This rule is issued under Marketing Order No. 981, as amended, (7 CFR part 981), regulating the handling of almonds grown in California, hereinafter referred to as the “order.” The order is effective under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. 601-674), hereinafter referred to as the “Act.”

The Department of Agriculture (Department) is issuing this rule in accordance with Executive Order 12866.

This rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. Under the provisions of the marketing order now in effect, salable and reserve percentages may be established for almonds during any crop year. This rule revises the salable and reserve percentages for marketable California almonds during the 1999-2000 crop year, which began August 1, 1999, and ends July 31, 2000. This rule will not preempt any State or local laws, regulations, or policies, unless they present an irreconcilable conflict with this rule.

The Act provides that administrative proceedings must be exhausted before parties may file suit in court. Under section 608c(15)(A) of the Act, any handler subject to an order may file with the Secretary a petition stating that the order, any provision of the order, or any obligation imposed in connection with the order is not in accordance with law and request a modification of the order or to be exempted therefrom. A handler is afforded the opportunity for a hearing on the petition. After the hearing the Secretary would rule on the petition. The Act provides that the district court of the United States in any district in which the handler is an inhabitant, or has his or her principal place of business, has jurisdiction in equity to review the Secretary's ruling on the petition, provided a bill in equity is filed not later than 20 days after the date of the entry of the ruling.

This interim final rule relaxes volume regulation implemented under the order during the 1999-2000 crop year (August 1 through July 31). The order regulates the handling of almonds grown in California and is locally administered by the Board. During the 1999-2000 season, handlers were required to withhold as a reserve, from normal competitive markets, 22.36 percent of the almonds which they received from growers. The remaining 77.64 percent of the crop could be sold by handlers to any market at any time. These percentages are referred to as reserve and salable percentages, respectively. This rule relaxes this regulation on handlers by releasing, in three stages, all almonds held as reserve to be available for sale to normal market channels. This is necessary to provide a sufficient quantity of almonds to meet anticipated trade demand and carryover needs. This action was unanimously recommended by the Board at a meeting on April 10, 2000.

Section 981.47 of the almond marketing order provides authority for the Secretary, based on recommendations by the Board and the analysis of other available information, to establish salable and reserve percentages for almonds during a crop year. To aid the Secretary in fixing the salable and reserve percentages, § 981.49 of the order requires the Board to submit information to the Department on estimates of the marketable production of almonds, trade demand needs for the year, carryin inventory at the beginning of the year, and the desirable carryout inventory at the end of the year. Reserve almonds may be disposed of in authorized reserve outlets, such as certified organic markets or for use in almond oil, almond butter, and animal feed. Reserve almonds can also be released for sale into normal marketing channels based on a revision of the aforementioned factors and other information. Authority for the Board to recommend revisions in the volume regulation percentages is provided in § 981.48 of the order. Such revisions must be recommended by May 15.

The Board met in May and July of 1999 to review projected crop estimates and marketing conditions for the 1999-2000 crop year. A record crop of 830 million kernelweight pounds was projected for the season. This would produce an estimated 796.8 marketable kernelweight pounds after an adjustment for processing losses and exempt product. When combined with estimated carryin and adjusted for desired carryout, an estimated 827.2 million pounds was available for the 1999-2000 crop year. Trade demand was estimated by the Board at 649 million pounds; thus, a projected oversupply of almonds existed for the 1999-2000 crop year of about 178.2 million pounds. The Board also considered other factors such as price levels and fluctuations, increased plantings and yields, and weather-related variations in production, and ultimately recommended establishment of a reserve for the 1999-2000 season. The Department established salable and reserve percentages of 77.64 and 22.36 percent, respectively, for almonds received by handlers during the 1999-2000 crop year, pursuant to a regulation published in the Federal Register on November 2, 1999 (64 FR 59107).

The Board met on April 10, 2000, to consider disposition of the reserve. At that time, the Board evaluated marketing and other conditions in the industry, and recommended revisions to the marketing policy estimates initially used in establishing the reserve. A comparison of the initial estimates and revised estimates are contained in the following table.

In arriving at these estimates, the Board revised its the 1999-2000 crop estimate of 830 million pounds to 827.4 million pounds, and marketable production of 796.8 million pounds to 794.3 million pounds. The carryin on August 1, 1999, was initially estimated to be 100.4 million pounds. That figure was revised to reflect actual carryin of 91.8 million pounds. Thus, the total available supply for the 1999-2000 crop year is slightly lower than initially estimated.

Shipment figures for the year to date were analyzed. Through March 2000, total industry shipments of almonds were 525.5 million pounds, significantly higher than shipments for a comparable period in any prior year. Based on historical shipping patterns and shipments to date this season, the Board anticipates strong shipment levels to continue for the remainder of the season. Therefore, the Board revised its trade demand estimate from 649 million pounds to 695 million pounds.

Although an official crop estimate for the 2000-2001 crop year will not be available until May 11, 2000, the consensus in the industry is that next year's crop will be significantly smaller than the current crop. Several factors have contributed to this conclusion. In addition to the usual pattern of a shorter crop following a large crop, the weather throughout the production area during the month of February was generally cool, rainy, and windy. During this period, almond trees were in bloom, and the weather conditions were not conducive to good flower pollination. Field observations since the bloom period confirm that next year's crop will be significantly smaller. Preliminary industry discussions indicate that the 2000-2001 crop will be approximately 550 million pounds. A crop of that size would not provide a sufficient supply of almonds to meet trade needs and provide an adequate carryout at the end of the 2000-2001 crop year. Therefore, to provide more almonds to satisfy the current year's trade demand and to augment next year's supplies, the Board recommended releasing the 1999-2000 crop year reserve.

The Board also considered the timing of releasing reserve product to salable market channels. The Board determined that a gradual release schedule would best serve the industry. This would prevent a large quantity of almonds from being made available for sale by handlers immediately, which could put downward pressure on prices and create disorderly marketing conditions. Thus, the Board unanimously recommended releasing one-third of the reserve as soon as possible, one-third on June 1, 2000, and the final-third on July 1, 2000. The resulting salable and reserve percentages will be 85.09 percent and 14.91 percent, respectively, on the effective date of this rule; 92.55 percent and 7.45 percent, respectively, on June 1, 2000; and 100 and 0 percent, respectively, on July 1, 2000.

Pursuant to requirements set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), the Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has considered the economic impact of this action on small entities. Accordingly, AMS has prepared this initial regulatory flexibility analysis.

The purpose of the RFA is to fit regulatory actions to the scale of business subject to such actions in order that small businesses will not be unduly or disproportionately burdened. Marketing orders issued pursuant to the Act, and rules issued thereunder, are unique in that they are brought about through group action of essentially small entities acting on their own behalf. Thus, both statutes have small entity orientation and compatibility.

There are approximately 105 handlers of California almonds who are subject to regulation under the marketing order and approximately 6,000 producers in the regulated area. Small agricultural service firms have been defined by the Small Business Administration (13 CFR 121.201) as those having annual receipts of less than $5,000,000, and small agricultural producers are defined as those whose annual receipts are less than $500,000.

Based on the most current data available, about 54 percent of almond handlers ship under $5,000,000 worth of almonds and 46 percent ship over $5,000,000 worth on an annual basis. In addition, based on production and grower prices reported by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), and the total number of almond growers, the average annual grower revenue is approximately $195,000. In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the majority of handlers and producers of California almonds may be classified as small entities.

Pursuant to §§ 981.47 and 981.49, during the 1999-2000 crop year, handlers were required to withhold as a reserve, from normal competitive markets, 22.36 percent of the almonds which they received from growers (64 FR 59107, November 2, 1999). The remaining 77.64 percent of the crop could be sold by handlers to any market at any time. Volume regulation was implemented because the available supply of almonds for the 1999-2000 crop year, adjusted by carryin and desired carryout, was estimated to be about 827 million pounds, which exceeded the estimated trade demand needs of about 649 million pounds.

Pursuant to § 981.48 of the order, this rule releases 7.45 percent of the reserve on the effective date of this rule, 7.45 percent on June 1, 2000, and 7.45 percent on July 1, 2000. Releasing the reserve is necessary to provide a sufficient quantity of almonds to meet anticipated trade demand and carryover needs. Shipment levels through March 2000 and anticipated strong shipments for the remainder of the season lead to an increased trade demand estimate from 649 million pounds to 695 million pounds. In addition, because a smaller 2000-2001 crop is expected (approximately 550 million pounds), the industry would like to increase the amount of 1999-2000 carryout inventory from 70 million pounds to 191.2 million pounds to augment supplies during the next crop year. Timing of the release is structured so that all 178 million pounds of reserve product will not enter the market at one time.

This action is expected to have a positive effect on producers and handlers of almonds. It gradually removes the regulatory requirement that handlers hold product in reserve or sell it to reserve outlets. Handlers will be able to sell reserve almonds into normal markets at prevailing prices (currently in the range of $1.25 per pound to $1.60 per pound) as opposed to selling them into lower value reserve outlets (ranging from 8 to 15 cents per pound for oil or 4 to 5 cents per pound for animal feed). Although reserve almonds can be sold to organic markets or for use in the manufacture of almond butter at higher prices than other reserve outlets, the quantity that can be sold is limited because those markets are limited. Handlers and growers should be able to achieve higher total revenue for their product by selling to normal markets, because trade demand for almonds has increased significantly from early season estimates, and price levels have also improved in recent months.

Releasing reserve almonds into the market in three stages will help to ensure that a large supply of almonds is not available for sale by handlers at the same time, which could create a temporary oversupply and have a negative impact on price levels. The staged release will also help to ensure that additional product will be available to carry into the following crop year to augment anticipated short supplies.

This action is intended to promote orderly marketing conditions for the remainder of the 1999-2000 crop year and also leading into the 2000-2001 crop year, for the benefit of producers and handlers, regardless of size.

One alternative considered was to release all of the reserve product to normal market channels as soon as possible. This alternative was not recommended because it was believed that too much product would be available at one time, creating a short-term oversupply situation, which could negatively impact prices and market conditions. Another alternative considered was to release one-third of the reserve as soon as possible, and if the May 11, 2000, crop estimate issued by NASS for the 2000-2001 crop is less than 525 million pounds, to release the entire reserve as soon as possible after that. If the May crop estimate is more than 525 million pounds, this alternative would release one-third of the reserve as soon as possible after the estimate is issued and the final one-third on July 1, 2000. This was not recommended. The Board decided that three equal releases were preferable.

All the scenarios considered had the common goal of releasing all the 1999-2000 crop year reserve to the salable category. The Board ultimately recommended releasing one-third of the reserve as soon as possible (on the effective date of this rule), one third on June 1, 2000, and the final one-third on July 1, 2000. The Board believed this would best achieve orderly marketing objectives. Adequate supplies should be available to meet market needs for the remainder of the crop year and for carryin to the next crop year, thus satisfying market needs and maintaining market and price stability.

This rule will not impose any additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements on either small or large handlers. As with all Federal marketing order programs, reports and forms are periodically reviewed to help reduce information requirements and duplication by industry and public sector agencies.

In addition, the Department has not identified any relevant Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or conflict with this rule.

Further, the Board's meeting was widely publicized throughout the almond industry and all interested persons were invited to attend the meeting and participate in Board deliberations. Like all Board meetings, the April 10, 2000, meeting was a public meeting and all entities, both large and small, were able to express their views on this issue.

Also, the Board has a number of appointed committees to review certain issues and make recommendations to the Board. The Board's Reserve Committee met on April 10, 2000, and discussed this issue in detail. That meeting was also a public meeting and both large and small entities were able to participate and express their views. Finally, interested persons are invited to submit information on the regulatory and informational impacts of this action on small businesses.

A small business guide on complying with fruit, vegetable, and specialty crop marketing agreements and orders may be viewed at the following website: http://www.ams.usda.gov/fv/moab.html. Any questions about the compliance guide should be sent to Jay Guerber at the previously mentioned address in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

After consideration of all relevant material presented, including the Board's recommendation, and other information, it is found that this interim final rule, as hereinafter set forth, will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act.

A comment period of 15 days is provided to allow interested persons to respond to this interim final rule. A comment period of 15 days is deemed appropriate to allow the Department sufficient time to consider comments prior to the scheduled releases on June 1, and July 1, 1999. All comments timely received will be considered in finalizing this action.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553, it is also found and determined upon good cause that it is impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest to give preliminary notice prior to putting this rule into effect and that good cause exists for not postponing the effective date of this rule until 30 days after publication in the Federal Register because: (1) This rule relaxes requirements currently in effect by increasing the quantity of almonds that may be marketed; (2) the 1999-2000 crop year ends July 31, (3) this rule was discussed at a public meeting and interested persons had an opportunity to provide input; (4) the rule was unanimously recommended by the Board; and (5) this rule provides a 15-day comment period and any comments received will be considered prior to finalization of this rule.

This rule has been determined to be “non significant” for purposes of Executive Order 12866, and, therefore, has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

This rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. It is not intended to have retroactive effect. This rule would not preempt any state or local laws, regulations, or policies, unless they present an irreconcilable conflict with this rule.

The Cotton Research and Promotion Act provides that administrative proceedings must be exhausted before parties may file suit in court. Under Section 12 of the Act, any person subject to an order may file with the Secretary a petition stating that the order, any provision of the plan, or any obligation imposed in connection with the order is not in accordance with law and requesting a modification of the order or to be exempted therefrom. Such person is afforded the opportunity for a hearing on the petition. After the hearing, the Secretary would rule on the petition. The Act provides that the District Court of the United States in any district in which the person is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, has jurisdiction to review the Secretary's ruling, provided a complaint is filed within 20 days from the date of the entry of ruling.

Pursuant to requirements set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) AMS has considered the economic impact of this action on small entities and has determined that its implementation will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small businesses.

There are an estimated 10,000 importers who are presently subject to rules and regulations issued pursuant to the Cotton Research and Promotion Order. This rule would affect importers of cotton and cotton-containing products. The majority of these importers are small businesses under the criteria established by the Small Business Administration. This rule would lower the assessments paid by the importers under the Cotton Research and Promotion Order. Even though the assessment will be lowered, the decrease is small and will not significantly affect small businesses.

The current assessment on imported cotton is $0.011397 per kilogram of imported cotton. The amended assessment is $0.009833, a decrease of $0.001564 or a 13.72 percent decrease from the current assessment. From January through December 1999 approximately $23 million was collected at the $0.011397 per kilogram rate. Should the volume of cotton products imported into the U.S. remain at the same level in 2000, one could expect the decreased assessment to generate approximately $19.8 million or a 13.72 percent decrease from 1999.

In compliance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations (5 CFR part 1320) which implement the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ) the information collection requirements contained in the regulation to be amended have been previously approved by OMB and were assigned control number 0581-0093.

The Cotton Research and Promotion Act Amendments of 1990 enacted by Congress under Subtitle G of Title XIX of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 on November 28, 1990, contained two provisions that authorized changes in the funding procedures for the Cotton Research and Promotion Program.

These provisions are: (1) The assessment of imported cotton and cotton products; and (2) termination of the right of cotton producers to demand a refund of assessments.

An amended Cotton Research and Promotion Order was approved by producers and importers voting in a referendum held July 17-26, 1991 and the amended Order was published in the Federal Register on December 10, 1991, (56 FR 64470). Proposed rules implementing the amended Order were published in the Federal Register on December 17, 1991, (56 FR 65450). Implementing rules were published on July 1 and 2, 1992, (57 FR 29181) and (57 FR 29431), respectively.

This rule will decrease the value assigned to imported cotton in the Cotton Board Rules and Regulations (7 CFR 1205.510 (b) (2)). This value is used to calculate supplemental assessments on imported cotton and the cotton content of imported products. Supplemental assessments are the second part of a two-part assessment. The first part of the assessment is levied on the weight of cotton produced or imported at a rate of $1 per bale of cotton which is equivalent to 500 pounds or $1 per 226.8 kilograms of cotton.

Supplemental assessments are levied at a rate of five-tenths of one percent of the value of domestically produced cotton, imported cotton, and the cotton content of imported products. The agency has adopted the practice of assigning the calendar year weighted average price received by U.S. farmers for Upland cotton to represent the value of imported cotton. This is done so that the assessment on domestically produced cotton and the assessment on imported cotton and the cotton content of imported products remain similar. The source for the average price statistic is “Agricultural Prices”, a publication of the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the Department of Agriculture. Use of the weighted average price figure in the calculation of supplemental assessments on imported cotton and the cotton content of imported products yields an assessment that approximates assessments paid on domestically produced cotton in the prior calendar year.

The current value of imported cotton as published in the Federal Register (64 FR 30236) on June 7, 1999, for the purpose of calculating supplemental assessments on imported cotton is $1.3977 per kilogram. This number was calculated using the annual weighted average price received by farmers for Upland cotton during the calendar year 1998 which was $0.634 per pound and multiplying by the conversion factor 2.2046. Using the Average Weighted Price Received by U.S. farmers for Upland cotton for the calendar year 1999, which is $0.492 per pound, the new value of imported cotton is $1.0847 per kilogram. The amended value is $0.313 per kilogram less than the previous value.

An example of the complete assessment formula and how the various figures are obtained is as follows:

One bale is equal to 500 pounds.

One kilogram equals 2.2046 pounds.

One pound equals 0.453597 kilograms.

A 500 pound bale equals 226.8 kg. (500 × .453597).

$1 per bale assessment equals $0.002000 per pound (1 ÷ 500) or $0.004409 per kg. (1 ÷ 226.8).

The 1999 calendar year weighted average price received by producers for Upland cotton is $0.492 per pound or $1.0847 per kg. (0.492 × 2.2046) = 1.0847.

Five tenths of one percent of the average price in kg. equals $0.005424 per kg. (1.0847 × .005).

The total assessment per kilogram of raw cotton in obtained by adding the $1 per bale equivalent assessment of $0.004409 per kg. and the supplemental assessment $0.005424 per kg. which equals $0.009833 per kg.

The current assessment on imported cotton is $0.011397 per kilogram of imported cotton. The amended assessment is $0.009833, a decrease of $0.001564 per kilogram. This decrease reflects the decrease in the Average Weighted Price of Upland Cotton Received by U.S. Farmers during the period January through December 1999.

Since the value of cotton is the basis of the supplemental assessment calculation and the figures shown in the right hand column of the Import Assessment Table 1205.510 (b)(3) are a result of such a calculation, the figures in this table have been revised. These figures indicate the total assessment per kilogram due for each Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) number subject to assessment.

A proposed rule with a request for comments was published in the Federal Register (65 FR 12141) on March 8, 2000. No comments were received during the comment period (March 8 through April 7, 2000).

Background

Section 218(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), requires that “[t]he Secretary [of Energy] shall establish a demonstration program, in cooperation with the private sector, for the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel at civilian nuclear reactor power sites, with the objective of establishing one or more technologies that the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission may, by rule, approve for use at the sites of civilian nuclear power reactors without, to the maximum extent practicable, the need for additional site-specific approvals by the Commission.” Section 133 of the NWPA states, in part, “[t]he Commission shall, by rule, establish procedures for the licensing of any technology approved by the Commission under Section 218(a) for use at the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor.”

To implement this mandate, the NRC approved dry storage of spent nuclear fuel in NRC-approved casks under a general license, publishing a final rule in 10 CFR Part 72 entitled, “General License for Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites” (55 FR 29181; July 18, 1990). This rule also established a new Subpart L within 10 CFR Part 72 entitled, “Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks,” containing procedures and criteria for obtaining NRC approval of dry storage cask designs.

This rule will add the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system to the list of NRC approved casks for spent fuel storage in 10 CFR 72.214. Following the procedures specified in 10 CFR 72.230 of Subpart L, Holtec International submitted an application for NRC approval with the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) entitled “Topical Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System.” The NRC evaluated the Holtec International submittal and issued a preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and a proposed Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the Holtec HISTORM 100 cask system. The NRC published a proposed rule in the Federal Register (64 FR 51271; September 22, 1999) to add the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system to the listing in 10 CFR 72.214. The comment period ended on December 6, 1999. Four comment letters were received on the proposed rule.

Based on NRC review and analysis of public comments, the NRC staff has modified, as appropriate, its proposed CoC, including its appendices, the Technical Specifications (TSs), and the Approved Contents and Design Features, for the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system. The NRC staff has also modified its preliminary SER. Finally, comments were received from other industry organizations suggesting changes to the TSs and the Approved Contents and Design Features. Some of these were editorial in nature, others provided clarification and consistency, and some reflected final refinements in the cask design. The NRC staff agrees with many of these suggested changes and has incorporated them into the final documents, as appropriate. The NRC staff has also modified the rule language by changing the word “Certification” to “Certificate” to clarify that it is actually the Certificate that expires.

The NRC finds that the Holtec International HI-STORM 100 cask system, as designed and when fabricated and used in accordance with the conditions specified in its CoC, meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72. Thus, use of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system, as approved by the NRC, will provide adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment. With this final rule, the NRC is approving the use of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system under the general license in 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K, by holders of power reactor operating licenses under 10 CFR Part 50. Simultaneously, the NRC is issuing a final SER and CoC that will be effective on May 31, 2000. Single copies of the CoC and SER are available for public inspection and/or copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

The NRC received four comment letters on the proposed rule. The commenters included a industry users group, two members of the public, and a State. Copies of the public comments are available for review in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20003-1527.

The comments and responses have been grouped into eleven areas: General, radiation protection, accident analysis, criticality, design, welds, structural, materials, thermal, technical specifications, and miscellaneous. Several of the commenters provided specific comments on the draft CoC, the NRC staff's preliminary SER, the TSs, and the applicant's SAR. Some of the editorial comments have been grouped. To the extent possible, all of the comments on a particular subject are grouped together. The listing of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system within 10 CFR 72.214, “List of approved spent fuel storage casks” has not been changed as a result of the public comments. A review of the comments and the NRC staff's responses follow.

Comment A.1: One commenter expressed concern over the number of cask designs being certified because there would be more problems and a lack of standardization and integration in the country's total waste system. The commenter stated that this amendment would change existing environmental concerns as it would add one more design, complicating the waste system for workers at a plant. The commenter asked how many designs would be certified by the NRC and how many designs could be used at one plant. Additional designs add to more mistakes and human error because each design has different fabrication criteria and handling procedures.

Response: These comments are beyond the scope of this rule that is focused solely on whether to add a particular cask design, the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system, to the list of approved casks. Pursuant to the general license, each licensee must determine whether or not the reactor site parameters are encompassed by the cask design bases considered in the cask SAR and SER. Further, each general licensee must document this determination in accordance with 10 CFR 72.212.

Comment A.2: One commenter stated that the tiered environmental impact statement (EIS) is outdated for current dry cask design and should be redone, particularly looking at terrorism and sabotage at an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The environmental assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI) prepared as required by 10 CFR Part 51 conform to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) procedural requirements. Tiering on past EISs and EAs is a standard process under NEPA. As stated in the Council on Environmental Quality's 40 Frequently Asked Questions, the tiering process makes each EIS/EA of greater use and meaning to the public as the plan or program develops without duplication of the analysis prepared for the previous impact statement.

The NRC reviewed potential issues related to possible radiological sabotage of storage casks at reactor site ISFSIs in the 1990 rule that added Subparts K and L to 10 CFR Part 72 (55 FR 29181; July 18, 1990). The NRC still finds the results of the 1990 rule current and acceptable. In addition, each Part 72 licensee is required by 10 CFR 73.51 or 73.55 to develop a physical protection plan for the ISFSI. The licensee is also required to install systems that provide high assurance against unauthorized activities that could constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

Comment A.3: One commenter questioned whether the NRC was including interim storage away from reactors in the EA, such as at a Federal or private storage site in Nevada or Utah. The commenter further questioned whether it was the NRC's intent to include transfer and storage at a second site in the EA. The commenter asked if the certification covered use at an interim site in Nevada or Utah.

Response: The EA supports the generic use of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system under a general license. The storage could occur at any site that meets the definition of a general licensee under 10 CFR Part 72. The general licensee must evaluate the site to determine whether or not the chosen site parameters are enveloped by the design bases of the approved cask as required by 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3). The EA does not cover transportation from one site to another.

Comment A.4: One commenter questioned whether the NRC claims to have done research on the condition of spent fuel after 20 to 50 years of storage at a reactor in pools and dry casks, after being unloaded twice and being transported across the country. The commenter stated that a detailed analysis of what can happen to spent fuel before it gets to Nevada or Utah should be conducted by the NRC. The commenter asked what the spent fuel will be like and what the potential environmental impacts will be after the fuel is unloaded and transported.

Response: The NRC staff has reviewed numerous research reports regarding the long term condition of spent fuel in wet and dry storage. Additionally, the NRC has ongoing confirmatory research with spent fuel removed from dry storage after 10 to 20 years. Analysis of spent fuel has included the loads from routine shipping; and the effects, primarily due to vibration, were found to be negligible.

The HI-STORM 100 MPC is a dual-purpose canister. Once loaded in the MPC, the fuel is not intended to be unloaded and reloaded as the questioner suggests. The lid welding and testing requirements and the structural and thermal analyses in the SAR give the NRC staff reasonable assurance that cask confinement and fuel integrity will be maintained under design basis normal, off-normal, or accident events. Therefore, fuel unloading should not be necessary. Regardless of whether unloading may be necessary, each cask user is required to develop detailed site-specific unloading procedures. Proper unloading does not cause any particular degradation to occur to the fuel.

Comment A.5: One commenter stated that the no action alternative was acceptable because the NRC should not be certifying numerous designs. The commenter stated that other agencies such as NWTRB, EPA, OCRWM, and DOE should be contacted for their views on what happens to the whole waste system as more designs are certified.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC found no inherent design features that would result in significant environmental impacts and that the HI-STORM 100 design meets regulatory requirements. Therefore, there is no basis for denial of the application. The NRC does not limit the number or types of casks that may be certified. The NRC is not required to contact the agencies mentioned by the commenter and we have not specifically solicited their input. The commenter may contact these other agencies if interested in their views.

Comment A.6: One commenter recommended finding a reference (reference 1 on page 3-16 of the SER) that is more recent than 1962.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. This reference refers to the change of the coefficient of friction from static to dynamic condition. The rational behind this engineering principle has not changed with time.

