is also proposed that the standards for all classes be amended to clarify when pieces should be counter-stacked to create packages of uniform thickness and to provide more emphasis on the standard that requires packages over 1 inch high to be secured with at least two bands or shrinkwrap.

It is also proposed that the current requirement to secure double-banded packages of all classes of mail first around the length and then around the girth be revised to eliminate a required banding sequence. Automated production lines in large printing plants are not designed to secure packages around the length first, and exceptions to the current standard must continually be granted to address this issue. Magazines and flyers are typically bound with stitches or glue and then stacked for packaging in accordance with the applicable presort, generally in groups ranging from 6 to 100 pieces. The stack is ejected and travels directly into a bander that secures the girth first, and then the length if a second band is required. If the first band was placed around the length of the stack, the stack would not be held securely enough to allow the second band to go around the girth because the backbone or spine is thicker than the face or side cut (length). This thickness variation would cause the bundle to fall apart, also affecting transport into another securing operation such as shrinkwrapping.

The Postal Service and the mailing industry have been working together to better understand the implications of package breakage and to identify opportunities to quantify and improve the current situation. In October and November 1999, the MTAC Package Integrity Work Group collected and analyzed data regarding the condition of packages of nonletter-size Periodicals and Standard Mail flats at the locations within processing facilities (e.g., SPBS feed belts) where they were initially unloaded by the Postal Service from mailer-prepared sacks and pallets. This data was collected at four Postal Service processing and distribution centers (P&DCs) and two BMCs.

Data collected for this live mail shows that of a total of 78,511 packages on pallets that were observed, 832 packages, or 1.1 percent, were broken when first unloaded from the mailer-prepared pallets by the Postal Service. For mail in sacks, of a total of 11,826 packages that were observed, 2,074 packages, or 17.5 percent, were broken when the sacks were emptied. Broken packages were identified as those with a total loss of integrity resulting in one or more pieces loose or missing. Various characteristics concerning the packages and the mailpieces were recorded to identify key factors affecting package integrity. For all mail in sacks, the breakage rates were statistically very close, ranging from 16.7 to 19.8 percent, when packages were secured with two rubber bands, two plastic straps, or two strings (twine). Shrinkwrapped packages broke at a rate of 13.3 percent while packages secured with shrinkwrap plus one strap broke at the lowest rate of 9.5 percent.

The data shows that coated paper stock leads to significantly greater package breakage than uncoated stock. Coated paper is the slick, shiny paper usually associated with magazines and catalogs while uncoated stock is often associated with newspapers and enveloped mail. For packages in sacks, the breakage rate for mailpieces with covers of coated paper stock was 23.6 percent compared with a breakage rate of 11.6 percent for mailpieces of uncoated stock. For pieces of coated paper stock, shrinkwrap plus one strap proved to be the most effective packaging method. Shrinkwrap alone was the second most effective packaging method, followed by double banding with rubber bands, string (twine), or plastic straps. All methods of double banding caused packages to break at about the same rate. However, as package height increases, the breakage rate for shrinkwrapped packages increases at a greater rate than the breakage rate for packages secured with two plastic straps. As a bundle increases in height, it often becomes more rigid and two plastic straps are likely to maintain package integrity more effectively. Packages secured with shrinkwrap of insufficient strength or durability are less likely to retain their integrity, as the packages become taller (and consequently heavier), particularly when those packages are placed in sacks. Mail in sacks is subject to additional processing steps before the contents are distributed by the Postal Service (e.g., sacks bedloaded on trucks or dumped on sack sorting equipment) when compared to mail prepared on pallets.

The data collected during the live mail tests in October and November 1999 are contained in USPS-LR-1-297 filed in conjunction with R2000-1.

On the basis of results of the live mail tests, the MTAC Package Integrity Work Group concluded that the most significant reductions in package breakage could be achieved in the near future by improving the integrity of packages currently prepared in sacks, particularly for packages of mailpieces with covers of coated stock. These changes supplement other efforts, described later in this notice, that are underway to move mail out of sacks and onto pallets, when possible. Accordingly, a controlled test of mail prepared in sacks was conducted in August 2000. A variety of packaging methods and mailpiece types, both coated and uncoated, were tested with test packages ranging in height from under 1 inch up to approximately 8 inches. These pieces were representative of the Periodicals and Standard Mail mailstreams. The following mailpiece types and securing methods were tested:

• Unbound, uncoated half-fold newspapers secured with plastic straps and with string (twine).

• Quarter-fold newsprint advertisements secured with plastic straps and with string (twine).

• DVDs prepared in padded plastic containers measuring approximately 71/2 inches by 53/8 inches by 5/8 inch and secured with plastic straps and with rubber bands.

• 9-inch by 12-inch enveloped pieces secured with plastic strap(s), with rubber bands, and with string.

• Individually polywrapped magazines secured with plastic straps.

• Saddle-stitched magazines with coated cover stock secured with shrinkwrap, with plastic straps, with string, and with rubber bands.

• Perfect bound magazines with coated cover stock secured with plastic straps, with rubber bands, and with shrinkwrap.

Sacks containing the test pieces were deposited at the Cincinnati BMC, processed through the sack sorter, and transported to the Philadelphia BMC, where they were processed through that facility's sack sorter before being unloaded to collect information about the condition of the packages. This was consistent with the transportation and processing of sacked mail that is entered at an origin facility for delivery to addresses outside of the mailer's local BMC service area. A small number of sacks were deposited at the Philadelphia BMC and were not processed through any sack sorter before being unloaded for examination of their contents.

