This proposal is issued under Marketing Order No. 920, as amended (7 CFR part 920), regulating the handling of kiwifruit grown in California, hereinafter referred to as the “order.” The order is effective under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. 601-674), hereinafter referred to as the “Act.”

The Department of Agriculture (Department) is issuing this rule in conformance with Executive Order 12866.

This proposal has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. This rule is not intended to have retroactive effect. This proposal would not preempt any State or local laws, regulations, or policies, unless they present an irreconcilable conflict with this rule.

The Act provides that administrative proceedings must be exhausted before parties may file suit in court. Under section 608c(15)(A) of the Act, any handler subject to an order may file with the Secretary a petition stating that the order, any provision of the order, or any obligation imposed in connection with the order is not in accordance with law and request a modification of the order or to be exempted therefrom. A handler is afforded the opportunity for a hearing on the petition. After the hearing the Secretary would rule on the petition. The Act provides that the district court of the United States in any district in which the handler is an inhabitant, or has his or her principal place of business, has jurisdiction to review the Secretary's ruling on the petition, provided an action is filed not later than 20 days after the date of the entry of the ruling.

This rule invites comments on proposed temporary suspensions of inspection and pack requirements prescribed under the order. This rule would continue, for the 2000-2001 season, the suspension of the requirement that fruit must be reinspected if it has not been shipped by specified dates, and the suspension of the minimum net weight requirements for kiwifruit tray packs. Both suspensions are scheduled to expire at the end of the 1999-2000 season (July 31, 2000). These suspensions are expected to reduce handler-packing costs, increase grower returns, and enable handlers to compete more effectively in the marketplace. This rule was unanimously recommended by the Committee at its February 24, 2000, meeting and would be in effect through July 31, 2001.

Section 920.55 of the order requires that prior to handling any variety of California kiwifruit, such kiwifruit shall be inspected by the Federal or Federal-State Inspection Service (inspection service) and certified as meeting the applicable grade, size, quality, or maturity requirements in effect pursuant to § 920.52 or § 920.53.

Section 920.55(b) provides authority for the establishment, through the order's rules and regulations, of a period prior to shipment during which inspections must be performed.

Prior to its suspension for 1998-1999 season, § 920.155 of the order's rules and regulations specified that the certification of grade, size, quality, and maturity of kiwifruit pursuant to § 920.52 or § 920.53 during each fiscal year was valid until December 31 of such year or 21 days from the date of inspection, whichever is later. Any inspected kiwifruit shipped after the certification period lapsed was required to be reinspected and recertified before shipment.

Section 920.155 was suspended for the 1998-1999 season by a final rule published August 4, 1998 (63 FR 41390). The Committee recommended this suspension to lessen the expenses upon the many kiwifruit growers who had either lost money or merely recovered their production costs in recent years. It concluded that the cost of reinspecting kiwifruit was too high to justify requiring it in view of the limited benefit reinspection provided. The Committee also believed it was no longer necessary to have fruit reinspected to provide consumers with a high quality product because storage and handling operations had improved in the industry.

During the 1998-1999 season, handlers voluntarily checked stored fruit prior to shipment to ensure that the condition of the fruit had not deteriorated. Suspension of the reinspection requirement enabled handlers to ship quality kiwifruit during the 1998-1999 season without the necessity for reinspection and recertification and the costs associated with such requirements. However, because the harvest started later than normal and more fruit was in-line inspected and shipped directly to buyers less fruit was repacked and available for evaluation than anticipated.

Therefore, at its February 25, 1999, meeting, the Committee unanimously recommended suspending § 920.155 of the order for one more season. Section 920.155 was suspended for the 1999-2000 season by a final rule published on July 29, 1999 (64 FR 41010).

During the 1999-2000 season a severe frost reduced the crop size from the estimated 9 million tray equivalents to 6 million tray equivalents. A tray equivalent is equal to approximately 7 pounds of fruit. This significant crop reduction and the excellent quality of the fruit resulted in limited quantities of fruit remaining in cold storage for repacking and evaluation. The Committee would like to fully evaluate the suspension of the reinspection requirement during a normal season. Therefore the Committee, at its February 24, 2000, meeting, unanimously recommended suspending § 920.155 for another season, the 2000-2001 season. This suspension would be in effect until July 31, 2001.

Under the terms of the order, fresh market shipments of kiwifruit grown in California are required to be inspected and meet grade, size, maturity, pack, and container requirements. Section 920.52 authorizes the establishment of minimum size, pack, and container requirements.

Section 920.302(a)(4) of the order's rules and regulations outlines pack requirements for fresh shipments of California kiwifruit.

Section 920.302(a)(4)(iii) specifies minimum net weight requirements for fruit of various sizes packed in containers with cell compartments, cardboard fillers, or molded trays.

Prior to the 1989-1990 season, there were no minimum tray weight requirements although 73.5 percent of the crop was packed in trays. During the 1989-1990 season, minimum tray weights were mandated, as there were many new packers involved in the kiwifruit packing process and stricter regulations were viewed as necessary to provide uniform container weights for each size. However, since that season the proportion of the crop packed in trays has steadily declined.

During the 1997-1998 season, only 15.5 percent of the crop was packed into molded trays and less than 1 percent of this fruit was rejected for failure to meet minimum tray weights. As a consequence, the Committee believed that minimum tray weight requirements might no longer be necessary to maintain uniformity in the marketplace.

Prior to the 1998-1999 season handlers were required to meet the minimum net weight requirements as shown in the following chart:

The Committee met on July 8, 1998, and unanimously recommended suspension of the minimum net weight requirements for kiwifruit packed in cell compartments, cardboard fillers, or molded trays for the 1998-1999 season. Section 920.302(a)(4)(iii) was suspended for the 1998-1999 season by an interim final rule which was published September 3, 1998 (63 FR 14861) and finalized July 29, 1999 (64 FR 41019).

Even though the fruit was shorter, more full-bodied, and heavier during the 1998-1999 season, handlers were able to reduce packing costs and to compete more effectively in the market. The industry continued to pack well-filled trays without having to spend the extra time weighing them. There was no reduction in the uniform appearance of fruit packed into trays. The consensus of the industry was that the absence of tray weights had no impact during the 1998-1999 season due to the exceptionally heavy weight of the fruit.

The Committee, at its February 25, 1999, meeting unanimously recommended suspending the minimum net weight requirements for the 1999-2000 season to evaluate the suspended requirements during a season when the fruit shape and density were normal. This suspension was implemented by a final rule published on July 29, 1999 (64 FR 41010) and is in effect until July 31, 2000.

As previously mentioned, the 1999-2000 crop was approximately three million tray-equivalents shorter than estimated due to a severe frost during the spring of 1999. This shortage of fruit resulted in limited quantities of fruit available for evaluation. Because of the uncharacteristic fruit in the 1998-1999 season and the short crop in the 1999-2000 season the Committee would like to suspend the minimum net weight requirement for another year of evaluation. Therefore, at its February 24, 2000, meeting, the Committee, once again, unanimously recommended continuing the suspension of § 920.302(a)(4)(iii) for another season, the 2000-2001 season. This suspension would be in effect until July 31, 2001 and is expected to result in reduced handler packing costs, and increased grower returns, and enable handlers to compete more effectively in the marketplace.

Pursuant to requirements set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has considered the economic impact of this action on small entities. Accordingly, AMS has prepared this initial regulatory flexibility analysis.

The purpose of the RFA is to fit regulatory actions to the scale of business subject to such actions in order that small businesses will not be unduly or disproportionately burdened. Marketing orders issued pursuant to the Act, and the rules issued thereunder, are unique in that they are brought about through group action of essentially small entities acting on their own behalf. Thus, both statutes have small entity orientation and compatibility.

There are approximately 60 handlers of California kiwifruit subject to regulation under the marketing order and approximately 400 producers in the production area. Small agricultural producers are defined by the Small Business Administration (13 CFR 121.201) as those whose annual receipts are less than $500,000, and small agricultural service firms are defined as those whose annual receipts are less than $5,000,000. Fifty-nine handlers have annual receipts less than $5,000,000, excluding receipts from other sources. Three hundred ninety producers have annual sales less than $500,000, excluding receipts from any other sources. Therefore, a majority of the kiwifruit handlers and producers may be classified as small entities.

This rule invites comments on proposed temporary suspensions of inspection and pack requirements prescribed under the order. This rule would continue, for the 2000-2001 season, the suspension of the requirement that fruit must be reinspected if it has not been shipped by specified dates, and the minimum net weight requirements for kiwifruit tray packs. Both suspensions are scheduled to expire at the end of the 1999-2000 season (July 31, 2000). Continuation of the suspensions is expected to reduce handler-packing costs, increase grower returns, and enable handlers to compete more effectively in the marketplace. This rule was unanimously recommended by the Committee at its February 24, 2000, meeting and would be in effect through July 31, 2001.

Section 920.55 of the order requires that prior to handling any variety of California kiwifruit, such kiwifruit shall be inspected by the Federal or Federal-State Inspection Service (inspection service) and certified as meeting the applicable grade, size, quality, or maturity requirements in effect pursuant to § 920.52 or § 920.53.

Section 920.55(b) provides authority for the establishment, through the order's rules and regulations, of a period prior to shipment during which inspections must be performed.

Prior to its suspension for 1998-1999 season, § 920.155 of the order's rules and regulations specified that the certification of grade, size, quality, and maturity of kiwifruit pursuant to § 920.52 or § 920.53 during each fiscal year was valid until December 31 of such year or 21 days from the date of inspection, whichever is later. Any inspected kiwifruit shipped after the certification period lapsed was required to be reinspected and recertified before shipment.

Section 920.155 was suspended for the 1998-1999 season by a final rule published August 4, 1998 (63 FR 41390). The Committee recommended this suspension to lessen the expenses upon the many kiwifruit growers who had either lost money or merely recovered their production costs in recent years. It concluded that the cost of reinspecting kiwifruit was too high to justify requiring it in view of the limited benefit reinspection provides. The Committee also believed it was no longer necessary to have fruit reinspected to provide consumers with a high quality product because storage and handling operations had improved in the industry.

During the 1998-1999 season, handlers voluntarily checked stored fruit prior to shipment to ensure that the condition of the fruit had not deteriorated. Suspension of the reinspection requirement enabled handlers to ship quality kiwifruit during the 1998-1999 season without the necessity for reinspection and recertification and the costs associated with such requirements. However, because the harvest started later than normal and more fruit was in-line inspected and shipped directly to buyers, less fruit was repacked and available for evaluation than anticipated.

Therefore, at its February 25, 1999, meeting, the Committee unanimously recommended suspending § 920.155 of the order for one more season. Section 920.155 was suspended for the 1999-2000 season by a final rule published on July 29, 1999 (64 FR 41010).

During the 1999-2000 season a severe frost reduced the crop size from the estimated 9 million tray equivalents to 6 million tray equivalents. A tray equivalent is equal to approximately 7 pounds of fruit. This significant crop reduction and the excellent quality of the fruit resulted in less fruit remaining in cold storage for repacking and evaluation.

While the Committee believes the industry realized benefits from the suspension of the reinspection requirement, it would like to evaluate the results of the suspended reinspection requirements during a normal season. Thus the Committee, at its February 24, 2000, meeting, unanimously recommended suspending § 920.155 for the 2000-2001 season. This suspension would be in effect until July 31, 2001.

Under the terms of the order, fresh market shipments of kiwifruit grown in California are required to be inspected and meet grade, size, maturity, pack, and container requirements. Section 920.52 authorizes the establishment of minimum size, pack, and container requirements.

Section 920.302(a)(4) of the order's rules and regulations outlines pack requirements for fresh shipments of California kiwifruit.

Section 920.302(a)(4)(iii) specifies minimum net weight requirements for fruit of various sizes packed in containers with cell compartments, cardboard fillers, or molded trays.

Prior to the 1989-1990 season, there were no minimum tray weight requirements although 73.5 percent of the crop was packed in trays. During the 1989-1990 season, minimum tray weights were mandated, as there were many new packers involved in the kiwifruit packing process and stricter regulations were viewed as necessary to provide uniform container weights for each size. However, since that season the proportion of the crop packed in trays has steadily declined.

During the 1997-1998 season, only 15.5 percent of the crop was packed into molded trays and less than 1 percent of this fruit was rejected for failure to meet minimum tray weights. As a consequence, the Committee believed that minimum tray weight requirements might no longer be necessary to maintain uniformity in the marketplace.

Prior to the 1998-1999 season handlers were required to meet the minimum net weight requirements as shown in the following chart:

The Committee met on July 8, 1998, and unanimously recommended suspension of the minimum net weight requirements for kiwifruit packed in cell compartments, cardboard fillers, or molded trays for the 1998-1999 season. Section 920.302(a)(4)(iii) was suspended for the 1998-1999 season by an interim final rule published September 3, 1998 (63 FR 14861).

Even though the fruit was shorter, more full-bodied, and heavier during the 1998-1999 season, handlers were able to reduce packing costs and to compete more effectively in the market. The industry continued to pack well-filled trays without having to spend the extra time weighing them. There was no reduction in the uniform appearance of fruit packed into trays. The consensus of the industry that season was that the absence of tray weights had no negative impact during the 1998-1999 season due to the exceptionally heavy weight of the fruit.

The Committee, at its February 25, 1999, meeting, unanimously recommended suspending the minimum net weight requirements for the 1999-2000 season in order to evaluate the suspended requirements during a season when the fruit shape and density were normal. This suspension was implemented by a final rule published on July 29, 1999 (64 FR 41010) and is in effect until July 31, 2000.

As previously mentioned, the 1999-2000 crop was approximately three million tray-equivalents shorter than estimated due to a severe frost during the spring of 1999. This shortage of fruit resulted in limited quantities of fruit available for evaluation. Because of the uncharacteristic fruit in the 1998-1999 season and the short crop in the 1999-2000 season the Committee would like to suspend the minimum net weight requirement for another year of evaluation. Therefore, at its February 24, 2000, meeting, the Committee, once again, unanimously recommended continuing the suspension of § 920.302(a)(4)(iii) for another season, the 2000-2001 season. This suspension would be in effect until July 31, 2001, and is expected to reduce handler-packing costs, increase grower returns, and enable handlers to compete more effectively in the marketplace.

These changes address the marketing and shipping needs of the kiwifruit industry and are in the interest of handlers, growers, buyers, and consumers. The impact of these changes is expected to be beneficial to all handlers and growers regardless of size.