Comment A.7: One commenter stated that the NRC should request simpler designs because of material interactions instead of approving designs with new materials that have never received long term testing for material interactions.

Response: The NRC staff disagrees with this comment. The materials used in casks are selected upon the basis of the needed properties. Casks are constructed from a limited number of materials. The materials used in the Holtec HI-STORM design have a long history of use in the nuclear industry and the performance of those materials is well known.

Comment A.8: One commenter objects to site specific changes that are made to generic designs.

Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rule that is focused solely on whether to place the HI-STORM 100 cask system on the list of approved casks. Section 72.48 permits changes to the spent fuel storage cask as described in the FSAR and defines the conditions under which these changes may be made without prior NRC approval.

Comment A.9: One commenter stated that it appeared that Holtec split what appears to be one generic system into two separate rules and asked why the system was not certified together. Systems should be complete when they are proposed for rulemaking. The commenter further stated that vendors should apply for storage and transport at the same time and that NRC should not allow loading until the transportation portion is certified.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The HI-STAR 100 Cask System and HI-STORM 100 Cask System are two separate spent fuel storage cask systems. Each is a complete spent fuel storage cask system that satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72. Regarding the dual-purpose (storage and transportation) use of a cask system or its components, separate certifications are required for approval of a cask design (or individual components such as a canister) under the provisions of use for 10 CFR Parts 71 and 72. There is no regulatory requirement that the certification be simultaneous.

Comment A.10: One commenter asked a number of site-specific questions related to Private Fuel Storage's plans to use the Holtec HI-STAR and HI-STORM cask systems at the Utah site. These issues related to cask handling, dry transfer, sabotage scenarios, infrastructure for unloading, etc. One commenter stated that they understood that Private Fuel Storage plans to use the HI-STAR system for storage and transport with the HI-STORM as a companion concrete overpack, that the metal HI-STAR overpack would be used as a backup, and that the commenter objected to these plans.

Response: The comment is beyond the scope of this rule that is focused solely on whether to add a particular design, the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system, to the list of approved casks. The rule will enable licensees to use this cask system under the general license provisions of 10 CFR Part 72. The rule does not address site-specific issues related to potential users.

Comment A.11: One commenter objected to calling the cask a multi-purpose cask (MPC) because that stands for storage, transport, and disposal, and stated that the cask is not approved for these functions which can cause confusion when real MPCs are certified.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The name or model number given to the cask design is developed by the applicant. The CoC for the Holtec HI-STORM 100 is intended for the interim storage of spent fuel. The use of MPC in a dry storage cask application or an NRC SER/CoC is not a certification under 10 CFR Part 71 for the transport of radioactive materials or an approval for disposal at a high-level waste repository.

Comment A.12: One commenter stated that Holtec should not be allowed to approve its own suppliers and that the suppliers should be ASME-approved.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. NRC regulations do not require an ASME stamp for a cask or the use of ASME-approved suppliers. The design and fabrication requirements for a certified dry cask storage system are described in 10 CFR Part 72 and the NRC staff's Standard Review Plan, NUREG-1536, “Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems” (SRP). Applicant submittals are reviewed to the criteria in the SRP. Cask fabrication activities are audited by the licensees and inspected by the NRC staff to ensure that components are fabricated as designed. The CoC holder and licensee are responsible for verifying that fabricators are qualified. The CoC holder and licensee must have a Quality Assurance (QA) Program that has been approved by the NRC as part of the licensing or CoC issue process. This QA program must meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.148 and 10 CFR 72.154 for the selection of fabricators. Also, the procurement documents issued to the fabricator must comply with 10 CFR 21.31. The licensee/CoC holder is required to verify that all regulations and CoC conditions applicable to the container are met. The NRC inspects the licensee/CoC holders and fabricators to verify compliance. Additionally, many storage cask fabricators are certified by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and are N-Stamp Certificate holders.

Comment A.13: One commenter stated that issues should not be resolved in telephone conferences but in public meetings with a record in the public document room.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Telephone conferences are an important mode of communication with applicants and licensees and enable the NRC staff to conduct its official business efficiently. If, in these telephone conferences, the NRC staff receives information that would form the basis for its regulatory decision, that information is documented and made available for public inspection under 10 CFR Parts 2 and 9.

Comment A.14: One commenter stated that all details of the design should be finalized and open for public comment.

Response: The NRC disagrees that all design details need to be finalized and open for public comment before a design is approved. The NRC staff focuses its review on those design details that are significant with respect to the health and safety of the public and/or are required to make a regulatory finding. Design details that are pertinent to the NRC staff's findings are finalized and made available for public inspection and comment under 10 CFR Parts 2 and 9.

Comment B.1: One commenter objected to the use of less shielding for the 100-ton transfer cask and allowing the utilities to perform a cost-benefit analysis to justify the use of the 100-ton transfer cask at the expense of the worker. The workers should receive the minimum achievable dose and not the maximum allowable dose. The NRC should not allow the use of the 100-ton transfer cask because the dose is 3 times higher and workers should not be treated as guinea pigs. The commenter stated that the utilities should be required to use the 125-ton transfer cask which is safer and modify their facilities to accommodate the transfer cask or choose a cask that works for their specific site limitations because the utilities shouldn't limit the shielding for workers.

Response: NRC disagrees with this comment. Each cask user will operate the HI-STORM 100 under a 10 CFR Part 20 radiological protection program. ALARA means making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the dose limits while taking in account the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to the state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety. As stated in Section 2.0.3 of the SAR, the general licensee should utilize the 125-ton transfer cask provided it is capable of using it. However, licensees not capable of using the more shielded design may employ ALARA considerations when evaluating whether to modify its plant or use the 100-ton transfer cask. The NRC found this acceptable as discussed in Section 10.2 of the SER.

Comment B.2: One commenter asked why the specific dose rate criteria for the HI-TRAC was not given and indicated that the criteria should be included.

Response: The applicant did not provide explicit dose rate values as design criteria for the transfer cask designs, but stated that the radiological requirements of 10 CFR Parts 72 and 20 as the overall shielding design objectives for the cask system. The NRC found this acceptable. The TSs in Appendix A of the CoC specify dose rate limits for the transfer casks that are based on the applicant's shielding calculations.

Comment B.3: One commenter questioned the bounding analysis for cobalt impurities, asked how much cobalt is really in the fuel, and if the quantity had been tested and verified for the real thing.

Response: The applicant's analysis of cobalt impurities is discussed in Section 5.2.1 of the SER. The applicant showed that the cobalt impurity values that are assumed in its shielding analyses were appropriate based on industry data and analysis of post-irradiation cooling of older fuel. The NRC found this acceptable. The cask user is not required to measure the actual quantity of cobalt in its spent fuel. The cask user will operate the cask under a 10 CFR Part 20 radiological protection program and verify that the cask system meets the dose rate limits specified in the TSs.

Comment B.4: One commenter asked why backscattering was not considered for all cask designs.

Response: This comment is beyond the scope of this rule that is focused solely on whether to add a particular cask design, the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system, to the list of approved casks. Note that backscatter was considered for the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system.

Comment B.5: One commenter asked what are the various array configurations allowed and what are the differences between them. The commenter asked if the cask array is limited to two rows and for the applicable NRC criteria.

Response: The use of the HI-STORM design is not limited to two rows. The NRC requires the applicant to perform off-site dose calculations from a typical ISFSI array to demonstrate that radiation shielding features are sufficient to meet the radiological requirements of 10 CFR Parts 72.104 and 72.106. As discussed in Section 5.3.1 of the SER, the applicant used a two-row cask array model as part of its methodology to estimate off-site dose rates. The values obtained by this method can be applied to dose rate calculations for typical cask arrays that may consist of multiple rows. NRC found the dose estimates to be acceptable. Each general licensee will identify an ISFSI configuration and perform a site-specific dose evaluation to demonstrate compliance with Part 72 radiological requirements.

Comment B.6: One commenter asked why the dose rate for the bottom of the MPC-68 was higher than for the MPC-24 when the dose rates at the side and top were higher for the MPC-24. The commenter stated that the trunnion doses showed that extreme care needs to be taken in those areas and that the bottom doses are really high and don't get enough attention.

Response: The applicant appropriately assumed design basis fuel loadings for each canister and estimated dose rates at various locations. The NRC notes that dose rates at the bottom of the canister depend on several factors such as the fuel hardware characteristics, irradiation and cooling history, and the relative position of each fuel type within the cask system. The NRC found that the applicant appropriately addressed these and other factors, and that the calculated dose rates at the bottom and at the trunnions of the transfer cask were acceptable. In addition, each cask user will operate the HI-STORM 100 under a 10 CFR Part 20 radiological protection program and monitor dose rates during loading and unloading.

Comment B.7: One commenter asked what the dose for the 2x5 cask array was at 100 meters.

Response: Figure 5.1.3 of the SAR indicates that the dose rate for a 2x5 array at 100 meters is approximately 600 to 700 mrem/yr assuming a design basis fuel loading and 100 percent occupancy. Each general licensee will identify an ISFSI configuration and perform a site-specific dose evaluation, based partly on site-specific characteristics, to demonstrate compliance with Part 72 radiological requirements.

Comment B.8: One commenter asked why other cask designs do not account for approximate atmospheric conditions. The commenter also asked the conditions of weather or location for which the air density decreases.

Response: Atmospheric density changes daily. The measure of the density is provided by local weather forecasters through the barometric pressure. When a high pressure front passes an area, the air density is greater than when a low pressure weather front passes the same location.

The comment concerning other cask designs is beyond the scope of this rule that is focused solely on whether to place the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system on the list of approved casks. For the HI-STORM 100, each general licensee should consider atmospheric conditions relevant to its ISFSI as indicated in Section 5.4.2 of the SER.

Comment B.9: One commenter asked how much the releases from dry storage add to the effluent from a reactor site and the duration of a release, and what happens to the cask and fuel during the release.

Response: Specific effluent releases from reactors operated by general licensees are beyond the scope of this rule. However, NRC does not expect any effluent release from the HI-STORM 100 under credible conditions. Design basis public exposures from direct radiation and hypothetical releases are discussed in SER Sections 10.4 and 10.5.

Comment B.10: One commenter approved of the condition in Appendix B of the CoC regarding the evaluation of engineering features ( e.g. berm) that are used for radiological protection by the user.

Response: No response is necessary.

Comment B.11: One commenter stated that average surface dose rates in TS 3.2.1 for transfer cask dose rates should not be used, that the highest value should be used, and the limit should not be exceeded. The commenter also asked why the side dose rates are measured along the middle of the flat surface section of the neutron shield rather than on the radial steel fins where dose rates are assumed by the commenter to be higher.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The specification of surface average dose rates and the measuring locations on the side of the neutron shield are consistent with health physics methods that are used to characterize radiation fields around a cask. The measuring locations are also consistent with the dose rate calculations presented in the applicant's shielding analysis. The cask user will operate the HI-STORM 100 under a 10 CFR Part 20 radiological protection program. NRC has reasonable assurance that the general licensee's radiological protection and ALARA program will detect and mitigate exposures from the radiation fields that are expected during operation of the HI-STORM 100 system.

Comment B.12: One commenter asked why the dose rate for the bottom of the transfer cask is not provided in TS 3.2.1 and what is that dose rate.

Response: Dose rate limits for the bottom of the transfer casks are not needed because they would not provide a significant benefit in ensuring compliance with regulatory limits on occupational dose and dose to the public. The dose limits at the top and side of the transfer casks are adequate to help ensure that the cask system is safely operated in compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 72. Calculated dose rates at the bottom of the transfer casks are reported in Sections 5.1 and 5.4 of the SAR.

Comment B.13: One commenter recommended that Section 5.1.2 of the SER be revised to clarify that overpack surface dose rates are design objectives and are shown to be met by analysis, and that the TSs are equal to or more conservative than the design objectives.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The NRC staff does agree that the vent dose rates calculated by the applicant are significantly less than the applicant's proposed design criteria. However, the differences between the calculated vent dose rates and the proposed design criteria are not relevant to the bases and findings in the SER. The TSs in Appendix A of the CoC specify vent dose rate limits for the overpack that are based on the applicant's shielding calculations. Therefore, a revision to the SER to reflect the dose rate difference is not necessary.

Comment B.14: One commenter recommended that Section 5.4.11 and Table 5.4-1 of the SER be clarified to indicate that the dose rates are not peak or maximum values.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The SER has been clarified to state the vent dose rates are average over the area of the vent opening. A footnote has been added to Table 5.4.1 to clarify values are average over surface detector areas.

Comment B.15: One commenter recommended that Section 10.5.1 of the SER be revised to indicate that the maximum MPC leak rate is utilized in the calculations.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The SER text has been revised accordingly.

Comment B.16: One commenter indicated there was an inconsistency between the accident condition whole body and thyroid dose values referenced in Chapter 11 of the draft SER and the dose values calculated in Section 7 of the applicant's SAR.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The SER has been revised to indicate the correct whole body and thyroid dose values calculated by the applicant. The accident condition whole body total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is 44.1 mrem and the thyroid dose is 4.1 mrem.

Comment B.17: One commenter objected to the use of a 30-day duration of a radiological release during an accident. The commenter noted that this assumption is stated in Interim Staff Guidance 5 but that it is not justified in the guidance or any accompanying report. The commenter pointed out that NRC regulations for ISFSIs do not require offsite emergency planning, or planning for the ingestion pathway zone, and therefore, there is no basis for assuming that something happens within 30 days to stop the release.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. As indicated in ISG-5, Rev.1, the 30-day assumption is consistent with the time period that is used to demonstrate compliance with radiological dose requirements associated with reactor facilities that operate under 10 CFR Part 50. The applicant specified corrective actions for each accident in Chapter 11 of the SAR. NRC believes that these corrective actions can be reasonably achieved within 30 days. Although NRC does not expect effluent release from the HI-STORM 100 under credible accident scenarios, the 30-day assumption in the analysis is acceptable because the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that in the 30-day timeframe adequate protective measures can and will be taken for the public in the event of a radiological emergency. These protective measures include implementation of the general licensee's Part 50 emergency plan, evacuation of the surrounding public, and mitigation of radiological ingestion pathways.

Comment B.18: One commenter objected to the assumption that a person at the fence post (500 meters) would be exposed for only 2000 hours/year which is the number of working hours in a year. The commenter stated that 8,760 hours/year should be used because a licensee can not control who would be in the area outside the fence or how long they would be there. For conservatism, the applicant should have assumed that people, such as mothers with pre-school aged children, the elderly, ranchers, and farmers are present at the fence post day-long and year-round.

Response: The NRC agrees that 8,760 hours/year should be used and notes that Section 7.2.9 of the HI-STORM SAR explicitly states that: “The individual at the site boundary is exposed for 8,760 hours [7.0.2].” The NRC staff's independent calculations confirmed Holtec's calculated results, as stated in the NRC staff's SER. In addition, Section 7.2.9 also assumed in its calculations that: “The distance from the cask to the site boundary is 100 meters.” With respect to hypothetical individual exposed at the site boundary, the methods used in the dosage calculations cover children, the elderly, ranchers, farmers, etc. The overall public dose limit is protective of all individuals because the variation of sensitivity with age and gender was accounted for in the selection of the lifetime risk limit, from which the annual public dose limit was derived.

The NRC continues to believe that the existing regulations and approved methodologies adequately address public health and safety. The issue of dose rates to children was addressed in the Federal Register on May 21, 1991 (56 FR 23387).

Comment B.19: One commenter stated that the dose due to direct gamma and ingestion of radionuclides should be considered in the dose calculation because to ignore these pathways underestimates the dose. The commenter further objected to the NRC staff stating (in the Holtec HI-STAR 100 final rule) that these pathways would be addressed in the general licensee's site-specific review. The commenter stated that there is no regulatory requirement for these actions to be taken by the general licensee. The commenter stated that it is misleading for the applicant to do a calculation that provides a reassuring result, based on assumptions that have nothing to do with the real requirements of the regulations because licensees tend to rely heavily on the generic analyses that have been performed by cask manufacturers.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Although the NRC does not expect effluent release from the HI-STORM 100 under credible conditions, the applicant's method used to determine design basis dose rates from a hypothetical release are adequate to demonstrate that the confinement features are sufficient to meet the radiological requirements of 10 CFR 72.106. The NRC staff believes the methods applied by the applicant conservatively bound hypothetical dose rates to the general public. Further, 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6) requires the general licensee to review its reactor emergency plan and radiation protection program to determine its effectiveness and make changes if necessary when using a cask listed in 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart L.

Comment B.20: One commenter stated that the thyroid and whole body doses should consider chlorine-36 (Cl-36) because it will be present in the irradiated fuel and will significantly contribute to the dose. The commenter points out that the Department of Energy acknowledges that Cl-36 is one of the significant radionuclides in Appendix A, of the Yucca Mountain Draft EIS.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC staff's independent analysis of the thyroid and whole body dose was based on independent calculations using the ORIGEN computer code, as referenced by the commenter. The calculated contribution of the chlorine gas was below the truncation limit used in the calculation. Cl-36 has an inconsequential contribution on the total dose to an individual.

Comment C.1: One commenter asked if lead could be a missile strike barrier from a tornado or from current weapons. The commenter asked if missiles could penetrate the transfer cask and canister inside, and when the missile strike is assumed to occur ( i.e. when a loaded transfer cask is on top of the overpack.) The commenter stated that this needs to be updated and evaluated.

Response: The lead backed outer shell of HI-TRAC has been evaluated for the required tornado missile strike. The analysis shows that there is no penetration consequence that would lead to a radiological release. The threat of missiles from weapons is beyond the scope of this rule.

Comment C.2: One commenter expressed concern that the transfer cask is a real target on top of the storage cask and asked if it had been fully evaluated for terrorism and sabotage, particularly when it was on top of the storage cask. The commenter asked if the overpack was put in place while on the pad; the commenter felt that this would be a target for terrorists. The commenter asked if the transfer cask, with inner cannister inside, could be knocked off by a terrorist blast and fall, crash, or roll into other casks or be upended so that the fuel is upside down.

Response: The performance of the transfer cask in a sabotage or terrorist event was not evaluated. The threat of terrorism or sabotage is beyond the scope of this rule. See also the response to C.8.

Comment C.3: One commenter asked if the seismic event was based on the actual pad analysis and not the reactor building seismic analysis because the conditions between the reactor building and pad location could significantly differ.

Response: The storage pad is a site-specific issue and is beyond the scope of this cask design rule. Under 10 CFR 72.212, the cask operators are required to perform written evaluations to ensure that storage pads have been designed to adequately support the stored casks. The licensee using a particular cask design has the responsibility under the general license to evaluate the match between reactor site parameters and the range of site conditions ( i.e. the envelope) reviewed by the NRC for an approved cask.

Comment C.4: One commenter asked how a full cask array would behave in a seismic event. The commenter asked what buildings or equipment are allowed on the pad that could crash into the casks during a seismic event, such as the transfer equipment. The commenter asked if a crack or “push up” of the pad could cause the cask to roll (down an incline or into water).

Response: The SAR indicates that the HI-STORM 100 overpack will neither slide nor tip over due to a seismic event with the design-basis earthquake input listed in Section 3.4.2 of the SER. The use of a general licensed cask by a utility requires that the user ensure that the site is not subject to any potential accident that has not been analyzed for the general license. This would include any potential design basis earthquakes that were not enveloped by the NRC SER for the cask or any site conditions associated with the actual pad and cask locations that could affect the cask design.

Comment C.5: One commenter asked what the design-basis earthquake on top of the surface pad was and where it occurred. The commenter questioned why the bottom surface was not evaluated because the ground can push up and crack or cause heaving in the concrete and how the condition of the bottom surface is known.

Response: The design basis earthquake is the most severe earthquake that has been historically reported for a particular site and surrounding area, with sufficient margins for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which historical data have been accumulated. Structure, systems, and components important to safety are designed to withstand the effects of this earthquake without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design basis earthquake is described by an appropriate response spectrum anchored at the peak ground acceleration. The response is then amplified through the pad to obtain the input response spectrum at the top of the pad (or at the bottom of the cask) for cask seismic evaluation. Soil and storage pad interaction is a site-specific issue that will be addresses in the cask user's 10 CFR 72.212 evaluation and is beyond the scope of this rule.

Comment C.6: One commenter asked what happens if the pad is cracked and heaving up as the cask is tipping over because a tornado or seismic event will likely affect both the pad and the casks.

Response: The NRC does not consider the scenario described by the commenter to be credible. The evaluation in Section 3 of the SAR shows that tipover will not occur. However, as a defense-in-depth measure, cask tipover is also evaluated in Section 3 of the SAR and discussed in Section 3.4.2 of the SER.

Comment C.7: One commenter asked if the cask could become upside down in a tornado or seismic event and if it happened would the top of the fuel hit the underside of the MPC lid with the weight on the overpack lid studs.

Response: The HI-STORM 100 overpack is evaluated for tornado, tornado missiles, and seismic events in Section 3 of the SAR. The results indicate that the cask will not tip over. Therefore, the cask will not become upside down.

Comment C.8: One commenter stated that an airplane crash with its fuel fire should be evaluated, including crash into a full cask array, damage to the pad, and a fuel and airplane explosion after the crash. The commenter stated that an anti-missile device with an incendiary device and a truck bomb should be analyzed for the cask transfer facility (CTF).

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Before using the HI-STORM 100 casks, the general licensee must evaluate the site to determine whether or not the chosen site parameters are enveloped by the design bases of the approved casks as required by 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3). The licensee's site evaluation should consider the effects of nearby transportation and military activities.

The NRC reviewed potential issues related to possible radiological sabotage of storage casks at reactor site ISFSIs in the 1990 rule that added Subparts K and L to 10 CFR Part 72 (55 FR 29181; July 18, 1990). NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 establish physical protection requirements for an ISFSI located within the owner-controlled area of a licensed power reactor site. Spent fuel in the ISFSI is required to be protected against radiological sabotage using provisions and requirements as specified in 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5). Further, specific performance criteria are specified in 10 CFR Part 73. Each utility licensed to have an ISFSI at its reactor site is required to develop physical protection plans and install systems that provide high assurance against unauthorized activities that could constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.

The physical protection systems at an ISFSI and its associated reactor are similar in design features to ensure the detection and assessment of unauthorized activities. Alarm annunciations at the general license ISFSI are monitored by the alarm stations at the reactor site. Response to intrusion alarms is required. Each ISFSI is periodically inspected by NRC. Also, the licensee conducts periodic patrols and surveillances to ensure that the physical protection systems are operating within their design limits. The ISFSI licensee is responsible for protecting spent fuel in the casks from sabotage not the certificate holder. Comments on the existing regulations specifying what type of sabotage events must be considered are beyond the scope of this rule.

Comment C.9: One commenter questioned why the tornado missile test simulated a pulse impact of a vehicle and stated that a sharp object such as a metal pole or other items that might be in the vicinity of a real pad would do more penetration damage.

Response: In addition to the 4,000-pound automobile impacting at a 126 mph velocity, the SAR also provided analyses for two more missiles impacting at 126 mph velocity: a 1-in diameter steel sphere and an 8-in diameter rigid cylinder. Results of the analyses show that the 4,000 pound automobile produces the highest impact force on the cask because it has the largest mass. Based on these results, the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the 4,000 pound vehicle bounds the effect of other credible types of tornado missiles.

Comment C.10: One commenter stated that the 15-minute transporter fire is not valid. A big plane crash with its fuel should be evaluated as well as a sabotage missile penetration with an incendiary device.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The basis for the 4.8-minute fire (not a 15 minute fire, see response to comment C.18) is associated with the time it would take to burn 50 gallons of fuel, presumably carried by the transporter. The CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4, states that “the on-site transporter fuel tank will contain no more than 50 gallons of diesel fuel while handling a loaded OVERPACK or TRANSFER CASK.” Other modes of transport causing the fire ( e.g., airplanes, trains, delivery trucks or missiles) are not considered as plausible and are beyond the scope of this rule. Before using the HI-STORM casks, the general licensee must evaluate the site to determine whether or not the chosen site parameters are enveloped by the design bases of the approved cask as required by 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3). Included in this evaluation is the verification that no credible source of an external explosion that would produce an external pressure above that analyzed in the SAR and that any cask handling equipment used to move the HI-STORM cask to the pad is limited to 50 gallons of fuel (refer to CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4—Site Specific Parameters and Analyses).

Comment C.11: One commenter asked why there were no calculations for the bottom plate, overpack lid, etc. in a fire because the temperatures of these plates were important to know and could affect the pad or fire fighting equipment.

Response: The applicant did calculate the temperatures for the bottom plate and the overpack lid. However, these temperatures were not reported in the SAR. Not all calculated temperatures are reported in the SAR. With respect to the impact of fire on the pad or fire fighting equipment, a postulated 50 gallon fuel source would have minimal impact on those components. The heat generated by the pool of fuel is directed upward where the fuel is in a gaseous state. The limiting temperatures will occur above the surface of the concrete pad. Because the fuel has to vaporize in order to burn, the liquid fuel on the concrete will have minimal impact on the bottom plate of the overpack lid (in a liquid state, the fuel is cool). The duration of the fire is less than 4 minutes. The impact on the fire fighting equipment would be minimal, if any. Table 4-3 of the SER was modified to indicate that the temperatures were not reported.

Comment C.12: One commenter asked how the 45,000 MWD/MTU for 5 years related to the sabotage and terrorist evaluation for radiation disposal and stated that the evaluation is outdated.

Response: The comment on the sabotage report is beyond the scope of this rule. See the discussion in the response to C.8.

Comment C.13: One commenter asked if the water jacket could be pierced with an anti-missile gun or if a terrorist could shoot the jacket full of holes, and what are the consequences if these events did occur.

Response: The specific threat of an anti-missile gun or other small arms against the HI-STORM 100 is beyond the scope of this rule. However, the resultant dose rate for an assumed complete loss of the water jacket is addressed in Section 5.1.2 of the SAR. The analysis indicates that the off-site dose at 100 meters will be below the 5 rem accident limit in 10 CFR 72.106.