Results from the controlled test show that the average breakage rate for packages of unbound, uncoated newspapers/newsprint advertisements and individually polywrapped pieces combined was approximately 3 percent while the average breakage rate for pieces with coated cover stock was approximately 55 percent. For the pieces with coated cover stock, the breakage rate increased significantly as the height of the packages increased. For pieces with coated cover stock, packages over 3 inches high (4 inches to 6 inches) broke apart at rates ranging from 42 to 100 percent depending on the package height and securing method. The taller packages that were secured with two plastic straps had the lowest breakage rates. Packages secured with shrinkwrap plus one strap had lower breakage rates than packages secured with only shrinkwrap. These data are consistent with the data collected in October and November 1999 for the live mail test which showed that double plastic bands or shrinkwrap plus one band are generally more effective for securing taller packages. It should be noted that various formulations of shrinkwrap were used to secure mail in the controlled test and the shrinkwrap ranged in thickness from 1 to 1.5 mil.

The breakage rate for the 9 inch × 12 inch enveloped mailpieces of uncoated paper stock was approximately 58 percent. The breakage rate for these pieces, which were of irregular thickness due to an insert enclosed in the center of each piece, also increased significantly as the height of the packages increased. This occurred because the packages were thicker in the center (football-shaped) and the straps, if they moved off the thicker package center during transportation or processing, would tend to fall off the thinner edges creating loose or broken packages.

Analysis of the data gathered from the controlled test described above indicates that increasing package height results in greater breakage rates, with breakage increasing by approximately 14 percentage points for each additional inch of package height. This results in a very high breakage rate for packages 4 inches and taller. On average, the breakage rate for shrinkwrapped packages was 15 percent higher than for packages secured with two plastic straps. Also, by adding a single plastic strap to shrinkwrapped packages, the breakage rate for shrinkwrapped packages was reduced by 25 percent.

As a result, the MTAC Package Integrity Work Group has identified preparation changes that will improve package integrity and reduce the percent of packages that break. This reduction in breakage will reduce processing costs. The proposed changes contained in this Federal Register notice have been drafted based on the data collected during the live mail and controlled tests. The specific proposed changes are described in detail below.

The key focus of the proposed changes is to significantly reduce package breakage for mailpieces with covers of coated stock that are prepared in sacks, identified as a key contributor to the package integrity problem. The proposed standards requiring smaller packages for some sacked mail may result in a greater number of packages in sacks for mail found to currently have exceptionally high breakage rates. However, any costs for handling additional smaller packages will be greatly outweighed by modeled savings that will result from avoiding additional package handlings, recovery costs, and single-piece handlings that are incurred when these packages break prematurely. The proposed revisions to the DMM, in conjunction with other Postal Service/Industry initiatives, are intended to and expected to improve package integrity in general for mail both in sacks and on pallets.

It is important to note that representatives of many Periodicals and Standard Mail associations, serving large and small volume mailers, have been involved in all aspects of test design, data collection and analysis, and development of recommendations to improve package integrity. These mailers produce a wide variety of flat-size mailpieces (and irregulars for Periodicals) using all currently permitted package securing methods.

Amending and revising the DMM packaging standards to improve mailer preparation, as proposed in this notice, is one of several efforts underway to reduce costs associated with processing packages of Periodicals non-letters and Standard Mail flats. Based on analyses of the test data described above and on other studies and discussions between the Postal Service and Periodicals industry representatives, it was determined that other steps, in addition to improvements in packaging by mailers, could help reduce Postal Service handling costs that relate to package breakage. These steps include working with mailers to move mail from sacks to pallets, improving package-sorting methods related to SPBS feed systems, improving Postal Service recovery methods for broken or damaged packages of flats, and working with mailers to develop a process enabling customers to prepare flat-size mail in a manner that supports processing on flat-sorting machines.

Many mailers have indicated that, until recently, they were not aware of the package breakage problem at Postal Service facilities. In response, and at the recommendation of the MTAC Package Integrity Work Group, the Postal Service established the MTAC Feedback Mechanism Work Group to develop effective methods to provide mailers with information about mail that is not properly prepared and that is adding costs to processing operations. The expectation is that when mailers receive feedback about specific package integrity problems, they will take appropriate steps to improve their packaging methods.

The MTAC Package Integrity Work Group also developed a video, produced and disseminated by the Postal Service, to raise mailer awareness of the impact of poor package integrity. Copies are available to mailers and have been shown at Postal Customer Council (PCC) meetings, focus groups, and Postal Forums. The video has also been used as a training tool by mailers to raise the awareness of their employees to the importance of package integrity and to focus on improving packaging. Additional videos are being developed to focus on best practices in packaging for small volume and large volume mailers.

Other efforts are underway by the mailing industry, particularly large printers, to analyze how changing presort parameters affects containerization in order to move mail out of sacks, where it is more vulnerable to package breakage and less likely to be drop shipped, by optimizing palletization.

The Postal Service has made several modifications to SPBS feed systems to reduce package breakage when containers are unloaded and when the packages are transported on belts to keying stations. Broken package recovery methods have also been modified to reduce costs.

Projected lower Postal Service mail processing costs, due to reduced package breakage, were incorporated into the rates resulting from the R2000-1 rate case. These savings were based, in part, on anticipated improvements in the preparation of packages of Periodicals non-letter-size mail and Standard Mail flats resulting from the activities of the MTAC Package Integrity Work Group and other related efforts that are currently underway. The following proposed DMM changes are attributable to those activities. The Postal Service is proposing to implement these revisions to the current mail preparation standards effective June 1, 2001.

Although exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553(b), (c)) regarding proposed rulemaking by 39 U.S.C. 410(a), the Postal Service invites comments on the following proposed revisions of the DMM, incorporated by reference in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 39 CFR part 111.