The Committee discussed alternatives to this change, including indefinitely suspending these requirements. While the industry continues to believe that the suspensions helped handlers reduce packing costs and compete more effectively in the marketplace, it is not yet ready to recommend permanent suspension for the 2000-2001 and future seasons. Both the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 seasons were abnormal in some respects and the Committee would like to study the results of the suspensions during a normal season. Thus, the Committee unanimously agreed to suspend these requirements for the 2000-2001 season.

This proposed rule would relax inspection and pack requirements under the kiwifruit marketing order. Accordingly, this action would not impose any additional reporting or recordkeeping requirements on either small or large kiwifruit handlers. As with all Federal marketing order programs, reports and forms are periodically reviewed to reduce information requirements and duplication by industry and public sector agencies.

The Department has not identified any relevant Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or conflict with this proposed rule.

In addition, the Committee's meetings were widely publicized throughout the kiwifruit industry and all interested persons were invited to attend the meetings and participate in Committee deliberations. Like all Committee meetings, the February 24, 2000, meeting was a public meeting and all entities, both large and small, were able to express their views on this issue. The majority of the industry are small entities. Finally, interested persons are invited to submit information on the regulatory and informational impacts of this action on small businesses.

A small business guide on complying with fruit, vegetable, and specialty crop marketing agreements and orders may be viewed at the following web site: http://www.ams.usda.gov/fv/moab.html . Any questions about the compliance guide should be sent to Jay Guerber at the previously mentioned address in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

A 30-day comment period is provided to allow interested persons to respond to this proposal. Thirty days is deemed appropriate because this rule would meet to be in place by August 1, 2000 as the current suspension expires on July 31, 2000, and handlers need to make operational decisions in time for the 2000-2001 season. All written comments timely received will be considered before a final determination is made on this matter.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, 7 CFR part 920 is proposed to be amended as follows:

This proposed rule has been determined to be not significant for the purposes of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

This proposed rule is excluded from the scope of Executive Order 12372, Intergovernmental Consultation, which may require consultation with State, local, and tribal government or the private sector. See the final rule related notice entitled “Department Programs and Activities Excluded from Executive Order 12372,” (50 FR 47034).

This proposed rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. RUS has determined that this rule meets the applicable standards provided in Section 3 of the Executive Order. In accordance with the Executive Order and the rule: (1) All State and local laws and regulations that are in conflict with this rule will be preempted; (2) no retroactive effect will be given to this rule, and (3), in accordance with § 212(e) of the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (7 U.S.C. § 6912(e)), if any are more required, they must be exhausted prior to initiating litigation against the Department or its agencies.

The Administrator of RUS has determined that this rule relating to RUS electric loan program is not a rule as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) and, therefore, the Regulatory Flexibility Act does not apply to this rule. RUS borrowers, as a result of obtaining federal financing, receive economic benefits that exceed any direct economic costs associated with complying with RUS regulations and requirements.

The Administrator of RUS has determined that this proposed rule will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment as defined by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). Therefore, this action does not require an environmental impact statement or assessment.

The program described by this proposed rule is listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance programs under No. 10.850, Rural Electrification Loans and Loan Guarantees. This catalog is available on a subscription basis from the Superintendent of Documents, the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325, telephone number (202) 512-1800.

The reporting and recordkeeping requirements contained in this rule were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) under OMB control number 0572-0118.

Send questions or comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of these collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to F. Lamont Heppe, Jr., Director, Program Development and Regulatory Analysis, Rural Utilities Service, USDA, 1400 Independence Ave., Room 4034 SBldg., STOP 1522, Washington, DC 20250-1522.

This proposed rule contains no Federal mandates (under the regulatory provision of title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act) for State, local, and tribal governments or the private sector. Thus, this proposed rule is not subject to the requirements of sections 202 and 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.

RUS has promulgated regulations pertaining to the design and construction of RUS electric borrower's systems. These regulations are contained in 7 CFR chapter XVII, Part 1724, Electric Engineering, Architectural Services and Design Policies and Procedures, which describes policies and procedures pertaining to RUS electric borrower procurement of architectural and engineering services for planning, design, and construction management of buildings and electric utility plant such as distribution and transmission lines, substations, communications and control systems, and generating plants. RUS has determined that continued review and approval of plans and specifications for buildings by RUS is not necessary. This will eliminate the burden on the borrowers of having to send the plans and specifications to RUS before issuing them to bidders. However, RUS will require that the borrower's architect or engineer state that the design complies with certain specific standards. This change is being made in order to provide better service to borrowers.

We are also correcting a date in the list of contract forms.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, RUS proposes to amend 7 CFR chapter XVII by amending part 1724 as follows:

On May 4, 1999 (64 FR 23796), NRC noticed receipt and requested comment on the PRM filed by Metabolic Solutions Inc. The comment period closed on July 20, 1999. Notice of receipt of the Metabolic Solutions PRM resulted in the NRC receiving comment letters from two medical universities in support of the petition.

The C-14 EBT measures the activity, in-vivo, of an important liver enzyme that is the most abundant drug-metabolizing enzyme in the body. This test is currently used to determine the safety of new drugs during clinical trials; as such, it is used only as a research tool. The petitioner states that the doses associated with this test are comparable to the doses for the C-14 urea test which is exempt from the requirement for licensing pursuant to 10 CFR 30.21 (a).

The notice of receipt of the PRM invited interested persons to submit comments. The two public comments received in response to the notice, from the University of Nebraska Medical Center and Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, were in support of the petition. The two comments generally noted the low doses associated with the test and the possible economic benefit in reducing the expense of clinical trials through elimination of the need for a byproduct materials license.

A denial is consistent with the Commission's previous decision on the C-14 urea tests to require that research be performed under a specific license (62 FR 63634), since this product is to be used only in research use. The doses are not the limiting factor for extending the distribution exemption to this test. The previous decision was based upon restrictions of such use under the common rule entitled “Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects; Notices and Rules” (56 FR 28002). Although the NRC did not adopt the common rule, our intention is to follow the essential requirements of the rule, which have been adopted into 10 CFR 35.6, “Provisions for Research Involving Human Subjects.” Specifically, 10 CFR 35.6 requires a licensee that conducts research involving human research subjects to obtain informed consent and obtain approval by an Institutional Review Board. Because the common rule did not allow for exemptions for research involving minimal risk, the Commission determined that such research use should not be exempt from 10 CFR 35.6.

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their mailed comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket No. 99-SW-66-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-SW-66-AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

On September 29, 1999, the FAA issued AD 99-19-22, Amendment 39-11357 (64 FR 54770, October 8, 1999), for ECD Model BO-105 helicopters. That AD currently requires, before further flight, creating a component log card or equivalent record, determining the calendar age and number of flights on each TT strap, and determining the age and number of flights on each TT strap. AD 99-19-22 also requires inspecting and removing, as necessary, certain unairworthy TT straps. That action was prompted by an accident in which a blade separated from an ECD Model MBB-BK 117 helicopter due to fatigue failure of a TT strap. The same part-numbered TT strap is also used on the ECD Model BO-105 helicopters. The requirements of that AD are intended to prevent failure of a TT strap, loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Since the issuance of that AD, we have determined the need to establish a life limit for the TT strap. We have also determined that the graduated inspection criteria and TT strap lives specified in AD 99-19-22 are no longer necessary when a life limit is established. ECD issued Alert Service Bulletin BO 105 No. ASB-BO 105-10-114, Revision 2, dated August 31, 1999 (ASB). The ASB describes procedures for determining the total accumulated installation time and number of flights on each TT strap. The ASB also specifies inspecting and replacing, as necessary, certain unairworthy TT straps. The Luftfahrt Bundesamt (LBA), which is the airworthiness authority for the Federal Republic of Germany, classified this ASB as mandatory and issued AD 1999-300/3, dated August 31, 1999, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified on the MBB-BK-117 that is likely to exist or develop on the ECD Model BO-105A, BO-105C, BO-105 C-2, BO-105 CB-2, BO-105 CB-4, BO-105S, BO-105 CS-2, BO-105 CBS-2, BO-105 CBS-4, and BO-105LS A-1 helicopters registered in the United States, the proposed AD would require establishing a life limit for the TT straps effective January 1, 2001, of 120 months or 40,000 flights, whichever occurs first.

The FAA estimates that 200 helicopters of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 16 work hours per helicopter to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $10,400 per helicopter. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $2,272,200.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 99-NM-313-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 99-NM-313-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

The FAA has received reports of stress corrosion cracks on the lower bearing journal of the number 2 and 7 inboard attach fittings of the outboard trailing edge flaps on Boeing Model 747-200 and -300 series airplanes. Each flap assembly has two attach fittings, one on each ballscrew which is attached to the flap transmission. Such cracking, if not detected and corrected, could result in abnormal operation or retraction of a trailing edge flap, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.

The subject actuator attach fittings on the inboard and outboard flaps on Boeing Model 747-100, -400, and 747SR series airplanes are identical to that of the affected Boeing Model 747-200 and -300 series airplanes. Therefore, all of these airplanes may be subject to the same unsafe condition.

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2310, Revision 1, dated November 23, 1999. This service bulletin describes procedures for repetitive ultrasonic and detailed visual inspections (as applicable) to detect cracks and corrosion around the lower bearing of the actuator attach fittings of the inboard and outboard flaps. This service bulletin also describes procedures for repetitive overhauls for the attach fittings on the outboard flaps or repetitive replacement of the attach fittings with new attach fittings, as applicable, which would eliminate the need for certain repetitive actions. In addition, the service bulletin describes procedures for accomplishing a terminating action for the inboard flap attach fittings.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously.

This is considered to be interim action. The manufacturer has advised that it currently is developing a modification that will positively address the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, the FAA may consider additional rulemaking.

There are approximately 1,008 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 206 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

It would take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed inspection(s), at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the inspection(s) proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $24,720, or $120 per airplane, per inspection cycle.

Should an operator be required to accomplish the proposed overhaul, it would take approximately 5 work hours per airplane to accomplish at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the overhaul proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $61,800, or $300 per airplane, per overhaul cycle.

Should an operator be required to accomplish the proposed replacement, it would take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish at an average labor rate of $60 per work hour. Required parts would cost approximately $6,623 (for each of the 4 attach fittings on the outboard flaps) and $7,566 (for each 4 attach fittings on the inboard flaps) per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the replacement proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $26,972 (outboard flaps) and $30,744 (inboard flaps) per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-25-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-25-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

The Luftfartsverket (LFV), which is the airworthiness authority for Sweden, notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Saab Model SAAB SF340A and SAAB 340B series airplanes. The LFV advises that there has been one reported false warning indicating the engine exhaust tailpipe was hot. The warning was caused by chafed wires located in the cabin compartment ceiling. Those wires are routed through the lightening holes of the airframe. The chafing was found between the wires and the edge (edge string) of the lightening holes. The LFV further advised of two additional occurrences of similar chafing. Such false warnings could result in unnecessary procedures executed by the flightcrew.

Saab has issued Service Bulletin 340-92-027, dated December 10, 1999, which describes procedures for a one-time inspection to detect chafing of the wires and harnesses in the cabin compartment ceiling. The service bulletin describes procedures for repair of certain chafing. The service bulletin further describes procedures for the installation of protective sleeving on all of the harnesses routed in the inspection area. Accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the identified unsafe condition. The LFV classified this service bulletin as mandatory and issued Swedish airworthiness directive 1-149, dated December 10, 1999, in order to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in Sweden.

These airplane models are manufactured in Sweden and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the LFV has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the LFV, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered in the United States, the proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in the service bulletin described previously, except as discussed below.

Operators should note that, although the service bulletin specifies that the manufacturer may be contacted for disposition of certain repair conditions, this proposal would require the repair of those conditions to be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by either the FAA, or the LFV (or its delegated agent). In light of the type of repair that would be required to address the identified unsafe condition, and in consonance with existing bilateral airworthiness agreements, the FAA has determined that, for this proposed AD, a repair approved by either the FAA or the LFV would be acceptable for compliance with this proposed AD.

The FAA estimates that 288 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 36 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts for the sleeving installation would cost approximately $358 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $725,184, or $2,518 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation: (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES .

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket Number 2000-NM-56-AD.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000-NM-56-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

The Direction Ge ne rale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for France, notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on all Dassault Model Falcon 2000, Mystere-Falcon 900, Falcon 900EX, Fan Jet Falcon, Mystere-Falcon 50, Mystere-Falcon 20, Mystere-Falcon 200, and Falcon 10 series airplanes. The DGAC advises that service experience has shown that the overwing emergency exits on Dassault Falcon series airplanes may not operate correctly. This incorrect operation may be caused by interference between the emergency exit and the upper part of the airframe structure, or between the emergency exit and the interior accommodation. This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of the overwing emergency exits to open, and consequent injury to passengers or crew members during an emergency evacuation.

The DGAC issued French airworthiness directives 1999-213-025(B) (for Model Mystere-Falcon 50, Mystere-Falcon 900, and Falcon 900EX series airplanes), 1999-212-024(B) (for Model Fan Jet Falcon, Mystere-Falcon 20, and Mystere-Falcon 200 series airplanes), 1999-211-023(B) (for Model Falcon 10 series airplanes), and 1999-210-009(B) (for Model Falcon 2000 series airplanes); all dated May 19, 1999. These French airworthiness directives require a test of the overwing emergency exit from inside the cabin, in accordance with the applicable maintenance manual procedures.

These airplane models are manufactured in France and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the DGAC, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design registered in the United States, the proposed AD would require repetitive tests and inspections to detect discrepancies of the overwing emergency exit; and corrective action, if necessary. Procedures for accomplishment of these actions are specified in the applicable aircraft maintenance manual.

The FAA estimates that 767 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, that it would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $46,020, or $60 per airplane, per inspection cycle.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES .

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

Interested parties are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments that provide the factual basis supporting the views and suggestions presented are particularly helpful in developing reasoned regulatory decisions on the proposal. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, aeronautical, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal. Communications should identify the airspace docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address listed above. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments on this action must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Airspace Docket No. 00-AAL-1.” The postcard will be date/time stamped and returned to the commenter. All communications received on or before the specified closing date for comments will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposal contained in this action may be changed in light of comments received. All comments submitted will be available for examination in the Operations Branch, Air Traffic Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 222 West 7th Avenue, Box 14, Anchorage, AK, both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded, using a modem and suitable communications software, from the FAA regulations section of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-3339) or the Federal Register 's electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 202-512-1661).