Comment C.14: One commenter asked why a burial under a landslide during a seismic event is not considered.

Response: Burying a cask due to seismic event, landside, or tornado is considered a very unlikely event. Considering the unlikeliness of the event coupled with the casks being able to withstand these events make burying and any adverse consequence in the opinion of the NRC not credible.

Comment C.15: One commenter asked why a vertical drop of a loaded transfer cask is not considered a credible accident, particularly as it is perched on top of the concrete overpack to load.

Response: A vertical drop of a transfer cask is not considered credible because vertical lifting of a loaded transfer cask must be performed with structures and components designed to prevent a cask drop. The criteria for those structures and components are specified in Section 3.5 of Appendix B to CoC No. 1014. The restrictions on vertical lifting are specified in Section 5.5 of the TSs (Appendix A to the CoC).

Comment C.16: One commenter stated that defense-in-depth is needed for sabotage events which could cause a tipover.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. Sabotage events are beyond the scope of this rule. They are considered in Part 73. Furthermore, the SAR demonstrates that the HI-STORM 100 overpack will not tipover due to a design basis accident. However, as an added defense-in-depth measure, cask tipover is evaluated in Section 3 of the SAR and discussed in Section 3.4.2 of the SER.

Comment C.17: One commenter asked why a postulated explosion from a truck bomb at the pad fence was not evaluated.

Response: The specific threat of a truck bomb is beyond the scope of this rule. The response to C.8 addresses radiological sabotage of storage casks at generally licensed ISFSIs.

Comment C.18: One commenter asked the basis for the 217-second fire for the overpack and the 4.8-minute fire for the transfer cask. The commenter also asked if the NRC assumed that nothing on the vehicle or in the vicinity (such as grass or trees or other structures) will burn and cause the fire to burn longer.

Response: The duration of a fire burn is based on several factors. One factor is the rate at which the fire burns, normally categorized as inches of fuel burned per minute. The burn rate (inches per minute) is the same for both the overpack and the transfer cask because the source of fuel is the same ( e.g. , diesel fuel). The duration of the burn comes from the postulated depth of the pool of fuel. A conservative estimate of the time of burn is to assume that the spilled fuel does not extend beyond 1 meter of the surface of the overpack or the surface of the transfer cask. (In reality, the fuel will spill significantly farther than one meter on a flat surface, just as spilling a bucket of water on the ground, and will not accumulate to any significant depth which creates a shorter fire burn time.) Because the outer diameter of the overpack and the outer diameter of the transfer cask are different, the postulated depth or height that 50 gallons of fuel is postulated to reach will differ for the two cases. The case with the higher column of fuel will burn longer. Because the surface area of the pool of fuel for the overpack is 1.3 times larger than for the transfer cask, the pool of fuel for the overpack will be lower (given the same volume of available fuel, e.g. , 50 gallons). A lower pool of fuel will burn quicker. (Note that the burn rate is in inches of fuel per minute, and a smaller column of fuel will burn quicker than a higher column of fuel). Therefore, the burn time for the overpack is shorter than the burn time for the transfer cask.

With respect to other flammable sources that could catch fire, before using the HI-STORM cask, the general licensee must evaluate the site to determine whether or not the chosen site parameters are enveloped by the design bases of the approved cask as required by 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3). Included in this evaluation is the verification that the cask handling equipment used to move the concrete cask to the pad is limited to 50 gallons of fuel (refer to CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4.5) and that the assumptions used in the SAR bound the consequences for the proposed site. Additional assessments would have to be performed if other sources are identified that could result in a more limiting fire.

Comment C.19: One commenter objected to the use of the leakage rate used by Holtec because it is based on an analysis of a transportation cask rather than a storage cask, for which the NRC and industry have different design and testing requirements. The commenter noted that the small assumed leakage rate and calculation methodology in NUREG/CR-6487 are based on ANSI standard N14.5 for transportation casks. ANSI N14.5 assumes that casks will be leak-tested periodically before shipment and after maintenance and repair. The commenter pointed out that some ISFSIs have no design provisions for testing helium leakage during storage and no provisions for repairing and maintaining casks and testing for leakage after repair and maintenance. Therefore, it is inappropriate to assume that these storage casks will have the same small leakage rate as transportation casks for which leakage potential is designed and planned to be monitored. The commenter stated that neither Holtec nor the NRC has any basis for relying on NUREG-1617 to assume a small leakage rate in a storage cask breach.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The ANSI N14.5 standard was developed to determine allowable leak rates for shipping packages that employ mechanical seals, which typically undergo repetitive use. Periodic testing is prescribed for the mechanical seal to ensure it has not degraded from repetitive use and/or seal maintenance. The analytic technique in ANSI N14.5 that is used to determine a leak rate across an assumed leak path is valid for determining an assumed leak rate across the confinement boundary of a welded canister. An off-site dose can be subsequently calculated using standard atmospheric dispersion principles and assuming a partial release of the cask constituents at the calculated leak rate. The welded closure is leak-tested to a sensitivity equal to the calculated leak rate to ensure integrity of the confinement system before storage operations. Periodic testing of the confinement boundary is not applicable because the welded confinement boundary is designed to remain intact during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions for the lifetime of the canister.

Comment C.20: One commenter stated that the methodology used in NUREG/CR-6487 may not apply for accidents that exceed the design basis accident. The allowed leak hole size can easily be exceeded in accidents involving sabotage such as an impact with a MILAN or TOW-2 hand held anti-tank device, a jet engine, or military ordnance.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Consideration of accidents that exceed design basis is not required by 10 CFR Part 72 and is beyond the scope of the NRC staff's review. The threat of accidents involving sabotage is beyond the scope of this rule. Sabotage issues are covered by 10 CFR Part 73.

Comment C.21: One commenter stated that Holtec should consider a 300 gallon fire or a 6,000 gallon fire. The commenter stated that these are credible accidents at an ISFSI and should be considered. A heavy haul tractor carries 300 gallons of fuel and is likely to be used at ISFSIs. Locomotives that carry casks to ISFSIs may carry 6,000 gallons of diesel fuel.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The analysis need only address the maximum permissible source of fuel at the storage site near the HI-STORM 100 system (10 CFR Part 72). Section 3.4 of Appendix B to the CoC limits the source of fuel near the HI-STORM 100 system to 50 gallons. Licensees are required to verify that all conditions of the CoC are met.

Comment C.22: One commenter stated that Holtec's fire analysis is deficient because the fire calculations assume that the fire takes place outside the concrete storage cask and does not consider the possibility of a fuel fire being drawn into the intake vent of the HI-STORM 100 cask.

Response: The NRC staff disagrees with the comment. The purpose of the fire analysis is to assess the consequences of a postulated fire on the HI-STORM system. The elements of interest are the impact of the fire on the peak clad temperature and the impact of the fire on the system materials. A 50-gallon fuel supply will have a very short burn duration. Applying the conservative assumptions of 10 CFR Part 71, a 50-gallon fuel supply would theoretically result in a pool size of 0.54 inches if limited to a one-meter spread around the overpack. The burn duration of the fuel in this configuration is 3.6 minutes. This burn duration will have insignificant impact on the peak clad temperature. The heat capacity of the system is too great to have an appreciable feedback on the peak clad temperature for a short duration transient. The greatest impact of a fire will be felt on the overpack. A bounding analysis was performed on the overpack by imposing a maximum burn temperature (specified in 10 CFR Part 71) on the entire outer surface of the overpack. This maximizes the impact on the steel liner and the concrete. In a less conservative calculation, the maximum temperature will be limited to the lower portion of the overpack. For additional conservatism, the applicant increased the inside temperature of the overpack to 300°F to account for heating of the air as it passes through the vents. As illustrated in SAR Figures 11.2.1—11.2.5, this bounding calculation illustrates that only the outer boundary of the concrete exceeds the temperature limit for concrete. At a depth of one inch into the concrete the temperature limit is not challenged. If a conservative assumption postulates the fire to occur inside the vent, similar results would occur because there is only a limited amount of energy (BTU) that can be deposited into the massive overpack structure. Exceeding the concrete temperature limit only at the concrete surface does not lead to a safety concern, and therefore, the SAR analysis is acceptable.

Comment C.23: One commenter stated that the consequences of a hit by an anti-tank missile, such as the MILAN or TOW-2 missile should be considered. The commenter noted that the regulations only require a licensee to install systems that protect against unauthorized entry; however, entry to a site is not necessary to successfully carry out sabotage using an anti-tank missile. The commenter stated that the NRC should place additional conditions in the CoC to lower the probability of a sabotage event. The commenter further pointed out that the NRC has been inconsistent and arbitrary in determining whether to treat sabotage issues as site-specific or generic.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The threat of an anti-tank missile and other sabotage events is beyond the scope of this rule. Requirements on radiological sabotage are covered in 10 CFR Part 73 and apply to both ISFSIs and spent fuel storage cask designs. Therefore, comments on a specific threat or mode of attack are beyond the scope of this Part 72 rule. See also the response to C.8 addressing radiological sabotage of storage casks at reactor site ISFSIs.

Comment D.1: One commenter objected to the assumption on the continued efficacy of the boral over a 20-year storage period because it has never been tested or proven.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC staff does not consider the loss of fixed neutron poisons credible after installation into the cask because the poisons are fixed in place and contained. The neutron absorber is designed to remain effective in the HI-STORM system for a storage period greater than 20 years and there are no credible means to lose the neutron absorber. Section 6.3.2 of the HI-STORM SAR describes the neutron absorber and its environment, and evaluated boron depletion due to neutron absorption. Section 9.1.5.3 of the SAR describes the testing procedures for the neutron absorber material. The neutron absorber material will be manufactured and tested under the control and surveillance of a quality assurance and quality control program that conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G. The compositions and densities for the materials in the computer models were reviewed by the NRC staff and determined to be acceptable. This material is not unique and is commonly used in other spent fuel storage and transportation applications.

Comment D.2: One commenter asked if Boral had ever been used in any dry storage casks before and if it had, how long and had it been tested. The commenter asked if this was an experiment with a new application. The commenter further asked what proof was available to show the continued efficacy of a boral panel. The commenter asked what other fuel storage and transport applications utilized Boral and stated that it should be documented in the SER.

Response: As described in SAR section 1.2.1.3.1, Boral has been used in environments comparable to those in spent fuel storage casks since the 1950s, and in spent fuel shipping casks for Canadian spent fuel in the 1960s. In the United States, Boral has been used in numerous other spent fuel transportation casks since the early 1980's and in storage casks since the early 1990's. Some of the casks that use Boral are the NAC-I28 S/T, NAC-S/T, the NUHOMS-24P, NUHOMS MP-187, and BMI-1. The NRC disagrees that the HI-STORM SER should include a list of other casks that use Boral. Information on other spent fuel casks and Boral is publicly available. The response to comment D.1 discusses the efficacy of Boral and why testing other than initial fabrication testing is not necessary.

Comment D.3: One commenter stated that a test should be conducted to verify the presence and uniformity of the neutron absorber in fabrication.

Response: The presence and uniformity of the neutron absorber is verified as described in Section 9.1.5.3 of the SAR. The neutron absorber material will be manufactured and tested under the control and surveillance of a quality assurance and quality control program that conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G.

Comment D.4: One commenter asked if water injection in unloading reflood could result in large amounts of steam generation and two-phase flow conditions inside the MPC cavity causing over pressurization of the confinement boundary and a potential criticality.

Response: As stated in SAR section 6.4.2.1, the HI-STORM system was evaluated with various water densities inside the cask. The cask met the design criterion of k eff less than or equal to 0.95 for all credible flooding conditions. The cask is most reactive when filled with full density water. As can be seen in SAR Table 6.4.1, the cask reactivity decreases when filled with low density water ( i.e. , steam).

In addition, Section 4.5.1.1.6 describes the cask cooldown and reflood analysis during fuel unloading operation. This section of the SAR states that before reflooding the cask with water, the helium inside the MPC is cooled to below 200°F which is below the boiling point of water. The procedures are outlined in Section 8.3.1 of the SAR with reference to TS 3.1.3. These procedures limit steam generation and two-phase-flow interactions with the fuel to acceptable levels, thereby preventing over pressurization of the MPC.

Comment E.1: One commenter asked if there are three MPCs that are NRC-certified for storage and transfer because the SER states that they are evaluated and approved.

Response: As stated in Condition 1.b. of the CoC and in Section 1.1 of the SER, there are three types of MPCs that can be used in the HI-STORM 100 Cask System: The MPC-24, the MPC-68, and the MPC-68F. The MPC-24 holds up to 24 PWR fuel assemblies that must be intact. The MPC-68 holds up to 68 BWR fuel assemblies that may be intact or damaged ( i.e. , with known or suspected cladding defects greater than hairline cracks or pinholes). The MPC-68F holds up to 68 BWR fuel assemblies that may be intact, damaged, or in the form of fuel debris ( i.e. , with known or suspected defects such as ruptured fuel rods, severed fuel rods, and loose fuel pellets). All three MPCs have the same external dimensions. Section 1.2.1.1 and Table 1.2.1 of the SAR has been revised to clarify that there are three types of MPCs.

Comment E.2: One commenter asked how and to what the trunnion is attached, and what it is made of.

Response: The trunnions are attached by welds to the inner and outer shell and to the HI-TRAC top flange. The trunnions are fabricated of SB-637-N07718 steel and SA-350-LF3 steel.

Comment E.3: One commenter stated that the concrete for the overpack should be reinforced and asked why it is not reinforced.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The main function of the concrete encased between the steel shells in the HI-STORM 100 overpack is shielding. The structural strength of the HI-STORM 100 overpack is provided by the inner and outer carbon steel shells. The concrete, on the other hand, will provide an added benefit to the HI-STORM 100 overpack because it will increase the stiffness and weight of the overpack to resist external forces due to seismic, tornado, and tornado missiles.

Comment E.4: One commenter asked if the pedestal could shift in movement and touch the liner or if it could corrode to the carbon steel liner or baseplate. The commenter also asked what the baseplate was made of and if a ceramic baseplate should be used.

Response: The pedestal consists of concrete, 17 inches thick, encased in a steel shell. This shell is welded to the steel overpack baseplate, and the weld is examined according to the ASME Code Section V. Stresses in the pedestal have safety factors exceeding 16. The pedestal will not shift. The exterior and interior surfaces of the overpack are coated with an epoxy paint to prevent corrosion. The overpack baseplate is made of carbon steel that meets the design criteria.

Comment E.5: One commenter stated that jamming of parts could be a problem because unjamming the parts could cause damage (during both loading and unloading). The commenter further asked if the cask had been tested for jamming and what the situation would be after 20 to 40 years in storage.

Response: Stainless steel shims, depicted in Detail T of drawing 1495, sheet 5, prevent the MPC from contacting the overpack interior and preclude the paint from being scraped during the operational steps. The drop accident analyses cause stresses which significantly bound the stresses that could occur during normal handling operations. Therefore, damage to the MPC during loading and unloading into the overpack is not credible.

The calculation in the SAR demonstrated that there will be no jamming of the MPC in the overpack under the most severe stack-up of tolerances. The cask has not been tested for jamming; however, a dry run of all operational steps is required before use of the system.

The license life of all overpack and MPC components is 20 years. The applicant engineered the overpack, HI-TRAC, and MPC for 40 years of design life. More detailed information regarding the service life of the overpack, HI-TRAC, and MPC can be found in Sections 3.4.11 and 3.4.12 of the SAR.

Comment E.6: One commenter stated that the clearances were not adequate. The commenter asked if the wet fuel would be inserted into the overpack in the same way as the dry run and what happens if the crane does not have the MPC completely vertical when inserting it in the overpack or if the HI-TRAC or pad is not level.

Response: There is no adverse tolerance stack-up that would prevent the insertion of the MPC into the overpack. Additionally, the dry run will verify that the MPC can be inserted into the HI-TRAC and overpack. All cell plates of the MPC are constructed of stainless steel that is not effected by immersion in water; therefore, the tolerances for the dry run would not change and the wet fuel will go in the same way as in the dry run.

Comment E.7: One commenter is concerned that the manufacturer's tolerances are not clear if fabrication is the minimum margin of safety or minimum clearance allowed.

Response: The most severe “stack-up” of manufacturer's tolerances provides sufficient clearance for insertion of the MPC into the HI-TRAC. The minimum clearance allowed is thus met. The cask could be manufactured to the minimum allowed clearances, but this would not reduce the minimum margin of safety.

Comment E.8: One commenter asked if there would be a problem if the radial clearance of the HI-TRAC MPC is at a maximum and the radial clearance of the MPC overpack is at the minimum allowed. The commenter asked how much leeway is allowed in fabrication in both of these radial clearance measurements.

Response: No operational problem exists if the radial clearance of HI-TRAC/MPC is at a maximum tolerance “stack-up” and the radial clearance of the MPC overpack is at the minimum tolerance “stack-up.” These tolerances have been evaluated for all manufacturer's design criteria requirements and for all design temperatures. The largest allowable radial dimension of the HI-TRAC is greater than the smallest allowable radial dimension of the overpack. Fabrication requirements, including tolerances, are stated on the drawings. These tolerances provide sufficient clearance for operations.

Comment E.9: One commenter expressed concern over the 13/16 -inch difference in the maximum MPC diameter and minimum overpack internal diameter because it was a minuscule amount for fabrication. The commenter also asked what was meant by average radial clearance of about 0.4 inches and stated that it was not a lot of clearance.

Response: The 13/16 -inches is the minimum clearance accounting for tolerances between the MPC diameter and the channels/shims that are attached to inner shell of overpack. The channels/shims provide guidance for MPC insertion, position MPC within the overpack, and allow the cooling air flow to circulate through the overpack. The minimum clearance between the MPC and overpack inner shell is approximately 5 inches without the channels. Both the clearance between the MPC and channels/shims and between the MPC and overpack inner shell are considered to be acceptable. The SER has been changed to clarify that 13/16 -inches is the clearance between the maximum MPC diameter and the channels/shims that are attached to inner shell of overpack rather than between the MPC and overpack inner shell. The average radial clearance is diametral clearance divided by two.

Comment E.10: One commenter asked what the computed decrease (page 3-9 of the SER) was related to. The commenter expressed concern that these were very small calculation amounts (0.11 inches) to depend on computer accuracy.

Response: The computed decrease of 0.11 inches is the calculated maximum decrease in the inner diameter of the overpack shell due to a tipover accident. The 0.11 inches decrease in the inner diameter of the overpack shell is not computed by computer simulation. Rather, it is computed by using a standard text book equation for deformation calculation. The deformation due to tipover is expected to be small. This calculation has been evaluated by the NRC staff and found to be acceptable.

Comment E.11: One commenter asked if the base under the pads would be the same at all sites and asked what is under the pad. The commenter is concerned that the pad evaluation has not received adequate attention because it is a crucial part of the tipover and drop evaluation.

Response: Each user is required to meet the site parameters in CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4 that include specific requirements for the pad. Site characteristics will be investigated by each cask user and addressed in the cask user's 10 CFR 72.212 evaluation. The pad is a site-specific issue. Site-specific issues are beyond the scope of this rule that is focused solely on whether to add the HI-STORM 100 cask system to the list of approved casks.

Comment E.12: One commenter asked why there were two different weights for the transfer cask.

Response: As discussed in Section 1.2.1.2.2 of the SAR, the 100-ton transfer cask weighs less than the 125-ton transfer cask because it has a reduced thickness in lead and water. The 100-ton transfer cask is designed for facilities not capable of handling the heavier 125-ton transfer cask.

Comment E.13: One commenter asked why the bottom pool lid supported the weight of a loaded MPC plus water.

Response: During lifting of the transfer cask from the fuel pool there is water in the MPC and the annulus. Therefore, the structural evaluation of the bottom pool lid of the transfer cask must consider all the applicable weights supported by the pool lid, including the water.

Comment E.14: One commenter stated that the cask should be up on something to air out the area under the cask to prevent rusting. The commenter questioned if the baseplate rusted if that could cause the cask to tipover or lean. The commenter is concerned that if the canister ended up leaning against the inner liner of the concrete shell, it would cause blockage of the venting annulus and create a hotspot in the concrete.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The baseplate is coated with an epoxy type coating to prevent corrosion. Some rusting may occur at scratches in the coating. However, even a postulated extreme case, assuming no coating present, would not result in sufficient corrosion to cause an amount of leaning that would be significant.

Comment E.15: One commenter asked if there is any leeway for the pressure in the concrete encasement between the two carbon steel outer and inner liners, if the concrete had room to move, and if the concrete could split the outer carbon steel encasing it, particularly at the welds.

Response: The coefficient of thermal expansion of steel is only slightly greater than that of concrete, and the thermal gradient through the overpack wall, experienced during the extreme temperature criteria, was calculated to be approximately 40°F. This temperature difference and thermal coefficient of expansions do not cause the inner steel to apply significant force to the concrete in the overpack. The outer steel shell expands somewhat more than the concrete; therefore, the concrete has room for expansion and exerts no force on the outer steel plates.

Comment E.16: One commenter asked what a bottom pool lid is and how it is replaced by the heavier shielded transfer lid and if it has been tested.

Response: The bottom pool lid is described in Section 1.2.1.2.2 of the SAR. The lids are interchanged with a transfer slide device as described in Section 8.1.1 of the SAR. The NRC did not require test results for lid changing operations. The NRC found the pool and transfer lid design to be acceptable for the HI-STORM 100 system.

Comment E.17: One commenter asked if the 17.000 inches of concrete for the overpack baseplate was a typo and if the number of significant figures was correct.

Response: The value in the SER has been revised to state 17.0 inches that reflects the thickness assumed in the shielding analysis.

Comment E.18: One commenter stated that the configuration discussion in Section 6.4.1 of the SER is not clear because the HI-STAR doesn't have a transfer cask.

Response: As stated in SER section 6.4.1, the HI-STORM system has a transfer cask, not the HI-STAR system. The transfer cask, the HI-STORM overpack, and the HI-STAR overpack are constructed of different materials. The effectiveness of these materials to reflect neutrons affects the criticality safety of the system; therefore, each was explicitly evaluated. The other parameters affecting the criticality safety of the HI-STORM system, including the transfer cask, are identical to the HI-STAR system.

Comment E.19: One commenter asked if the closure ring was a ring or a lid.

Response: The closure ring is a ring. In the MPC, the lid and the closure ring are two different components.

Comment E.20: One commenter asked how many rings are included in the design.

Response: There is one closure ring included in the design.

Comment E.21: One commenter asked why voids in the installation of the lead shield are only minimized instead of being disallowed completely, if the shield was composed of lead bricks or poured, and which was more prone to voids. The commenter asked if lead bricks could be used and then have lead poured into the cracks between the bricks, and how the lead shield is installed.

Response: The HI-STORM 100 must be fabricated and tested in accordance with the drawings specified in the SAR and under a quality assurance program that meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart G. The proper fabrication of the lead shield, including potential voids, will be evaluated under this quality assurance program. As discussed in Section 9.1.5.2 of the SAR, effectiveness of the lead pours are verified during fabrication by performing gamma scanning on all accessible surfaces of the transfer cask in the lead-pour regions. Installation of the lead shields is discussed in Section 9.1.5.1 of the SAR. The SAR specifies the use of poured lead and does not allow the installation of lead bricks.

Comment E.22: One commenter asked what the relief valve was and what type of maintenance it received.

Response: A relief valve is a mechanical device that opens when pressure inside a system exceeds the actuation pressure of the valve (pressure that will open the valve). Relief valves are common pressure limiting devices. Relief valves are placed on water heaters in homes to ensure that the water pipes in a house will not fail due to excessive pressure. Similarly, relief valves are attached to the radiator in a car to ensure that the coolant hoses do not burst from excessive pressurization of the engine coolant system. Maintenance of the relief valves are discussed in SAR Section 9.2.4. The relief valves are calibrated annually to ensure that their pressure relief setting is correct or they are replaced with factory-set relief valves.

Comment E.23: One commenter asked if there were holes in the shield jacket to add and drain things and indicated that holes would be a potential sabotage threat for someone to drain the jacket or add something dangerous to the water.

Response: There are drain holes in the water jacket end plate. The 125-ton HI-TRAC has two 1 1/2 -inch drain holes and the 100-ton HI-TRAC has four 3/4 -inch drain holes. The resultant dose rate for an assumed loss of the water jacket is addressed in Section 5.1.2 of the SAR. The analysis indicates that the off-site dose at 100 meters will be below the 5 rem accident limit in 10 CFR 72.106. In addition, NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 72 have established physical protection and security requirements for an ISFSI located in the owner-controlled area of a licensed power reactor site.

Comment E.24: One commenter stated that Conditions 1a and 1b of the CoC should both state that the cask system has two transfer casks.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Condition 1b of the certificate of compliance specifies that there are two types of transfer cask options: the 125-ton HI-TRAC and the 100-ton HI-TRAC. It is not necessary to repeat that information in Condition 1a.

Comment E.25: One commenter stated that there should be a drawing of the damaged fuel container in the CoC because the structure is not explained.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. A drawing of the damaged fuel container is included in Chapter 1 of the SAR and is available to the public. This level of detail is not necessary in the CoC.

Comment E.26: One commenter asked what the screens are made of, how the screens are attached, if the screens can deteriorate or come loose over time, and what happens if the screens fall out.

Response: As shown on the drawings in Chapter 1 of the SAR, the damaged fuel container, including the screen, is constructed of stainless steel. The damaged fuel container is an additional structural component that will make the MPC fuel basket even stronger. The screen is placed between two steel plates welded together with a 0.06 inch, continuously 360 degree, all around fillet weld. It is not considered credible for the screens to fall off or fail. However, if a screen failed, there would be no release of radioactive material because the MPC is sealed. Small amounts of loose debris in the MPC have been considered during unloading operations, as described in SAR Section 8.3.4.

Comment E.27: One commenter stated that damaged fuel and intact fuel should not be placed in the same cask because it can cause potential problems in unloading.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Damaged fuel can be stored safely with undamaged fuel. If damaged fuel is stored with undamaged fuel, then CoC, Appendix B, Section 2.1.1.c requires all fuel assemblies in the cask to meet the more restrictive heat generation requirements for the damaged fuel. Additionally, damaged fuel must be loaded into damaged fuel containers to enable safe handling during cask loading and unloading operations.

