Short title

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the

Gray Zone Defense Assessment Act

. (b)

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 4. Statement of policy.

Sec. 5. Evaluation of national capacities for conducting gray zone operations.

Sec. 6. Report on Department of State capacity to respond to gray zone aggression.

Sec. 7. Expansion of intelligence community assessment regarding gray zone assets.

Findings

Congress finds the following: (1)In 1948, George F. Kennan observed that, In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.. (2)Today, this coercive activity is referred to by many names within the United States Government and the academic community, most notably gray zone operations. (3)Although increasingly employed as a means of political warfare, the full contours of gray zone operations remain ambiguous. However, central features of gray zone operations include that they are ultimately directed by state actors, consist of efforts not associated with routine statecraft, and are intended to advance a country’s objectives at the expense of a rival, without crossing a threshold that results in kinetic military conflict. They include such operations and tactics as the following: (A)Information warfare, including conducting disinformation campaigns or the spreading of propaganda. (B)Encouraging internal strife within target countries. (C)Subversive economic practices, such as economic coercion, systematic IP theft, blocking international shipping lanes, and overproduction of commercial commodities. (D)Cyber operations, below the threshold of conflict, aimed at coercion, espionage, or otherwise undermining a target. (E)Support of domestic or foreign proxy forces. (F)Coercive investment and bribery for political aims. (G)Industrial policy designed to monopolize a strategic industry or to destroy such an industry in other nations, especially when coordinated with other gray zone operations. (H)Military, paramilitary, or similar provocations and operations short of war. (I)Hostage diplomacy. (J)Gradual changes of internationally recognized borders. (K)Government financing or sponsorship of activities described in subparagraphs (A) through (J). (4)Various gray zone operations are frequently linked together into a coordinated campaign, that may also include tools of routine diplomacy, and that is designed to achieve a state’s political or military objective. (5)Gray zone campaigns are attractive to state actors for several reasons, including reduced costs compared to the deployment of conventional forces, thereby allowing states to pursue their objectives with limited resources. (6)The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other countries actively advance their own strategic objectives and challenge United States interests through the extensive use of gray zone operations. (7)Unwelcome escalation by adversarial powers—especially over the last decade—from routine statecraft into gray zone competition is a defining feature of the recent reemergence of great-power competition and requires an appropriate United States response. (8)The United States has not sufficiently deterred or responded to gray zone campaigns, thereby risking undermining United States national interests, diminishing United States influence and credibility, and encouraging rivals to further employ such tactics. (9)Successfully responding to adversary gray zone campaigns relies upon the full integration of instruments of national power across multiple domains and the ability to deploy such capacities in a coordinated, real-time campaign.

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that— (1)gray zone competition is a central and enduring aspect of great-power competition, and the United States should elevate the effective response to adversary gray zone campaigns as a central feature of its approach to great-power competition; (2)an effective, whole-of-government approach is essential to meeting the gray zone challenges posed by competitors of the United States; and (3)since gray zone activity takes place below the threshold of kinetic military conflict and since narrative formation is frequently a critical aspect of gray zone campaigns, the Department of State should take a preeminent role in coordinating, within applicable interagency processes, the disparate means of national power as the United States seeks to respond to adversary gray zone campaigns.

Statement of policy

It is the policy of the United States to— (1)seek effective responses, particularly at the Department of State, to adversary gray zone campaigns and to recognize the paramount importance of such responses to the national interests of the United States; (2)continue upholding the international rule of law and the rules-based international order, which is a core national security interest of the United States; and (3)call on United States allies and partners to employ sufficient national resources to equitably contribute to the response to gray zone challenges.

Evaluation of national capacities for conducting gray zone operations

(a)

Report

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a review and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the processes and capabilities by which the United States responds to gray zone campaigns and recommendations to enhance such processes and capabilities. (b)

Elements

The report required by subsection (a) shall include— (1)an assessment of the capability and capacity of the United States interagency to— (A)identify adversary activity as a gray zone campaign, including the adversary’s intent, capabilities, interactive effects, and impact on United States interests; (B)devise effective theories of deterrence; and (C)coordinate instruments of United States national power to consistently and effectively respond to adversarial gray zone campaigns against the United States or allies and partners; (2)a description of the process for determining the threshold at which adversary gray zone activities or campaigns targeting the United States, allies, or partners threaten United States interests, including the methods and mechanisms for— (A)determining which such activities or campaigns warrant a United States response; (B)calibrating such response; (C)communicating such thresholds to adversaries; and (D)establishing and regularly reviewing protocols with allies and partners to respond to such activities or campaigns; and (3)recommendations for further enhancing the ability of the United States to deter and respond to adversarial gray zone campaigns, including— (A)institutional reforms to enhance United States interagency coordination in response to adversarial gray zone campaigns and, as necessary, additional statutory authorities required to implement those reforms; (B)additional resources, authorities, or institutional capacities necessary for United States agencies to counter gray zone threats; and (C)budget estimates for the implementations of the recommendations made pursuant to this paragraph. (c)

Form

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a classified form and shall contain an unclassified summary. (d)

Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1)the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and (2)the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

Report on Department of State capacity to respond to gray zone aggression

(a)

Report required

Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report discussing the capacity of the Department of State to contribute to coordinated United States responses to adversary gray zone campaigns and the Department’s understanding of the gray zone threat environment. (b)

Elements

The report required by subsection (a) shall also include the following: (1)The capabilities, offices, and entities particularly suited to countering adversary gray zone operations and a description of the roles each can play. (2)An evaluation of the adequacy and utility of established Department of State definitions for understanding adversary gray zone activity. (3)Recommendations, including proposed necessary investments and the rationale and expected costs of such investments, for further enhancing the capacity of the Department of State to effectively respond to adversary gray zone operations. (4)An identification of 25 priority countries at the front lines of adversary gray zone aggression and a discussion, developed in consultation with relevant embassy country teams, of the matters described in paragraphs (1) through (3) with respect to each such country. (5)A list of activities that are currently being undertaken to respond to adversary gray zone campaigns conducted against such priority countries. (c)

Form

The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in a classified form and shall contain an unclassified summary.

Expansion of intelligence community assessment regarding gray zone assets

Section 6516 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117–263; 136 Stat. 3548) is amended— (1)in the heading, by striking Russian; (2)in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(4)

Country of concern

The term country of concern means— (A)the People’s Republic of China; (B)the Russian Federation; (C)the Islamic Republic of Iran; (D)the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; (E)the Republic of Cuba; and (F)the Syrian Arab Republic.

; and

(3)in subsection (b)— (A)in the heading— (i)by inserting

Annual

before

Intelligence

; and (ii)by striking

Russian

; (B)in paragraph (1)— (i)in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)— (I)by inserting annually before produce; and (II)by inserting with respect to each country of concern after intelligence community assessment; and (ii)by striking Russia each place the term appears and inserting the country of concern; (C)in paragraph (2)— (i)in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking Russia and inserting a country of concern; and (ii)in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), by striking Russia each place it appears and inserting the country of concern; and (D)in paragraph (3)— (i)in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking Russia and inserting each country of concern; and (ii)in subparagraph (B), by striking Russia and inserting the country of concern.