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<dc:title>119 HR 5287 IH: China Advanced Technology Monitoring Act</dc:title>
<dc:publisher>U.S. House of Representatives</dc:publisher>
<dc:date>2025-09-10</dc:date>
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<dc:language>EN</dc:language>
<dc:rights>Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.</dc:rights>
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<distribution-code display="yes">I</distribution-code><congress display="yes">119th CONGRESS</congress><session display="yes">1st Session</session><legis-num display="yes">H. R. 5287</legis-num><current-chamber>IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES</current-chamber><action display="yes"><action-date date="20250910">September 10, 2025</action-date><action-desc><sponsor name-id="V000138">Mr. Vindman</sponsor> (for himself and <cosponsor name-id="M001219">Mr. Moylan</cosponsor>) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the <committee-name committee-id="HFA00">Committee on Foreign Affairs</committee-name></action-desc></action><legis-type>A BILL</legis-type><official-title display="yes">To require an annual report on the advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.</official-title></form><legis-body id="H9E34011D01644BC1A9BA6011F2EDD13C" style="OLC"><section id="H68556FB88D984B64BCE68EDC596B2D73" section-type="section-one"><enum>1.</enum><header>Short title</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">This Act may be cited as the <quote><short-title>China Advanced Technology Monitoring Act</short-title></quote>.</text></section><section id="HA78F8700C94C4D3EA0D336A73A2C5F44"><enum>2.</enum><header>Annual report on advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of China</header><subsection id="H7CF4CDF906CC405FBB6C5A57016BFA6B"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than May 1, 2026, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, including advanced and mature-node semiconductors, of the People’s Republic of China.</text></subsection><subsection id="H1A2C05EFD7F74AFFA855D5540907AC99"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report required by subsection (a) shall also include the following:</text><paragraph id="H8711AD4EAE1D41AC88D755B8821E32D3"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">A statement of key findings and assessments with respect to the United States strategy to counter China and specific policy recommendations to Congress regarding China's goal to advance semiconductor manufacturing.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="H12B30AB278B34335AE0CA8617E16D398"><enum>(2)</enum><text>An assessment of the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of China.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="H941EDF235E62457B91A2E79D22313078"><enum>(3)</enum><text>A detailed analysis of the industrial policies of China and the outcomes of such policies on such manufacturing capabilities.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="HF64D4ECED7E5455D89EACD07D056842F"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">A year-by-year assessment of technological development efforts by China in the fields of semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans and initiatives, that specifically addresses gains in every aspect of manufacturing, such as design, intellectual property, research and development, silicon and critical minerals, industrial gases, intermediaries such as photomasks, equipment, tools, and software, and advanced packaging techniques.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="HBFD6E520DAF147599D3C4E13C7B477EA"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">A description of engagement between China and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities, including—</text><subparagraph id="HE03C478673D94F54A4C5163F537422B9"><enum>(A)</enum><text>coordination with other countries and markets to expand semiconductor influence; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H604005B04E1A42748E21F5A5D7A4172A"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">foreign investment, trade, and research ties and partnerships with other countries.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H0EF9B87E1C1947A59E8D0D8BBCBCBC4A"><enum>(6)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">An analysis of the extent to which there is collaboration, joint ventures, or partnerships between China and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="H6C06C68023FB401396B0FD7EC9F862AB"><enum>(7)</enum><text>An analysis of the impact of United States and allied and partner export controls on covered items related to the development of semiconductor manufacturing in China, specifically with respect to the effectiveness of current United States protections against—</text><subparagraph id="HF9F933AF42CF4B248BD746030C46AF89"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">export control workarounds and loopholes;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA9A5FD7BE69A45AF96F792DF3634FDFD"><enum>(B)</enum><text>circumvention through foreign investments or third-party acquisitions; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H89285CEF62044D7D948A392DFA586027"><enum>(C)</enum><text>risks posed by collaborative agreements, partnerships, supplier relocations, and contractual relationships that may indirectly benefit China.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H8F7386D24F7542948F1BC4C5EDFA174F"><enum>(8)</enum><text>An assessment of whether such export controls remain effective in curbing the development of semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities in China and recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of such controls.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="HB3FEB9D9DE044476989DFC274A317769"><enum>(9)</enum><text>An assessment of the implications of Chinese semiconductor manufacturing dominance on—</text><subparagraph id="HF43D54A6C28345ECBC9616FBC348DFE4"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">United States global competitiveness;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="H7AFC90BB6B5147C1AD3730A5D75C5121"><enum>(B)</enum><text>United States national security and national economic security; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="HA18223CC33E5430994B343E1CC57CC49"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the national economy of the United States.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H7D6313C2687F4922B64FD5C4CDFE0218"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Form</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex, providing additional details and supporting intelligence, as available. The unclassified portion, or an unclassified synopsis, of the report shall concurrently be made available on a publicly available website of the Federal Government and a notice to that effect shall be concurrently published in the Federal Register.</text></subsection></section></legis-body></bill> 