Comment E.28: One commenter asked what the basis is for putting the hotter fuel in the center of the cask. The commenter also asked if the doses would be accurate if the lower dose fuel is placed at the periphery positions. The commenter stated that it would be better to have a more even heat and dose distribution in the MPC and asked if dose was more important than the heat.

Response: The design of the HI-STORM cask considered both the thermal and radiological effects of the fuel. If one assumes the same enrichment and burnup (time that the fuel was left in the reactor to produce power), the fuel that is left longer to decay in the spent fuel pool ( e.g. , “cooler fuel”) will generate less heat and high-energy radiation than the fuel that is removed sooner from the pool ( e.g. , “hotter fuel”). For the method used in the HI-STORM design, cooler fuel assemblies are stored on the periphery of the cask for two reasons. First, the “cooler fuel” assemblies have lower allowable peak clad temperature limits and the temperature of the assemblies on the periphery is cooler. Second, storing the “cooler fuel” on the periphery of the MPC provides some additional radiological shielding from the hotter fuel assemblies in the center.

Comment E.29: One commenter asked if BPRAs and thimble plugs could be stored in the cask. The commenter stated that they should not be because they add weight.

Response: BPRAs and thimble plugs have not been analyzed for this cask system and, therefore, are not authorized for storage in the HI-STORM 100 at this time.

Comment E.30: One commenter asked what the cask transfer station is and whether it had been designed yet. The commenter asked if it is constructed of reinforced concrete. The commenter stated that more explanation was necessary and that a drawing should be included. The commenter asked how and why an impact limiter is used. The commenter asked what the basis is and if an evaluation had been completed. The commenter was concerned with the use of terms “if” and “shall be designed” because this implies the CTF hasn't been designed. The design should have specific criteria.

Response: The term “cask transfer station” in CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.5.1, is a typographical error and has been corrected to “cask transfer facility.” A cask transfer facility (CTF) is a facility used for transferring the MPC between the transfer cask and the overpack. The CTF does not include 10 CFR Part 50 controlled structures such as the fuel handling building or reactor building. The NRC disagrees that a drawing of the CTF or more design details are necessary. The HI-STORM 100 Cask System is approved for use under the general license provisions of 10 CFR Part 72. Therefore, the cask may be used in any nuclear power reactor site licensed under 10 CFR Part 50, provided that the site parameters are enveloped by the cask design bases. The specific design and operation of the CTF will be dictated by site-specific needs. Because of the varied needs of each reactor site, the NRC found it impractical and unnecessary to review and approve a specific CTF design, including the specific materials of construction. The NRC reviewed and approved the criteria for the design, construction, and operation of the CTF. These criteria are specified in CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.5, and SAR Section 2.3.3.1.

The impact limiter is a possible CTF design feature whose function would be a defense-in-depth measure because the lifting equipment used in the CTF must be designed to preclude a drop. As discussed in the response to comment J.14, the specific requirement for an impact limiter has been eliminated because other methods may be available to prevent a canister breach in case of a canister drop during transfer operations.

Comment E.31: One commenter stated that we should clearly state what the CTF is and make sure that every detail of the procedure is carefully analyzed because it is vague.

Response: The CTF is defined in SAR Section 2.3.3.1 and in CoC, Appendix B, Section 1.0. Detailed design and operational requirements for the CTF are also specified in SAR Section 2.3.3.1, as well as in CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.5. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 72.212 and CoC Condition 2, each licensee that elects to use a CTF must develop written procedures for operating the CTF. These procedures are subject to NRC review during inspection. As required by TS 5.2.h, the licensee must conduct a dry run training exercise, prior to first use of a CTF, to demonstrate that the procedures can be conducted safely and successfully.

Comment E.32: One commenter recommended that Design Drawing 1495, Sheets 4 and 6 and Design Drawing BM-1575, Sheet 2 be revised.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. These changes correct drafting errors or provide a level of flexibility that is acceptable to the NRC staff. The SAR drawings have been revised accordingly.

Comment F.1: One commenter asked how use of the trunnions puts stress on the weld at the water jacket.

Response: Use of the pocket trunnion does not put any stress on the water jacket. The seal weld between the pocket trunnion and water jacket shell is for retaining the water inside the water jacket. The pocket trunnion is attached to the outer transfer cask shell by full penetration welds all the way around the trunnion. When the pocket trunnion is used, the force is transferred to this weld and not to the seal weld on the water jacket. The other type of trunnion on the transfer cask is the lifting trunnion. The lifting trunnion is not connected to the water jacket and, therefore, puts no stress on the water jacket.

Comment F.2: One commenter asked how the welds are checked to be leakproof and whether water can enter the trunnion.

Response: All the structural welds have to be examined and inspected according to the applicable ASME code. The welded joint is an integral part of the structure and is leak proof. Because the trunnions are made of solid steel, water cannot leak into them.

Comment F.3: One commenter stated that the lid and closure ring of the MPC should be full penetration welds and should be ultrasonic tested (UT) as this is the basis for qualification as a redundant seal.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. Full penetration welds are unnecessary from the structural and containment boundary requirements of the design. Employing unnecessarily heavy welds leads to fabrication problems such as excessive warpage. UT of heavy section, full or partial penetration, austenitic stainless steel welds to ASME Code acceptance criteria is not feasible with current technology. The redundant seal concept is based upon the use of two welds forming the leak barrier, not the inspection method. With redundant welds, one weld could leak and the second still provide leak tight integrity.

Comment F.4: One commenter stated that just because there is no known plausible, long-term degradation mechanism to cause seal welds to fail doesn't mean that the welds won't fail.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The NRC staff has examined the plausible mechanisms that would cause failure of the seal welds and has determined that those mechanisms are inoperative under normal service and design accident conditions for HI-STORM. This gives the NRC staff reasonable assurance that the welds will not fail under design basis normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

Comment F.5: One commenter asked how lid welds are removed in unloading and stated that the procedures should be in the documents before the casks are loaded.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. Welded cask lids may be removed by one of several methods. The method of removal and the detailed procedures (as opposed to the general procedures of the SAR) are the responsibility of the ISFSI licensee, subject to NRC review and inspection. The TSs require ISFSI licensees to perform lid removal method demonstrations on full-size mock-ups as part of their pre-operational testing and training exercises. The NRC staff has reviewed and inspected several methods and their associated procedures. Inclusion of such detailed procedures in the SAR is unnecessary.

Comment F.6: One commenter asked what happens if the water jacket welds leak water.

Response: The resultant dose rate for an assumed loss of the water jacket is addressed in Section 5.1.2 of the SAR. The analysis indicates that the off-site dose at 100 meters will be below the 5 rem accident limit in 10 CFR 72.106.

Comment F.7: One commenter stated that the penetrant test (PT) is unacceptable, that the criteria for layers and time are “wishy washy,” and that PT tests should not be allowed.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The commenter has not specified why PT is unacceptable or why it should not be allowed. PT is a Code accepted examination method. The progressive PT technique is used and accepted in the nuclear industry when a volumetric examination by means such as UT is impractical. UT is unsuitable for heavy section austenitic stainless steel welds.

The basis for the structural lid weld examination methods is documented in the NRC's Interim Staff Guidance-4, Revision 1, that allows the use of a multi-layer ( i.e. , progressive) PT examination in lieu of a volumetric examination.

Comment F.8: One commenter stated that welds need to be checked carefully.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. Welds are important which is why they are examined and inspected according to the applicable ASME code.

Comment F.9: One commenter stated that the leak testing procedure used to demonstrate MPC closure cannot be performed as described and that performance of the test is not generally consistent with ANSI N14.5-1997, “Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment.” Consequently, containment of the radioactive material to the stated criteria cannot be demonstrated. The principal reason provided by the commenter is that the nominal concentration of helium in air is 5 parts per million. This atmospheric concentration masks any leakage from the MPC using the specified test conditions. In addition, the commenter noted that there is no direct reference to definitions, equations, formula, methodology, or criteria of the standard in the text. The commenter further noted that when terminology from the standard is given, it is (for the most part) used incorrectly.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. These welds are multipass stainless steel welds that are dye penetrant examined multiple times during the weld process. The multiple dye penetrant examinations provide reasonable assurance of high integrity welds that will retain the inert gas and prevent leakage of radioactive material into the environment. The leakage testing of these welds provides additional insight into the leak-tightness of these welds.

The NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the leakage test procedure outlined in SAR Section 8.1 can be performed as described provided that appropriate equipment is used and the leak test method is properly qualified. The leakage testing for the lid is to be performed with a sniffer type probe; however, the test method for the port and drain covers is not specified in the SAR. There are test methods discussed in Appendix A of ANSI N-14.5 that could be used to perform the port and drain cover leakage testing. Detailed procedures are developed by the user who is responsible for ensuring that the TS limits are met and therefore, confinement is adequately maintained. The leakage testing will require a demonstration that the detector can identify an appropriate calibrated leak in the presence of background helium. Although sniffer probes detect discrete leaks rather than an integrated leakage rate, the typical sniffer probe sensitivity of 10− 8 provides reasonable assurance that the TS leakage rate limit of 5×10− 6 will not be exceeded.

As stated in the SAR, the leak testing will be performed in accordance with ANSI N14.5. It is not necessary to include any more level of detail in the SAR; therefore, no change to the SAR is necessary. Appropriate detail will be included in the site procedures.

The SAR has been changed to use terminology consistent with the TS and the 1997 revision of ANSI N14.5. The terminology was changed from std cc/s to atm cc/s. SAR section 7.3.3 justifies the use of the units atm-cc/sec. Also, the SAR was revised to delete the sensitivity of the detector. The sensitivity will be addressed in the detailed site procedures.

Comment G.1: One commenter stated that all of the accident level events and conditions listed in the SER, particularly a transfer cask handling accident or sabotage, should be evaluated for structural analysis in a jamming condition on top of the overpack.

Response: All design basis normal, off-normal, and accident events have been evaluated in the structural analyses and are discussed in Section 3 of the SER. This includes an evaluation of the transfer cask under a 42-inch horizontal drop during transfer operations. A horizontal drop from a greater height is not considered because the horizontal lifting height limit for the transfer cask is 42 inches. The evaluation shows that the HI-TRAC meets all structural requirements and there is no adverse effect on the confinement, thermal, or subcriticality performance of the contained MPC.

As discussed in the response to C.15, vertical drop of a transfer cask is not considered credible because vertical lifting of a loaded transfer cask must be performed with structures and components designed to prevent a cask drop. Also, as discussed in the response to E.5, jamming is not considered to be credible because of the design of the HI-STORM system. The threat of sabotage is beyond the scope of this rule and is discussed in the response to C.8.

Comment G.2: One commenter stated that bending of the web and pushing of the flanges possibly accompanied by some local weld failures sounded feasible and may not result in limited deformation as assumed. The commenter asked if a full size cask had been tested in a drop or tipover.

Response: The channels attached to the inner shell of the overpack are not classified as important-to-safety and serve no structural purpose. Deformation of the channels, whether limited or complete collapse, does not affect retrievability of the MPC. On the contrary, the deformation of these channels due to a tipover accident absorbs energy which reduces the deceleration loadings to the MPC and provides a greater opening in the overpack during retrieval. NRC regulations do not require full size testing of casks. The applicant can choose the method of analysis. Computer analyses have been performed to determine the responses of a cask in drop and tipover accidents.

Comment G.3: One commenter questioned how the structural analysis conducted for the 125-ton HI-TRAC transfer cask could bound the 100-ton version and indicated that the 100-ton version needs its own analysis.

Response: All the structural analyses and evaluations of the 125-ton transfer cask were repeated for the 100-ton transfer cask. However, the analytical results of the 125-ton transfer cask are greater than that of the 100-ton transfer cask. Therefore, the structural analysis of the 125-ton transfer cask bounds the 100-ton transfer cask.

Comment G.4: One commenter asked what would be the consequences of the deformation of the outer shell and lead and water jacket from a missile, particularly if the transfer cask was on top of the concrete shell.

Response: The HI-TRAC transfer cask is always held by the handling system while in a vertical orientation completely outside of the fuel building. Therefore, considerations of instability due to a tornado missile strike are not included in the evaluation. However, a structural evaluation of the damage to the HI-TRAC transfer cask from an intermediate missile strike and a large missile strike is performed. The evaluation shows that the outer shell and the water jacket would not experience any plastic deformation and will not adversely affect the retrievability of the MPC.

Comment H.1: One commenter questioned why carbon steel was used for the inner and outer plate instead of stainless steel because of the concern over corrosion. The commenter also asked if the carbon steel was coated.

Response: The materials used in the fabrication of the cask are described in Chapters 1 and 3 of the SAR and discussed in Section 3.3 of the NRC SER. These materials have been found acceptable because they meet the requirements for their respective applications in the cask system. They are suitable for the expected loading and storage in wet and dry environments, including corrosion and galvanic effects. There is no requirement for designers to select materials from a given class, e.g. stainless steels.

The carbon steel used in the overpack is protected from corrosion by an industrial epoxy coating commonly used for the protection of steel.

Comment H.2: One commenter stated that one alloy should be specified for cask fabrication instead of allowing a choice because if later problems develop, there are fewer variables.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The materials used in casks are selected on the basis of the needed properties. Allowing a choice of more than one material or alloy for fabrication is acceptable provided that each of the options has the appropriate properties. The materials chosen for use in the Holtec HI-STORM 100 design have a long history of favorable performance in the nuclear industry.

Comment H.3: One commenter questioned why plain concrete is not included in NUREG-1536 and why an exemption was being given to allow plain concrete since reinforced concrete is stronger.

Response: No exemption was given to allow plain concrete to be used for structural components. The plain concrete in the HI-STORM 100 overpack is for shielding only and is not a structural component of the overpack. The reinforced concrete included in NUREG-1536 is for concrete structures (concrete components that provide structural strength) only. The HI-STORM 100 overpack is a welded steel structure, not a concrete structure.

Comment H.4: One commenter asked if the NRC has reviewed the manufacturers direction for the carboline 890 and thermaline 450 coatings. The commenter asked how the coatings are used and applied, and if they will wash or flake off in pool water, making the water cloudy.

Response: The NRC staff has reviewed the manufacturer's technical information for the coatings mentioned. Both coatings are standard coatings employed in industry for immersion service and are applied using common industry tools and techniques. No performance problems would be expected during intended service.

Comment H.5: One commenter asked if the carbon steel caused reactions that could create loading or unloading problems such as reaction products clogging venting or draining equipment with crud or flakes or making the pool water cloudy.

Response: Carbon steel exposed to the cask loading environment produces very fine particulates that do not clog equipment. Turbidity that may arise from corrosion of uncoated carbon steel can be controlled with appropriate water treatment equipment.

Comment H.6: One commenter asked if temperature or coatings on the channel could affect the fit. The commenter also asked if flaking of the coating could clog a channel slide or if corrosion in the channels could cause problems in unloading.

Response: The effects of temperature on the channels have been calculated and do not affect the fit. Each coat of the epoxy paint applied to the exposed surfaces of the inner components of the overpack is, at maximum, 0.008 inches thick. Two coats result in a maximum diametral reduction in inside diameter of 0.032 inches. This reduction will not affect the fit. Both the interior and the exterior of the channels are coated to prevent corrosion.

Comment H.7: One commenter asked if aging was factored into the analysis of the pad and stated that the specific site should be evaluated for a full cask array.

Response: Concrete is resistant to environmental conditions, including air pollution and moisture. Therefore, the NRC staff expects no significant degradation of the pad during the licensed lifetime of the ISFSI facility. Each proposed site is subject to a specific evaluation to ensure that the design parameters satisfy site-specific conditions. In addition, cask users are responsible for inspecting and maintaining the pad, and for ensuring that significant degradation is not occurring over time.

Comment H.8: One commenter asked what the condition of the concrete is right under the shell and expressed concern that the concrete could crack where nobody would see damage needing repair.

Response: As discussed in the response to E.3, the main function of the concrete encased between the steel shells in the HI-STORM 100 overpack is shielding. The structural strength of the HI-STORM 100 overpack is provided by the inner and outer carbon steel shells. Cracking of the concrete would not have a significant impact on the cask's ability to meet the regulatory dose limits. There is no credible mechanism for the concrete to undergo any significant damage. Thus, inspection of the concrete is not necessary.

Comment H.9: One commenter asked if concrete expanded or released water or gas when it is superheated.

Response: Concrete contains some traces of free water. If the water is heated, it will evaporate. Concrete will expand upon heating and contract upon cooling. The amount is governed by the temperature. These expansions/contractions are reversible and not permanent. There are no significant effects of expansions/contractions that would occur even if the temperature went considerably beyond the design temperature parameters.

Comment H.10: One commenter asked how the bottom face affects the supporting surfaces (heat, radiation, weight, stress, pressure etc.).

Response: As listed in Table 4.4.9 of the SAR, the temperature of the bottom lid plate at normal conditions is 183°F. That temperature will not have an adverse effect on the concrete. Radiation will have minimal impact on the concrete pad due to the shielding provided by the pedestal. The weight, stress, and pressure from the cask bottom have no adverse effect upon the pedestal or slab because they are specifically designed to support all the loads due to the casks.

Comment H.11: One commenter asked how the gas and liquid media that escapes from the damaged fuel container interacts with other materials in the MPC and if they can cause problems.

Response: The materials of the cask have been selected to be compatible with any constituent or reaction product of the fuel.

Comment I.1: One commenter asked if hot spots in the cladding could cause lead to sag in the transfer cask if the inner canister is in place and the temperature is close to the boiling point of the water pack.

Response: Hot spots in the cladding would not result in sagging or melting of the lead. The bounding calculation performed by Holtec assumed all the fuel assemblies were at the design basis limit (hottest assemblies). The bounding rod cladding temperature occurs at the center of the MPC and does not have a direct impact on the lead. The assemblies on the periphery of the MPC are significantly cooler because they are located near the cooler surface of the MPC. Table 11.2.8 in the SAR provides the results from a calculation that assumes no water in the water jacket. These results bound the impact of boiling in the water pack. Based on those results, it can be concluded that the lead temperature remains well below the melting temperature.

Comment I.2: One commenter asked what happens if the water in the transfer pack boils and the steam pressure builds up, and stated that this situation should be evaluated.

Response: As the pressure builds up, the pressure is relieved through a safety valve. As water is removed through the safety valve, the temperature of the water remains at the saturation temperature. The case of water boiling in the HI-TRAC water jacket is bounded by the event that assumed no water in the water jacket. This event leads to a temperature in the water jacket that is higher than the saturation temperature of the water. The impact of loss of water in the water jacket is summarized in Table 11.2.8 of the SAR.

Comment I.3: One commenter asked how, during normal conditions, the temperature of the outer shell could be higher than the temperature of the concrete because the carbon steel would breathe less than the concrete, causing the heat to be retained in the concrete. The commenter also asked how the temperature of the concrete could be measured since it is encased in the carbon steel.

Response: The question raised by the commenter is not clear. The temperature of the concrete is higher than the temperature of the outer shell under normal conditions. Reviewing Table 4.4.9 in the SAR, the temperature at the overpack outer shell is not higher than the concrete cross sectional average temperature. The temperature distribution through the overpack under normal conditions is listed in Table 4.4.9 of the SAR ( e.g ., 149 °F for the concrete and 131 °F for the outer shell).

With regard to the question of measuring the temperature of the concrete, the applicant does not measure the temperature of the concrete. Bounding calculations are used to assure that the concrete temperature limits will not be exceeded.

Comment I.4: One commenter asked how the pad reacts to the bottom plate of a cask from a temperature differential standpoint. The commenter asked if the pad would crack and sink under each cask and form a concave area that could then collect moisture. The commenter further asked if the collected moisture could boil and if the moisture could cause the bottom plate to rust.

Response: The heat transfer between the bottom plate of the overpack and the concrete pad is modeled in the thermal computer code for the HI-STORM cask system. As listed in Table 4.4.9 of the SAR, the temperature of the bottom lid plate at normal condition is 183 °F. That energy is transmitted to the concrete pad down to the ground, which is at the normal soil annual average temperature of 77 °F. Therefore, the concrete will not experience temperatures above boiling (no superheating will occur). In the winter, the concrete will not reach freezing temperatures below the cask because it generates heat. If the concrete reaches or exceeds boiling or freezing temperatures, there is no detrimental effect on the strength or condition of the concrete. The pad is specifically designed to support the weight of the casks without any cracking or sinking of the pad. The bottom plate of the cask is stainless steel and will not rust.

Comment I.5: One commenter questioned the basis and validity of simulating the heat effect of adjacent casks radiating heat back to an interior cask and if an analysis of the real situation had been conducted.

Response: The impact of radiation heat transfer from neighboring casks was calculated in the HI-STORM thermal evaluations. The method used by the applicant was to assume that all of the radiated heat is reflected back to the cask. This modeling assumption is equivalent to assuming that the cask was totally encircled by other casks. In reality, less heat will be radiated back to the cask; therefore, the calculations bounded the effects of neighboring casks. The impact of neighboring casks was shown to be minimal. The NRC staff does not require validation of the analytic method with actual experimental data.

Comment I.6: One commenter asked why the analysis assumed that the soil below the overpack was at a constant temperature because the casks could cause hot spots.

Response: The analyses did model the hot spots below the overpack. The computer simulation of the overpack modeled the concrete pad that the overpack is placed on and the temperature of the soil below the concrete pad. The soil is one of several paths for heat to leave the cask. The most significant path for heat dissipation is through the air passage between the MPC and the overpack. The applicant used the highest annual average soil temperature found in the USA. The purpose for using the highest average temperature for the soil and air in the thermal analyses is to demonstrate fuel retrievability and that the cladding is protected during storage against degradation that leads to gross ruptures (10 CFR Part 72.122). One acceptable method for demonstrating that the cladding will not undergo gross rupture is to place a limit on the allowable cladding temperature such that reasonable assurance exists that the cladding will not significantly degrade. A report by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, PNL-6189, dated May 1987, provides one acceptable approach for establishing a temperature limit. The PNL method is conservative when compared to the maximum allowable degradation permitted in Part 72 of the regulations. This method, in conjunction with the maximum annual average temperature, solar heating ( e.g ., insulation), analytic assumptions, etc., provide reasonable assurance that the requirements of Part 72 will be met.

Comment I.7: One commenter asked why an exception was allowed for exceeding the short term temperature limit for the fire accident scenario and stated that an exception should not be allowed.

Response: The American Concrete Institute (ACI) establishes temperature criteria for concrete. One, but not the only, acceptable demonstration that the concrete overpack will maintain its intended function is to meet the temperature criteria in ACI 349. However, as stated in the NRC staff's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1536), “a small amount of exterior concrete spalling may result from a fire, the application of fire suppression water, rain on heated surfaces or other high-temperature condition. The damage from these events is readily detectable, and appropriate recovery or corrective measures may be presumed. Therefore, the loss of such a small amount of shielding material is not expected to cause a storage system to exceed the regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 72.106 and, therefore, need not be estimated or evaluated in the SAR. The NRC accepts that concrete temperatures may exceed the temperature criteria of ACI 349 for accidents if the temperatures result from a fire.” The Holtec analysis demonstrated that the amount of concrete that exceeds the ACI temperature limit is very limited and would not pose a significant safety hazard.

Comment I.8: One commenter asked for the basis of using an average temperature of the gas in the gap and plenum of the limiting rod and questioned the validity of the assumption.

Response: The purpose for evaluating the average of the gas temperature in the fuel rod is to calculate the pressure within the fuel rod. The computer code used in the analysis calculates the temperature profile of the fuel rod, but does not calculate the corresponding pressure for that rod. To calculate the pressure, the average temperature of the gas is calculated and from the ideal gas law, the corresponding pressure is established.

Comment I.9: One commenter asked what is in the water used for forced water circulation under wet transfer of the fuel from the spent fuel pool to the location for vacuum drying and if the water could chemically affect other materials in the cavity. The commenter asked how fast the water flows, if steam could be formed, and if the water could physically affect other materials in the cavity, movement of rods, flaking of paint, etc.

Response: The licensee can either use demineralized water or water from the spent fuel pool. Neither demineralized nor spent fuel pool water would adversely interact with the system. The flow rate of the water is based on the heat output of the fuel assemblies and is a site-specific issue.

Comment I.10: One commenter asked what the water chiller is used for and what material is used as the chilling medium.

Response: The water chiller is used as the heat sink for cooling the helium inside the MPC to below 200°F. The type of water chiller used is a site-specific issue and not part of this rulemaking activity.

Comment I.11: One commenter asked for specific criteria that defines clearance around the cask for cooling purposes instead of stating a reasonable amount. The commenter also asked how close other heat sources may be located and what is considered to be a significant heat source.

Response: The actions identified by the commenter are only valid when a breakdown occurs in the helium coolers (LCO 3.1.3). Section B3.1.3 of the technical specification bases states that “if the TRANSFR CASK is located in a relatively open area such as a typical refuel floor, no additional actions are necessary.” However, a licensee may elect to perform the cooling with the cask located in a pit or vault. This is a site-specific activity. The bases identify three acceptable options for ensuring adequate heat transfer for the TRANSFER CASK. The user may develop other alternatives on a site-specific basis, considering actual fuel loading and decay heat generation within the cask. One of the options is to fill the annulus between the MPC and the TRANSFER CASK with water. The second option is to remove the TRANSFER CASK from the pit or vault and place it in an open area such as the refueling floor with a reasonable amount of clearance around the cask and not near a significant source of heat. The third option is to supply nominally 1000 SCFM of ambient air to the space inside the confined space ( e.g ., pit or vault). With respect to defining an acceptable distance, the licensee could use the analyzed event of 15 feet center-to-center storage spacing that corresponds to a four foot clearance. Smaller clearances would also be acceptable, given the heat load rating of the cask and ambient conditions. With regard to defining a significant heat source, this is a site specific consideration. For example, if the plant is using a bank of radiant heaters near the cask, then an evaluation needs to be performed to ensure that those heaters pose no adverse impact on the cask. These options are only guidelines to an LCO that a user would have to consider.