Internet users may reach the Federal Register 's web page for access to recently published rulemaking documents at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the Operations Branch, AAL-530, Federal Aviation Administration, 222 West 7th Avenue, Box 14, Anchorage, AK 99513-7587. Communications must identify the docket number of this NPRM. Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRM's should contact the individual(s) identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

The FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 by revising Class E airspace at Barrow, AK, due to the revision of several instrument approach procedures to RWY 6 and RWY 24. The intended effect of this proposal is to provide additional controlled airspace for IFR operations at Barrow, AK.

The area would be depicted on aeronautical charts for pilot reference. The coordinates for this airspace docket are based on North American Datum 83. The Class E airspace areas designated as 700/1200 foot transition areas are published in paragraph 6005 in FAA Order 7400.9G, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, dated September 1, 1999, and effective September 16, 1999, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The Class E airspace designations listed in this document would be published subsequently in the Order.

The FAA has determined that this proposed regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore—(1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

Interested parties are invited to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Comments that provide the factual basis supporting the views and suggestions presented are particularly helpful in developing reasoned regulatory decisions on the proposal. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, aeronautical, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal. Communications should identify the airspace docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address listed above. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments on this action must submit with those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Airspace Docket No. 99-AGL-57.” The postcard will be date/time stamped and returned to the commenter. All communications received on or before the specified closing date for comments will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposal contained in this action may be changed in light of comments received. All comments submitted will be available for examination in the Rules Docket both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-3339) or the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 202-512-1661).

Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov or the Superintendent of Documents's webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published rulemaking documents.

Any person may obtain a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Air Traffic Airspace Management, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-8783. Communications must identify the docket number of this NPRM. Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRM's should call the FAA's Office of Rulemaking, (202) 267-9677, for a copy of Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, which describes the application procedure.

The FAA will be decommissioning the Marquette VOR/DME and will be commissioning the Gwinn VOR/DME. As a result, five Federal airways will have to be realigned from the Marquette VOR/DME to the new Gwinn VOR/DME (which is approximately 15 NM to the southeast of the present location of the Marquette VORTAC).

The FAA is proposing an amendment to part 71 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 71) to realign five Federal airways due to the decommissioning of the Marquette VOR/DME, and the installation of the Gwinn VOR/DME. The Gwinn VOR/DME will be located approximately 15 NM southeast of the present location of the Marquette VORTAC. Specifically, V-7, V-133, V-224, V-316, and V-341 would be realigned from the Marquette VOR/DME to the Gwinn VOR/DME.

VOR Federal airways are published in Section 6010(a), of FAA Order 7400.9G, dated September 1, 1999, and effective September 16, 1999, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1. The airways listed in this document would be published subsequently in the Order.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore—(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a Regulatory Evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

We encourage you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting comments or related material. If you do so, please include your name and address, identify the docket number for this rulemaking (CGD01-99-069), indicate the specific section of this document to which each comment applies, and give the reason for each comment. Please submit all comments and related material in an unbound format, no larger than 8 1/2 by 11 inches, suitable for copying. If you would like to know if they reached us, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard or envelope. We will consider all comments and material received during the comment period. We may change this proposed rule in view of them.

We do not now plan to hold a public meeting. But you may submit a request for a meeting by writing to the First Coast Guard District, Bridge Branch, at the address under ADDRESSES explaining why one would be beneficial. If we determine that one would aid this rulemaking, we will hold one at a time and place announced by a later notice in the Federal Register .

Pulaski Bridge. The Pulaski Bridge, at mile 0.6, across Newtown Creek between Brooklyn and Queens has a vertical clearance of 39 feet at mean high water and 43 feet at mean low water. The existing regulations require the draw to open on signal at all times.

Greenpoint Avenue Bridge. The Greenpoint Avenue Bridge, at mile 1.3, across the Newtown Creek between Brooklyn and Queens has a vertical clearance of 26 feet at mean high water and 31 feet at mean low water. The existing regulations require the draw to open on signal at all times.

Grand Street/Avenue Bridge. The Grand Street/Avenue Bridge, at mile 3.1 across the Newtown Creek (East Branch) between Brooklyn and Queens has a vertical clearance of 8 feet above mean high water and 12 feet at mean low water. The existing operating rules for the Grand Street/Avenue Bridge, listed at 33 CFR 117.801(e), requires the bridge to open on signal unless the drawtender is at the Borden Avenue, Hunters Point Avenue or Roosevelt Island Bridges. In this event a notice to the New York City Department of Transportation (NYCDOT) Radio Hotline, or NYCDOT Bridge Operations Office shall be given, resulting in up to a one-hour delay.

Metropolitan Avenue Bridge. The Metropolitan Avenue Bridge, at mile 3.4, across the English Kills at Brooklyn has a vertical clearance of 10 feet above mean high water and 15 feet above mean low water. The existing operating regulations require the draw to open on signal at all times.

Borden Avenue Bridge. The Borden Avenue Bridge, at mile 1.3, across the Dutch Kills has a vertical clearance of 4 feet at mean high water and 9 feet at mean low water. The existing regulations in 33 CFR 117.801(c) require the draw to open on signal if at least a one-hour advance notice is given to the drawtender at the Grand Street/Avenue Bridge, the New York City Department of Transportation Radio Hotline or NYCDOT Bridge Operations Office. In the event the drawtender is at the Roosevelt Island Bridge or the Hunters Point Avenue Bridge, up to an additional half-hour delay may occur.

Hunters Point Avenue Bridge. The Hunters Point Avenue Bridge, at mile 1.4, over the Dutch Kills has vertical clearances of 8 feet at mean high water and 13 feet at mean low water. The existing regulations for the Hunters Point Avenue Bridge in 33 CFR 117.801(d) require the draw to open on signal if at least a one-hour advance notice is given to the drawtender at the Grand Street/Avenue Bridge, the NYCDOT Radio Hotline, or NYCDOT Bridge Operations Office. In the event the drawtender is at the Roosevelt Island Bridge or the Borden Avenue Bridge, up to an additional half-hour delay may occur.

The owner of all the bridges, the New York City Department of Transportation (NYCDOT), submitted bridge opening log data to the Coast Guard for review. The bridge owner plans to operate these bridges with multiple crews of drawtenders. The two-hour advance notice should allow sufficient time for the crews to operate these bridges due to the close proximity of the bridges to each other. Recent yearly openings have been relatively low which will allow the bridge owner to utilize the roving crew concept and still meet the needs of navigation.

The total number of bridge openings at the above bridges from 1991 to 1999 are as follows:

We encourage you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting comments and related material. If you do so, please include your name and address, identify the docket number for this rulemaking (CGD01-00-015), indicate the specific section of this document to which each comment applies, and give the reason for each comment. Please submit all comments and related material in an unbound format, no larger than 8 1/2 by 11 inches, suitable for copying. If you would like to know they reached us, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard or envelope. We will consider all comments and material received during the comment period. We may change this proposed rule in view of them.

We do not now plan to hold a public meeting. But you may submit a request for a meeting by writing to the Waterways Oversight Branch at the address under ADDRESSES explaining why one would be beneficial. If we determine that one would aid this rulemaking, we will hold one at a time and place announced by a later notice in the Federal Register .

The Borough of Staten Island has submitted an Application for Approval of a Marine Event for a fireworks display on the Arthur Kill. This proposed regulation establishes a temporary safety zone in all waters of the Arthur Kill, Ward Point Bend (West), and the Raritan River Cutoff, within a 300-yard radius of the fireworks barge in approximate position 40°30′18″ N 074°15′30″ W (NAD 1983), about 250 yards northwest of Raritan Bay Channel Buoy 60 (LLNR 36319). The proposed safety zone would be effective from 8:15 p.m. (e.s.t.) until 9:45 p.m. (e.s.t.) on July 2, and September 2, 2000. If either event is cancelled due to inclement weather, then this proposed safety zone would be effective from 8:15 p.m. (e.s.t.) until 9:45 p.m. (e.s.t.) on July 3, and September 3, 2000. The proposed safety zone prevents vessels from transiting a portion of the Arthur Kill, Ward Point Bend (West), and the Raritan River Cutoff for approximately 45 minutes of the 90 minute long event, and is needed to protect boaters from the hazards associated with fireworks launched from a barge in the area. Public notifications will be made prior to the events via local notice to mariners, and marine information broadcasts.

The proposed safety zone is for the Borough of Staten Island Fireworks displays held on the Arthur Kill. This event will be held on Sunday, July 2, and Saturday, September 2, 2000, from 8:15 p.m. (e.s.t.) until 9:45 p.m. (e.s.t.). If either event is canceled due to inclement weather, then the event will be held on Monday, July 3, and Sunday, September 3, 2000, from 8:15 p.m. (e.s.t.) until 9:45 p.m. (e.s.t.). This rule is being proposed to provide for the safety of life on navigable waters during the events and to give the marine community the opportunity to comment on this event.

The proposed size of this safety zone was determined using National Fire Protection Association and New York City Fire Department Standards for 10 inch mortars fired from a barge, combined with the Coast Guard's knowledge of tide and current conditions in the area.

This proposed rule is not a “significant regulatory action” under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and does not require an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that Order. The Office of Management and Budget has not reviewed it under that Order. It is not significant under the regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 11040; February 26, 1979).

We expect the economic impact of this proposed rule to be so minimal that a full Regulatory Evaluation under paragraph 10e of the regulatory policies and procedures of DOT is unnecessary.

Although this regulation prevents traffic from transiting a portion of the Arthur Kill during the event, the effect of this regulation will not be significant for several reasons: commercial facilities in the Arthur Kill and the Sandy Hook Pilots Association will be notified of this proposal, recreational vessels will be able to transit through the western 50 yards of the Arthur Kill during the event, recreational vessels would not be precluded from getting underway, or mooring at, any piers or marinas currently located in the vicinity of the safety zone, and advance notifications which will be made to the local maritime community by the Local Notice to Mariners, and marine information broadcasts. Additionally, commercial vessels will normally be precluded from entering the zone for only a 45-minute period during the effective period of the safety zone.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), we considered whether this proposed rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The term “small entities” comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.

The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This proposed rule would affect the following entities, some of which might be small entities: the owners or operators of vessels intending to transit a portion of the Arthur Kill, Ward Point Bend (West), and the Raritan River Cutoff during the time this zone is activated.

This safety zone would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities for the following reasons: commercial facilities in the Arthur Kill and the Sandy Hook Pilots Association will be notified of this proposal, recreational vessels will be able to transit through the western 50 yards of the Arthur Kill during these times. Recreational vessels would not be precluded from getting underway, or mooring at, any piers or marinas currently located in the vicinity of the proposed safety zone. Additionally, commercial vessels will normally be precluded from entering the zone for only a 45-minute period during the effective period of the safety zone.

If you think that your business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction qualifies as a small entity and that this rule would have a significant economic impact on it, please submit a comment (see ADDRESSES ) explaining why you think it qualifies and how and to what degree this rule would economically affect it.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small entities in understanding this proposed rule so that they can better evaluate its effects on them and participate in the rulemaking. If the rule would affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please contact Lieutenant J. Lopez, Waterways Oversight Branch, Coast Guard Activities New York (718) 354-4193.

This proposed rule would call for no new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this proposed rule under E.O. 13132 and have determined that this rule does not have implications for federalism under that Order.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) governs the issuance of Federal regulations that require unfunded mandates. An unfunded mandate is a regulation that requires a State, local, or tribal government or the private sector to incur direct costs without the Federal Government's having first provided the funds to pay those costs. This proposed rule would not impose an unfunded mandate.

This proposed rule would not effect a taking of private property or otherwise have taking implications under E.O. 12630, Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.

This proposed rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

We have analyzed this proposed rule under E.O. 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks. This rule is not an economically significant rule and does not concern an environmental risk to health or risk to safety that may disproportionately affect children.

We considered the environmental impact of this proposed rule and concluded that, under figure 2-1, paragraph 34(g), of Commandant Instruction M16475.1C, this proposed rule is categorically excluded from further environmental documentation. This proposed rule fits paragraph 34(g) as it establishes a safety zone. A “Categorical Exclusion Determination” is available in the docket where indicated under ADDRESSES .

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes to amend 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

For additional information see the direct final rule published in the rules section of this Federal Register .

You may comment via the Internet to WOComment@blm.gov . Please also include “Attention: RIN 1004-AD23” and your name and return address in your Internet message. If you do not receive a confirmation from the system that we have received your Internet message, contact us directly at (202) 452-5030.

For BLM to keep your personal information confidential, you must request confidentially and prominently state your request at the beginning of your comment. BLM will consider withholding your name, street address, and other identifying information on a case-by-case basis to the extent allowed by law. BLM will make available for public inspection in their entirety all submissions from organizations or businesses, and from individuals identifying themselves as representatives or officials of organizations or businesses.

The Act of October 20, 1976, as amended (31 U.S.C. 6901-6907), commonly known as the Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act (PILT), authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Land Management, to disburse Federal payments annually to counties and other units of general local government to compensate for the exemption of real estate taxes on entitlement lands within their boundaries.

BLM proposes to update the existing regulations to incorporate statutory changes to the PILT Act in the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses (Pub. L. 103-397, October 22, 1994; Pub. L. 104-333, November 12, 1996; and Pub. L. 105-83, November 14, 1997).

The proposed rule would:

• Conform the existing regulations to plain language format; and

• Update the existing regulations to incorporate statutory changes to the PILT Act in the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses (Pub. L. 103-397, October 22, 1994; Pub. L. 104-333, November 12, 1996; and Pub. L. 105-83, November 14, 1997); and

Congress made the following statutory changes to the authorizing legislation:

1. Public Law 103-397 amends the PILT Act to indicate increases to the per acre values used to compute “6902 payments” and to the population table used to determine each unit of general local government's population ceiling. The public law also indexes payments for inflation, increases payments for entitlement lands based on the Consumer Price Index, and authorizes payments for certain land exchanges and acquisitions.

2. Public Law 104-333 further amends the Act to redefine the meaning of “unit of general local government” and also stipulates which units of general local government are eligible to receive a PILT payment.

3. Public Law 105-83 amends the Act to exclude cities in Alaska from the definition of unit of general local government eligible to receive PILT payments.

