Instructs FERC, to the extent practicable in light of the nature of the grid security threat and the urgency for emergency measures, to consult with certain governmental authorities, including Canada and Mexico, regarding implementation of emergency measures.

Prescribes: (1) implementation procedures; and (2) related cost recovery measures affecting owners, operators, or users of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure.

Directs FERC to require any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-power system in the United States to implement measures necessary to protect the bulk-power system against specified vulnerabilities.

Directs FERC also to order the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to submit reliability standards to: (1) protect the bulk-power system from a reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm event; and (2) require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure their adequate availability to restore promptly the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is destroyed or disabled as a result of a reasonably foreseeable physical or other attack or a geomagnetic storm event.

Directs the President to designate for FERC the domestic facilities that are: (1) most critical to the national defense; and (2) most vulnerable to an electric energy supply disruption.

Directs FERC to require an owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure to implement measures to protect it against any vulnerability that has not been adequately addressed.

Directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to develop technical expertise in the protection of systems for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy against either geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic weapons.

Requires either the President or the Secretary of Energy to notify specified congressional committees promptly whenever the President issues such directive.

Instructs FERC, to the extent practicable in light of the nature of the grid security threat and the urgency for emergency measures, to consult with certain governmental authorities, including Canada and Mexico, regarding implementation of such emergency measures.

Prescribes: (1) implementation procedures; and (2) related cost recovery measures affecting owners, operators, or users of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure.

Directs FERC to require any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-power system in the United States to implement measures necessary to protect the bulk-power system against specified vulnerabilities.

Directs FERC also to order the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to submit reliability standards to: (1) protect the bulk-power system from a reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm event; and (2) require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure their adequate availability to restore promptly the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is destroyed or disabled as a result of a reasonably foreseeable physical or other attack or a geomagnetic storm event.

Directs the President to designate for FERC the domestic facilities that are: (1) critical to the national defense; and (2) vulnerable to an electric energy supply disruption.

Directs FERC to require an owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure to implement measures to protect it against any vulnerability that has not been adequately addressed.

Directs FERC, before promulgating a rule or issuing such order, to request and consider recommendations from the ERO.

Directs the Secretary to establish a program to develop technical expertise in the protection of systems for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy against either geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic pulse.

Requires either the President or the Secretary of Energy to notify specified congressional committees promptly whenever the President issues such directive.

Instructs FERC, to the extent practicable in light of the nature of the grid security threat and the urgency for emergency measures, to consult with certain governmental authorities, including Canada and Mexico, regarding implementation of such emergency measures.

Prescribes: (1) implementation procedures; and (2) related cost recovery measures affecting owners, operators, or users of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure.

Directs FERC to require any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-power system in the United States to implement measures necessary to protect the bulk-power system against specified vulnerabilities.

Directs FERC to order the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to submit reliability standards to: (1) protect the bulk-power system from a reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm event; and (2) require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure their adequate availability to restore promptly the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is destroyed or disabled as a result of a reasonably foreseeable physical or other attack or a geomagnetic storm event.

Directs the President to designate for FERC the domestic facilities that are: (1) critical to the national defense; and (2) vulnerable to an electric energy supply disruption.

Directs FERC to require an owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure to implement measures to protect it against any vulnerability that has not been adequately addressed.

Directs FERC, before promulgating a rule or issuing such order, to request and consider recommendations from the ERO.

Directs the Secretary to establish a program to develop technical expertise in the protection of systems for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy against either geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic pulse.

Exempts the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration for 11 years from any requirement under this Act pertaining to emergency response measures or measures to address Grid security vulnerabilities (except for a requirement addressing a malicious act using electronic communication).

(Sec. 3) States that the budgetary effects of this Act shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled "Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation" for this Act, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

Authorizes FERC to issue such rules or orders without prior notice or hearing if it determines that a rule or order must be issued immediately to protect critical electric infrastructure from a cyber security vulnerability.

Directs FERC, before issuing a rule or order, to consult with specified entities and federal agencies regarding implementation of actions that will effectively address the identified cyber security vulnerabilities.

Requires the rule or order issued to address a cyber security vulnerability to expire on the effective date of a certain standard developed to address the cyber security vulnerability.

Empowers the Secretary of Energy to require, by order, with or without notice, persons subject to FERC jurisdiction to take such actions as the Secretary determines will best avert or mitigate an immediate cyber security threat.

Encourages the Secretary to consult and coordinate with officials in Canada and Mexico responsible for the protection of cyber security of the interconnected North American electricity grid.

Directs FERC to establish a mechanism that permits public utilities to recover prudently incurred costs required to implement immediate actions ordered by the Secretary under this Act.

States that any such expedited or emergency rules or orders issued without prior notice or hearing shall remain effective for not more than 90 days unless, during such 90-day period, FERC: (1) gives interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments (with or without opportunity for oral presentation); and (2) affirms, amends, or repeals the rule or order.

Applies this Act to any entity that owns, controls, or operates critical electric infrastructure. Excludes Alaska and Hawaii from the scope of this Act.

Directs the Secretary of Defense to prepare a comprehensive plan that identifies the emergency measures or actions to be taken to protect the reliability of the electric power supply of national defense facilities located in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Territory of Guam in the event of an imminent cybersecurity threat.

Directs the Secretary and FERC to: (1) prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of information obtained or developed in ensuring cyber security if such disclosure would be detrimental to the security of critical electric infrastructure; and (2) establish procedures governing the release of critical infrastructure information to enable to entities subject to this Act to implement rules or orders of FERC or the Secretary.