Comment I.12: One commenter asked how cool air was provided to the space inside the vault at the bottom of the overpack. The commenter stated that this needs to be planned out ahead of time for ALARA considerations and equipment availability.

Response: This is a site-specific issue and not part of this rulemaking activity. The NRC staff agrees with the comment that the user needs to plan this activity considering ALARA and equipment availability.

Comment I.13: One commenter stated that fuel should be adequately cooled before it goes into the transfer cask.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment that adequate planning is needed when performing cask cooldown and reflooding. The purpose of the analyses performed in the SAR is to maintain the integrity of the fuel. The requirements on the burnup and minimum cooling time serve that purpose.

Comment I.14: One commenter asked if the temperature of the helium accurately reflects the internal temperature of the MPC and stated that this should be tested.

Response: The exit temperature of the helium reflects the conditions of the fuel rods. After the helium temperature is reduced below 200°F, the bulk of the fuel will be at low temperatures, minimizing the potential for excessive steaming. Reflooding of a canister has been demonstrated without pre-cooling the helium. No additional tests are needed.

Comment I.15: One commenter objected to the addition of ethylene glycol solution to the demineralized water in the water jacket to prevent freezing and asked where this had been tested. The commenter also asked why the antifreeze was used, how the solution would mix, how the NRC knows it will work, what types of effects it could have on the inside of the water jacket and the channel walls, if it would add weight, and how it is added to the water if the jacket is welded shut.

Response: Ethylene Glycol is the chemical name for ordinary antifreeze. Adding antifreeze to the water jacket, located on the outside of the HI-TRAC transfer cask, is an option if the user elects to move a loaded MPC in cold weather, down to 0°F. The use of antifreeze in the water jacket does not add appreciable weight to the HI-TRAC cask. Although the water jacket is a welded system, openings are designed to add and remove water from the water jacket. Antifreeze has been used in many applications to keep water from freezing. The NRC staff believes that the industry has ample experience with antifreeze that additional testing and validity is not necessary. Mixing of the antifreeze is a site-specific issue that will ensure that the proper amount of antifreeze is added to prevent the water from freezing at temperatures down to 0°F.

Comment I.16: One commenter recommended the addition of a note to Tables 4.4.20 and 4.4.21 of the SAR to provide clarification for the heat loads.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. SAR Tables 4.4.20 and 4.4.21 refer to loading the MPC with uniformly aged fuel assemblies emitting heat at the design basis maximum rate. Section 4.4.2 identifies these assemblies as the limiting design basis fuel assemblies.

Comment I.17: One commenter stated that Holtec's use of a two-by-four block array to be equivalent to an infinite array assumed a center-to-center distance between casks of 18.6 feet. The commenter stated that this equivalency determination between an infinite array and a two-by-four array is invalid where the differences in cask spacing do not meet the 18.6-feet center-to-center assumption underlying the analysis. The commenter noted that the PSF facility design uses a 15-foot center-to-center distance. The commenter stated that any CoC issued for this cask system must address this shortcoming.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. First, the PFS facility is outside the scope of this rulemaking activity. Second, as identified in Table 1.4.1 of the SAR, the analysis of a 2 by N array was performed using a pitch of 13.5 feet, not 18.6 feet. The 18.6-feet pitch is used for a square array. When calculating an equivalent hydraulic diameter for the square array and taking into account that the center-to-center spacing of neighboring casks between the pads is 38 feet, as described in Figure 1.4.1 of the SAR, the hydraulic diameters for the two cases (square array versus 2 by N array) is the same.

Comment I.18: One commenter stated that thermal interaction of casks through radiative heat transfer should be considered. The commenter also stated that the assumption that individual casks will not interfere with cooling air supply of each other may not be correct.

Response: The NRC agrees that neighboring casks can have an influence on each other. However, these influences have a second order impact on the results. The analyses performed by Holtec did credit radiation heat transfer between the neighboring casks. A bounding calculation was performed with an ambient temperature of 125°F. That calculation accounted for heat reflected by the hot concrete pad and heat generated by neighboring casks. Although not required by the NRC staff's review of the SAR submittal, Holtec, in response to other inquiries, performed a sensitivity study to quantify the impact of neighboring casks and the impact of the sun heating the concrete pad.

The impact of increasing the spacing between casks by a factor of five in the radial direction resulted in a decrease in the peak cask surface temperature of 16 oF for an ambient temperature of 100°F and 17°F for an ambient temperature of 125°F. The impact on peak clad temperature resulted in a decrease of 6°F for an ambient temperature of 100°F and a decrease of 8°F for an ambient temperature of 125°F. Because the peak clad temperature is on the order of 760+°F, the impact of neighboring casks is minimal.

Comment I.19: One commenter stated that the temperature of the reflecting boundary should be taken as the temperature of the cask in interaction with the other casks and not the temperature of an isolated cask.

Response: The NRC agrees that one method for calculating the impact of neighboring casks is to model the neighboring casks in the array. Another acceptable method, that was used by the applicant, is to model the limiting (highest temperature) cask and assume that all the radiation it emits is reflected back. This analysis bounds the amount of radiation that neighboring casks can impose on the center cask. This bounding analysis is acceptable. As noted in the response to comment I.18, above, the impact of neighboring casks is minimal, given the significant margins between the allowable temperatures and the bounding calculated temperatures.

Comment I.20: One commenter stated that the Holtec model does not appear to take into account that the heating of the concrete pad is likely to diminish the “chimney effect” of the intake and outlet vents. The commenter stated that if Holtec had taken this effect into account, the calculated temperature would be higher in Revision 9 of the SAR.

Response: In a response to other inquires, Holtec performed calculations to quantify the effect of concrete pad heating on the cask performance. For the bounding 125°F ambient temperature event, neglecting the heat reflected by the pad resulted in a reduction of cask surface temperature of 10°F and a reduction in peak clad temperature of 6°F. These temperature differences illustrate that the concrete pad has negligible impact on the cask.

Comment I.21: One commenter stated that ambient temperature should be defined due to the importance of the term. The commenter noted that ambient temperature is an important assumption in the thermal calculations and an important design element in the CoC. The commenter stated that the gross oversimplification of the concept of ambient temperature renders the Holtec thermal analysis completely useless. The commenter noted that Holtec assumes that the ambient temperature at the intake and outlet vents is the same; however, the temperature at ground level will be significantly higher than it will be some distance above due to the ground absorbing solar energy. The commenter stated that a desert may have a surface temperature of 180°F, much higher than the 80°F assumed by Holtec as an intake temperature. This would reduce the effective buoyancy and air velocity through the cooling ducts and result in a higher fuel cladding temperature.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The thermal response of a cask is very slow. This is due to the large mass of the system. An analogy can be reached by observing the buildings constructed in the desert. Massive concrete is used to maintain the indoor temperatures at reasonable conditions where air conditioners do not exist. The temperature in those regions fluctuates over each day. For these structures, an estimate of the average conditions can be assessed by assuming a bounding average daily temperature. Holtec used such a method. In addition, the method assumed the maximum solar heating specified in 10 CFR Part 71 averaged over a 24-hour period. Holtec used bounding assumptions approved in the NRC staff's SER.

Comment I.22: One commenter stated that NRC should have reviewed the inputs and outputs of the FLUENT calculation. The commenter also stated that the NRC should have conducted an independent analysis and validation of the thermal model employed by Holtec. The commenter stated that the HI-STAR analysis cannot be extrapolated to the HI-STORM cask because the casks are constructed of different materials, with different methods of heat dispersion. The commenter stated that the NRC performed a superficial review and had abdicated its role as independent regulator and should not issue a CoC for the HI-STORM 100 cask system because there is no lawful basis.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC staff's review of the HI-STORM system was not superficial. This is clearly demonstrated by the NRC staff's requests for additional information, the applicant's many revisions to the SAR to address NRC staff concerns, and commitments made by the applicant as outlined in Appendix 12B of the SAR. The NRC staff does not perform independent confirmatory calculations for every analysis submitted in an application, nor does the NRC staff routinely review the inputs and outputs of the computer calculations without cause. Independent analyses that duplicate the extensive computer calculations performed by an applicant may, at times, be performed for various reasons. Some reasons include, but are not limited to, concern that a major error exists in the calculations; allegations that calculations were improperly performed; use of new modeling techniques not previously reviewed by the NRC staff; crediting heat transfer mechanisms not previously reviewed by the NRC staff; concern that the margin in a complex analysis is small; and concern that little conservatism exists in the modeling approach.

For the HI-STORM application, the NRC staff reviewed the basic assumptions used in the calculations, as identified in the SAR and in the NRC's requests for additional information. A detailed review of every number is not warranted. As for performing independent analysis and validation, the NRC staff was able to reach its safety findings without the need for such calculations. The need for these calculations is case specific, as addressed above. For HI-STORM, the applicant used computer codes that are employed by the NRC and have been found acceptable. The applicant demonstrated its knowledge of the code by benchmarking its methodology with a full-scale spent fuel cask instrumented with thermocouples, validating its thermal model and providing reasonable assurance that its analysts have good working knowledge of the code to perform the required calculations. The NRC staff's review of the applicant's methods and assumptions indicate ample margin and conservatism in the analyses.

The HI-STORM application review process was conducted under NRC policy and guidance, and as required by the regulations in 10 CFR Part 72. Regarding the reference to the HI-STAR analysis in Section 4.5.4 of the preliminary SER, the NRC staff intended to indicate that it was aware that Holtec's use of the FLUENT code had been previously found acceptable for the HI-STAR application. This reference was not intended to imply that the NRC staff relied on the HI-STAR calculations or the prior evaluation in its evaluation of the HI-STORM cask. Section 4.5.4 of the SER has been modified to clarify the description of the NRC staff's review. Also, to better illustrate the NRC staff's review of the applicant's submittal, Section 4 of the SER was supplemented with additional information.

Comment I.23: One comment indicated that the SER states that the ambient temperature under normal conditions must be less than 80°F. In addition, the commenter believed Holtec assumed that the ambient temperature at the inlet and outlet vents is the same and did not consider warming of the air by heat generated by neighboring casks and the concrete pad. The commenter stated that calculations indicated that a desert may have a surface temperature of 180°F and that the temperature 0.5 m above the ground would be 130°F.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The SER does not state that the ambient temperature under normal conditions must be less than 80°F. The applicant evaluated the cask conditions with an annual average ambient temperature of 80°F. The use of an annual average ambient temperature is used in conjunction with the method described in a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory report PNL-6189. The method provides one acceptable means for obtaining reasonable assurance that the requirements in 10 CFR Part 72 will be met. These requirements include protecting the cladding from degradation that leads to gross ruptures and designing the storage system to allow ready retrieval of the spent fuel or high-level radioactive waste. With respect to the 180°F surface temperature in the desert, the SAR assumptions used in the 125°F ambient temperature calculation credits solar heating (also referred to as solar insolation) and heat generated by the casks. Holtec calculated a concrete pad surface temperature of 206°F (surrounding the concrete overpack), an ambient temperature just above the inlet vent of the overpack of 136°F, and a concrete temperature at the outlet vent of the overpack of 182°F. The NRC staff finds that the Holtec calculation adequately models the thermal responses of the cask and its environment.

Comment J.1: One commenter asked for clarification on the conditions for use and the TSs, and if they could be changed without an amendment.

Response: The conditions for cask use are specified in the CoC, and includes Appendix A (TSs) and Appendix B (Approved Contents and Design Features). These conditions cannot be changed without an amendment to the certificate.

Comment J.2: One commenter stated that the Use and Application section of the TSs is confusing and allows too much flexibility for completion times and frequencies, and that the TSs should be simple to understand and done on time.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The Section 1.0, “Use and Application” of the HI-STORM 100 TSs are modeled on the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) for power reactors. The ISTS were developed as the result of extensive technical meetings and discussions between the NRC staff and the nuclear power industry in the early 1990s in an effort to improve clarity and consistency of the power reactor TSs and to make them easier for operators to use. The most likely users of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System TSs are power reactor licensees familiar with the format of the ISTS. The NRC staff believes that the format of the HI-STORM 100 TSs will make them easier for operators to use and will help to achieve consistency between power reactor and spent fuel dry cask storage TSs. The NRC staff disagrees that there is too much flexibility for completion times and frequency. The NRC staff believes that the specific wording of the TSs clearly specifies the allowable time to complete a required action and the frequency of any surveillance requirements.

Comment J.3: One commenter objected to the use of the term “TRANSPORT” in TS 3.2.2 and indicated that movement to the pad should be used because this CoC is for storage only.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The term TRANSPORT OPERATIONS is specifically defined in Section 1.1 of the Technical Specifications and includes all activities involved in moving a loaded overpack or transfer cask to and from the ISFSI pad. Further clarification of the term is not warranted.

Comment J.4: One commenter stated that “Each” should be in large letters in LCO 3.2.2. The commenter also asked why all the removable contamination is not removed instead of setting a limit.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The capitalization of “each” is consistent with the format of the TSs. As discussed in the TS Bases, Section B.3.2.2, the contamination limits for the transfer cask are established from guidance in NRC IE Circular 87-01. The limits are based on minimum level of activity that can be routinely detected under a surface contamination control program using direct survey methods. These limits are consistent with levels that prevent the spread of contamination to clean areas and are significantly less than the levels associated with significant occupational exposure.

Comment J.5: One commenter stated that the dry run should be conducted in sequence and not an alternate step sequence as permitted by TS 5.2.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The dry runs are performed in discrete functional areas to demonstrate the ability to perform certain activities as anticipated. The order of performance of the functional areas, for the purpose of a dry run, is not directly pertinent to a demonstration of a user's capability. The operating procedures and technical specifications already control, as necessary, functional areas that must be performed sequentially for safe storage. The NRC staff considers it important to allow the cask user the necessary flexibility to allocate the appropriate resources and oversight to the performance of dry runs thatmay involve performing and concentrating on certain activities that would be out of sequence with a cask loading.

Comment J.6: One commenter asked why no lifting height limit was established for the vertical orientation of the transfer cask in TS 5.5 and stated that there should be a limit established.

Response: In the SAR, the design basis drop event analysis is based on the horizontal lifting height of 42 inches. Therefore, TS 5.5 only specifies the lifting height of the horizontal lifting limit. TS 5.5.c permits vertical lifting of loaded transfer cask to any height necessary to perform cask handling operations, including the MPC transfer. However, the lifts must be made with structures and components designed to prevent a drop and in accordance with the criteria specified in CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.5 and SAR Section 2.3.3.1. Therefore, a vertical lift height limit was not established.

Comment J.7: One commenter asked if the diamond-shaped water rod mentioned in note 10 of TS Table 2.1-3 had been completely analyzed.

Response: The shape (geometry) of water rods that are part of the fuel assembly, is considered in the evaluation.

Comment J.8: One commenter recommended deleting the words “For OVERPACKS with installed temperature monitoring equipment” at the beginning of the second option under SR 3.1.2.1 because users should have the option of using temporary equipment.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. Temperature monitoring, a surveillance option permitted in SR 3.1.2.1, could be conducted with either temporary or permanently installed equipment. The term “installed” could be interpreted as a requirement that the temperature monitoring equipment be permanently fixed. Therefore, the beginning of the second option under SR 3.1.2.1 has been reworded as follows: “For OVERPACKS with temperature monitoring equipment” ( i.e ., the word “installed” has been deleted).

Comment J.9: One commenter recommended several miscellaneous editorial changes to the appendices to the CoC.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The appendices to the CoC have been revised to correct typographical errors and incorporate minor editorial changes.

Comment J.10: One commenter recommended that Items 5.2.f and 5.2.j in Section 5 of the TSs be revised to insert the phrase “(for which a mock-up may be used)” at the end of the items for consistency with SAR Section 12.2.2.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. Items 5.2.f and 5.2.j of the TSs have been revised to indicate that a mock-up may be used for those specific dry-run evolutions.

Comment J.11: One commenter recommended that item 5.5.c in Section 5 of the TSs be revised to replace the words “and MPC” with “or OVERPACK” because some utilities plan to implement an MPC transfer scheme that requires temporary lifting of the loaded OVERPACK above its lift height limit.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. There are no evaluations, equipment design criteria, or other information in the SAR that support lifting a loaded overpack above its lift height limit.

Comment J.12: One commenter recommended revising the definitions of DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLY and PLANAR-AVERAGE INITIAL ENRICHMENT in Section 1 of Appendix B to the CoC to reflect the evolution of these terms and for consistency with those in the HI-STAR 100 CoC.

Response: The NRC agrees with this comment. The CoC, Appendix B, Section 1 has been revised to reflect the new definitions.

Comment J.13: One commenter recommended revising CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4.6.c to replace the specified yield strength with the equivalent ASTM Grade specification.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment in part. Storage pad design is a site-specific issue that needs to be addressed in the cask user's 10 CFR 72.212 evaluation. CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4.6.c lists the design parameters for the storage pads. It is not a list of components for fabrication. By using the specific ASTM Grade specification as recommended by the commenter, namely, ASTM A615, Grade 60, the designer of the pad will not have the flexibility to choose other reinforcing steels that could also be used ( e.g . ASTM A616 or A617, Grade 60, etc.). To allow flexibility for the design and still ensure adequate reinforcement in the pad CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4.6.c has been changed to state that reinforcement shall be 60 ksi yield strength ASTM material.

Comment J.14: One commenter recommended eliminating the requirement for impact limiters at the cask transfer facility contained in CoC, Appendix B, Item 3.5.2.2.

Response: The NRC staff assumes that the commenter's reference to Section 3.5.2.2 is a typographical error because the requirement for an impact limiter is in CoC, Appendix B, Item 3.5.2.1. The NRC agrees in part with the comment. The specific requirement for an impact limiter has been eliminated from CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.5.2.1.4. The NRC determined that this requirement is too restrictive because other methods may be available to prevent a canister breach in the event of a canister drop during transfer operations. Instead, Item 3.5.2.1.4 has been revised to require that the CTF be designed, constructed, and evaluated to ensure that if the MPC is dropped during an inter-cask transfer operation, its confinement boundary would not be breached.

However, the NRC disagrees with the underlying reason for the comment which is: Because a single failure proof crane (or equivalent) is required in the CTF, the design features to mitigate the consequence of a drop should not be necessary. The NRC staff acknowledges that the use of a single-failure proof crane precludes the possibility of a heavy load drop event. The requirement for a mitigating feature in the CTF design is a defense-in-depth measure that is consistent with the overall philosophy and approach of NUREG-0612. This philosophy encompasses an intent to prevent as well as to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidental load drops. The NRC staff notes that, even with a single-failure proof crane, NUREG-0612 still imposes a requirement for a safe load travel path “to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment.” The NRC staff views the mitigating feature in the CTF as a defense-in-depth measure equivalent to the safe load path. Its function is to protect the MPC confinement boundary and the integrity of the spent fuel in the MPC in case of a postulated drop.

Comment J.15: One commenter recommended that CoC, Appendix B, Item 3.5.2.1.4 be clarified to indicate that the acceptance criterion for the impact limiter also applies to the use of mobile cranes.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. As discussed in the response to J.14, CoC, Appendix B, Item 3.5.2.1.4 has been revised to require that the CTF be designed and evaluated to ensure that if the MPC is dropped during an inter-cask transfer operation, its confinement boundary would not be breached. Section 3.5.2.1.4 has also been revised to specify that this requirement and acceptance criterion apply to both stationary and mobile cranes.

Comment J.16: One commenter recommended that CoC, Appendix B, Item 3.5.2.1.4 be revised to clarify the scope of drops that require evaluation in designing the impact limiter.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. CoC, Appendix B, Item 3.5.2.1.4 has been revised to clarify that the potential drops that require evaluation are those that may occur during inter-cask transfer operations.

Comment J.17: One commenter recommended that the TSs be removed from Appendix 12.A of the SAR because they are included in the appendices to the CoC.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The TSs have been removed from the SAR.

Comment K.1: One commenter expressed approval that movement could be conducted at 0°F and above.

Response: No response is necessary.

Comment K.2: One commenter stated that the HI-TRAC transfer cask must be as safe as the HI-STORM overpack if it is to be used outside the reactor security fence.

Response: The NRC staff reviewed the HI-TRAC transfer cask and determined that, like the HI-STORM overpack, it will perform its intended safety functions under the design basis normal, off-normal, and accident events. It should be noted that the CoC authorizes use of the HI-TRAC only within the owner-controlled areas of a licensed power reactor.

Comment K.3: One commenter asked if the inner canister could be dropped through, if water could spill out of the overpack, and if the water helped to disperse the fuel particles.

Response: During a canister transfer operation, the transfer cask is placed on top of the storage overpack. The canister is then lowered through the bottom of the transfer cask into the overpack. It is unlikely that a canister drop would occur during this operation because the canister must be lifted with equipment ( i.e ., a single failure proof crane or equivalent) that are designed to prevent a drop. In addition, the overpack contains only traces of water that is part of the concrete material and the canister is dry during cask transfer operations.

Comment K.4: One commenter questioned the assumption that the HI-TRAC remains static because there are a number of man-made or natural causes that could put it in motion, drop, tipover, roll, etc.

Response: The HI-TRAC is required to be independently secured on top of the overpack during the transfer of the MPC.

Comment K.5: One commenter asked when the measuring equipment (for checking tolerances) is calibrated.

Response: The timing of calibration at the fabricator's facility is beyond the scope of this rule. However, the implemented QA program at the fabricator's facility provides reasonable assurance that the measuring equipment for checking tolerances of fabrication will be appropriately calibrated.

Comment K.6: One commenter asked if the restraint of 11 inches in vertical height for overpack handling would actually preclude a corner drop situation. The commenter asked how a corner drop could be initiated, such as a defective trunnion or lifting lug, etc.

Response: The 11-inch restriction on lifting height for the overpack was calculated to ensure that deceleration loading to the loaded MPC would not exceed the design criteria for the confinement boundary of the basket. A tipover of the overpack cannot occur if the baseplate is limited to 11 inches above a receiving surface.

Comment K.7: One commenter asked what happens to the inside of the cask during a horizontal drop of 50 inches.

Response: The effect of a 50-inch horizontal drop of a cask was not evaluated because the horizontal lifting height limit for the transfer cask is 42 inches. The 50-inch carry height specified in the SER was a typographical error and has been corrected to 42 inches. There is no effect on the confinement function of the MPC as a result of a horizontal drop of 42 inches. The structural evaluation shows that all stresses are within allowable values and that the confinement boundary integrity of the MPC is not impaired.

Comment K.8: One commenter requested that the SER define what is meant by cladding oxide thickness on page 4-1 of the SER.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Cladding oxide thickness is a measure of corrosion at the clad surface. As water interacts with the zirconium clad, the zirconium can interact with the oxygen molecules to create zirconium oxide (ZrO 2 ). The terminology is commonly used in the spent fuel storage arena and a definition in the SER is not necessary.

Comment K.9: One commenter asked why the internal rod pressure is assumed to remain the same. The commenter asked how the gas behaves in a dry cask and if it can leak from pinhole leaks and hairline cracks over the storage period. The commenter further asked how the lower pressure in the rods affects the analysis and heat transfer.

Response: The internal rod pressure is derived from the initial gas inserted during fabrication plus the fission product gases that develop during power production within the reactor core. In a closed system ( e.g., the fuel pin), the pressure is a function of the gases in the fuel rod and the average temperature of the gas. As the decay heat decreases with time, so does the temperature and the pressure. Therefore, the rod temperature does not remain the same. This is similar to inflating a balloon with hot air and placing the balloon in the refrigerator. As the gases cool, the pressure decreases, as is implied by the smaller diameter of the balloon. The lower pressure reduces the stress on the cladding and permits a higher allowable temperature limit. If the rod experiences a pinhole leak or a hairline crack, the gases inside the rod will mix with the helium gas in the cask and reduce the internal pressure within the rod.

Reduction of the internal fuel rod pressure results in added assurance that the cladding will remain stable because the internal pressure will have equilibrated with that of the cask. The gases from the fuel pin mix with the gases in the cask and decreases the thermal conductivity of the helium, while at the same time increasing the density of the gas. The analyses for accident conditions incorporate the impact of reduced conductivity of the helium gases. This impact is reduced when crediting cooling that results from natural circulation of the gases inside the cask. The use of a maximum allowable temperature limit provides assurance that the fuel pins will remain intact throughout the storage period. For conservatism, the applicant assumed that 1 percent of the cladding experiences a leak under normal conditions, a 10-percent leak under off-normal conditions, and a 100-percent leak under accident conditions.

Comment K.10: One commenter asked what cask design was tested at INEEL (page 4-3 of the SER).

Response: Several full scale cask designs were tested at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The cask used by Holtec to validate the FLUENT computer code was the TN-24P. The heat output of the cask was 23 kW. The NRC staff found the FLUENT computer code acceptable for calculating the thermal response of a spent fuel cask.

Comment K.11: One commenter expressed concern over water and debris going into cracks on the pad and then freezing and thawing causing concrete upheaval and subsequent cask tipover.

Response: Issues related to cask storage pad will be addressed in the cask user's evaluation under 10 CFR 72.212 and is beyond the scope of this rule.

Comment K.12: One commenter asked how moisture and pollution in the air could affect the casks and pad over time and if the pad would ever need to be replaced.

Response: The cask can withstand the ambient environmental conditions over its 20-year license period with no significant degradation. The adequacy of the pad must be addressed by the cask users in their 10 CFR 72.212 evaluation and is beyond the scope of this rule. Cask users are responsible for inspecting and maintaining the pad. With appropriate maintenance, air pollution or moisture would not cause significant degradation to the pad.

Comment K.13: One commenter asked if both the helium and fission gases created the pressure inside the rods and for an explanation of the fission gases. The commenter also asked why only 30 percent of the fission product gas was assumed to be released instead of 100 percent because over time 100 percent would likely leak out.