The following Section Conversion Table amends the existing regulations to redesignate the sections as follows:

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.0-1 of the existing regulations. The purpose of this subpart is to set forth the governing procedures BLM uses for disbursing PILT payments to units of general local government for entitlement lands within their boundaries.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.0-3 of the existing regulations. The references to the authority for promulgating these regulations continue to be the same.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.0-5 of the existing regulations, alphabetize the remaining definitions, and add definitions of:

BLM proposes to remove from the existing regulations the definitions for the terms listed below because the definitions are explained in the regulatory text or are no longer needed.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.1-1881.1-1 of the existing regulations. This proposed section would include a statutory change made to the authorizing legislation which affects the units of general local government eligible to receive PILT payments.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.1-2 of the existing regulations. This proposed section would include a statutory change made to the authorizing legislation which would change Section 1 payments in § 1881.1-2 of the existing regulations to Section 6902 (31 U.S.C. 6902) payments. The proposed section also explains how BLM would process section 6902 payments.

This proposed section would describe what information BLM needs to calculate PILT payments. After BLM receives the required information, BLM uses the formula in 31 U.S.C. 6903(b)(1) to calculate the actual payments.

This proposed section would explain how BLM calculates PILT payments if a unit of general local government reorganizes. BLM will calculate payments for the fiscal year of the reorganization as if the reorganization did not occur.

This proposed section would explain how BLM certifies payment computations after receiving the required information from the State in which the unit of general local government is located.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.1-3 of the existing regulations. This proposed section would include a statutory change made to the authorizing legislation which would change Section 3 payments in § 1881.1-3 of the existing regulations to Section 6904 (31 U.S.C. 6904) payments. The proposed section also explains how BLM would process section 6904 payments.

This proposed section would explain how BLM calculates Section 6904 payments after receiving required information from the State in which the units of general local government are located.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.1-3 of the existing regulations. This proposed section would include a statutory change made to the authorizing legislation which would change Section 3 payments in § 1881.1-3 of the existing regulations to Section 6905 (31 U.S.C. 6905) payments. The proposed section also explains how BLM would process section 6905 payments.

This proposed section would explain how BLM calculates section 6905 payments after receiving required information from the State in which the units of general local government are located.

BLM proposes to remove and renumber § 1881.1-4, 1881-1-5, 1881.2, and 1881.3 of the existing regulations. This proposed section would explain the local governments' responsibilities after receiving PILT payments from BLM which include distributing the payments and certifying to BLM that it made the distribution.

This proposed section would explain BLM's procedures applicable to all PILT payments including minimum payments to units of general local government and how BLM pro rates payments.

This proposed section would explain that a State may enact legislation to reallocate or redistribute PILT payments but must follow certain procedures after the legislation is enacted.

This proposed section would explain that BLM will not change its PILT payment if a State enacts distribution legislation procedures until the following Federal fiscal year.

This proposed section would explain the process for starting payments if a State repeals or amends distribution legislation. It would require States to notify BLM of the changes. BLM would determine compliance with 31 U.S.C. 6907 and if in compliance, BLM would begin payments the following fiscal year.

This proposed section would state that a unit of general local government can protest the results of payment computations.

This proposed section would explain the process of filing a protest including the time within which the unit of general local government must file.

This proposed section would explain that a unit of general local government can appeal a rejection of a protest to the Interior Board of Land Appeals.

This proposed regulation is not a significant regulatory action and is not subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under Executive Order 12866. We have determined that this proposed regulation: Does not have an annual economic impact of $100 million or more; will not have an adverse impact in a material way on the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; does not pose a serious inconsistency or interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; does not alter the budgetary effects of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the right or obligations of their recipients; and will not have novel legal or policy implications. Therefore, we do not have to assess the potential costs and benefits of the rule under section 6(a)(3) of this order.

Executive Order 12866 also requires each agency to write regulations that are easy to understand. We invite your comments on how to make this proposed rule easier to understand, including answers to the following questions:

• Are the requirements in the proposed rule clearly stated?

• Does the proposed rule contain unclear technical language or jargon?

• Does the format of the proposed rule aid or reduce its clarity?

• Would the rule be easier to understand if it were divided into more sections?

• Is the description of the proposed rule in the “Supplementary Information” section helpful in understanding the proposed rule.

Send comments that concern how we could make this proposed rule easier to understand to: Office of Regulatory Affairs, Department of the Interior, Room 7229, 1849 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20240. You may also email the comments to: Execsec@ios.doi.gov.

This proposed rule is subject to a categorical exclusion under NEPA. The proposed rule would incorporate statutory changes to the PILT Act. The PILT Act authorizes BLM to disburse PILT payments annually to counties and other units of general local government to compensate for the exemption of real estate taxes on entitlement lands within their boundaries. BLM has determined that this action to update existing regulations to incorporate statutory changes to the authorizing legislation is a regulation of financial, technical, and legal nature under section 101(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, pursuant to 516 Departmental Manual, Chapter 2, Appendix 1, Item 1.10. The environmental effects of the regulation are too broad, speculative, or conjectural to lend themselves to meaningful analysis. Therefore, pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 CFR 1508.4) and the environmental policies and procedures of the Department of the Interior, BLM has found that neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required.

This proposed rule does not require a regulatory flexibility analysis. Congress enacted the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as amended (5 U.S.C. 601-612), to ensure that Government regulations do not necessarily or disproportionately burden small entities. The RFA requires a regulatory flexibility analysis if a rule has a significant economic impact, either detrimental or beneficial, on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule would not have significant economic impacts on small entities under the RFA (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ). The proposed rule would merely update existing regulations to incorporate statutory changes to the authorizing legislation. The Acts do not affect small entities as they address transfer of funds from BLM to States. Accordingly, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

This proposed rule is not a “major rule” as defined by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 804(2)). This proposed rule will not have a significant impact on the economy or on small businesses in particular. As discussed above, this proposed rule would merely update existing regulations to incorporate statutory changes to the authorizing legislation and do not affect small businesses.

This proposed rule does not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local or tribal governments or the private sector of more than $100 million per year. This proposed rule does not have a significant or unique effect on State, local or tribal governments or the private sector. Therefore, we are not required to prepare a statement containing the information required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1502 et seq. ). This proposed rule would explain how BLM disburses PILT payments to States and units of general local government and update the existing regulations to incorporate statutory changes to the authorizing legislation.

This proposed rule does not represent a government action capable of interfering with constitutionally protected property rights. Therefore, we have determined that the regulation would not cause a taking of private property. No further discussion of takings implications are required under this Executive Order.

We have considered the effect of the proposed rule in accordance with Executive Order 13132 and have determined that it does not have sufficient Federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism summary impact statement. The proposed rule does not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. The rule does not preempt State law. However, we consulted with the National Association of Counties staff to discuss the general framework of this rule making.

A 60-day notice was provided in the Federal Register (61 FR 11649) which solicited public comments on its announcement to request renewal of approval to collect certain information relating to PILT. We did not receive any comments.

The OMB has approved the information collection requirements in this proposed rule under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ), and has assigned clearance number 1004-0109. BLM estimates the public reporting burden of this section to average 50 respondents reporting one time per year at 20 hours per response or 1,000 total annual hours. This estimate includes the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.

The Office of the Solicitor has determined that this proposed regulation will not unduly burden the judicial system and that it meets the requirements of sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

The principal author of this proposed rule is Bill Howell, Budget Group, assisted by Shirlean Beshir, Regulatory Affairs Group.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the preamble and under the authority of 43 U.S.C. 1740, BLM proposes to revise 43 CFR part 1880, subpart 1881, to read as follows:

This is a summary of the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rule Making, WT Docket No. 00-48, FCC 00-105, adopted March 17, 2000, and released on March 24, 2000. The full text of this Notice of Proposed Rule Making is available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC. The complete text may be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, International Transcription Service, Inc., 1231 20th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037. The full text may also be downloaded at: www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Notices/2000/fcc00105.doc. Alternative formats are available to persons with disabilities by contacting Martha Contee at (202) 418-0260 or TTY (202) 418-2555.

In this Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Commission seeks comment on the proposals: (1) To modify the Commission's Rules to reflect revised international standards and recommendations which were endorsed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), many at the initiation of the United States; and to reflect significant changes in IMO and ITU performance standards and regulations; (2) to allow radio-teletypewriter, data, telemetry, and telecommand transmissions on frequencies reserved for Morse code transmissions; (3) to apply the Commission's Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) Rules, or alternative safety measures, to the commercial fishing industry; (4) to create a new Restricted GMDSS Radio Operator License in order to provide a subordinate class of GMDSS license for radio operators aboard ships that operate exclusively within Sea Area A1 (an area extending approximately 20 miles from the coast); (5) to accept a proof of passing certificate from the United States Coast Guard training program, which includes both theoretical examinations and practical demonstrations of the candidate's ability to operate GMDSS equipment, as evidence that an applicant has met the obligations for any GMDSS operator license issued by the Commission; and (6) to remove the certification for Class A, B, and S emergency position indicating radiobeacons, which operate at 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz, due to their ineffectiveness in lifesaving operations.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)  1 requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”  2 In this Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Commission proposes to consolidate, revise, and streamline the Commission's Rules governing maritime communications. The purpose of these proposed rule changes is to address new international maritime requirements, improve the operational ability of all users of marineradios and remove unnecessary or duplicative requirements from the Commission's Rules. In an effort to clarify the existing regulations, the Commission also proposes to make minor and non-substantive modifications to Part 80 of the Commission's Rules. The proposed rule changes do not impose any additional compliance burden on small entities regulated by the Commission. Accordingly, the Commission certifies, pursuant to section 605(b) of the RFA, that the rules proposed in this Notice of Proposed Rule Making will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities, as that term is defined by the RFA. 3 The Commission shall send a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rule Making, including a copy of this certification, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in accordance with the RFA. We shall also publish a copy of this certification in the Federal Register .

This proposed rulemaking is the culmination of experience gained from inspections, accident investigations and risk management and system integrity initiatives. This experience has given us the foundation for proposing a rulemaking that addresses in a comprehensive manner NTSB recommendations, Congressional mandates and pipeline safety and environmental issues raised over the years.

Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and analyses of major pipeline incidents have emphasized the importance of ensuring safety and environmental protection in areas of population density and in areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage. NTSB recommendations on this subject include:

• NTSB recommended that OPS require periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other time-dependent damages.

• NTSB recommended that OPS establish criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, including safe service intervals between pressure testing.

• NTSB recommended that OPS determine hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe and establish standards for leak detection.

• NTSB recommended that OPS expedite requirements for installing automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on high-pressure lines in urban and environmentally sensitive areas to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipeline segments.

Several incidents, including pipeline ruptures in Bellingham, Washington; Simpsonville, South Carolina; Reston, Virginia; and Edison, New Jersey have illustrated the importance of integrating and analyzing data from various sources to ensure a pipeline's integrity. Our analyses indicate that many accidents are caused by complex factors involving mechanical and control system failures, previous outside force damage, system design errors and operator error. These accidents indicate the need for operators to address the potential interrelationship among failure causes and to implement coordinated risk control actions to supplement the protection of the regulations.

We are persuaded of the urgent need to propose regulations for an overall pipeline integrity management program that requires continual assessment and evaluation through internal inspection or pressure testing, data integration and analysis, and follow-up remedial, preventive and mitigative actions.

Congress has directed OPS to undertake a variety of activities concerning areas where the risk of a pipeline spill could have significant impact. Required actions include:

• 49 U.S.C. 60109(a)(2)—OPS is to prescribe standards establishing criteria for identifying gas pipeline facilities located in high-density population areas and hazardous liquid pipelines that cross waters where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists, located in a high-density population area, or in an area unusually sensitive to environmental damage (USAs).

• 49 U.S.C. 60102(f)(2)—OPS is to prescribe additional standards requiring the periodic inspection of pipelines in USAs and high-density population areas. The regulations are to prescribe when an instrumented internal inspection device, or similarly effective inspection method, should be used to inspect the pipeline.

• 49 U.S.C. 60102(j)—OPS is to survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and other procedures, systems, and equipment used to detect and locate hazardous liquid pipeline ruptures, and to prescribe regulations on the circumstances where an operator of a hazardous liquid pipeline facility must use an EFRD or such other procedure, system, or equipment.

Although the pipeline safety regulations have a demonstrated record in addressing risks to the nation's pipelines, safety programs based only on compliance with the regulations may overlook the interrelationships among failure causes and the benefits of coordinated risk control activities.

To study and evaluate if comprehensive and integrated approaches to safety and environmental protection could work, OPS created the Risk Management Demonstration Program and the Systems Integrity Inspection (SII) Pilot Program. These programs encourage and evaluate operator-developed safety and environmental management processes that incorporate operator- and pipeline-specific information and data to identify, assess, and address pipeline risks, in conjunction with compliance with existing pipeline safety regulations. These programs, along with the Oil Spill Response Plan Review and Exercise Program, have helped OPS refine its regulatory oversight to ensure that pipeline operators have effective processes to identify the most important risks to the public and the environment, and to develop and implement cost-effective preventive and mitigative actions to manage these risks. OPS's interim assessment of the benefits of risk management processes, after four years of experience with the demonstration program, indicates the validity of focusing resources and establishing higher levels of protection in areas where a pipeline spill could have significant consequences.

In evaluating the operators who applied for the Risk Management and SII Programs, OPS found that liquid operators have made progress in developing and implementing formalized management systems to identify and address the most significant integrity threats to their pipeline systems. These programs are designed to supplement the protections that the pipeline safety regulations provide. OPS further found that liquid operators generally have more experience than natural gas operators with using internal inspection devices.

In the Risk Management Demonstration Program, participants perform systematic and comprehensive risk assessments to identify the specific nature and location of the most significant risks posed by operation of their pipeline system. An essential feature of these risk assessments is the integration of information from many diverse sources to fully understand the integrity threats at specific locations on the pipeline. Environmental consequences and the impact on nearby population are explicitly considered in these risk assessments. Through formal, risk-based decision making processes, these companies can use the risk assessment results to identify projects and activities that address potential system integrity threats, thereby preventing pipeline failures. The risk management process also examines the consequences of potential releases and explores opportunities to minimize the environmental and public safety and health impacts should a failure occur. Participants are using these risk-based programs to comprehensively investigate all potential sources of risk, and implement risk control activities to prevent these risks or mitigate their consequences. These programs supplement the public and environmental protections the pipeline safety regulations provide.

