Directs the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) to submit to Congress and the Comptroller General (GAO) a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the transportation security card program at enhancing security and reducing security risks for maritime facilities and vessels. Requires the assessment to be conducted, to the extent practicable, by a national laboratory within the DHS laboratory network or a maritime security university-based center within the DHS centers of excellence network.

Directs the Secretary to submit to Congress a corrective action plan responding to the assessment which: (1) includes an implementation plan with benchmarks, and (2) shall be considered in any DHS rulemaking with respect to the transportation security card program.

Directs the Comptroller General, within 120 days after the corrective action plan is issued, to: (1) review the extent to which it implements the recommendations of the national laboratory or the maritime security university-based center and of the Comptroller General, and (2) inform Congress as to the plan's responsiveness to such recommendations.

Prohibits the Secretary from issuing a final rule requiring the use of transportation security card readers until: (1) the Comptroller General informs Congress that the submission is responsive to the GAO recommendations, and (2) the Secretary issues an updated list of transportation security card readers that are compatible with active transportation security cards.

Requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress on implementation of the plan at least 18 months after it is issued, and every 6 months thereafter for the ensuing 3-year period.

Declares that no additional funds are authorized to carry out this Act. Requires this Act to be carried out using amounts otherwise available for the purpose.

Essential Transportation Worker Identification Credential Assessment Act

(Sec. 2) Directs the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) to submit to Congress and the Comptroller General (GAO) a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the transportation security card program at enhancing security and reducing security risks for maritime facilities and vessels. Requires the assessment to be conducted, to the extent practicable, by a national laboratory within the DHS laboratory network or a maritime security university-based center within the DHS centers of excellence network.

Directs the Secretary to submit to Congress a corrective action plan responding to the assessment which: (1) includes an implementation plan with benchmarks, and (2) shall be considered in any DHS rulemaking with respect to the transportation security card program.

Directs the Comptroller General, within 120 days after the corrective action plan is issued, to: (1) review the extent to which it implements the recommendations of the national laboratory or the maritime security university-based center and of the Comptroller General, and (2) inform Congress as to the plan's responsiveness to such recommendations.

Prohibits the Secretary from issuing a final rule requiring the use of transportation security card readers until: (1) the Comptroller General informs Congress that the submission is responsive to the GAO recommendations, and (2) the Secretary issues an updated list of transportation security card readers that are compatible with active transportation security cards.

Requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress on implementation of the plan at least 18 months after it is issued, and every 6 months thereafter for the ensuing 3-year period.

(Sec. 3) Declares that no additional funds are authorized to carry out this Act. Requires this Act to be carried out using amounts otherwise available for the purpose.

(Sec. 2) This bill directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to commission a national laboratory or a university-based center within the DHS centers of excellence network to conduct a two-phase comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program at enhancing security and reducing security risks for maritime facilities and vessels that pose a high risk of being involved in a transportation security incident.

The assessment shall include: (1) in Phase 1, a review of the credentialing process; (2) in Phase 2, which shall follow the implementation of the TWIC reader rule, an evaluation of the extent to which the TWIC Program addresses security risks in the maritime environment and the technology, business process, and operational impacts of the use of the transportation worker identification credentials and TWIC readers in the maritime environment; (3) an evaluation of the extent to which deficiencies identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have been addressed; and (4) a cost-benefit analysis of the TWIC Program.

If the assessment identifies a deficiency in effectiveness of the TWIC Program, DHS shall submit to Congress a corrective action plan that: (1) responds to the assessment and includes an implementation plan with benchmarks, and (2) shall be considered in any DHS rulemaking with respect to the TWIC Program.

The DHS Inspector General, after submission of the corrective action plan, shall: (1) review the extent to which such plan implements the recommendations of the national laboratory or university-based center and of the GAO, and (2) notify Congress about the plan's responsiveness to such recommendations.

DHS may not issue additional rules with respect to the issuance of transportation worker identification credentials or use of TWIC readers until: (1) the Inspector General notifies Congress that the corrective action plan is responsive to the Inspector General's recommendations, and (2) DHS issues an updated list of TWIC readers that are compatible with active transportation worker security credentials. Such prohibition is inapplicable with respect to any final rule issued pursuant to the notice of proposed rulemaking on TWIC-Reader Requirements published by the Coast Guard on March 22, 2013.

The Inspector General shall report to Congress on implementation of the corrective action plan within 18 months after the plan is issued and every 6 months thereafter for the next three years.

These actions shall include:

• conducting a comprehensive risk analysis of security threat assessment procedures, including identifying procedures that need additional internal controls as well as best practices for quality assurance at every stage of the assessment;
• implementing such internal controls and best practices;
• improving fraud detection techniques;
• updating the guidance provided to Trusted Agents (Credentialing Office) regarding the vetting process and related regulations;
• finalizing a manual for such agents and adjudicators on the vetting process; and
• establishing quality controls to ensure consistent procedures to review adjudication decisions and terrorism vetting decisions.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall commission a national laboratory, a university-based center within the Science and Technology Directorate's centers of excellence network, or a qualified federally-funded research and development center to conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program at enhancing security and reducing security risks for maritime facilities and vessels that pose a high risk of being involved in a transportation security incident.

The assessment shall review:

• the credentialing process,
• the process for renewing TWIC applications, and
• the security value of the TWIC program.

If the assessment identifies a deficiency in effectiveness of the TWIC Program, DHS shall submit to Congress a corrective action plan that:

• responds to assessment findings and includes an implementation plan with benchmarks, and
• shall be considered in any DHS rulemaking with respect to the TWIC Program.

The DHS Inspector General must review and report on the corrective action plan.

(Sec. 1) This bill directs the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to commence actions to improve its process for vetting individuals with access to secure areas of vessels and maritime facilities.

These actions shall include:

• conducting a comprehensive risk analysis of security threat assessment procedures, including identifying procedures that need additional internal controls as well as best practices for quality assurance at every stage of the assessment;
• implementing such internal controls and best practices;
• improving fraud detection techniques;
• updating the guidance provided to Trusted Agents (Credentialing Office) regarding the vetting process and related regulations;
• finalizing a manual for such agents and adjudicators on the vetting process; and
• establishing quality controls to ensure consistent procedures to review adjudication decisions and terrorism vetting decisions.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shall commission a national laboratory, a university-based center within the Science and Technology Directorate's centers of excellence network, or a qualified federally-funded research and development center to conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program at enhancing security and reducing security risks for maritime facilities and vessels that pose a high risk of being involved in a transportation security incident.

The assessment shall review:

• the credentialing process,
• the process for renewing TWIC applications, and
• the security value of the TWIC program.

If the assessment identifies a deficiency in effectiveness of the TWIC Program, DHS shall submit to Congress a corrective action plan that:

• responds to assessment findings and includes an implementation plan with benchmarks, and
• shall be considered in any DHS rulemaking with respect to the TWIC Program.

The DHS Inspector General must review and report on the corrective action plan.