Response: Fission gases are byproducts of uranium splitting in a reactor. These include gases such as hydrogen, krypton, and iodine. The gases are contained inside the fuel rod. Data have shown that a conservative estimate of 30 percent of the gases generated inside the fuel pellet can escape to the gap that exists between the fuel pellet and the cladding. This is a conservatively large number used for calculating dosage. Experimental data has shown this number to be significantly less. The rest of the gases are trapped inside the fuel pellet. Therefore, assuming that 100 percent of the gases are released from the fuel pellet is not realistic. Helium gas is added to the MPC to keep the environment inside the cask inert so it does not promote corrosion and to help cool the fuel by transferring heat from the fuel rods to the wall of the cask. The impact of helium gas on the pressure within a fuel rod is not as significant as the temperature of the gas within the fuel rod.

Comment K.14: One commenter asked what is in the water of the water jacket and if the water could affect the carbon steel channels or get into the pool through a weld crack or leak and affect the pool. The commenter also asked how hot the water and the lead get, and if the water could cause pressure buildup in the channels.

Response: The water used in the water jacket is demineralized water as is used in the loading pool, but without boron addition because the boron is unnecessary for loading/unloading operations. Carbon steel corrodes very slowly in demineralized water; thus, its effect may be ignored for the durations experienced in loading operations. If the cask is to be loaded in cold weather, antifreeze may be added to the jacket water. Antifreeze contains an inhibitor to prevent corrosion. There would be no significant effect if the jacket water or water with antifreeze leaked into the pool. With regard to the water and lead temperatures and pressure buildup in the water jackets, see the response to comment I.2.

Comment K.15: One commenter asked if there was a recent study on cladding degradation from creep cavitation.

Response: Studies on cladding degradation were performed several years ago. These studies led to the development of analytic methods to calculate the maximum allowable peak clad temperature limits. A report developed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL) in May 1987, PNL-6189, “Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircaloy-Clad Fuel Rods in Inert Gas” provides an acceptable method for assessing cladding temperature limits.

Comment K.16: One commenter stated that the 100-ton transfer cask should not be included in the certification because it is site-specific and not made the same as the 125-ton cask.

Response: NRC disagrees with the comment. The 100-ton and 125-ton transfer cask designs have been evaluated and found to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 72. The 100-ton transfer cask design is not considered site-specific and is approved under this rule for use by any general licensee as part of the HI-STROM 100 system as described in the SAR. Section 2.0.3 of the SAR provides guidance regarding site-specific ALARA objectives that should be considered by each user when using either transfer cask design.

Comment K.17: One commenter asked what does reasonable assurance mean in Section 5.1.2 of the SER regarding acceptability of the shielding design criteria.

Response: The finding in Section 5.1.2 is intended to mean that the NRC staff believes that the dose rate criteria presented in the SAR are acceptable values and that a cask system operating at these values can meet the applicable radiological requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72. The SAR subsequently demonstrates that the dose rates calculated for the HI-STORM system meet the regulatory requirements.

Comment K.18: One commenter asked if the MOX (mixed oxide) fuel was covered by the sabotage report. The commenter asked if MOX fuel had been tested and verified to be safe for this design. The commenter further questioned how the NRC could include MOX fuel in the SER evaluation and stated that storage of MOX fuel should not be allowed by the certification. The commenter also asked how we know that storage of MOX fuel will work as expected because it has not yet been tested in Canada.

Response: The sabotage report is beyond the scope of this rule. However, the design and physical characteristics of a MOX fuel assembly are very similar to those of a uranium fuel assembly. The primary difference is the fuel pellet constituents and its effects on the radiological source term. Testing of MOX fuel is also beyond the scope of this rule.

The HI-STORM design was evaluated for storage of the MOX fuel assemblies listed in the Appendix B to the CoC using computer codes and models. In lieu of testing, the NRC finds analytic conclusions that are based on sound engineering methods and practices to be acceptable. Testing is only required if the analytic methods have not been validated or assured to be appropriate and/or conservative. The NRC staff reviewed the applicant's analyses and found them acceptable. The basis of the safety review and findings are identified in the SER and the CoC.

Comment K.19: One commenter asked if all the analysis was based on the 100-ton transfer cask or did HI-STORM 100 refer to something else.

Response: The shielding analysis presented in the SAR evaluated both the 100-ton and 125-ton transfer cask designs as part of the HI-STORM 100 cask system.

Comment K.20: One commenter asked how the NRC could base its evaluation on historical statements when reference documents indicate Inconel impurity may be higher than 1000 ppm. The commenter further asked what the historical statements were and how we know if the statements are valid.

Response: The applicant's analysis of cobalt impurities are discussed in Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.3 of the SER. The applicant showed that the cobalt impurity value of 1000 ppm assumed in the shielding analyses was appropriate based on industry data and analyses of post-irradiation cooling of older fuel types that may have had higher cobalt impurities for the HI-STORM 100 cask system. As discussed in Section 5.2.1 of the SAR, historical statements included industry data gathered by the applicant from utilities and vendors.

Cobalt impurities were not necessarily controlled for older fuel designs. However, the applicant showed that the post-irradiation cooling time that is inherent to these older fuel types significantly reduces the HI-STORM 100 dose rates. Therefore, the effects of higher impurities are mitigated. Based on historical knowledge of recent cobalt reduction programs, the decay effects on older fuel, and its own independent evaluations, NRC has reasonable assurance that the historical statements referenced in the application are used appropriately for the HI-STORM 100. Furthermore, each cask user will operate the HI-STORM 100 under a 10 CFR Part 20 radiological protection program and will be required to verify dose rates that are specified in the TSs. This defense-in-depth approach will mitigate potential hardware activation anomalies and ensure compliance with radiological requirements.

Comment K.21: One commenter asked if the steel transport overpacks could be reused, how contaminated the overpacks would be after use, the number of times an overpack could be reused, and if they would be checked after each use.

Response: This comment that concerns the HI-STAR steel transport overpack, is beyond the scope of this rule on the Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system.

Comment K.22: One commenter was pleased that the NRC had evaluated uneven flooding.

Response: No response is necessary.

Comment K.23: One commenter asked about the chance of one of the screens being damaged or loosened in unloading and the debris floating out with the cooling water into the pool.

Response: The damaged fuel container that is placed in the MPC is stainless steel and is designed to retain damaged fuel and debris in a safe configuration under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. The damaged fuel container also provides a means to safely handle the damaged fuel and debris during loading and unloading. It is not considered credible that the screens will fall off or fail. However if a screen failed, there would be no release of radioactive material during storage since the MPC is sealed. Consideration of loose debris during unloading is addressed in SAR Section 8.3 which outlines the MPC unloading operations in a spent fuel pool and specifically considers loose debris in the MPC. Additionally, the spent fuel pool filtration system would capture any debris that remained in the pool.

Comment K.24: One commenter asked why the volume of water removed from the cask is recorded and why this is not done for other cask designs.

Response: The purpose of recording the volume of water removed from the canister is to identify the open volume in the canister. This open volume is used to calculate the amount of helium to be added to the cask following vacuum drying. The procedure and equation used for this procedure is discussed on page 8.1-21 in the HI-STORM SAR. The comment concerning other cask designs is beyond the scope of this rule.

Comment K.25: One commenter stated that a detailed procedure on mitigating the possibility of fuel crud particulates dispersal should be included in the documents and that the procedure should not be site-specific.

Response: NRC disagrees with the comment. The generic unloading procedures for the HI-STORM 100 system are designed to mitigate crud dispersal. However, each cask user will need to develop detailed unloading procedures that incorporate the ALARA objectives of its site-specific radiation protection program. NRC expects the cask user to consider the specific characteristics of its fuel, including crud phenomena, when developing these procedures.

Comment K.26: One commenter asked how the utilities are required to document that they will not lift the overpack any higher than 11 inches and that the receiving surface hardness does not exceed that analyzed in the SAR. The commenter stated that the criteria should be clarified and which surface should be indicated.

Response: The receiving surface is the top of the storage pad as clearly stated in Sections 3.4.2 and 11.2.3.2 of the SER and described in Section 3.4.10 of the SAR. Users of the HI-STORM 100 system are required to meet Appendices A and B of the CoC that list the design parameters for surface hardness and the restriction for lifting height. Furthermore, the cask users are required to develop detailed written operating procedures. The restriction on lifting height must be incorporated into the operating procedures subject to NRC inspection.

Comment K.27: One commenter stated that Condition 8 should remain in the CoC.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. Condition 8 has not been removed from the CoC. Under Condition 8, Certificate holders who wish to make changes to the CoC, including Appendices A and B, must submit an application for amendment of the Certificate.

Comment K.28: One commenter asked how upending/downending of the transfer cask affected the water in the neutron shield, how the licensee knows the shield is full, what happens to the contents of the cask when the position changes, what are the stresses and pressures, and if the debris in damaged fuel containers goes through the screen.

Response: The structural, shielding, and confinement functions of the transfer cask are not affected during movement of the cask. The neutron shield will normally be filled through the drain valve at the bottom of the water jacket and is considered full as water exits the vent port at the top of the water jacket. The vent plug is then installed to retain the water in the jacket. During the upending and downending of the transfer cask, water remains within the neutron shield and fuel debris remains within the confinement boundary of the MPC. The structural evaluation in the SAR showed all the stresses and pressures to remain within allowable values.

Comment K.29: One commenter stated that exceptions to the codes should not be allowed and that the NRC should demand full code requirements.

Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. Exceptions (alternatives) to the ASME Code specifications may be granted by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis. During the NRC staff review of a proposed alternative, the applicant must demonstrate that the proposed alternative to the Code satisfies one of the following criteria: (1) The alternative provides an acceptable level of quality and safety, or, (2) compliance with a specific Code requirement would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality or safety.

Comment K.30: One commenter stated that videos should not be used as a permanent record. The commenter stated that black and white photos and negatives should be used and that the negatives should be kept in museum qualified storage. The commenter asked what method is best to document weld integrity and how the records are stored. The NRC should have specific criteria for record keeping requirements.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC's regulations do not explicitly require specific criteria for record keeping to document weld integrity by the applicant. A permanent record of completed welds will be made using video, photographic, or other means that can provide a retrievable record of weld integrity. As per accepted industry practice, the record is typically in color format, in order to capture the red dye typically used for PT examinations. The general licensee's QA program will specify the types of records and how the records are to be stored.

Comment K.31: One commenter stated that even if the overpack baseplates, shell, pedestal shell, and radial plates have large margins of safety in the design, they should still be examined to code.

Response: Holtec has committed to inspect the welds of the overpack baseplate to the shell, pedestal shell, and radial plates under ASME Code Section V, Article 9. Weld inspection acceptance criteria meet the requirements in ASME Section III, Subsection NF-5360.

Comment K.32: One commenter asked why a mobile lifting device is used and why it is not required to meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(2) for new cranes. If a new crane is necessary to meet the requirements, the utilities should get one and not be allowed to lower requirements.

Response: A mobile lifting device is an alternative option to a stationary lifting device that may be used in a CTF. The decision to use either a mobile or stationary lifting device would be made by the cask users and would be based on their plant's site-specific needs. NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(2) specifies that new cranes should be designed to meet NUREG-0554, “Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants.” These requirements are not applicable to mobile lifting devices which are not single-failure-proof; therefore, mobile lifting devices are exempted from this particular requirement in NUREG-0612. To ensure that the mobile lifting device has the equivalent level of safety as a single-failure-proof crane, additional conditions in CoC, Appendix B, Sections 3.5.2.2.1, 3.5.2.2.2, and 3.5.2.2.4 were imposed.

Comment K.33: One commenter stated that a discussion on the cask transfer facility should be included in the SER, and that the public should not have to read the SAR to understand the generic design. The commenter requested that this part of the cask transfer facility be resubmitted with a complete clear design with specific criteria.

Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. SER Section 1.1 discusses the CTF in a level of detail appropriate for an SER. The detailed design and operating criteria for the CTF are given in SAR Section 2.3.3.1. This satisfies 10 CFR 72.24, which requires that the SAR contain information on structures, systems, and components important to safety in sufficient detail for the NRC staff to make its regulatory finding. Repeating this information in the SER is not necessary. The NRC disagrees that cask transfer facility should be resubmitted with a complete clear design with specific criteria. The specific criteria for the CTF are already given in CoC, Appendix B, Section 3.4, and SAR Section 2.3.3.1. As discussed in the response to E.30, NRC found it unnecessary to approve a specific CTF design.

Comment K.34: One commenter recommended that Section 3.5.7 of the SER be revised to reflect that transport of the HI-TRAC transfer cask in the vertical orientation is permitted. The comment also recommended that “50 inches” be changed to “42 inches” to be consistent with TS Table 5-1.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. The SER has been modified to reflect that transport of the HI-TRAC transfer cask in the vertical orientation is permitted. The horizontal lifting height per TS Table 5-1 will be corrected to 42 inches to correct the typographical error.

Comment K.35: One commenter recommended that Section 9.1.2.2.b of the SER be revised to delete “(either to the fuel pool or the site licensee's off-gas system)” because users may or may not have these systems at their plants.

Response: The NRC agrees with the comment. It is up to the cask users to develop the specific procedures for venting the MPC and to determine the appropriate location under their plant's waste gas handling system design and radiation protection program. Section 9.1.2.2.b of the SER has been modified as recommended.

As a result of the NRC staff's response to public comments, or to rectify issues identified during the comment period, TSs 5.2.f and 5.2.j have been modified (see comment J.10). The NRC staff has also updated the CoC, including Appendix B, and has removed the bases section from the TSs attached to the CoC to ensure consistency with NRC's format and content. The NRC staff has also modified its SER. In addition, the NRC staff has modified the rule language by changing the word “Certification” to “Certificate” to clarify that it is actually the Certificate that expires.

Under the “Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs” approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997, and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR 46517), this rule is classified as compatibility Category “NRC.” Compatibility is not required for Category “NRC” regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), or the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements reserved to NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is consistent with the particular State's administrative procedure laws, but does not confer regulatory authority on the State.

Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, the NRC has determined that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. This final rule adds an additional cask to the list of approved spent fuel storage casks that power reactor licensees can use to store spent fuel at reactor sites without additional site-specific approvals from the Commission. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are available from Merri Horn, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 415-8126, e-mail mlh1@nrc.gov.

This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0132.

If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

The National Technology Transfer Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-113) requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this final rule, the NRC is adding the Holtec International HI-STORM 100 cask system to the list of NRC-approved cask systems for spent fuel storage in 10 CFR 72.214. This action does not constitute the establishment of a standard that establishes generally-applicable requirements.

On July 18, 1990 (55 FR 29181), the Commission issued an amendment to 10 CFR Part 72. The amendment provided for the storage of spent nuclear fuel in cask systems with designs approved by the NRC under a general license. Any nuclear power reactor licensee can use cask systems with designs approved by the NRC to store spent nuclear fuel if it notifies the NRC in advance, the spent fuel is stored under the conditions specified in the cask's CoC, and the conditions of the general license are met. In that rule, four spent fuel storage casks were approved for use at reactor sites and were listed in 10 CFR 72.214. That rule envisioned that storage casks certified in the future could be routinely added to the listing in 10 CFR 72.214 through the rulemaking process. Procedures and criteria for obtaining NRC approval of new spent fuel storage cask designs were provided in 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart L.

The alternative to this action is to withhold approval of this new design and issue a site-specific license to each utility that proposes to use the casks. This alternative would cost both the NRC and utilities more time and money for each site-specific license. Conducting site-specific reviews would ignore the procedures and criteria currently in place for the addition of new cask designs that can be used under a general license, and would be in conflict with NWPA direction to the Commission to approve technologies for the use of spent fuel storage at the sites of civilian nuclear power reactors without, to the maximum extent practicable, the need for additional site reviews. This alternative also would tend to exclude new vendors from the business market without cause and would arbitrarily limit the choice of cask designs available to power reactor licensees. This final rule will eliminate the above problems and is consistent with previous Commission actions. Further, the rule will have no adverse effect on public health and safety.

The benefit of this rule to nuclear power reactor licensees is to make available a greater choice of spent fuel storage cask designs that can be used under a general license. The new cask vendors with casks to be listed in 10 CFR 72.214 benefit by having to obtain NRC certificates only once for a design that can then be used by more than one power reactor licensee. The NRC also benefits because it will need to certify a cask design only once for use by multiple licensees. Casks approved through rulemaking are to be suitable for use under a range of environmental conditions sufficiently broad to encompass multiple nuclear power plants in the United States without the need for further site-specific approval by NRC. Vendors with cask designs already listed may be adversely impacted because power reactor licensees may choose a newly listed design over an existing one. However, the NRC is required by its regulations and NWPA direction to certify and list approved casks. This rule has no significant identifiable impact or benefit on other Government agencies.

Based on the above discussion of the benefits and impacts of the alternatives, the NRC concludes that the requirements of the final rule are commensurate with the Commission's responsibilities for public health and safety and the common defense and security. No other available alternative is believed to be as satisfactory, and thus, this action is recommended.

In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants, independent spent fuel storage facilities, and Holtec International. The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of “small entities” set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.

The NRC has determined that the backfit rule (10 CFR 50.109 or 10 CFR 72.62) does not apply to this rule because this amendment does not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in the backfit rule. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not required.

On August 24, 1999, the Department published in the Federal Register an interim final rule (64 FR 46111) revising the regulations for its State Energy Program (SEP or program). This rule provides for the possibility of certain activities being funded under the Special Projects part of the program that are not permitted under the formula grant part of the program. The rule also provides for the specification of any Special Projects funding limitations by the sector specific program offices providing the Special Projects funding, and clarifies the applicability of Subpart B to the formula grant part of the program and of Subpart C to the Special Projects part of the program.

The program provides formula grants to States for a wide variety of energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives, and, in years when funding is available, may also offer financial assistance for a number of State-oriented competitively awarded Special Projects activities with funding contributed by the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy's End-Use Sector Programs. Special Projects have been funded in every fiscal year since SEP was established in 1996. DOE expects the Special Projects part of SEP to continue in future years.

Among the goals of the SEP Special Projects activities are to assist States to: accelerate deployment of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies; facilitate the acceptance of emerging and under utilized energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies; and increase the responsiveness of Federally funded technology development efforts to private sector needs.

The interim final rule published on August 24, 1999 announced a 30-day public comment period that closed on September 23, 1999. We received no comments regarding the changes made under 10 CFR part 420, and those changes are made final. Therefore, this rule is adopted as it was published in the program's interim rule on August 24, 1999 (64 FR 46111).

Today's regulatory action has been determined not to be a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” 58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993). Accordingly, this action was not subject to review under the Executive Order by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).

Section 3 of Executive Order 12988, 61 FR 4729 (February 7, 1996), instructs each agency to adhere to certain requirements in promulgating new regulations. These requirements, set forth in Section 3(a) and (b), include eliminating drafting errors and needless ambiguity, drafting the regulations to minimize litigation, providing clear and certain legal standards for affected legal conduct, and promoting simplification and burden reduction. Agencies are also instructed to make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation describes any administrative proceeding to be available prior to judicial review and any provisions for the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Department has determined that today's regulatory action meets the requirements of Section 3(a) and (b) of Executive Order 12988.

Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 4, 1999) imposes certain requirements on agencies formulating and implementing policies or regulations that preempt State law or that have federalism implications. Agencies are required to examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States and carefully assess the necessity for such actions. DOE has examined today's rule and has determined that it does not preempt State law and does not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. No further action is required by Executive Order 13132.

No new information collection or record keeping requirements are imposed on the public by today's rules.

A programmatic environmental assessment has been prepared covering the grant program under the final rule published today which was sent to the States for comment on March 27, 1996. No comments were received by the end of the 14-day comment period. This programmatic environmental assessment resulted in a finding of no significant impact (FONSI). A FONSI was issued on June 7, 1996. The documents relating to this programmatic environmental assessment are available in the DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room, United States Department of Energy, Room 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-3142.

The final rule published today is subject to the Congressional notification requirements of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Act), 5 U.S.C. 801. DOE will report to Congress on the promulgation of the final rule prior to the effective date set forth at the beginning of this notice.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) places a variety of review and consultative obligations on Federal agencies proposing regulatory actions for Federal intergovernmental mandates. Today's rule does not involve such a mandate because the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act excludes from the definition of “Federal intergovernmental mandate” provisions in a regulation that would impose conditions incident to a financial assistance program (not involving an entitlement) or a duty arising from participation in a voluntary Federal program 2 U.S.C. 658(5). This program is a standard non-entitlement financial assistance program and States are not obligated to participate in it.

The regulatory flexibility analysis requirements in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C 601 et seq. , do not apply to this final rule because a general notice of proposed rulemaking was not required by law.

The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance number for the State Energy Program is 81.041. The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance number for the State Energy Program Special Projects is 81.119.

In 1994, NCUA changed the name of its Office of Information Systems to the Office of Technology and Information Services. 59 FR 47072, Sept. 14, 1994. On November 18, 1999, the NCUA Board voted to rename this office as the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO). This name is more consistent with similar offices within other government agencies and private industry. Additionally, the name is comparable to the offices of other NCUA executive staff, such as the Office of Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Executive Director, Office of General Counsel, and Office of the Inspector General. 12 CFR 790.2(b). The name change does not alter the description or responsibilities of the OCIO.

The amendment to the final rule is technical rather than substantive. NCUA finds good cause that notice and public comment are unnecessary under section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).

NCUA also finds good cause to dispense with the 30-day delayed effective date requirement under section 553(d)(3) of the APA. The rule is technical rather than substantive. The rule will, therefore, be effective immediately upon publication of this notice.

An initial regulatory flexibility analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act is required only when an agency is required to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking for any proposed rule. 5 U.S.C. 603. As noted previously, NCUA has determined that it is unnecessary to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking for this rule. Accordingly, an initial regulatory analysis is not required. Moreover, since this final rule imposes no new requirements and makes only a technical amendment, NCUA has determined and certifies that this rule will not have any significant economic impact on a substantial number of small credit unions (primarily those under $1 million in assets).

Title II of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121) provides, generally, for congressional review of agency rules. A reporting requirement is triggered in instances where NCUA issues a final rule as defined by section 551 of the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 U.S.C. 551. The Office of Management and Budget has reviewed this rule and has determined that for purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 it is not a major rule.

NCUA has determined that the final rule does not increase paperwork requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ) and regulations of the Office of Management and Budget.

Executive Order 13132 encourages independent regulatory agencies to consider the impact of their regulatory actions on state and local interests. In adherence to fundamental federalism principles, NCUA, an independent regulatory agency as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5), voluntarily complies with the executive order. NCUA has determined that this final rule does not constitute a policy that has federalism implications for purposes of the executive order.

On January 3, 2000, the Finance Board published for comment a proposed rule to add to its regulations a new part 917, setting forth a state-of-the-art corporate governance framework for the Banks' boards of directors and senior management. See 65 FR 81 (2000). The 30-day public comment period closed on February 2, 2000. The Finance Board received a total of sixteen comment letters: eleven from Banks, three from trade associations and one from a Bank director.

While all commenters suggested modifications to the proposed rule, six expressed general support for the overall purpose of the rule. No commenters expressed general opposition to the rule, but two commenters believed that the rule as a whole was too detailed. Specifically, one commenter (a Bank) opposed the proposed rule's detailed allocation of responsibilities between Banks' boards of directors and senior management and recommended that each Bank's board of directors be permitted to determine the appropriate allocation of responsibilities between itself and the Bank's senior management. Another commenter (a trade association) stated that the rule would create unnecessary administrative burdens and operational complexities.

It is the opinion of the Finance Board that an active and informed board of directors is one of the cornerstones of safe and sound Bank operation. The agency understands that, as is the case with any bank or corporation, most of a Bank's day-to-day operational functions will be undertaken by management and other Bank personnel. However, while a Bank's board of directors may the delegate the execution of managerial functions to Bank employees, the responsibility for seeing that these functions are properly executed may not be delegated. Part of the reason for the detailed nature of the rule is to make these responsibilities clear.

Now that the Banks have been given full responsibility for their own corporate governance, the ability of the Finance Board to ensure the safety and soundness of the Banks lies primarily in its ability to examine the Banks and to take action pursuant to Bank examinations. The material set forth in part 917 also is intended in part to make clear the standards against which Banks will be examined. Although the rule is detailed in some respects, the Finance Board believes that it is preferable to state explicitly the standards to which the Bank's boards of directors and management will be held than to promulgate a more general governance rule the application of which would remain ambiguous until specific examination concerns arise.

As part of a proposed rule to amend its advances regulation, 12 CFR part 950, the Finance Board will be proposing to add to part 917 a requirement that each Bank have in place at all times a member products policy to address various aspects of the financial products that the Bank provides to its members and associates. In this final rule, the Finance Board has reserved § 917.4 for the member products policy provision.

In addition, the strategic planning provision, which appeared in the proposed rule as § 917.9, has been moved to § 917.5 in the final rule. This was done in order to give part 917 a more logical structure by placing the provisions requiring Banks' board of directors to adopt major written policies or plans ( i.e., the risk management policy, the member products policy and the strategic plan) in consecutive sections. Consequently, the sections numbered as 917.4 through 917.8 in the proposed rule have been redesignated as §§ 917.6 through 917.10 in the final rule.

As reflected in the proposed rule, the Finance Board has begun the process of revising its regulations to refer to nonmember mortgagees who are eligible under section 10b of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (Bank Act), 12 U.S.C. 1430b, to obtain advances from the Banks as “associates.” In addition to a desire to use less cumbersome terminology, this change arises from the Finance Board's concern that, to those not familiar with the nuances of the Bank System, the use of the term “nonmember mortgagee” could imply that the Banks are transacting business with entities beyond those authorized by statute. The term “associate” more accurately reflects the fact that these entities have a Congressionally-sanctioned relationship with the Banks, albeit one that falls short of full Bank membership.

In its recent regulatory reorganization rulemaking, the Finance Board established in its regulations a new part 900, to contain definitions of terms that are used often throughout the Finance Board's regulations. See 65 FR 8253 (2000). By creating this part, the Finance Board intended both to standardize common terms used in the regulations and to eliminate repetitive definitions and excessive definitional cross-references throughout the regulations. Although this is the first rulemaking in which the term “associate” has been used, the Finance Board intends eventually to use the term throughout its regulations. Accordingly, the term, which appeared in § 917.1 of the proposed rule, has been moved to part 900 (§ 900.1) in the final rule.