The SII pilot program is focused on developing a more integrity-based approach to OPS inspections. Instead of basing inspections on a checklist approach to compliance with the regulations, the program focuses the inspection process on how an operator controls the integrity of the pipeline. In this program, OPS is working with the operator to better understand the most significant integrity threats and assure that programs actually address these risks. Similar to the Risk Management Program, the SII program focuses on how operators evaluate their system and make sound integrity management decisions.

Although OPS has consulted with a limited number of operators who have applied for these programs, OPS discussions with other pipeline companies during standard inspections, in industry forums and through working groups have indicated that integrated risk-based programs are becoming more common, particularly within the hazardous liquid industry. OPS has found that many liquid companies are using diagnostic tools and developing more sophisticated and mature integrity management systems.

The hazardous liquid pipeline companies in the Risk Management and SII programs use internal inspection in their integrity management programs because of its powerful diagnostic capability. Examples of how these programs use internal inspection include:

• Comparing multiple internal inspection runs over the same line to determine corrosion growth rates;

• Testing new inspection techniques to detect seam flaws and stress corrosion cracking;

• Overlaying internal inspection log results with Geographic Information System data to correlate locations of metal loss with cathodic protection system performance, environmentally sensitive areas, and other geo-spatial data;

• Integrating hydrostatic pressure testing with internal inspection where appropriate;

• Using probabilistic techniques to optimize the frequency at which internal inspection and pressure testing is conducted;

• Using probabilistic approaches to prioritize and define the extent of anomaly excavation and repair; and

• Developing more sophisticated analytical tools to evaluate internal inspection results.

OPS is also working to improve overall pipeline integrity through the inspection process. OPS is gaining value from the approach taken in the Risk Management and SII programs, particularly benefitting from evaluating pipelines on a “systems” basis. Therefore, last year, OPS implemented this approach through a new high impact inspection format, evaluating pipeline systems as a whole rather than in small segments. A system-wide approach is a more effective and, in most cases, more efficient means of evaluating pipeline integrity. As part of the “systems” approach, we are evaluating how pipeline operators integrate information about their pipeline to determine the best means of addressing risk. We will build on this experience in developing detailed inspection guidelines to evaluate compliance with the requirements we are proposing in this rule.

As noted previously, accident and investigation analyses have identified several critical pipeline safety issues that appear to either cause or significantly contribute to pipeline accidents. As part of our NHIF process, we are evaluating how pipeline companies are addressing these issues and are noting the best industry practices we observe. Effectively managing these critical issues often relates to integrating information about different problems and examining their relationship in contributing to the potential for a failure.

On November 18 & 19, 1999, OPS hosted a public meeting in Herndon, VA to gather information on current pipeline assessment methods and integrity management programs so that OPS could develop a regulatory process to require testing and other means of identifying and repairing defects and further evaluating pipeline integrity in areas where a pipeline release posed the greatest safety or environmental harm. Topics discussed included the key elements of an effective integrity management program, the extent to which operators now have integrity management programs, and how to validate the effectiveness of such programs.

At the meeting, OPS held breakout sessions to specifically discuss some key issues about how to better protect high consequence areas through an integrity management process.

In addition to areas already given greater protection in the regulations or covered by the proposed USA definition (discussed later in this document), attendees suggested OPS consider areas in proximity to large bodies of water used for transportation or recreation; industries that impact public health and welfare, such as water treatment facilities and power plants; and major corridors such as road ways, rail roads and power lines.

Several pipeline companies described approaches they use in their risk assessments and integrity evaluations to identify locations where a pipeline failure might have significant human health and safety impacts. Some participants maintained that defining actual impact zones would be preferable to the classic population corridor used in the gas regulations. For liquid lines, it was suggested that a more useable definition of non-rural areas than currently exists in the regulations may be desirable to provide greater clarity. Some participants suggested that OPS let operators test a definition of high consequence areas for a trial period.

There was a general belief that many of the components of effective integrity management are already in the regulations, the major exception being effective integration of information in support of decision making. Attendees also pointed out that the Risk Management Program Standard or API standard 1129 could be used to define the elements of an integrity management program. Participants said that a successful integrity management program must be embodied within an environment, safety, and health management system framework. Several companies described elements of their environment, safety, and health management systems and emphasized the importance of policy, leadership, and continuous improvement to program success. Public representatives identified the need for thoroughness in assessing risks and the importance of better data to monitor leak and failure history. Public communication and local safety and planning agencies' participation in identifying risks were also emphasized as key program elements.

Participants suggested that operators have a documented integrity management plan that has goals and performance measures so that regulators could review the plan, and evaluate performance against that plan. Some participants said that the review should be performance-based. It was also suggested that OPS review the results of the operator's audit of its own program. Concerns were raised over how OPS would assure staff expertise to adequately conduct performance-based inspections, and how OPS would establish a uniform standard against which to measure company performance.

Attendees listed a variety of information, emphasizing location-specific information from sources such as close interval surveys, patrols, in-line inspection data, top-side anomaly information, maintenance history, third party excavation activity, physical pipe inspections, incident and leak history.

Participants emphasized that OPS should focus on the key location-specific issues an operator identifies, examine the process an operator uses to address these issues, and examine changes since the last inspection. Several attendees suggested using SII Program Protocols in crafting an approach to reviewing operator programs.

Due to the complexity of the issues, OPS requested participants submit additional information and comments by December 20, 1999. We then extended the comment period to January 17, 2000 (64 FR 71713) to allow adequate time for commenters to prepare and submit information. OPS also established an electronic public discussion forum to get ideas on requirements for an effective integrity management programs. We posted a draft conceptual model for a pipeline integrity management process on the OPS web-site. The comments and information we received from the public meeting and electronic forum helped us in drafting this proposed rule. We discuss these comments later in this document.

OPS also hosted a number of smaller meetings and conference calls to make sure we considered the broadest range of comments and information in drafting this NPRM. Discussion items included the areas that should be considered high consequence areas, reasonable milestones for completing benchmark or baseline testing, developing industry standards to support a rule, how a rule should acknowledge differences between the gas and liquid pipeline industries as well as among individual operators, and how best to involve affected communities. These topics were discussed with Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) representatives on January 12, American Petroleum Institute (API) representatives on January 13 and National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR) on January 14, February 15, and March 3. Discussions with public interest representatives on January 19 and February 29 included the National League of Cities; Safe Bellingham; the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia; the Environmental Defense Fund; the City of Austin, Texas; the Pipeline Reform Coalition; and the national organization of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC's). OPS met with the NTSB on February 8. Minutes from each of these sessions are in the Docket.

These meetings again showed how hazardous liquid and gas pipeline operators' experience differed in developing and implementing a risk-based integrity approach to pipeline safety.

For reasons discussed later in this document, at this time we are applying this proposed rule to certain hazardous liquid operators i.e., those hazardous liquid operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline used in transportation. Therefore, we will discuss only those comments relevant to this action. Later this year, when we issue proposed system integrity rules that apply to those hazardous liquid operators not covered by this initial action and to all natural gas transmission pipeline operators, we will discuss the other comments.

We received comments relevant to this action from the following sources:

Engineering firm: Advanced Technology Corporation

Engineering Consultant: Foy Milton, P.E.

Federal Agency: U.S. Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service

Citizen Group: SAFE Bellingham

We discuss the comments under the applicable heading below. Commenters generally supported the idea of providing further protection for critical areas. Operators and industry groups requested regulations that allow flexibility. SAFE Bellingham urged stronger federal regulation of pipelines, to include requirements for pressure testing, internal inspection, leak detection systems, safety management practices and audits, valve location and safety condition reporting.

As discussed later in this document, this proposal specifically requires an integrity assessment done by internal inspection, pressure testing or an equivalent technology within specified time frames established by specified risk criteria. The proposed program must comprehensively evaluate all threats to pipeline safety in high consequence areas. Among the required elements of an integrity management program are a continuous process to assess and maintain pipeline integrity, an analysis that integrates all information about the pipeline, information on how a failure would affect a high consequence area, and measures to prevent and mitigate pipeline failures, such as installing emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) and establishing or modifying systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks.

The New York State Department of Public Service commented that the integrity management program should apply to all transmission pipeline facilities, not just those in areas deemed high consequence. At our recent meeting, NTSB also recommended that pipeline integrity management requirements, including testing, be applied system-wide, not just in high consequence areas.

Pipeline safety regulations apply to the entire pipeline to protect the public and the environment from a pipeline release. We have decided to focus this immediate initiative on pipelines in areas where additional protection is the most critical—the populated areas, unusually sensitive environmental areas, and commercially navigable waterways. We believe operators should take necessary steps to develop and maintain an effective integrity management program for their pipeline system-wide. However, based on available data, OPS is proposing additional measures, particularly pipeline testing and evaluation, for those areas where additional protection is clearly warranted at this time. We will continue to consider whether integrity-related actions for the rest of the pipeline should be required.

We also intend to look at additional protection for other environmentally sensitive and vital resources, such as designating additional areas of national importance, cultural resources, sensitive environmental resources that do not meet the USA filtering criteria, wetlands and water bodies, and other transportation networks.

Nonetheless, many of the proposed measures for high consequence areas may benefit other parts of the pipeline system. For example, the proposed rule requires an operator to analyze and integrate various data about the integrity of the entire pipeline. This analysis is likely to benefit other segments of the pipeline system. The preventive and mitigative measures that the rule proposes an operator take to protect the high consequence area might also yield benefits beyond the segment in the critical area. Many operators will choose to extend the internal inspection or testing beyond the pipeline segment in or near the high consequence areas.

Foy Milton recommended against a subjective performance-based rule, asserting the advantages of specification-type standards (uniformity of application, ease of understanding). Other commenters stated that regulatory requirements that set performance standards for pipeline operators are the most effective.

The proposed rule uses both performance and specification-based language. Specification-type standards do not provide for selection of the most effective processes and technologies as they become available. OPS needs to create incentives for operators to invest in the development of new technology. Because internal inspection technology and other integrity monitoring equipment have evolved considerably in recent years and are expected to continue to improve, we want to encourage operators to use and make recommendations on how to improve the best available technologies and processes, rather than specifying only currently available technologies. Thus, the performance-based parts of the rule provide for operators to develop customized programs that address pipeline-specific characteristics, are fully integrated into company safety and environmental protection programs, and use the best available technologies to inspect and repair pipelines.

The specification parts of the rule ensure uniformity among integrity management programs so that they all, at minimum, address key issues, such as baseline and continual inspection or testing, data integration, and remedial, preventive and mitigative measures.

OPS received several comments on how to define high consequence areas. Commenters said that these areas should be limited to populated areas, unusually sensitive areas, and commercially navigable waterways. API recommended that these areas be defined as high population areas of greater than 100,000 people, based on U.S. Census data, other populated areas including non-rural areas, and unusually sensitive environmental areas. API argued that expansion beyond these areas would dilute industry resources and reduce the impact of any rule on public safety and environmental protection. API suggested that both subcategories of populated areas be similarly considered in conducting risk assessments, but might be treated differently for prevention activities.

Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. expressed the opinion that high consequence areas can differ dramatically depending on the nature of the product in the pipeline. They offered the example that a sensitive estuary might be a high consequence environment for under water hazardous liquid pipelines, but would be a very low consequence environment for an under water hydrogen pipeline.

Fish and Wildlife Service stated high consequence areas should include high population areas and areas designated as critical habitats for threatened and endangered species, areas of national significance, areas migratory birds concentrate, wetlands and riparian areas, areas of recreational significance, and areas of tribal subsistence, ceremonial use, or historic value. All American Pipeline stated it considers all areas along its pipeline as high consequence areas, but distinguishes areas that have a higher consequence than others based on: proximity to populated places and waterways, potential to impact USAs or drinking water resources, and policies and regulations of local, county government bodies, and local political climate. New York State Department of Public Service stated that creating a high consequence area definition would be difficult, and perhaps, unnecessary. Rather, a model properly developed and applied to the entire pipeline system would distinguish high consequence components that are given higher priority for repair or remedial action.

Participants at the public meeting said the high consequence area definition should include both safety and environmental impacts. The hazardous liquid industry breakout groups agreed that the definition should include a population component and USAs.

We are focusing this rulemaking on areas where we have determined a pipeline failure could pose the greatest threat to public safety, the environment, and water commerce. We are designating these areas “high consequence areas”. Our proposed definition does not take the type of product into account in defining the high consequence area. However, an operator needs to consider product type when determining which risk factors apply in establishing schedules for pipeline integrity assessments and other forms of evaluation.

High consequence areas will be identified on OPS's National Pipeline Mapping System and made available to the public on the Internet.

OPS agreed with commenters that the population definitions should follow the U.S. Census Bureau's work. OPS is, therefore, proposing that the population portion of the high consequence area definition follow the Census Bureau's definitions and delineations of populated areas. The U.S. Census Bureau is the expert on, and the collector of, population data. It has used its collected data to create maps of populated areas in the United States that anyone may access.

To protect the public from a potential pipeline failure, we are proposing a definition of high consequence area that encompasses two population tiers: high population areas and other populated areas. These are areas in the United States that have significant population densities.

High population areas are areas of the United States with moderate to high population densities. The U.S. Census Bureau calls these places “Urbanized Areas”, and defines them as areas that contain 50,000 or more people and have a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile.

Other population areas are areas the U.S. Census Bureau identifies as “Places”, and defines them as areas that contain a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town, village, or other designated residential or commercial area.

Although an operator must assess and evaluate the integrity of pipelines that could affect either population area, an operator might give different inspection priorities to the areas.

The U.S. Census Bureau has created digital data layers and maps of high population areas (Urbanized Areas) and other populated areas (Places). OPS has obtained these data layers and will make them available on our National Pipeline Mapping System home page http://www.npms.rspa.dot.gov. The National Pipeline Mapping System will allow an operator, member of the public, or other government agency to view and download this data and to view pipelines in relation to these populated areas.

We are also including unusually sensitive environmental areas (USAs) in our proposed high consequence area definition. These will be the same drinking water and ecological resource areas that we recently proposed as unusually sensitive to environmental damage if there is a hazardous liquid pipeline release (64 FR 73464; December 30, 1999). The Federal Register notice gives more details of the proposed definition (proposed section 195.6).

The proposed USA definition was created through a series of public workshops and our collaboration with a wide range of federal, state, public, and industry stakeholders. The identification of USAs is based on a multi-step process that begins by designating and assessing environmentally sensitive areas (ESAs), determining which of these ESAs are potentially more susceptible to permanent or long term damage from a hazardous liquid release (areas of primary concern), and finally identifying filtering criteria to determine which areas of primary concern can be reached by a release and sustain permanent or long-term damage. The areas that result are the proposed USAs.