Section 917.1 of the rule continues to contain definitions of terms that are used in the substantive provisions of part 917, but that are not used frequently enough throughout the Finance Board's regulations to warrant inclusion in part 900. Changes made to, and comments regarding, these definitions are discussed below in the context of the substantive provisions to which the definitions relate.

Section 917.2(b)(1) of the rule requires that each director carry out his or her duties in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the Bank, and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. One commenter (a Bank), while supporting this regulatory statement of the standard of care, suggested that the Finance Board state explicitly in the final rule that Bank directors and management are subject to the same standard of care as directors of ordinary corporations are under state law.

Overall, part 917 charges Bank directors and management with many specific duties and responsibilities in connection with the operation of the Banks. In addition, § 917.2(b)(1) sets forth a general standard of care with which the specific duties are to be executed. While the Finance Board believes that this regulatory standard of care is equivalent to the legal standard that normally applies to officers and directors of state-chartered corporations under state law, the Finance Board declines to make explicit reference to state law in the regulation. Part 917 specifically enumerates both the specific and general standards that the Finance Board has determined are appropriate, and it is by these express standards—and not by any ambiguous reference to state law—that the actions of Bank directors and management will be measured by the Finance Board.

In addition, several commenters expressed their opinion that, while § 917.2(b)(1) sets forth a standard of care identical to that which exists under the law of most states, various specific provisions in proposed part 917 appeared to impose a greater duty upon directors and management by essentially requiring them to guarantee the outcome of actions taken by other parties. The Finance Board has reviewed the provisions in question and has made amendments to several of them (specifically, final rule §§ 917.3(a)(2)(iv), 917.3(c), 917.6(b)(2) and 917.7(e)(2), all discussed in greater detail below) in order to make clear that, while a Bank's board of directors and senior management are required to adopt certain policies and order certain actions that are “reasonably designed” to achieve a particular result, the officers and directors do not have the responsibility to guarantee that, in executing these policies or orders, Bank employees will achieve the precise result specified. However, by requiring that policies and orders be “reasonably” designed to achieve the desired result, the Finance Board does intend to require that officers and directors take all objectively reasonable measures necessary to design the policy or order, and oversee its implementation, in such a way as to maximize the chances of the desired result being achieved.

Section 917.2(b)(3) of the proposed rule would have required that every Bank director “be financially literate, or become financially literate within a reasonable time after appointment or election.” One commenter (a Bank) suggested that the Finance Board explicitly define the term “financially literate” in the final rule, using the explanation of the term set forth in the preamble to the proposed rule. The Finance Board agrees that the meaning of the term “financially literate” was unclear in the proposed rule. However, instead of defining the term, the Finance Board has opted in the final rule to eliminate its use altogether and to require, more plainly, that at the time of his or her election, or within a reasonable time thereafter, each director have a working familiarity with basic finance and accounting practices, including the ability to read and understand the Bank's balance sheet and income statement and to ask substantive questions of management and the internal and external auditors.

Three commenters (two Banks and one trade association) opposed this requirement on the grounds that elected directors—who are primarily chief executives or senior officers of financial institutions—are likely to meet the standard, while appointed directors are chosen by the Finance Board, thereby giving the agency plenary power to select only those individuals who have a working familiarity with basic finance and accounting practices. Similarly, two other Banks questioned the requirement, given that the Banks have no power to lobby for the appointment or election of any director.

The Finance Board agrees that elected directors, as representatives of member financial institutions, would presumably meet the requirement of § 917.2(b)(3) with ease. The agency does not agree that this fact logically leads to the conclusion that the requirement should not be included in the rule.

The Finance Board also agrees that, because it is responsible for the appointment of each Bank's public interest directors, it has the power to use financial literacy as a criterion in the appointment process. However, the intent of the requirement set forth in § 917.2(b)(3) is not to eliminate from consideration for Bank directorships individuals who do not currently possess a working familiarity with basic finance and accounting practices, regardless of any other relevant qualifications they may possess. Instead, the purpose of § 917.2(b)(3) is to require that those who do not possess such familiarity become so educated to the extent that they can effectively carry out their duties as directors. The Finance Board trusts that any individual who merits consideration as either an elected or appointed Bank director would be capable of learning in a very short period of time how to read the Bank's income statement and balance sheet and how the data set forth therein relate to the general operations of the Bank. The Finance Board also believes that this requirement will impose little burden on the Banks, especially if the option of such education is made a part of existing director orientation programs.

Section 917.3(a)(1) of the rule requires that, within 90 days of the effective date of the final rule, each Bank have in effect at all times a risk management policy. Section 917.3(b) of the rule sets forth the requirements for this policy. As it appeared in the proposed rule, § 917.3(b)(1) required that the risk management policy “describe how the Bank will comply with its capital structure plan, after such plan is approved by the Finance Board.”

Four commenters (two Banks and two trade associations) stated that the proposed rule was unclear as to whether the risk management policy must immediately state how the Bank will comply with capital requirements that will not be known until after the 90-day implementation period, or whether the policy is to be amended after the Finance Board issues a final rule on capital and subsequently approves that Bank's capital structure plan. Three of these commenters (one Bank and two trade associations) stated that the Finance Board should not require a Bank to adopt its risk management plan until 90 days after that Bank's capital structure plan has been approved by the Finance Board. The remaining Bank stated that the Finance Board should allow the Banks 180 days after the publication of the final rule to adopt their risk management policies.

Of course, the Finance Board does not intend to require that the Banks describe how they will comply with a capital regulation or a capital structure plan that will not yet exist at the end of the 90-day implementation period. In the final rule, § 917.3(b)(1) has been revised to more clearly state that this risk management policy requirement will apply only after the Finance Board has adopted its new capital regulations and has approved the Bank's capital structure plan. At that time, a Bank will need to amend its existing policy to add the material required under this provision.

The Finance Board declines to extend the risk management policy implementation period beyond 90 days after the effective date of the final rule. It is the agency's view that, pursuant to the Federal Home Loan Bank System Financial Management Policy (FMP) (which is the Finance Board policy that currently addresses Bank risk management), Banks should already have in place policies that largely conform to the requirements of § 917.3(b). The rule does not require that a Bank adopt a new risk management policy if one is already in place that meets the requirements of § 917.3(b), but requires merely that the Bank have such a policy “in effect at all times” after the end of the 90-day period.

Even if a Bank must amend its existing policy, or adopt an entirely new risk management policy, in order to conform to new § 917.3(b), the necessary changes should be easily accomplished by the close of the 90-day implementation period given that, under the FMP, the Banks have very little discretion regarding the management of the risk components that must be addressed in the risk management policy. As the substantive requirements of the FMP are gradually superceded in the coming year by new regulations that are likely to give the Banks more discretion in the area of risk management and capital structure, each Bank will need to make appropriate amendments to its risk management policy.

Proposed § 917.3(a)(2)(iv) would have required each Bank's board of directors to ensure that policies and procedures are in place to achieve Bank compliance at all times with its risk management policy. Four commenters (all Banks) opposed this language on the ground that it would be unreasonable to require the Bank's board of directors to act as a guarantor that the Bank would always be in compliance with the risk management policy. The Finance Board recognizes that a Bank's board of directors typically is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the Bank and, therefore, would not be in a position constantly to monitor and enforce employee compliance with Bank policies and procedures. Accordingly, the Finance Board has revised the language of § 917.3(a)(2)(iv) to require only that the board ensure that policies and procedures are in place “that are reasonably designed” to achieve “continuing” Bank compliance with its risk management policy.

Sections 917.3(b)(3)(i) and (ii) require that each Bank's risk management policy set forth standards for the Bank's management of credit risk and market risk, respectively. One commenter (a Bank) suggested that the Finance Board amend the definitions of both market risk and credit risk, which in proposed § 917.1 referred to the “market value” of a Bank's portfolio and of a particular obligation, respectively, to refer also to the “estimated fair value” of assets. In the final rule, these two definitions have been revised to add references to “estimated fair value if market value is not available.”

The same Bank also suggested that the Finance Board define the terms “market value” and “estimated fair value” in the final rule. Because these terms are standard accounting terms, see, e.g., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, App. D, ¶ 534(j), the Finance Board has determined that they need not be defined in the final rule.

The same Bank also suggested that the definition of “market risk” be amended to include changes in interest rate volatility as an underlying causal factor. Because the Finance Board believes that the concept of changes in interest rate volatility are subsumed within the general term “changes in interest rates,” which is included in the definition of market risk, it finds the suggested revision to be unnecessary.

Section 917.3(b)(3)(iii) of the rule requires that each Bank's risk management policy set forth standards for the Bank's management of day-to-day operational liquidity needs and contingency liquidity needs. One commenter (a Bank) recommended that the definition of “contingency liquidity,” set forth in § 917.1, include both maturing advances and off-balance sheet sources of funds that a Bank can use to help meet liquidity needs if access to capital markets is impeded. Because the Finance Board considers maturing advances to be included within paragraph (2) of the definition of “contingency liquidity” (self-liquidating assets with a maturity of seven days or less), it has chosen not to list maturing advances separately in the definition.

Regarding off-balance sheet items, during a funding crisis, a Bank may be expected to lose access to normal sources of unsecured borrowings such as deposits or federal funds. However, even if, due to a funding crisis, a Bank were to lose access to its normal sources of unsecured borrowing, it is expected that the Bank would continue to have access to previously-established irrevocable lines of credit from AAA- or AA-rated financial institutions, through either deposits or the federal funds market. Accordingly, the Finance Board has amended the definition of “contingency liquidity” in the final rule to include these sources of funds.

One commenter (a Bank), noting that the proposed rule contained a definition of “contingency liquidity,” but did not define “operational liquidity,” requested that a definition of “operational liquidity” be added to the final rule. In response, the Finance Board has, in final § 917.1, defined “operational liquidity” as including sources of cash from both a Bank's ongoing access to the capital markets and its holding of liquid assets to meet operational requirements in a Bank's normal course of business.

Section 917.3(c) of the rule requires that each Bank's senior management perform an annual risk assessment to identify and evaluate all material risks that could adversely affect the achievement of the Bank's performance objectives and compliance requirements. One commenter (a Bank) requested that the Finance Board include in the final rule a definition of the word “material.” The same Bank opposed the requirement that a Bank identify and evaluate “all” material risks, stating that the “innocent failure” to identify a risk that is deemed by a Finance Board examiner to be “material” could expose the Bank's board and management to criticism.

Because “material risk” is a standard accounting concept, see, e.g., FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2; SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, the Finance Board finds it unnecessary to define the term in the final rule. Additionally, because the Finance Board would consider the failure of a Bank's management to identify any material risk—whether innocent or intentional—to be a matter of supervisory concern, the agency declines to eliminate the word “all” from § 917.3(c). However, so as not to set an unreasonable regulatory standard, the Finance Board has amended § 917.3(c) in the final rule to require only that the risk assessment be “reasonably designed” to identify and evaluate all material risks.

Section 917.5 of the final rule (§ 917.9 in the proposed rule) requires that, beginning 90 days after the effective date of the final rule, each Bank's board of directors have in effect at all times a strategic business plan that describes how the Bank's business activities will achieve the mission of the Bank. In the proposed rule, the “mission of the Banks” was defined in paragraph (a) of the strategic business plan section. In the final rule, this mission provision remains substantively unchanged, but is moved from part 917 and to a new part 940, entitled “Mission of the Banks.”

The mission provision describes the mission of the Banks as providing to their members and associates financial products and services, including but not limited to advances, that assist and enhance their members' and associates' financing of housing and community lending. Three commenters (all Banks) stated their belief that individual Banks should have the responsibility for establishing their own mission statements. One Bank stated that each Bank's mission statement should be a reflection of how the Bank, its board, its management and shareholders construe the authority granted under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (Bank Act). The Bank further stated that the Bank Act does not explicitly define the mission of the Banks and does not require that the Finance Board do so. Another Bank commented that the drafting of a mission statement is fundamentally a management responsibility that should be exercised by the entity's board of directors and not by the entity's regulator.

The Bank Act authorizes the Finance Board to supervise the Banks and to promulgate and enforce such regulations and orders as are necessary from time to time to carry out the provisions of the Bank Act. See 12 U.S.C. 1422b(a)(1). Among the provisions of the Bank Act are those outlining the duties of the Finance Board, which include the duty to “ensure” that the Banks carry out their housing finance mission. See id. at 1422a(a)(3)(B)(ii). Many of the comment letters received in response to the proposed rule criticized the Finance Board for using the word “ensure” in some of the provisions setting forth specific duties of Bank directors, noting that the word implies that the directors would have a duty to “guarantee” that Bank employees would carry out the board's directives with precision. The Finance Board agrees that the word “ensure” connotes an affirmative obligation that carries a high degree of responsibility. Thus, the use of the word “ensure” in section 2A(a)(3)(B)(ii) of the Bank Act makes clear that, consistent with the safe and sound operation of the Banks, the Finance Board has the duty to take active measures, using all available avenues, to see to it that the Banks carry out their housing finance mission.

Because Congress has not expressly defined the term “housing finance mission,” it is the responsibility and the privilege of the Finance Board—as the body charged with the duty to ensure that the Banks fulfill that mission and, more generally, as the supervisory regulator of the Banks and the agency charged with the administration of the Bank Act—to construe the term reasonably in light of the totality of the Act. It is the position of the Finance Board that, when Congress amended the Bank Act in 1989 to require the Banks to offer Affordable Housing Programs (AHP) and Community Investment Programs (CIP) and authorized the Banks to offer Community Investment Cash Advance Programs (CICA), the Banks' “housing finance mission,” as referenced in section 2A(a)(3)(B)(ii), came to include support not only for the financing of traditional housing-related activities, but also for those types of community lending that the Banks are authorized by statute to support and that indirectly enhance traditional housing finance by helping to create and sustain thriving and livable communities. See 12 U.S.C. 1430(i), (j).

Section 940.2 of the final rule implements in regulation this description of the Banks' “housing finance mission.” Although, as discussed, the Finance Board believes that support of community lending is an integral part of the Banks' statutory housing finance mission, it has used the terms “housing” and “community lending” separately in § 940.2 and in other parts of the regulations in order to make clear that the Banks' housing finance mission goes beyond the parameters that the term “housing finance” would traditionally connote.

Regarding the substance of the mission provision, seven commenters (five Banks and two trade associations) stated that the scope of the provision was too narrow. Specifically, several commenters noted that the mission provision does not reference the Banks' new authority to extend advances to CFIs for the purpose of funding loans to small businesses, small farms and small agri-businesses. One of the Banks stated that, if the Finance Board must enact a mission provision, the agency should draft the provision broadly enough to support all activities explicitly allowed by the Bank Act. Similarly, two of the Banks opined that the mission provision does not include sufficient reference to other types of investments, products and services that may directly contribute to mission achievement. Yet another Bank stated that the mission provision should recognize the need to use member's capital prudently and effectively, particularly in light of the recent statutory change to an all-voluntary membership base.

As drafted, the mission provision does not appear to consider as mission-related activities related to those purposes addressed by the Modernization Act-namely facilitating the funding of loans by CFIs to small businesses, small farms and small agri-businesses. However, the Finance Board has recently approved for publication a proposed rule to amend its advances regulation to incorporate the new CFI-related advance authorities. As part of this rule, the Finance Board is proposing to amend the term “community lending,” as defined in part 952 of the regulations, to include these authorities. Because the mission provision incorporates the term “community lending,” it will also encompass the new CFI-related authorities once the Finance Board promulgates a final rule amending its advances regulation, most likely in the third quarter of 2000. Presently, the Finance Board is in the midst of an ambitious regulatory agenda intended to implement in a timely manner the statutory changes brought about by the Modernization Act. In order to accomplish these changes effectively, the agency must necessarily proceed one step at a time. With many interrelated regulations, it will in some cases take two or more rulemakings before a change can be fully integrated into all relevant aspects of the Finance Board's regulatory scheme. In order to make clear immediately that the CFI-related authorities, as well as support for the financing of multi-family housing, are considered to be part of each Bank's mission, the Finance Board has added to § 917.5(a) a requirement that performance goals for these areas be included in each Bank's strategic plan.

It should also be noted that the mission provision is not intended to be an all-encompassing description of every function that a Bank is authorized to undertake. As mentioned in several of the comment letters, there are many ways in which a Bank may serve its members and associates that do not fall within the parameters of the mission provision. The point of the mission provision, in combination with the strategic planning requirement, is to require the Banks to focus primarily upon carrying out their housing finance mission and to do so in a profitable manner.

Finally one commenter (a trade association) expressed concern that the Finance Board's promulgation of the mission provision, in combination with the strategic planning requirement, is inconsistent with the content of an October 18, 1999 letter from Finance Board Chairman Bruce Morrison to Senator Phil Gramm and Congressman Jim Leach. In that letter, Chairman Morrison stated that, upon the enactment of the Modernization Act, the Finance Board would withdraw its Financial Management and Mission Achievement (FMMA) proposed rulemaking, see 64 FR 52163 (1999), and would take no action to promulgate proposed or final regulations limiting Bank assets or advances beyond those regulations currently in effect, except to the extent necessary to protect the safety and soundness of the Banks. As discussed, this rule does nothing to limit Bank assets or advances of any kind, but merely requires the Banks to adopt a strategic plan setting forth how their assets, advances and other products and services will contribute to fulfillment of the Banks' mission.

The requirements regarding the content of the Banks' strategic plans remain in part 917, at § 917.5. Regarding the actual strategic plan requirement, one commenter (a Bank) expressly opposed specific strategic planning requirements, stating that each Bank should be permitted to determine the strategic planning methodology most appropriate for the Bank to pursue its mission. As mentioned above, it is the duty of the Finance Board to ensure that the Banks carry out their statutory mission. The Finance Board has determined that, in order to fulfill this duty, it must require the Banks to focus upon the development of profitable products and services that enhance the carrying out of this mission. This is the intent behind the strategic planning requirement.

One commenter (a Bank) asked whether the strategic business plan may consist of multiple documents generated and approved by a Bank's board of directors in a sequential manner. Nothing in the rule prohibits the Banks from drafting and approving elements of the strategic business in a sequential fashion, so long as: (1) It is clear which documents comprise the strategic business plan; and (2) these documents, as a whole, meet the requirements set forth in § 917.5.

Five commenters (three Banks and two trade associations) opposed the 90-day time limit the Banks have been given to adopt their strategic business plans. Two of the Banks suggested that the rule be revised to permit the Banks to adopt the plan during their next scheduled annual planning process. Another of the Banks requested that the Banks be given one year to adopt their plans. The trade associations suggested that the Finance Board delay imposition of the strategic planning requirement until the implementation of each Bank's new capital structure. The Finance Board believes that, under current requirements, the Banks should already have most elements of the strategic plan in place and that, therefore, the adoption of the full plan under § 917.5 within 90 days should not be overly burdensome. Accordingly, the 90-day requirement remains unchanged in the final rule.

Section 917.6 of the final rule (§ 917.4 of the proposed rule) sets forth requirements pertaining to the establishment and maintenance of a Bank's internal control system. Section 917.6(a)(1) enumerates the areas of concern that each Bank's internal control system should be designed to address. Section 917.6(a)(2) sets forth several of the ongoing internal control activities that the Finance Board has determined are necessary in order to adequately address the concerns referred to in paragraph (a)(1). One commenter (a Bank) opposed the non-exclusive listing of required ongoing internal control activities in § 917.6(a)(2), stating that the list added little, if anything, to the regulation.

In determining whether a Bank's internal control system adequately addresses the areas of concern set forth in paragraph (a)(1), Finance Board examiners will be looking to determine whether the Bank is effectively carrying out the ongoing internal control activities listed in paragraph (a)(2). Accordingly, the Finance Board finds it preferable to list explicitly some of the internal control activities on which examiners will focus so that each Bank will be aware in advance of the standards that will be applied in the examination of its internal control system.

Section 917.6(b) of the rule lists the internal control responsibilities of each Bank's board of directors. In the proposed rule, paragraph (b)(2) would have required that each Bank's board ensure that an effective and comprehensive internal audit of the internal control system is performed annually. Four commenters (three Banks and one Bank director) objected to the proposed rule language on the ground that it appeared to require Bank boards of directors to “guarantee” that employees carrying out an internal control audit would do so effectively and comprehensively. The commenters argued that this regulatory standard would exceed the legal standard that normally applies to corporate directors under state law. In response to these concerns, and to emphasize that the regulatory standard of care applicable to Bank directors is equivalent to the legal standard that normally applies to corporate directors under state law, the Finance Board has revised § 917.6(b)(2) in the final rule to require only that: (1) The board require an annual internal audit of the Bank's internal control system; and (2) the audit plan is reasonably designed to be effective and comprehensive.

Two commenters (one Bank and one trade association) suggested that the Finance Board modify § 917.6(b)(2) to enable Banks to distinguish between high- and low-risk internal control areas and that audits of low-risk areas be required less frequently than annually. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) requires that each insured depository institution prepare annually, among other things, a report signed by the chief executive officer and the chief accounting or financial officer of the institution that contains: (A) A statement of the management's responsibilities for (i) preparing financial statements; (ii) establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and (iii) complying with the laws and regulations relating to safety and soundness; and (B) an assessment, as of the end of the institution's most recent fiscal year, of (i) the effectiveness of such internal control structure and procedures; and (ii) the institution's compliance with the laws and regulations relating to safety and soundness. See 12 U.S.C. 1831m(b)(2); see also 12 CFR part 363 (FDIC implementing regulations). These FDIA provisions essentially require that each FDIC-insured financial institution perform an annual comprehensive audit of its internal control system. Section 917.6(b)(2) of the rule is intended to apply a similar requirement to the Banks and therefore remains unchanged in the final rule.

One commenter (a Bank) also objected to the requirement, set forth in § 917.6(b)(6), that a Bank's board of directors report to the Finance Board in a timely manner any internal control deficiencies found and the corrective action taken. The commenter suggested that the Banks be required to report only significant internal control deficiencies that have the potential to impact a Bank's safety and soundness. As the entity charged by statute with ensuring the safety and soundness of the Banks, see 12 U.S.C. 1422a(a)(3)(A), it is ultimately the statutory responsibility of the Finance Board to determine which deficiencies may impact upon the safety and soundness of a Bank. As such, final § 917.6(b)(6) continues to hold each Bank's board of directors responsible for reporting all known internal control deficiencies to the Finance Board.

Section 917.6(b)(8) of the rule requires that each Bank's board of directors review all delegations of authority to specific personnel or committees and require that such delegations state the extent of the authority and responsibilities delegated. One commenter (a Bank) requested clarification as to whether, under this provision, it would be permissible for a Bank's management to make particular delegation decisions, so long as the Bank's board of directors reviews the delegations. The Finance Board understands that decisions regarding delegations of authority among specific Bank personnel will most likely be made by a Bank's management as part of its responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the Bank. Such management decisions are permissible under § 917.6(b)(8), provided that the Bank's board of directors reviews the delegations and requires that the delegations state the extent of the power delegated.

Section 917.6(c) of the rule addresses the responsibilities of each Bank's senior management for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of the Bank's internal control system. As it appeared in the proposed rule, this provision would have required that senior management ensure that Bank personnel fully understand and comply with all policies, procedures and legal requirements. One commenter (a trade association) requested that the Finance Board amend this provision to require only that management ensure that Bank personnel understand and comply with policies, procedures and requirements applicable to their positions and responsibilities. Although this was implicit in the proposed rule, the Finance Board agrees that the provision may have appeared to be overly-burdensome as written. Therefore, the agency has revised § 917.6(c)(2) to add the requested clarification.

In addition, one commenter (a Bank) objected to the use of the word “ensure” in § 917.6(c)(2), and also to its use in § 917.6(c)(6), which requires that senior management ensure adherence to the lines of authority and responsibility established by the Bank's board of directors. Contrary to the role of the Bank's board of directors, which sets overall policy and oversees the operations of the Bank in a general sense, the management of the Bank is responsible for day-to-day operations, including the direct supervision of Bank employees. As such, Bank management should be in a position: (1) To educate employees regarding policies, procedures and legal requirements related to their positions and regarding lines of authority and responsibility relevant to their positions; (2) to determine on a regular basis whether employees are complying with these policies, procedures and requirements and lines of authority and responsibility; and (3) to take prompt corrective action when it is discovered that they are not so complying. Accordingly, the Finance Board has determined that use of the word “ensure” in §§ 917.6(c)(2) and (6) is appropriate.

Section 917.7 of the final rule (§ 917.5 in the proposed rule) addresses the powers and responsibilities of Bank audit committees. One commenter (a Bank) stated generally that the language of the rule suggests that audit committees will interact directly with Bank management as an independent source of authority, while, under traditional notions of corporate governance, the audit committee acts as an agent of the full board. Nothing in the audit committee provisions of the rule is intended to suggest that the authority of a Bank's audit committee derives other than from its status as agent of the full board of directors. References in the rule to direct audit committee supervision of, or authority over, the internal auditor or other Bank employees are to powers that the Finance Board has determined a Bank audit committee must possess in order to be effective. These powers would be delegated by the full board of directors to the audit committee as part of the audit committee charter.

Section 917.7(b) of the rule addresses the required composition of Bank audit committees. Specifically, § 917.7(b)(1) requires that the audit committee comprise at least five persons drawn from the Bank's board of directors. One commenter (a trade association) opposed this requirement, stating that the rule contradicts Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (Feb. 8, 1999) (Blue Ribbon Committee Report), which establishes a minimum of three directors.

Section 917.7(b)(2) requires that each Bank's audit committee include a balance of representatives of: (i) community financial institutions (CFIs) and other members; and (ii) appointive and elective directors of the Bank. One commenter (a Bank) opposed the diversity requirement, stating that the safety and soundness issues that face the Banks are straightforward and that the requirement adds to the complexity of the audit committee without adding to its ability to deal with issues of safety and soundness. Another commenter (a trade association) opposed the diversity requirement, stating that it has no basis in the Blue Ribbon Committee Report. Two commenters (both Banks) suggested that the Finance Board remove the provision requiring a balance between representatives of CFIs and other members, stating that there can be no assurance that a particular Bank's board of directors will have any elected directors representing a CFI. Finally, one commenter (a trade association) opposed the diversity requirement as written, suggesting that large borrowers be precluded from serving on the audit committee.