OPS is conducting a pilot test to determine if the proposed definition can be used to identify and locate unusually sensitive drinking water and ecological resources using available data from government agencies and environmental organizations. Texas, California, and Louisiana were the states chosen for the test due to the large number of hazardous liquid pipelines and the considerable drinking water and ecological resources that exist in these states. OPS is using the results to evaluate whether the proposed definition identifies the majority of unusually sensitive areas and whether environmental data is accessible and appropriate to support the proposed definition. Once OPS finishes the test, receives technical review from federal and state water and ecological experts and gets public comment on the proposed definition, it will go forward with a final rule.

In addition, OPS believes that other sensitive and vital resources may need to be considered in this regulation. OPS requests comments on whether this regulation should cover additional areas of national importance, cultural resources, sensitive environmental resources that do not meet the USA filtering criteria, including certain wetlands and water bodies, and other transportation networks. OPS currently protects some of these resources in accordance with requirements for spill response planning of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

We will be working with the other Federal agencies to help define and identify any additional resources that should be considered in this or future regulations. OPS is holding a technical workshop April 27-28 to gather technical comments.

OPS is including commercially navigable waterways in the proposed high consequence area definition. Because these waterways are critical to interstate and foreign commerce and supply vital resources to many American communities, are a major means of commercial transportation, and are a part of a national defense system, a pipeline release in these areas could have significant impacts.

We are proposing to define commercially navigable waterways as those waterways “where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists.”

Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Vanderbilt University have created a geographic database of navigable waterways in and around the United States. The database, called the National Waterways Network, was created with input from the National Waterway GIS Design Committee which is comprised of members from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. DOT's Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, the Maritime Administration, the Military Traffic Management Command, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Bureau of Census, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Railroad Administration. The database includes commercially navigable waterways and non-commercially navigable waterways. The database can be downloaded from the BTS website: http://www.bts.gov/gis/ntatlas/networks.html.

OPS will place a map and database of the commercially navigable waterways portion of the National Waterways Network database on the National Pipeline Mapping System. Operators will be able to determine which areas of their pipeline intersect commercially navigable waterways, and the public and other government agencies will be able to view pipelines in relation to commercially navigable waterways.

OPS has been concerned for some time with the issue of the optimum placement of emergency flow restricting devices (EFRDs) to limit commodity release after the location of the release has been identified. EFRD means a check valve or remotely controlled valve.

A 1991 Departmental study titled “Emergency Flow Restricting Devices Study” (1991 EFRD Study) recommended that OPS seek public input on the placement of EFRDs in urban areas, at water crossings, at other critical areas affected by commodity release, and areas in close proximity to the public outside of urban areas. The 1991 Study concluded remote control and check valves are the only effective EFRDs. A copy of the 1991 EFRD Study is filed in Docket No. PS-133.

In response to 49 U.S.C. 60102(j), OPS issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (59 FR 2802, Jan. 19, 1994) asking questions concerning the performance of leak detection equipment and location of EFRDs. Those responding were generally against requiring EFRDs. Some endorsed the selective use of EFRDs in high risk areas based on an operator's particular pipeline system.

Although the number of responses was small, there was sufficient information to give guidance in considering the circumstances under which hazardous liquid pipeline operators should have EFRDs. In addition, past accidents, such as the 1986 Mounds View, Minnesota accident involving two deaths and one injury where it took one hour and 40 minutes to isolate the ruptured section, and the 1988 Maries County, Missouri accident where the installation of a check valve would have substantially reduced the 20,554 barrel (863,268 gallons) spill, demonstrated the need to propose regulations requiring the selective use of EFRDs.

In October 1995, we held a public workshop to discuss the issues involved in developing regulations on EFRDs. Participants were generally against installing EFRDs except in very limited situations. Participants had concerns about the costs and effectiveness of these mitigative features.

Because environmental sensitivity of the location is a factor when considering installing an EFRD, we have previously deferred proposing requirements until there was a USA definition. Since we now have a proposed USA definition, and because an EFRD can minimize a spill in a high consequence area, we have decided to include a proposal for EFRDs in this rulemaking. The rule proposes that a required element of an integrity management program is for an operator to take preventive and mitigative measures to protect a high consequence area. The operator must conduct a risk analysis to determine what additional protections are needed. Installing EFRDs is one of several mitigative measures the operator could take to protect a high consequence area.

We are inviting comments on any needed further guidance to operators on when EFRDs should be installed. We also invite comment on the criteria for evaluating the decision on whether to install an EFRD or to take other measures, and if in certain limited circumstances the use of EFRDs should be mandatory. OPS is particularly interested in how the operator has determined that the measures would minimize the amount of product that could be released, how the measures would mitigate permanent damage to the environment, and how public safety has been protected.

Experts in the use of internal inspection and pressure testing, API and technology vendors have provided information on the current state of technology for in-line inspection tools and pressure testing. This information will help operators determine the integrity assessment methods that will be most effective for their systems.

Internal inspection is one of the most useful tools in an integrity management program. Operators should select tools based on their particular requirements. At least two types of tools should be used: (1) Geometry pigs for detecting changes in circumference and (2) magnetic flux leakage pigs for determining wall anomalies, or wall loss due to corrosion. Both high resolution and low resolution tools have their place in pipeline integrity assessment.

With respect to corrosion, high-resolution tools can identify anomalies and, with the use of engineering critical assessments, use a conservative evaluation of the potential for the anomaly to have affected remaining pipe strength (or affected the pressure capacity of the pipeline segment). This assessment uses analytical techniques that consider a conservative approximation of the anomaly which estimates average depth of metal loss. Based on the evaluation of in-line inspection results, a prioritized listing of potential defects is developed to guide the initiation of the field digging, inspection, confirmation and the necessary repair program. Once in the field, additional calculations based on actual profile of metal loss are used to confirm the need and type of appropriate repair. It is the combination of the technological capabilities of the inspection tool, the expertise in performing engineering critical assessments and the field confirmation program that assure corrosion anomalies that pose a threat to the pipeline's integrity have been identified, assessed and addressed.

High-resolution tools can distinguish between internal and external corrosion and provide more extensive information to more accurately assess the potential for an anomaly to pose a risk. Due to the significantly higher costs of high-resolution tools, however, they are used for only those pipeline segments that, based on their unique mix of risk factors, justify the additional cost and analysis. For instance, on an older line with a higher probability of corrosion or a line with limited access for excavations, the operating company may find an advantage to spending more money on data collection and analysis to reduce the number of repairs required or to safely delay repairs until access to the site is possible ( i.e. acquisition of permits or during winter when marshy areas are frozen). Conversely, on a line segment that has a lower expected risk, the low resolution tool may produce an appropriate field engineering assessment.

In-line inspection tools to measure dents or geometric deformations are common and are typically run routinely following installation of new pipelines. Technology has advanced such that geometry tools can normally withstand even the most extreme pipeline conditions. The tool is able to pass restrictions ( e.g. deformations) of up to 25%, and with the high sensitivity of gauging systems now on the market and large number of sensing fingers, current tools can detect even very small ovalities (0.6%). OPS is concerned about improving the technology capability to detect gouges in dents. Following an inspection run, a preliminary study of recorded data is performed in the field, enabling operators to react quickly to the inspection results and investigate anomalies of concern.

Since the early 1990's, pipeline operators have successfully field tested internal inspection tools capable of non-destructively identifying fatigue cracks and stress corrosion cracking in the longitudinal seam. Research and development continues on these tools to strive for reliable identification of other types of seam defects, such as hook cracks. With the use of ultrasonic and MFL (transverse orientation) technology, pipeline segments that have experienced fatigue cracking can now be inspected. Cracks with a potential to rupture can be identified and repaired prior to growing to a critical stage. This is particularly important as this type of defect could survive initial and subsequent pressure tests but then with pressure cycling, grow over time to a critical stage and leak or rupture.

The purpose of a pressure test is to remove defects that might impair the integrity of the pipeline during operation. Defects might exist as a result of the manufacturing process or damage to the pipe during shipping or even construction. The defects are identified by failure of the pipe during the test; the defective pipe is removed; new pipe is installed; and the pipe is tested again until no failure occurs. The pressure test provides a margin of safety for the pipeline by being conducted at a pressure higher than the maximum pressure at which pipeline safety regulations allow the pipeline to be operated. An operator must test to a minimum of 1.25 times maximum operating pressure because research has shown that at that level of pressure all critical defects can be identified and eliminated.

An operator using hydrostatic pressure testing as its integrity assessment tool will also need to confirm the quality and effectiveness of its corrosion protection program for the affected segments of the pipeline. We expect that additional guidance on pressure testing as an integrity assessment method will be provided in the forthcoming industry consensus standard on pipeline integrity discussed later in this document.

Although the proposed rule considers internal inspection, and in some instances, pressure testing, as the preferred integrity assessment tools, use of new technologies will also be allowed. OPS wants to encourage operators to use innovative evaluation methods and new technologies for their pipeline integrity management program. Thus, the proposed rule allows an operator to use new technology as its assessment tool if the operator demonstrates that this new technology can provide an equivalent level of protection in assessing the integrity of the pipeline, i.e. detecting wall loss, changes in pipe circumference and other defects.

Although communications with the public is an important part of a pipeline integrity management program, the proposed rule does not address communications requirements. OPS has determined that the significance of this issue warrants further discussions with all the stakeholders before it proposes to require a communications plan as part of an integrity management program. Industry and public interest group representatives, such as the National League of Cities, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the National Organization of Local Emergency Planning Committees, are working to develop some models on communications and public education that can be pilot tested to determine what kind of information is most beneficial to local officials in preventing and responding to pipeline spills.

OPS is considering proposing requirements for how operators are to communicate with local officials about results of risk assessment processes and measures to prevent and mitigate damage to pipelines in case of a failure. We are also considering requirements on how operators should provide the public access to this information. OPS invites comments on how local officials could use and benefit from risk assessment information, how the consequences of potential pipeline failures should be characterized, how risk control actions should be described and what performance indicators would be meaningful.

Commenters also urged the development of an industry standard, and OPS basing the rule on such a standard. API recently recommended a consensus standard be developed for pipeline system integrity in high consequence areas under American National Standards Institute (ANSI) consensus procedures. API has established a working group of technical experts to coordinate with OPS for the development of an ANSI pipeline integrity program standard. The new standard would define the requirements of a pipe integrity program that can affect high consequence areas.

The working group intends for this standard to:

• Establish the basic elements of a company pipe integrity program;

• Establish integrity requirements that are pipeline segment specific and system-wide specific;

• Establish a standard for system- or segment-specific historical information, such as leak history, close interval surveys, one-call system, previous pressure testing and in-line inspections, including integrating such information as part of risk-control decisions;

• Establish a standard for pipe integrity assurance activities;

• Establish standards for the engineering assessment of information, for example, evaluating remaining wall thickness using repair criteria;

• Define the documentation process and provide a process for auditing company integrity programs.

While technical experts are working on the standard, minutes of the meetings will be posted on the OPS Website so that the public can make comments to OPS as the process is ongoing. When this API standard is finalized, OPS will then consider adopting it, providing a public notice and comment period prior to incorporating it into a final regulation on pipeline system integrity.

As will be explained in the next section, the proposed rule gives an operator an option to develop its own criteria in establishing integrity assessment (inspection or testing) schedules and intervals, and in establishing evaluation intervals. We expect that an industry consensus standard, once developed, will give operators guidance on this option.

OPS has decided to implement integrity management requirements for hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission operators in several steps. Natural gas and liquid have different physical properties, pose different risks and the configuration of the systems differ. OPS must examine how best to structure effective system integrity requirements for each part of the pipeline transportation system.

In this first rulemaking, OPS is proposing to apply the system integrity program requirements to liquid operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline used in hazardous liquid transportation. This proposed rule applies to all pipelines, regardless of date of construction. This initial action will cover approximately 87 percent of all the hazardous liquid pipelines in the United States. Based on the volume which these operators transport, they have the greatest potential to adversely affect the environment. While these hazardous liquid operators have been developing and using integrity management programs to manage risks on their systems, and have extensive experience with use of internal inspection devices, this proposed rule will provide direction on how they must protect critical areas. Further, it will assure that these protections will be put in place, with an operator being required to test 50 percent of the pipeline mileage in the most critical areas within three and a half years and the balance of the mileage within seven years. As proposed, an operator will then have to repair defects and implement preventive and mitigative measures.

In the next rulemaking in this integrity series, we plan, later this year, to propose system integrity program requirements for the remaining hazardous liquid operators. Proposed system integrity requirements for natural gas transmission operators will then follow.

OPS is proposing to add new sections on High Consequence Areas and Pipeline Integrity Management to subpart F. The proposed new section 195.450 titled “Definitions” defines high consequence areas (described earlier in this document) and emergency flow restricting devices.

The proposed new section 195.452 titled “Pipeline integrity Management in High Consequence Areas” would apply to each operator with 500 or more pipeline miles used in hazardous liquid transportation. This rule proposes requirements to test, repair and validate through analysis the integrity of hazardous liquid pipelines in high consequence areas, i.e., populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage and commercially navigable waterways.

The rule proposes that, no later than one year after the effective date of the final rule, an operator would have to have a written integrity management program. The program would include a plan for baseline assessment (internal inspection, or pressure testing, or equivalent alternative technology) of all pipelines that could affect a high consequence area, and a framework addressing required program elements, including continual integrity assessment and evaluation. In the first year after the effective date of a final rule, we would expect the framework to indicate how decisions will be made to implement each required element. We recognize that an integrity management program is a dynamic program that an operator will modify and improve, based on evaluation of the program's effectiveness in reducing risk and protecting high consequence areas.

The proposed baseline assessment plan must include the methods selected to assess the integrity of the pipeline. OPS expects an operator to make the best use of current and innovative technology in assessing the integrity of pipelines. Methods could include internal inspection, pressure testing or equivalent alternative technology. An internal inspection tool would have to be capable of detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies including dents, gouges and grooves. If pressure testing is used, an operator would also have to confirm the quality and effectiveness of its corrosion protection program and test to a minimum of 1.25 times the maximum operating pressure. To encourage innovation, the proposed rule also allows an operator to use new technology for the baseline assessment, if the operator demonstrates that this new technology can provide an equivalent level of protection in assessing the integrity of the pipeline.

The proposed baseline assessment would also include a schedule for completing the integrity assessment of all pipelines that could affect a high consequence area and an explanation of the assessment methods the operator selected and an evaluation of risk factors the operator considered in establishing the assessment schedule for the pipelines.

The proposed rule requires an operator to initially assess all pipelines that could affect a high consequence area by seven (7) years from the effective date of the final rule. The proposed rule further requires that at least 50 percent of that mileage must be assessed by three and one half years from the effective date of the final rule. As explained in the previous section, the integrity assessment would be by internal inspection, pressure test or alternative equivalent technology. We request comments on whether seven years is an adequately protective minimum period to complete the baseline assessment of all pipelines in high consequence areas and whether three and a half years is an adequately protective minimum period to complete 50 percent of the assessments.

The proposed rule allows an operator to use an integrity assessment method conducted five years before the effective date of the final rule as the baseline assessment if the method is at least equivalent to the requirements for internal inspection, pressure testing or alternative technology. An operator would have to maintain for review during inspection the results of the baseline assessment, including assessments conducted five years before the rule's effective date.

For both the baseline and continual assessments, the proposed rule requires that an operator select one of two options. In option 1, the proposed rule requires that an operator base the integrity assessment schedule on certain risk factors. These risk factors include, but are not limited to, pipe material, pipe manufacturing information, local environmental factors that could impact the pipeline ( e.g., corrosivity of soil, subsidence, climatic), existing or projected activities in the area, coating type, product transported, repair history, all previous data/results from pressure testing or internal inspection, geo-technical hazards, corrosion history and pipeline leak history. OPS has also proposed guidance (in an Appendix C) on assigning priorities to these risk factors.

In option 2, the proposed rule permits an operator to base the integrity assessment schedule on risk factors the operator considers essential in risk or consequence evaluation, provided that the operator demonstrates that the factors provide an equivalent level of safety and environmental protection to option 1.

This option gives an operator the choice to use risk factors that are most closely suited to the operator's pipeline. We expect that once an industry consensus standard is developed, the standard can provide further guidance for this option.

The proposed rule gives the minimum elements that an operator must include in its integrity management program. Elements include: (1) A baseline assessment plan meeting the requirements previously described; (2) a continual process of assessment and evaluation to maintain a pipeline's integrity; (3) an analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the pipeline or the consequences of a failure; (4) criteria for repair actions to address integrity issues raised by the assessment method and data analysis; (5) identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high consequence area; (6) methods to measure the program's effectiveness; and (7) a process for review of integrity assessment results and data analysis by a person qualified to evaluate the results and data. Each of these elements is described in the proposed rule.

An integrity management program must be an evolving program that an operator continually improves as the operator gains experience from evaluating the effectiveness of the program in reducing risk and protecting high consequence areas. OPS expects that the initial program will consist of a framework that specifies the criteria for making decisions to implement each of the required elements. The program will change once actual decisions are made and actions implemented.

The proposed rule requires an operator to take prompt action to address all pipeline integrity issues raised by the assessment method and data integration analysis. An operator must evaluate, and repair all defects that could reduce a pipeline's integrity. In establishing an evaluation and repair schedule, the rule proposes that an operator follow 49 CFR 195.401(b), which requires that if a condition on the pipeline is of such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard, the operator may not operate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition. For all other conditions, the rule proposes that an operator base the schedule for evaluation and repair on the risk factors used for establishing an assessment schedule and on specified criteria if the operator uses an internal inspection tool. An operator would have to maintain for review during inspection documents on remedial actions planned or taken. We invite comments on whether the rule should contain specific time lines for conducting repairs.

The proposed rule requires an operator to periodically evaluate the integrity of the pipeline that could affect a high consequence area by analyzing all available information about the integrity of the pipeline or the consequences of a failure. This information includes: (1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage due to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities, and development or planned development along the pipeline; (2) data gathered through the required integrity assessment; (3) information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such as location of water intake valves; (4) data gathered in conjunction with other inspections and tests required in Part 195, including, corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys.

Through this requirement, OPS expects operators to analyze the entire range of threats to pipeline integrity in high consequence areas, by integrating information from diverse sources. This analysis will be done in conjunction with the periodic evaluation discussed below.

The proposed rule requires an operator to take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures include conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline to determine if public safety or environmental protection would be enhanced by additional risk control actions. Required risk actions OPS proposes an operator consider include implementing damage prevention best practices, having better monitoring of cathodic protection where corrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals, repairing defects other than those required by this proposed rule, installing EFRDs on the pipeline, establishing or modifying the systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders and adopting other management controls. The proposal would further require an operator to identify and implement other needed site-specific measures. As proposed, an operator would have to maintain for review during inspection records on any actions planned or implemented.

The proposed rule requires that an operator must not only complete the baseline integrity assessment, but must continue to assess (by pressure testing, internal inspection, or new technology that provides an equivalent level of protection in assessing integrity) and evaluate the integrity of each pipeline that could affect a high consequence area. The integrity assessment must be done at specified intervals, as determined by one of two options.

The evaluation must be done as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity by a person qualified to evaluate the results and other related data. The evaluation will consider the past and present integrity assessment results, data integration analysis, and decisions about repair, preventive and mitigative actions. In this evaluation, we propose to require an operator to consider information, such as:

• Pipeline design features;

• Construction practices and information;

• Operating and accident history;

• Maintenance and surveillance records, including cathodic protection records;

• Previous inspection and testing results;

• Damage prevention and other prevention program effectiveness;

• Mitigation feature effectiveness.

In establishing the integrity assessment intervals, an operator must choose one of two options. In option one, the rule proposes that an operator establish intervals not to exceed ten (10) years for assessing the pipeline's integrity. We invite comment on whether ten years is an adequately protective minimum period for integrity assessments.

To establish the intervals, an operator would have to consider the risk factors previously listed for establishing an assessment schedule, the analysis of the results from the last integrity assessment, and the data integration analysis. An operator would also have to consider several factors concerning internal inspection results if that was the previous assessment method. We provide further guidance on analyzing internal inspection results in proposed Appendix C. We invite comment on whether we should specify what the evaluation interval should be.

In option 2, the proposed rule allows an operator to establish intervals to assess the pipeline's integrity based on criteria the operator demonstrates provide an equivalent level of safety and environmental protection to option 1. This option gives an operator the choice of using innovative evaluation methods. We expect that an industry consensus standard would provide guidance for this option, should an operator choose not to develop its own criteria. We invite comment on other necessary guidance for this option. We also request comments on whether the standards in the proposed rule are clear and if there are ways we can make the standards more clear.

Another required element of the proposed rule is that the integrity management program include methods to measure whether the program is effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of the pipelines and in protecting the high consequence areas. Again, the proposal is performance-based to encourage the operator to choose the most effective risk control measures. Measures could focus on the operator's performance system-wide (the integrity of the pipeline in the high consequence area versus other pipelines in the system) or industry-wide (integrity management of the operator's pipelines in high consequence areas compared to high consequence areas across industry).

The proposed rule requires that an operator maintain for inspection its written integrity management program. This proposed requirement is not any different from the procedural manual an operator is required to maintain for operations, maintenance and emergencies. An operator would also be required to maintain for review during inspections documents that support the decisions and analyses made and actions taken to implement each element of the integrity management program. These documents would include, at minimum, results of the baseline and periodic assessments, results of analyses and evaluations, records of defects detected and repairs made to those defects, records of other remedial actions planned or taken, and records of preventive and mitigative actions planned or taken.

In this proposed rule, we are also adding a new Appendix C to Part 195. This Appendix provides guidance on how to prioritize risk factors in determining assessment frequency, how to analyze smart pig inspection results, how to prioritize metal loss features, and what types of smart pigs to use to find pipeline anomalies. In addition, this Appendix includes risk indicator tables for leak history, volume or line size, age of the pipeline, and product transported, to help determine if the pipeline segment should fall into a high, medium or low risk category.

By using the risk factors prioritization and risk indicator tables, an operator should be able to establish the priority for assessing (by internal inspection, pressure testing, or new technology) the integrity of pipeline segments. An operator can apply weights or values to the risk factors and then with the help of the risk tables and other analyses, determine which segments need immediate attention.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) does not consider this action to be a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735; October 4,1993). Therefore, it was not forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget. This proposed rule is not significant under DOT's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 11034: February 26, 1979).

A regulatory evaluation of this proposal was prepared and placed in the docket of this action. This section summarizes the findings of that evaluation.

Numerous investigations by the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have highlighted the importance of protecting the public and environmentally sensitive areas from pipeline failures. NTSB has made several recommendations to ensure the integrity of pipelines near populated and environmentally sensitive areas. These recommendations included requiring periodic testing and inspection to identify corrosion and other damage, establishing criteria to determine appropriate intervals for inspections and tests, determining hazards to public safety from electric resistance welded pipe and requiring installation of automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on high-pressure lines to provide for rapid shutdown of failed pipelines.

Congress also directed OPS to undertake additional safety measures in areas that are densely populated or unusually sensitive to environmental damage. These statutory requirements included having OPS prescribe standards for identifying pipelines in high density population areas, unusually sensitive environmental areas, and commercially navigable waters; issue standards requiring periodic inspections using internal inspection devices on pipelines in densely-populated and environmentally sensitive areas; and survey and assess the effectiveness of emergency flow restricting devices, and prescribe regulations on circumstances where an operator must use the devices.

This proposed rulemaking is a comprehensive response to NTSB's recommendations, Congressional mandates, as well as pipeline safety and environmental issues raised over the years.

This proposal focuses on a systematic approach to integrity management to reduce the potential for hazardous liquid pipeline failures in populated and environmentally sensitive areas, and commercially navigable waterways. This proposed rulemaking requires pipeline operators to develop and follow an integrity management program that continually assesses and evaluates, through internal inspection or pressure testing and data integration, the integrity of those pipelines that could affect what we propose to designate as high consequence areas i.e., populated areas, areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage and commercially navigable waterways. The integrity of the pipelines would be further assured through remedial actions and preventive and mitigative measures.

This initial proposed rule covers hazardous liquid pipeline operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline used in transportation. Later this year, OPS intends to propose integrity management program requirements for the liquid operators not covered by this proposed rule and for natural gas transmission operators. OPS chose to start with this group of hazardous liquid operators because they had the greatest potential to adversely affect the environment, based on the volume of product they transport. Further, by focusing first on these liquid operators, OPS is addressing requirements for an estimated 86.7 percent of hazardous liquid pipelines. It is estimated that 29.3 thousand miles (of the 157,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipeline in the U.S.) will be impacted by this proposed rule.

In discussions between OPS officials and several hazardous liquid pipeline operators, the operators agreed that pipeline operators subject to this proposal were developing integrity management programs and would likely have performed initial integrity testing voluntarily over the same period given in this proposal. The cost of developing the necessary program is estimated to cost the pipeline industry approximately $1.5 million with an additional annual cost of $66,000. (The program begins with a baseline assessment plan and a framework that addresses each required program element. The framework initially indicates how decisions will be made to implement each element. As decisions are made and operators evaluate the effectiveness of the program in protecting high consequence areas, the program will be continually updated and improved.)

The proposal requires a baseline assessment of applicable pipelines through internal inspection, pressure test, or use of new technology capable of comparable performance. The baseline assessment must be completed within seven years after a final rule becomes effective. After this baseline assessment, an operator is further required to periodically retest and evaluate the pipeline to ensure its integrity. It is estimated that the cost of periodic retesting will generally not occur until the sixth year unless the baseline test indicates significant defects that would require earlier retesting.

One of the many preventive or mitigative actions an operator may take is to install EFRD's. OPS could not estimate the total cost of installing EFRD's because OPS does not know how many operators will install them. OPS requests information from the public on how many operators are likely to install EFRD's and their potential benefit. OPS also requests information on the cost of other preventive and mitigative measures operators are likely to take. Periodic integrity assessment (internal inspection, hydrostatic testing, or an equivalent method, required at a maximum of 10 years after baseline assessment) is estimated to cost the industry $7.9 million in years 6-7 after implementation of a final rule and then $3.4 million thereafter.

The benefits to this proposal can not easily be quantified but can be described in qualitative terms. Issuance of this proposed rule ensures that all operators will perform at least to a baseline safety level and will contribute to an overall higher level of safety and environmental performance nationwide. It will lead to greater uniformity in how risk is evaluated and addressed and will provide more clarity in discussion by government, industry and the public about safety and environmental concerns and how they can be resolved.

Much of the proposed rule is written in performance-based language. A performance-based approach provides several advantages: Encouraging development and use of new technologies; supporting operators' development of more formal, structured risk evaluation programs and OPS's evaluation of the programs; and providing greater ability for operators to customize their long-term maintenance programs.

The proposal has also stimulated the pipeline industry to begin developing a supplemental consensus standard to support risk-based approaches to integrity management. The proposal has further fostered development of industry-wide technical standards, such as repair criteria to use following an internal inspection.

Our emphasis on an integrity-based approach encourages a balanced program, addressing the range of prevention and mitigation needs and avoiding reliance on any single tool or overemphasis on any single cause of failure. This orientation will lead to addressing the most significant risks in populated areas, unusually sensitive environmental areas, and commercially navigable waterways. Commercially navigable waterways are included because of their importance as a supply route of vital resources to many American communities as well as their role in the national defense system. This integrity-based approach is the best opportunity to improve industry performance and assure that these high consequence areas get the protection they need. It also addresses the interrelationships among failure causes and benefits the coordination of risk control actions, beyond what a solely compliance-based approach would achieve.

The proposed rule provides for a validation process, which gives the regulator a better opportunity to influence the methods of assessment and the interpretation of results. OPS will provide a beneficial challenge to the adequacy of an operator's decision process. Requiring operators to use the integrity management process, and having regulators validate the adequacy and implementation of this process, should expedite the operators' rates of remedial action, thereby strengthening the pipeline system and reducing the public's exposure to risk.

A particularly significant benefit is the quality of information that will be gathered as a result of this proposal to aid operators' decisions about providing additional protections. Two essential elements of the proposed integrity management program are that an operator continually assess and evaluate the pipeline's integrity, and perform an analysis that integrates all available information about the pipeline's integrity. The process of planning, assessment and evaluation will provide operators with better data on which to judge a pipeline's condition and the location of potential problems that must be addressed.

Integrating this data with the environmental and safety concerns associated with high consequence areas will help prompt operators and the Federal and state governments to focus time and resources on potential risks and consequences that require greater scrutiny and the need for more intensive preventive and mitigation measures. If baseline and periodic assessment data is not evaluated in the proper context, it is of little or no value. It is imperative that the information an operator gathers is assessed in a systematic way as part of the operator's ongoing examination of all threats to the pipeline integrity. The proposed rule is intended to accomplish that.

The public has expressed concern about the danger hazardous liquid pipelines pose to their neighborhoods. The proposed integrity management process leads to greater accountability to the public for both the operator and the regulator. This accountability is enhanced through our choice of a map-based approach to defining the areas most in need of additional protection—the visual depiction of the populated areas, unusually sensitive environmental areas, and commercially navigable waterways in need of protection focuses on the safety and environmental issues in a manner that will be easily understandable to everyone. The proposed system integrity requirements and the sharing of information about their implementation and effectiveness will assure the public that operators are continually inspecting and evaluating the threats to pipelines that pass through or close to populated areas to better ensure that the pipelines are safe.

OPS has not provided quantitative benefits for the continual integrity management evaluation required in this proposed rule. OPS does not believe, however, that requiring this comprehensive process, including the re-assessment of pipelines in high consequence areas at a minimum of once every 10 years, will not be an undue burden on hazardous liquid operators covered by this proposal. OPS believes the added security this assessment will provide and the generally expedited rate of strengthening the pipeline system in populated and important environmental areas and commercially navigable waterways, is benefit enough to promulgate these proposed requirements.

A copy of the complete draft regulatory evaluation is available for reading in the public docket.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) OPS must consider whether a rulemaking would have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rulemaking was designed to impact only hazardous liquid operators operating 500 or more miles of pipeline. Because of this limitation on pipeline mileage, only 66 hazardous liquid pipeline operators (large national energy companies) covering 86.7 percent of regulated liquid transmission lines are impacted by this proposed rule. Based on this, and the evidence discussed above, I certify that this proposed rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This notice of proposed rulemaking contains information collection requirements. As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), the Department of Transportation has submitted a copy of the Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis to the Office of Management and Budget for its review. The name of the information collection is “Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas.” The purpose of this information collection is designed to require operators of hazardous liquid pipelines to develop a program to provide direct integrity testing and evaluation of hazardous liquid pipelines in high consequence areas.

Sixty-six hazardous liquid operators will be subject to this proposed rule. It is estimated that 59 of these operators will have to develop integrity management plans taking approximately 430 hours per plan. Additionally, all 66 operators will be required to update their plans annually. This will take approximately 33 hours per plan.

Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the information collection should direct them to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, Room 10235, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503: Attention Desk Officer for the Department of Transportation. Comments must be sent within 30 days of the publication of this NPRM. Comments can also be sent to the Department of Transportation either by mail or electronically. See the Addresses section of this NPRM.

The Department considers comments by the public on this proposed collection of information in:

Evaluating whether the proposed collection is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Department, including whether the information would have a practical use;

Evaluating the accuracy of the Department's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of assumptions used;

Enhancing the quality, usefulness and clarity of the information to be collected; and minimizing the burden of collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology; e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses.

According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless a valid OMB control number is displayed. The valid OMB control number for this information collection will be published in the Federal Register after it is approved by the OMB. For more details, see the Paperwork Reduction Analysis available for copying and review in the public docket.

This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13084 (“Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments”). Because this proposed rule does not significantly or uniquely affect the communities of the Indian tribal governments and does not impose substantial direct compliance costs, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 13084 do not apply.

This proposed rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (“Federalism”). This proposed rule does not propose any regulation that:

(1) Has substantial direct effects on the States, the relationship between the national government and the States, or the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government;

(2) Imposes substantial direct compliance costs on States and local governments; or

(3) Preempts state law.

Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; August 10, 1999) do not apply. Nevertheless, in a November 18-19, 1999 public meeting, OPS invited National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR), which includes State pipeline safety regulators, to participate in a general discussion on pipeline integrity. Again in January, and February 2000, OPS held conference calls with NAPSR, to receive their input before proposing an integrity management rule.

This rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of $100 million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome alternative that achieves the objective of the rule.

We have analyzed the proposed rule for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ) and have preliminarily determined that this action would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The Environmental Assessment determined that the combined impacts of the initial baseline assessment (testing or internal inspection), the subsequent periodic assessments, and additional preventive and mitigative measures that may be implemented in high consequence areas will result in positive environmental impacts. The number of incidents and the environmental damage from failures in high consequence areas is likely to be reduced. However, from a national perspective, the impact is not expected to be significant for the pipeline operators covered in the proposed rule, primarily because most of these operators are already voluntarily performing most of the activities proposed by the rule.

Operators covered by the proposed rule already have internal inspection and testing programs. These operators typically consider the pipeline's proximity to populated areas and environmental resources when making decisions about where and when to inspect and test pipelines. As a result, some high consequence areas have already been recently assessed, and a large fraction of remaining locations would have been assessed in the next several years, without the provisions of the rule. The primary effect of the proposed rule—accelerating testing and inspection in some high consequence areas—only shifts the improved integrity assurance forward for a few years for most high consequence areas. Because pipeline failure rates are low, shifting the time at which high consequence areas are assessed forward by a few years, has only a small effect on the likelihood of pipeline failure in these locations.

Neither internal inspection nor pressure testing provide protection against all threats to pipeline integrity—specifically they do not prevent outside force damage, the most significant contributor to hazardous liquid pipeline failures. The proposed rule does require operators to conduct an integrated assessment of all the potential threats to pipeline integrity, and to consider additional preventive or mitigative risk control measures to provide enhanced protection. If there is a vulnerability to a particular failure cause—like third party damage—these assessments should result in additional risk controls to address these threats. However, without knowing the specific high consequence area locations, the specific risks present at these locations, and the existing operator risk controls (including those that surpass the current minimum regulatory requirements), it is difficult to determine the impact of this requirement.

A number of liquid operators covered by the proposed rule already perform integrity evaluations or formal risk assessments that consider the environmental sensitivity and impacts on population. These evaluations have already led to additional risk controls beyond existing requirements to improve protection for these locations. Thus, it is expected that additional risk controls resulting from the proposed integrated evaluation will be limited and customized to site-specific conditions that the operator may not have previously recognized. For many high consequence areas, it is probable that operators will determine the existing preventive and mitigative activities provide adequate protection, and that the small additional risk reduction benefits of additional risk controls are not justified by their cost.

The primary benefit of the proposed rule will be to establish requirements for conducting integrity assessments and periodic evaluations of integrity in high consequence areas. In effect, this will codify the integrity management programs and assessments many operators are currently implementing. It will also require operators who have little, or no, integrity assessment and evaluation programs to raise their level of performance. Thus, the proposed rule is expected to ensure a more consistent, and overall higher level of protection for high consequence areas across the industry.

The Environmental Assessment of this proposal is available for review in the docket.

We do not want to impose new requirements that would mandate business process changes when the resources necessary to implement those requirements would otherwise be applied to “Y2K” or related computer problems. This proposed rule does not mandate business process changes or require modifications to computer systems. Because this proposed rule does not affect organizations' ability to respond to those problems, we are not delaying the effectiveness of the requirements.

In consideration of the foregoing, OPS proposes to amend part 195 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Any person wishing to provide testimony at one of the public hearings should notify FRA's Docket Clerk at the address above at least three working days prior to the date of the hearing. The notification should also provide either a telephone number or e-mail address at which the person may be contacted. If a participant will be representing an organization, please indicate the name of the organization.

FRA will attempt to accommodate all persons wishing to provide testimony, however depending on the number of people wishing to participate, FRA may find it necessary to limit the length of oral comments to accommodate as many people as possible. Participants may wish to submit a complete written statement for inclusion in the record, while orally summarizing the points made in that statement.

Silene spaldingii is a long-lived perennial herb currently known from a total of 52 populations that are primarily restricted to mesic (neither extremely wet nor extremely dry) grasslands (prairie or steppe vegetation) that make up the Palouse region (a Pacific Northwest bunchgrass habitat type). Seven populations occur in west-central Idaho; 7, in northeastern Oregon; 9, in western Montana; 28, in eastern Washington; and 1, in adjacent British Columbia, Canada. This taxon is threatened by a variety of factors including habitat destruction and fragmentation from agricultural and urban development, grazing and trampling by domestic livestock and native herbivores, herbicide treatment, and competition from nonnative plant species.

Critical habitat is defined in section 3 of the Act as: (i) The specific areas within the geographical area occupied by a species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the Act, on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) that may require special management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geographic area occupied by a species at the time it is listed, upon a determination that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species. “Conservation” means the use of all methods and procedures needed to bring the species to the point at which listing under the Act is no longer necessary.

Critical habitat designation, by definition, directly affects only Federal agency actions through consultation under section 7(a)(2) of the Act. Section 7(a)(2) requires Federal agencies to ensure that activities they authorize, fund, or carry out are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat.

Section 4(a)(3) of the Act, as amended, and implementing regulations (50 CFR 424.12) require that, to the maximum extent prudent and determinable, we designate critical habitat at the time the species is determined to be endangered or threatened. Our regulations (50 CFR 424.12(a)(1)) state that the designation of critical habitat is not prudent when one or both of the following situations exist—(1) the species is threatened by taking or other human activity, and identification of critical habitat can be expected to increase the degree of threat to the species, or (2) such designation of critical habitat would not be beneficial to the species.

In the December 3, 1999, proposed rule, we did not propose a critical habitat determination for Silene spaldingii . We stated that we would publish a critical habitat determination for S. spaldingii in the Federal Register subsequent to the proposed rule. The Final Listing Priority Guidance for FY 1999/2000 (64 FR 57114) states that the processing of critical habitat determinations (prudency and determinability decisions) and proposed or final designations of critical habitat “will no longer be subject to prioritization under the Listing Priority Guidance. Critical habitat determinations, which were previously included in final listing rules published in the Federal Register , may now be processed separately, in which case stand-alone critical habitat determinations will be published as notices in the Federal Register . We will undertake critical habitat determinations and designations during FY 2000 as conservation efforts demand and in light of resource constraints.” As explained in detail in the Listing Priority Guidance, our listing budget is currently insufficient to allow us to immediately complete all of the listing actions required by the Act.

We now propose that designation of critical habitat is prudent for Silene spaldingii . In the last few years, a series of court decisions have overturned Service determinations regarding a variety of species that designation of critical habitat would not be prudent ( e.g. , Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Department of the Interior 113 F. 3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1997); Conservation Council for Hawaii v. Babbitt , 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Hawaii 1998)). Based on the standards applied in those judicial opinions, we believe that designation of critical habitat would be prudent for S. spaldingii .

Due to the small number of populations, Silene spaldingii is vulnerable to unrestricted collection, vandalism, or other disturbance. We are concerned that these threats might be exacerbated by the publication of critical habitat maps and further dissemination of locational information. However, at this time we do not have specific evidence for S. spaldingii of taking, vandalism, collection, or trade of this species or any similarly situated species. Consequently, consistent with applicable regulations (50 CFR 424.12(a)(1)(i)) and recent case law, we believe that the identification of critical habitat is unlikely to increase the degree of threat to this species of taking or other human activity.

In the absence of a finding that identification of critical habitat would increase threats to a species, if any benefits would result from a critical habitat designation, then a prudent finding is warranted. In the case of this species, designation of critical habitat may provide some benefits. The primary regulatory effect of critical habitat is the section 7 requirement that Federal agencies refrain from taking any action that destroys or adversely modifies critical habitat. While a critical habitat designation for habitat currently occupied by this species would not be likely to change the section 7 consultation outcome because an action that destroys or adversely modifies such critical habitat would also be likely to result in jeopardy to the species, in certain instances, section 7 consultation might be triggered only if critical habitat is designated. Examples could include unoccupied habitat or occupied habitat that may become unoccupied in the future. Designating critical habitat may also provide some educational or informational benefits. Therefore, we propose that designation of critical habitat is prudent for Silene spaldingii . However, deferral of a critical habitat designation for S. spaldingii would allow us to concentrate our limited resources on higher priority critical habitat and other listing actions, without delaying the final listing decision. We anticipate in FY 2000 and beyond giving higher priority to critical habitat designation, including designations deferred pursuant to the Listing Priority Guidance, such as the designation for this species, than we have in recent fiscal years.

We plan to employ a priority system for deciding which outstanding critical habitat designations should be addressed first. We will focus our efforts on those designations that will provide the most conservation benefit, taking into consideration the efficacy of critical habitat designation in addressing the threats to the species, and the magnitude and immediacy of those threats. We will make the final critical habitat determination with the final listing determination for Silene spaldingii . If this final critical habitat determination is that designation of critical habitat is prudent, we will develop a proposal to designate critical habitat for S. spaldingii as soon as feasible, considering our workload priorities and budgetary capabilities. Unfortunately, for the immediate future, most of Region 1's listing budget must be directed to complying with numerous court orders and settlement agreements, as well as due and overdue final listing determinations.

We intend that any final action resulting from this proposal will be as accurate and as effective as possible. Therefore, we are soliciting comments or suggestions from the public, other concerned governmental agencies, the scientific community, industry, or any other interested party concerning this proposed prudency determination and the proposed listing of Silene spaldingii as threatened. We are particularly seeking comments concerning:

(1) Biological, commercial trade, or other relevant data concerning any threat (or lack thereof) to this species;

(2) The location of any additional populations of this species and the reasons why any habitat should or should not be determined to be critical habitat pursuant to section 4 of the Act;

(3) Additional information concerning the range, distribution, and population size of this species; and

(4) Current or planned activities in the subject area and their possible impacts on this species.

We will take into consideration for any decision on this proposal the comments and additional information we receive, and such communications may lead to a final regulation that differs from this proposal.

We have determined that an environmental assessment and environmental impact statement, as defined under the authority of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, need not be prepared in connection with regulations adopted pursuant to section 4(a) of the Act. We published a notice outlining our reasons for this determination in the Federal Register on October 25, 1983 (48 FR 49244).

This rule does not contain any information collection requirements for which Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. , is required. An information collection related to the rule pertaining to permits for endangered and threatened species has OMB approval and is assigned clearance number 1018-0094. This rule does not alter that information collection requirement. For additional information concerning permits and associated requirements for threatened plants, see 50 CFR 17.72.

The authority for this action is the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. ).