As stated in the proposed rule, the Finance Board included the diversity requirement in the rule in order to prevent dominance of the audit committee by any particular interest. Section 917.7(a)(1) sets the minimum audit committee membership at five (instead of the three established by the Blue Ribbon Committee Report) because the Finance Board has determined that this is the minimum number required to achieve adequately diverse representation on a Bank's audit committee. The Finance Board rejects suggestions that it eliminate the requirement that there be a balance of representation between CFIs and other members. If there are no CFI representatives on a Bank's board of directors, there will obviously be no one to serve on the audit committee in that capacity and the Bank would not be in violation of the regulation for failure to appoint a non-existent CFI director to the board. Section 917.7(b)(4) requires that at least one member of each Bank's audit committee have extensive accounting or related financial management experience. Three commenters (two Banks and one trade association) expressly supported this requirement. One of the Banks requested that the Finance Board clarify the meaning of the phrase “extensive accounting or related financial management experience.” The Blue Ribbon Committee Report uses the phrase “accounting or related financial management expertise,” where “expertise” signifies “past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities.” Although the Finance Board has chosen to use the word “experience” in order to express the standard more clearly, the explanation contained in the Blue Ribbon Committee Report is equally applicable to the standard set forth in final § 917.7(b)(4).

In the proposed rule, the Finance Board requested comment on two specific questions regarding the composition of a Bank's audit committee. First, the Finance Board asked whether, in the final rule, the provision requiring that at least one member of the audit committee have extensive accounting or related financial management experience should be made to apply specifically to the chair of the audit committee. Eight commenters (six Banks and two trade associations) opposed, and no commenters supported, the inclusion of this requirement in the final rule. The primary objection to this idea was that such a requirement might prevent an individual with other important qualifications, such as proven administrative ability, from serving as chair. Most commenters expressed a belief that, so long as at least one member of the committee has extensive financial or accounting experience, it would add little to the effectiveness of the audit committee to require that the chair specifically possess such experience. The Finance Board agrees with these arguments and, therefore, has not included this requirement in the final rule.

Second, the Finance Board asked whether the final rule should require that the vice chair of the board of directors serve as chair of the audit committee, to enable Banks to pay the audit committee chair at a higher rate of compensation. Twelve commenters (nine Banks and three trade associations) opposed, and no commenters supported, the inclusion of this requirement in the final rule. Most commenters believed that this decision properly should be left to a Bank's board of directors. Others expressed concern that, far from being an incentive, service as vice chair would only distract the audit committee chair from his or her audit committee duties. The Finance Board also agrees with these comments and, therefore, has not included this requirement in the final rule.

Section 917.7(c) of the rule prohibits any member of a Bank's board of directors from serving on the audit committee if he or she has a disqualifying relationship with the Bank or its management that would interfere with the exercise of that director's independent judgment. This section includes a non-exclusive list of relationships that would disqualify a board director for audit committee service regardless of the attendant circumstances. In the proposed rule, paragraph (4) of this list deemed as disqualifying “being an immediate family member of an individual who is, or has been in any of the past five years, employed by the Bank.” Two commenters (both Banks) suggested that the Finance Board amend this provision to refer only to family members who are employed by the Bank “as an executive officer.” The commenters pointed out that the suggested language conforms to the standard set forth in the Blue Ribbon Committee Report and that a director's familial relationship with a low-ranking Bank employee would be likely to have little effect on the director's independent judgment.

The Finance Board agrees that, on its face, a familial relationship with a low-ranking Bank employee should not disqualify a director from service on the Bank's audit committee and, therefore, has added the requested language to final § 917.7(c)(4). However, if circumstances surrounding the relationship were to cast doubt upon the director's ability to act independently, that director would still be prohibited from serving on the audit committee pursuant to the general prohibition against disqualifying relationships set forth in the introductory paragraph of § 917.7(c).

In addition, one commenter (a Bank) requested clarification that the concept of “independence” does not in any way preclude elected directors associated with Bank members from serving on the audit committee. Given that, under § 917.7(b)(2), a Bank is expressly required to have on its audit committee elective directors that represent both CFI and non-CFI members, § 917.7(c) should not be read as overriding this requirement. Only if an industry representative were to have a direct personal or financial relationship with the Bank or its senior employees would that director's independence be called into question under § 917.7(c).

Section 917.7(e) enumerates the duties applicable to Bank audit committees. Under the proposed rule, paragraph (2) of this section would have required, among other things, that each Bank's audit committee ensure that policies are in place to achieve disclosure and transparency regarding the Bank's true financial performance and governance practices. One commenter (a Bank) requested that the Finance Board modify the language of this paragraph to refer instead to policies that are “reasonably designed” to achieve disclosure and transparency regarding the Bank's true financial performance and governance practices. The commenter argued that the language of the proposed rule appeared to require that audit committee members “guarantee” that Bank employees would implement these policies without error and that the precise result intended would be achieved. The Finance Board agrees that, in the proposed rule, this provision appeared to impose upon audit committee members a regulatory requirement that exceeds the legal standard that normally applies to corporate directors under state law. Accordingly, the Finance Board has amended § 917.7(e)(2) in the final rule to include the requested language.

Sections 917.8, 917.9 and 917.10 of the final rule address the power and responsibilities of Banks' boards of directors and senior management regarding, respectively, budget preparation and reporting requirements, dividends and Bank bylaws. These provisions already appear in existing part 917 as §§ 917.6, 917.7 and 917.8, respectively, having been redesignated from old §§ 934.7, 934.16 and 934.17, respectively, in the recent final rulemaking that reorganized and renumbered the Finance Board's regulations. See 65 FR 8253 (2000). Each of these provisions has also been substantively amended as part of the Finance Board's recent rulemaking that devolved various corporate governance authorities to the Banks in response to statutory changes made by the Federal Home Loan Bank Modernization Act of 1999 (Modernization Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, Title VI (1999). See 64 FR 71275 (1999) (interim final rule); 65 FR 13663 (2000) (final rule). As such, no further amendments are made to these provisions in this final rule, other than their redesignation as §§ 917.8, 917.9 and 917.10.

The final rule applies only to the Banks, which do not come within the meaning of “small entities,” as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). See 5 U.S.C. 601(6). Therefore, in accordance with section 605(b) of the RFA, see id. at 605(b), the Finance Board hereby certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The final rule does not contain any collections of information pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. See 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. Consequently, the Finance Board has not submitted any information to the Office of Management and Budget for review.

A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 and 727C series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on November 22, 1999 (64 FR 63753). That action proposed to require one-time inspections of the exterior body skin located at the forward corners of the mid-galley door hinge cutouts to detect cracking; corrective actions, if necessary; and modification of the body skin of the mid-galley door hinge cutouts.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

On behalf of two of its members, the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) comments that no airplanes operated by those two members are affected by this proposal. The ATA makes no further comment or request.

One commenter, the manufacturer, requests that the FAA revise the applicability statement of the proposed AD to remove two airplanes. The commenter states that, according to its records, the airplanes having line numbers 153 and 339 were determined to be irreparable on August 8, 1965, and February 16, 1968, respectively.

The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request. Though the commenter states that the airplanes were determined to be irreparable, the FAA considers it possible that the subject airplanes could be repaired by an entity other than the manufacturer. Should one of these airplanes be repaired and added to the U.S. Register in the future, the FAA finds that, to ensure safe operation, the airplane must be inspected, repaired, and modified, as applicable, in accordance with the requirements of this AD. No change to the final rule is necessary.

After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed.

There are approximately 1,516 Boeing Model 727 and 727C series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 3 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD.

The FAA estimates that it will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the required inspections of the body skin at the corners of the mid-galley door hinge cutouts, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the inspections required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $180, or $60 per airplane.

The FAA also estimates that it will take approximately 28 work hours per airplane to accomplish the repair and modification, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts will cost approximately $1,023 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the repair and modification required by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $8,109, or $2,703 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on October 6, 1999 (64 FR 54232). That action proposed to require modification of the high pressure bleed valve controller of each engine.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

One commenter supports the proposed rule.

One commenter, the manufacturer, requests that the language in NOTE 2 of the proposal be revised to reflect that the Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-36-065, dated February 9, 1999, specifically references Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-1060 R1, dated March 1, 1997.

The FAA concurs with the commenter's request and has revised NOTE 2 of the final rule accordingly.

One commenter, an airline operator, requests that the compliance time for the proposed modification be revised to coincide with a “C” check interval. The commenter states that the proposed compliance time of 14 months does not match its “C” check interval of 19 months. The commenter explains that it will incur an undue financial burden unless the compliance time is extended to 19 months since it is necessary to remove an airplane from service in order to accomplish the tasks associated with the proposal.

The FAA does not concur. The modification of the bleed valve controller itself (installing the new check valve) can be accomplished previous to installation of the bleed valve controller on the airplane. The FAA estimates that the installation of the modified bleed valve controller will take 1 work hour to accomplish. If installation of the modified check valve is performed with the controller mounted on the engine, the installation can still be accomplished in approximately 2 work hours. Therefore, the FAA considers that it is not necessary to accomplish the required modification during an extended downtime of a “C” check. Therefore, it is unnecessary to revise the final rule.

One commenter, the manufacturer, requests that the FAA revise the “Differences Between Proposed Rule and Service Information” section of the proposal to specify “this proposed AD would require the modification of both high pressure bleed valve controller types to a later configuration (P/N 739084-4) with the installation of the restrictor check valve P/N 764898-2 or later.”

The FAA acknowledges that the “Differences Between Proposed Rule and Service Information” section of the proposed AD, as revised by the commenter clarifies the intent of the proposed rule. However, since that section of the preamble does not reappear in the final rule, no change to the final rule is necessary.

That same commenter, the manufacturer, requests that paragraph (b) of the proposal be revised to specify particular high pressure bleed valve controllers. The commenter suggests that the revised paragraph should read that “No person shall install on any airplane a high pressure bleed valve controller, Hamilton Standard P/N 739084-2 or 739084-3 (Lockheed P/N 672286-103 or 672286-105), unless it has been modified in accordance with this AD.” The FAA concurs and has revised paragraph (b) of the final rule accordingly.

After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

There are approximately 235 Model L-1011-385 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 116 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the required actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts will cost approximately $650 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $89,320, or $770 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES .

A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on November 5, 1999 (64 FR 60386). That action proposed to require repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the forward and aft inner chords and the splice fitting of the forward inner chord of the station 2598 bulkhead, and repair, if necessary.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

One commenter requests that the proposed AD be revised to reference Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1999. (The original issue of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, dated December 17, 1998, was referenced in the proposal as the appropriate source of service information for the proposed actions.)

The FAA concurs with the commenter's request. Since the issuance of the proposed rule, the FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, Revision 1. Revision 1 of the alert service bulletin is substantially similar to the original issue. However, Revision 1 includes instructions for a one-time high frequency eddy current (HFEC) and repetitive detailed visual inspections to detect cracking of the splice fitting of the forward inner chord of the station 2598 bulkhead. Though not described in the original issue of the alert service bulletin, such inspections of the splice fitting were described in the proposed rule, so adding references to Revision 1 of the alert service bulletin to this final rule would not add any additional requirements beyond those that were proposed. Thus, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this final rule have been revised to reference both the original issue and Revision 1 of the alert service bulletin as appropriate sources of service information for the requirements of this AD.

In addition, the same commenter requests that the FAA make several specific changes to paragraphs (a) and (b) of the proposed rule:

• Revise paragraph (a)(1) to refer to Figure 2, Steps 1 and 2, of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, Revision 1;

• Revise paragraph (a)(2) to refer to Figure 2, View C and View A, of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, Revision 1;

• Revise paragraph (b)(1) to refer to Figure 3, Steps 1 and 2, of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, Revision 1; and

• Revise paragraph (b)(2) to refer to Figure 2, View C and View A, of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427, Revision 1.

The commenter states that these changes will make inspection instructions more explicit.

The FAA concurs with the commenter's request, and references to specific figures and steps contained in Revision 1 of the alert service bulletin have been included in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this final rule accordingly. However, for consistency, where the commenter recommends “View C and View A” in its suggested revisions to paragraphs (a)(2) and (b)(2) of the proposed AD, the FAA instead has revised those paragraphs to refer to “Step 3” of the figures.

The same commenter that requests that the FAA revise the proposed rule to reference new service information also requests that the FAA delete “NOTE 2” and “NOTE 4” of the proposed rule. These notes explain that inspection areas specified in paragraphs (a)(2) and (b)(2) of the proposed rule are not highlighted in certain figures in the original issue of the alert service bulletin. In Revision 1 of the alert service bulletin, the figures to which these notes refer have been updated to show the subject inspection areas. The commenter cites no justification for this request, but the FAA infers that the commenter considers “NOTE 2” and “NOTE 4” no longer necessary.

The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request. As stated previously, this final rule has been revised to reference both the original issue and Revision 1 of the alert service bulletin as appropriate sources of service information. The information in “NOTE 2” and “NOTE 4” is still correct for the original issue of the alert service bulletin. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

One commenter requests that the FAA revise paragraph (d) of the proposed rule to allow repairs of cracking of the aft inner chord to be accomplished in accordance with the applicable chapters of the Boeing 747 Structural Repair Manual (SRM) referenced in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2427. The commenter states that, without clarification, paragraph (d) of the proposal may be interpreted to require approval by the Manager of the FAA's Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) for repairs of cracking of the aft inner chord because the alert service bulletin provides the option to contact Boeing for repair data instead of using the SRM.

The FAA does not concur with the commenter that any change is necessary. Paragraph (c) of the proposed rule (and this final rule) states that any cracking detected during the inspections required by paragraph (a)(1) or (b)(1) of this AD must be repaired in accordance with the alert service bulletin, except as provided by paragraph (d) of this AD. The FAA considers paragraph (d) of this AD to apply to cracks on the aft inner chord only if those cracks cannot be repaired in accordance with the chapters of the SRM listed in the alert service bulletin. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

This is considered to be interim action. The manufacturer has advised that it currently is developing a modification that will positively address the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, the FAA may consider additional rulemaking.

There are approximately 1,301 Model 747 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 260 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD.

It will take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the required HFEC inspection, at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this inspection on U.S. operators is estimated to be $31,200, or $120 per airplane.

It will take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the required detailed visual inspections, at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this inspection on U.S. operators is estimated to be $31,200, or $120 per airplane, per inspection cycle.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES .

Early in 1998, API requested that MMS incorporate by reference Supplements 1 and 2 (dated December 1996 and December 1997, respectively) to API SPEC 6D. (Supplement 2 actually fully incorporates and expands upon Supplement 1.) For metal-to-metal seated valves, the Supplements changed from a “no visible leakage” standard to “allowable internal leakage rates” according to valve size. This raised two concerns for MMS with regard to its regulatory program. First, once an attempt has been made to purge a pipeline of all contents and close its valves, how can an operator be sure that the pipeline is properly isolated and free of combustibles or pressure during repairs? (Cutting into an existing pipeline in preparation to repair it is considered among the most hazardous operations conducted offshore.) Second, how can MMS be sure that out-of-service pipelines isolated by block valves are really shut down?

MMS issued Notice to Lessees and Operators on the Outer Continental Shelf (NTL) No. 98-16N in October 1998 rejecting Supplements 1 and 2 as documents incorporated by reference. MMS needed more time to discuss the issues with API and to consider the ramifications of the “allowable internal leakage” standard for the OCS regulatory program. MMS reasoned:

The MMS made a concerted attempt with API to collect data on this question and held further discussions with industry. In February 1999, MMS proposed a research project on leakage rates to API and asked them to survey their members on their perceptions of the “allowable leakage rates” and willingness to participate in the research project. Only 25 of 250 potential respondents replied. Their answers indicated that few valve suppliers believe that the “no visible leakage” standard is realistic, other than for special-purpose, non-off-the-shelf ( i.e. , expensive) valves. Support for new research was very limited.

Industry representatives maintained that there is little formal data on leakage rates. They explained, however, that most correspondence on this subject focuses on leakage rates contained in International Standards Organization Standard 5208, Rate D. These rates are incorporated into Supplements 1 and 2. The API SPEC 6D workgroup generally agrees that these leakage rates are reasonable and in line with their experience.

Further discussions with the API SPEC 6D workgroup revealed that participants almost unanimously agree that all pipeline valves leak after they have been in service for a short time due to operational residues and abrasion. This indicates that initial leakage rates for new valves are irrelevant by the time a pipeline is in need of repair or placed out-of-service. Therefore, measures in addition to “closed valves” are needed to protect workers and to ensure “isolated pipelines” during pipeline repairs.

The MMS's own pipeline workgroup conferred on these issues. They decided that rejecting the new allowable internal leakage rates would be unrealistic in light of what MMS had learned from its discussions with industry. Moreover, the maintenance of an unrealistic “no visible leakage” standard would not address the real regulatory dilemma that regardless of initial internal leakage rates, eventually all pipeline valves will leak internally. The MMS workgroup reasoned that since internal leakage occurs in pipeline valves regardless of initial leakage rates, MMS must address this concern in its inspection and maintenance procedures. Therefore, the MMS workgroup recommended canceling NTL 98-16N and adopting Supplement 2 as a document incorporated by reference. They also recommended two additions to Subpart J that would address the problems posed by leaking pipeline valves. The first would add a requirement for operators to submit a work plan detailing the measures they intend to take and procedures they intend to follow to ensure the safety of their employees during any pipeline repair. The second would add a requirement for placing a blind flange on lateral lines taken out-of-service. The MMS intends to propose both of these requirements in a separate rulemaking.

MMS has reviewed Supplements 1 and 2 to the 21st Edition of API SPEC 6D in light of the above considerations and determined that they will not impose undue cost on the offshore oil and gas industry. Moreover, further discussions with API confirm that Supplement 2 completely replaces Supplement 1. (Thus, parties that order copies of the 21st Edition of API SPEC 6D from API receive only Supplement 2 in addition to the primary document.) Therefore, we are incorporating Supplement 2 according to the authority in 30 CFR 250.198(a)(2).

Upon the effective date of this technical amendment, NTL No. 98-16N is cancelled.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem and suitable communications software from the Government Printing Office's Electronic Bulletin Board Service at (202) 512-1661. Internet users may reach the Office of the Federal Register's home page at: http://www.nara.gov/fedreg and the Government Printing Office's database at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara.

The Secretary has rescinded the authority previously delegated to the Office of Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS) to perform motor carrier functions and operations. This authority has been redelegated to the Administrator, FMCSA, a new agency within the Department of Transportation [65 FR 220, January 4, 2000]. The new FMCSA assumes the motor carrier functions previously performed by the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA's) Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety (OMCHS) before October 19, 1999, and the OMCS before January 1, 2000. Ongoing rulemaking, enforcement, and other activities of the FMCSA, initiated while part of the FHWA or OMCS, will be continued by the FMCSA. The redelegation will cause no changes in the motor carrier functions and operations of the offices or field service centers (formerly resource centers).

The authority to require medical certification of CMV driver qualification was originally granted to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (Public Law 74-255, 49 Stat. 543). The authority was transferred to the DOT in 1966 and is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 31502(b).

The importance of physical qualification of commercial drivers was recognized in 1939 when the first regulatory medical standard was established by the ICC. Those regulations, published at 4 FR 2294 on June 7, 1939, required a driver to possess the following minimum qualifications:

Good physical and mental health; good eyesight; adequate hearing; no addiction to narcotic drugs; and no excessive use of alcoholic beverages or liquors.

The first change to this standard was initiated in 1952 and went into effect on January 1, 1954. The certificate of physical examination required under the 1954 rule was slightly more specific than the 1939 regulation, and also required a physical examination form and a doctor's certificate. A second revision made in 1964 (29 FR 14495, October 22, 1964) amended the standard to allow limb-amputee and limb-impaired drivers, who are otherwise eligible, to become medically qualified through a waiver program. On April 22, 1970 (35 FR 6458) in light of discussions with the FHWA medical advisors, the existing physical qualification requirements were substantially tightened by including guidelines for evaluation of persons in high-risk medical categories. This rule also provided that the examining physician be given full information about the responsibilities of and the exacting demands made on commercial drivers.

In 1984, the Congress provided the Department of Transportation with alternative regulatory authority with the enactment of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832). This Act directed the Secretary to establish minimum safety standards to ensure that “the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate such vehicles safely * * *.” 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(3).

On June 9, 1998, the FHWA's waiver authority changed with enactment of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Public Law 105-178, 112 Stat. 107. Section 4007 of TEA-21 amended the waiver provisions of 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) and 31315 to change the standard for evaluating waiver requests, to distinguish between a waiver and an exemption, and to establish term limits for both. Under revised section 31136(e), the FMCSA may grant a waiver for a period of up to 3 months or an exemption for a renewable 2-year period.

The amendments to 49 U.S.C. 31136(e) also changed the criteria for exempting a person from application of a regulation. Previously an exemption was appropriate if it was consistent with the public interest and the safe operation of CMVs. Now the FMCSA may grant an exemption if it finds “such exemption would likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level that would be achieved absent such exemption.” According to the legislative history, the Congress changed the statutory standard to give the agency greater discretion to consider exemptions. The previous standard was judicially construed as requiring an advance determination that absolutely no reduction in safety would result from an exemption. The Congress revised the standard to require that an “equivalent” level of safety be achieved by the exemption, which would allow for more equitable resolution of such matters, while ensuring safety standards are maintained.

Section 391.41(b)(1) of 49 CFR states that a person is physically qualified to drive a motor vehicle if that person:

(1) Has no loss of a foot, a leg, a hand, or an arm, or has been granted a waiver pursuant to § 391.49;

(2) Has no impairment of:

(i) A hand or finger which interferes with prehension or power grasping; or

(ii) An arm, foot, or leg which interferes with the ability to perform normal tasks associated with operating a motor vehicle; or any other significant limb defect or limitation which interferes with the ability to perform normal tasks associated with operating a commercial motor vehicle; or has been granted a waiver pursuant to § 391.49.

The Handicapped Driver Waiver Program, established in 1964 under 49 CFR 391.49 (waiver of physical defects), provides an opportunity for physically challenged drivers, who do not meet the physical qualification requirements under §§ 391.41(b)(1) or (b)(2), but who are otherwise qualified, to become medically qualified to operate commercial motor vehicles in interstate commerce.

This rule amends § 391.49 by revising the title of the section and removing all references to “Regional Director of motor carriers, regional offices(s),” “waiver,” and “region” and replacing them with “State Director, FMCSA,” “Skill performance evaluation certificate,” and “State of legal residence,” respectively.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. , allows agencies engaged in rulemaking to dispense with prior notice and opportunity for comment when the agency for good cause finds that such procedures are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. This amendment merely reflects a change in the name of the Handicapped Driver Waiver Program, a change in the title of the designated official authorized to sign the SPE certificate, and the merging of the SPE certificate form into current regulations. As a result, the FMCSA has determined that prior notice and opportunity for public comment on this action are unnecessary.

Furthermore, due to the technical nature of this amendment, the FMCSA has determined that prior notice and opportunity for public comment are not required under the Department's regulatory policies and procedures, as it is not anticipated that such action will result in the receipt of useful information. The APA, under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), also allows agencies, upon a finding of good cause, to make a rule effective immediately and avoid the otherwise applicable 30-day delayed effective date requirement. The FMCSA finds that good cause exists to dispense with the 30-day delay in the effective date in this instance due to the minor and technical nature of these amendments. Thus, the FMCSA is proceeding directly with a final rule which will be effective on its date of publication.

The FMCSA has determined this action is not major within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 or significant within the meaning of Department of Transportation regulatory policies and procedures. Since this final rule makes only those technical changes to current regulatory language discussed above, the FMCSA hereby certifies that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), the FMCSA has evaluated the effects of this rule on small entitles. Based on the evaluation, and particularly because this final rule makes only those technical changes to current regulatory language discussed above, the FMCSA hereby certifies that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 dated August 4, 1999, and it has been determined this action does not have a substantial direct effect or sufficient federalism implications on States that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States. Nothing in this document directly preempts any State law or regulation.

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Number 20.217, Motor Carrier Safety. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372 regarding intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and activities do not apply to this program.

The agency has analyzed this rulemaking for the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 432 et seq. ) and has determined that this action would not have any effect on the quality of the environment.

This rule does not impose a Federal mandate resulting in the expenditure by State, local and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more in any one year. (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. ).

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), Federal agencies must obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for each collection of information they conduct, sponsor or require through regulations. An analysis of this rule has been made by the FMCSA, and it has been determined that the actions outlined in these technical amendments are covered under a currently-approved information collection, OMB Control No. 2126-0006, Medical Qualifications Requirements, (which is approved through September 30, 2000). No revisions to this current clearance are necessary due to this action.

This action meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

We have analyzed this action under Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks. This rule is not an economically significant rule and does not concern an environmental risk to health or safety that may disproportionately affect children.

This rule will not effect a taking of private property or otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630, Governmental Actions and interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.

A regulation identification number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the Unified Agenda.

A final rule was published in the Federal Register on November 15, 1999 (64 FR 61964), to revise recordkeeping and reporting regulations. Figures 1 and 3 to 50 CFR part 679 list Federal reporting areas and coordinates for the boundaries of those areas. Recently the coordinates of Figures 1 and 3 were plotted using a Geographic Information System. This highly accurate plotting procedure revealed several errors in the published points depicting the boundary between the Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska. NMFS correctly revises the description of reporting areas 518 and 519 in Figure 1b and the description of reporting area 610 in Figure 3b.

In the final rule Revisions to Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements published in 64 FR 61964, November 15, 1999, FR Doc. 99-28294, correct Figure 1b to Part 679 and Figure 3b to part 679.

On page 61984, under Figure 1 to Part 679—BSAI Statistical and Reporting Areas: b. Coordinates, correctly revise the description of reporting areas 518 and 519 to read as follows:

On page 61987, under Figure 3 to Part 679—Gulf of Alaska Statistical and Reporting Areas: b. Coordinates, correctly revise the description of reporting area 610 to read as follows: