116 S4112 IS: Economic Statecraft for the Twenty-First Century Act
U.S. Senate
2022-04-28
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EN
Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
1.(a)This Act may be cited as the Economic Statecraft for the Twenty-First Century Act
.(b)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title.Sec. 2. Findings.TITLE I—ConfrontSubtitle A—Economic coercionSec. 101. Mandatory disclosure of Chinese debt in aid-related applications.Sec. 102. Coordination with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on Chinese engagement.Sec. 103. Countering Chinese Economic Coercion Task Force.Sec. 104. Strategy to counter Chinese economic coercion on countries and entities that support Taiwan.Subtitle B—Investment securitySec. 111. Provision of assistance to allies and partners with respect to reviewing foreign investment.Subtitle C—Anti-competitionSec. 121. Improvement of anti-counterfeiting measures.Sec. 122. Intellectual property violators list.Sec. 123. Report on subsidies provided by Government of People’s Republic of China.Subtitle D—Supply chainsSec. 131. Definitions.Sec. 132. Department of State diplomatic strategy on semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls.Sec. 133. Prohibition on commercial export of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to People's Republic of China.Sec. 134. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People's Republic of China.Sec. 135. Supply chain coordination.Sec. 136. Statement of policy on international cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains.Sec. 137. Prioritization of efforts and assistance to secure critical mineral supply chains.Sec. 138. Leveraging international support.TITLE II—CompeteSubtitle A—InfrastructureSec. 201. Sense of Congress on the Build Back Better World initiative.Sec. 202. Office of Strategic Investments in United States International Development Finance Corporation.Sec. 203. Prohibition on transfer of sovereign loan guarantees to United States International Development Finance Corporation.Sec. 204. Strategy for promoting and strengthening nearshoring.Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on the Blue Dot Initiative.Sec. 206. Sense of Congress on the Three Seas Initiative.Subtitle B—EnergySec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding United States engagement at the World Economic Forum.Sec. 212. Clean energy efforts of the United States International Development Finance Corporation.Sec. 213. Consistency in United States policy on development finance and climate change.Sec. 214. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.Sec. 215. United States and European Union cooperation on climate finance for developing countries.Subtitle C—TechnologySec. 221. United States leadership and representation in standards-setting bodies.Sec. 222. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the G20 Digital Economy Working Group.Sec. 223. Statement of policy on artificial intelligence and the global economy.Sec. 224. Diplomatic strategy for artificial intelligence.Sec. 225. International collaboration on research and development.Subtitle D—International financial institutions and multilateral economic organizationsSec. 231. Statement of policy on United States leadership at international financial institutions.Sec. 232. Loans to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the International Monetary Fund.Sec. 233. Clearing World Bank Group arrears.Sec. 234. 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank.Sec. 235. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank.Sec. 236. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.Subtitle E—ResilienceSec. 241. Sense of Congress regarding United States leadership in recovery and resiliency.Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding improving resilience capacities through foreign assistance.Sec. 243. Office of Economic Resiliency.Sec. 244. Establishment of Resilience Trust Fund at the World Bank.2.Congress makes the following findings:(1)As of 2020, the United States accounts for nearly 25 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, amounting to approximately $20,953,000,000,000. The United States has major business dealings on almost every continent with involvement in multilateral financial systems, bilateral and multilateral economic partnerships, and a robust economy that held nearly 30 percent of the world’s share of research and development in 2019.(2)Since World War II, the United States has been a leader in the global economy, as demonstrated by its membership in economic-focused multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International Labour Organization, and the Group of Twenty (G20). The United States has leveraged its economic advantage to ensure its national security in countless instances, such as through the investment of billions of dollars used to rebuild Europe and restore world order following World War II.(3)The robust economy of the United States is directly tied to its ability to engage economically, diplomatically, and militarily with allies and adversaries. In a 2019 Pew Research study, of the countries surveyed, 46 percent of Asia-Pacific countries, 37 percent of European countries, and 47 percent of Middle Eastern countries view the United States as the world’s leading economic power. African countries that had an overall more favorable impression of the People’s Republic of China have consequently been engaging in greater economic partnerships with the People’s Republic of China, amounting to approximately $2,960,000,000 in 2020.(4)According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, about 70 percent of global economic activity occurs through global value chains. Driven by a greater outsourcing of service industry work and greater financial and business service linkages with Europe, the United States has increased its engagement with global value chains in both the manufacturing and services industries. Although the United States has attempted to encourage value-based practices in international business through business advisories, public diplomacy, and other economic tools, countries like the People’s Republic of China do not operate with such value-oriented business operations.(5)In 2020, exports made up 10 percent of the United States economy, and the United States utilizes export controls to safeguard its economic edge and national security interests. As has been seen in the case of export controls imposed through the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce to restrict dual-use trade with the People’s Republic of China, such controls curtail potential militant activity by the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea, human rights abuses, and the use of semiconductor technology for military purposes. The expanded usage of export controls can continue to benefit United States economic security.(6)International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank have key roles in encouraging regional cooperation, sustaining economic development, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, and reducing global poverty. Those values are in line with United States international development practices, a commonality that can be leveraged for greater coordinated cooperation in the future, especially in the wake of the COVID–19 pandemic, including as follows:(A)To meet the needs of developing countries that need to repay debt amounting to approximately $860,000,000,000 in 2020, United States cooperation with key multilateral organizations in the smooth rollout of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative Refresher can ensure global economic recovery from the pandemic while mitigating the risk of loan default.(B)The rise in debt transparency has become a critical issue as more countries become unaware of the full extent of their sovereign debt as a result of predatory lending and poor debt management. The continued support by the United States of international financial institutions can facilitate reforms that go beyond the 2003 proposal of the International Monetary Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.(7)Despite the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic, which has had devastating effects on global supply chains and economic productivity, the economy of the People’s Republic of China continues to grow. As a result, global investors are looking more toward the People’s Republic of China, instead of the United States, for potential economic activity and are willing to turn a blind eye to the People’s Republic of China’s human rights violations, including its use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.(8)The United States, as a major economic leader, has a role in preventing predatory economic practices, such as loans to developing countries from the Government of the People’s Republic of China through the Belt and Road Initiative. As the People’s Republic of China has come to fill the role of an economic leader to many developing countries with its lending, the United States stands to lose economically from its trading partners being stuck in billion dollar debt traps. Furthermore, such predatory practices have come to the United States with the increase of foreign investment in the United States from $4,400,000,000,000 to $4,630,000,000,000 over the course of 2020. <enum>I</enum><header>Confront</header><subtitle id="id50189F485193439690120EA8A38E2DD2" style="OLC"><enum>A</enum><header>Economic coercion</header><section id="id077757a788384ab9b4d7a4fe822e1eee"><enum>101.</enum><header>Mandatory disclosure of Chinese debt in aid-related applications</header><subsection id="id87E8F1BCC1E9404B952AFF870D81A619"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The United States International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development, the Trade and Development Agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other independent and executive branch agencies responsible for disbursing foreign aid and development assistance shall require all applicants for United States aid to disclose any debt the applicant may owe to any entity known to be owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including loan amounts, duration, rates, and contractual provisions. </text></subsection><subsection id="idE56E0B5AAF5A4B69810D8B18E16BA3E8"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Limitation</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">United States foreign aid and development assistance may not be used to amortize any loan principal owed to any entity known to be owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.</text></subsection></section><section id="id4f909ade4ae34ea1b35e04fbcf6c061f"><enum>102.</enum><header>Coordination with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on Chinese engagement</header><subsection id="idA954462749D3434CBE2727CD0809EDDA"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries—</text><paragraph id="idB552A94C1EE34E859C4E87873D0CD3EF"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to study the effects of the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other predatory economic practices;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id75BF9721C6244658B12642C99B97D88A"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to create a shared set of facts and promote more transparency with respect to such practices, including a joint stocktaking of the People's Republic of China’s distortive economic practices, such as subsidies and other forms of market-distorting state intervention in the People's Republic of China’s economy, and the negative global spillovers from such practices;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idCC8396A6D7AA418BBF97FF0F18ABADBE"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to establish a solid definitional foundation for future dialogues on the People's Republic of China’s unfair economic practices and a clear understanding of common concerns and priorities among member countries; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id279E8B8BA321466BBDBE432D769304D6"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to issue joint informational reports that contain the results of such data gathering efforts.</text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id4c692da488c64c45a380b4e7149f4304"><enum>103.</enum><header>Countering Chinese Economic Coercion Task Force</header><subsection id="id76f577c69a2f4199a0d45bb3d9b4d80b"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Establishment</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the <quote>Countering Economic Coercion Task Force</quote> (referred to in this section as the <quote>Task Force</quote>). </text></subsection><subsection id="id661bca42b2fe4ffaa1f7b591f75e1cff"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Duties</header><paragraph id="id023fe1a5e1e545d286593be0fbc5505a"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Task Force shall—</text><subparagraph id="id48f88cd6e2a54ba0b8882c28f49fd455"><enum>(A)</enum><text>oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to coercive economic practices of the People’s Republic of China that are abusive, arbitrary, pretextual, and contrary to international rules, which shall include—</text><clause id="idbcbcc074cb6c4132867b0435f40685b5"><enum>(i)</enum><text>systematically monitoring and evaluating—</text><subclause id="idd575d946b0184209a54d2d787673a177"><enum>(I)</enum><text>the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;</text></subclause><subclause id="id7cad4c8b77b947b3a89a5a8f098ce29d"><enum>(II)</enum><text>instances in which such practices taken against a non-Chinese entity have benefitted United States parties; and</text></subclause><subclause id="id9a6f471b45d5402d97851e863d948e5c"><enum>(III)</enum><text>the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests;</text></subclause></clause><clause id="ida97a9a8c3c8b48c5a78f48a687a770e7"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices; and</text></clause><clause id="idc913f53660fd4b0db386cdc4fffc507a"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>proactively deterring such economic coercion;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id631502cba91647a8bf61c01428a125f9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>consult with United States allies and partners regarding—</text><clause id="ide39a22940e95404783ed278364bf9540"><enum>(i)</enum><text>the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices;</text></clause><clause id="id72d7a1bbdb8245f3bb824003b7bbb65f"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>actions that could be taken to expand international coordination; and</text></clause><clause id="id3500ea4092c94cf6a30273acfb2367fd"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>establishing a consistent, coherent, and collective international response to such coercive practices, including a long-term deterrence to such practices;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd443ec53e4474b14b32dd1ee3f88dbc4"><enum>(C)</enum><text>effectively engage the United States private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are susceptible to such coercive economic practices, to identify their concerns regarding such practices; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id794226666b0b4a8d8f1ad1682927e50f"><enum>(D)</enum><text>develop and implement a process for regularly sharing relevant information, including classified information, to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such coercive economic practices with United States allies, partners, and the private sector. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="iddfe4cd3b86a14a1291ac4b6357fa9c38"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Consultation</header><text>In carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—</text><subparagraph id="id75094351bcec47dcaf22e858627af7f2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>relevant stakeholders in the private sector;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc07e7715d8934f5aa94d6896b884a1a9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9472f88e54de479db9ea7c239bf05e60"><enum>(C)</enum><text>United States allies and partners.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id22574ab4635243418d36c77494ca4ed1"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Membership</header><text>The President shall—</text><paragraph id="id9e709cda611446b88d10fa2f2f7ba0a5"><enum>(1)</enum><text>appoint the Chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id14eec2dd12c443fd999011824887a258"><enum>(2)</enum><text>appoint the Vice Chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id7a46b95b15ee4e8198989949ef600b69"><enum>(3)</enum><text>direct the head of each of the following Federal departments and agencies to appoint personnel, at the level of Assistant Secretary or higher, to participate in the Task Force:</text><subparagraph id="idc32819d70fc840d1aeb34024d727fa1c"><enum>(A)</enum><text>The Department of State.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd8b6e7c14b0b4fcf9682a9d44fc4db5a"><enum>(B)</enum><text>The Department of Commerce.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id22ee57cf17f244c5b862a7f9c9095dd3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>The Department of the Treasury.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6ea2549f6eb6407dab40bead202ac9a1"><enum>(D)</enum><text>The Department of Justice.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idb4558c8e106b41dbbb3f338c372419d9"><enum>(E)</enum><text>The Office of the United States Trade Representative.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id992f76c385d74904a1b6edd0ee73559a"><enum>(F)</enum><text>The Department of Agriculture.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id59288237c11b46a0ba96fc40bbf4c7b3"><enum>(G)</enum><text>The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/3003">50 U.S.C. 3003</external-xref>)).</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6022bc06686a4eacb33fc9841c2330fb"><enum>(H)</enum><text>The Securities and Exchange Commission.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idad98651a681e40b5bde29ce025f8b4a7"><enum>(I)</enum><text>The United States International Development Finance Corporation.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id06db126107d5405685b9ac67cb6c174d"><enum>(J)</enum><text>Any other department or agency designated by the President.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id98bff60554414ed5ac4d5c963ad743e6"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Reports</header><paragraph id="id5108bb56d23b4c28b944f75a7b86e684"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Initial report</header><text>Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—</text><subparagraph id="id453214d93cbf492db8a5a2d801227c07"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a comprehensive review of the array of economic tools the Government of the People's Republic of China employs or could employ to coerce other governments, non-Chinese companies (including United States companies), and multilateral institutions and organizations, including the Government of the People's Republic of China's continued efforts to codify informal practices into its domestic law;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2498a41b40d44e7ab9222b3ab04f4ff5"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the strategy developed pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A);</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5f01861ab85b43d2af8ee86b34881663"><enum>(C)</enum><text>an interagency definition of the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices that captures—</text><clause id="iddabfa5460fbc4bad974ec6c8370f5855"><enum>(i)</enum><text>the use of informal or extralegal coercive economic practices; and </text></clause><clause id="idf6881c3922534d06a7032f1bc7b84f39"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>the illegitimate use of formal economic tools; </text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id44605a50298c4def86a23165639769e2"><enum>(D)</enum><text>a comprehensive review of the array of economic and diplomatic tools that the United States Government employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion against the United States and United States allies and partners;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf341bbe579d042f5a3fc5e55753f76b0"><enum>(E)</enum><text>a list of unilateral or multilateral—</text><clause id="id17e4ec581c904268a21010f07e1df8cb"><enum>(i)</enum><text>proactive measures to defend or deter against the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices; and</text></clause><clause id="id1d196b62600f42d597af3dfdafb59fcf"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>actions taken in response to the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s general use of coercive economic practices;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1d91d1bb2d654f1ba21ca69732516e33"><enum>(F)</enum><text>an assessment of areas in which United States allies and partners are vulnerable to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7f36c23d5a9d4f02a045dfaf1b60cc2e"><enum>(G)</enum><text>a description of the gaps in existing resources or capabilities of Federal departments and agencies—</text><clause id="ida3800e5ece794dce9f33bdeac1b8c7a1"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to respond effectively to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices directed at United States entities; and</text></clause><clause id="ide38f01bdbcc84b1a94ce8fc1114b945e"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to assist United States allies and partners in their responses to such practices. </text></clause></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id64f9375199384335a6532c947327b26c"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Interim reports</header><subparagraph id="iddbdacf9584f842668efb24835ca7f4c7"><enum>(A)</enum><header>First interim report</header><text>Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report is submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— </text><clause id="ide8d945f4e0194e1f91576e0e3df58ed5"><enum>(i)</enum><text>updates to the information required under subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1); and</text></clause><clause id="idcb2e24d5db57470fa6ac43ebc7e27716"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>a description of the activities conducted by the Task Force to implement the strategy required under subsection (b)(1)(A). </text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2bb8cd8f7edf40059c6d56fa778f0c99"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Second interim report</header><text>Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report is submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an update to the elements required under the previously submitted report. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id244a6e3ba1fe4e49bd76f495b5bd5c67"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Final report</header><text>Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report required under paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees, the Task Force shall submit a final report to the appropriate congressional committees and make such report available to the public on the website of the Executive Office of the President. The final report shall include— </text><subparagraph id="id39033193b2f544a3af351b7aa3f62e69"><enum>(A)</enum><text>an analysis of the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices, including the cost of such practices to United States businesses;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id78d3288428864d9c998123d474f096fa"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a description of areas of particular vulnerability for United States businesses and the businesses of United States partners and allies;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9d4f7bf6f1964a00850adce024d23dd0"><enum>(C)</enum><text>recommendations on the best means for continuing the effort to counter such coercive practices; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id935c05a7b22741e29b5a9855bf10cf8c"><enum>(D)</enum><text>a list of the cases that have been made public pursuant to subsection (e).</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id353c886046934a77b74d8fc9cdc4fd1b"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Form</header><subparagraph id="id9236114dbb0a4d88b5d674cd025a2c53"><enum>(A)</enum><header>Initial and interim reports</header><text>The reports required under paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (2)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include classified annexes. </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3e838c72d8e8459da044a03fcd461adc"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Final report</header><text>The report required under paragraph (3) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. </text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id7d56ec2bcdaf48879df05abe4f1caf6c"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Publicly available list</header><paragraph id="id947c8e92e86740d48b5e1745d3cc6d7a"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until its termination pursuant to subsection (f), the Task Force, to the extent practicable, shall make available to the public on the website of the Executive Office of the President a list of instances during the most recent 6-month period that the Government of the People's Republic of China has directed coercive economic practices against a non-Chinese entity. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id493dd820fddd448c94c6d255142b4a20"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Updates</header><text>The list required under paragraph (1)—</text><subparagraph id="id6661CEA20CAB4F6487CD13114D0C9AB2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>shall be updated every 180 days; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idB7D441B9470E4B129D4A05827550905B"><enum>(B)</enum><text>shall be managed by the Secretary of State after the Task Force is terminated pursuant to subsection (f). </text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id0b90af30459f44788dfb0723ca4610a9"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Sunset</header><paragraph id="idfb246ed2194d4d388a00880cfdbb384b"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Task Force shall be terminated at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final report required under subsection (d)(3) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees and made publicly available. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="ide03865e60a474a5294ae818b8d366476"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Additional actions</header><text>During the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1), the Task Force may conclude its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning its final report.</text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idca671fe52c564ea593840be7a2ad1009" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>104.</enum><header>Strategy to counter Chinese economic coercion on countries and entities that support Taiwan</header><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id9CA125265CC9439EB25CDE199D196701"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a description of the strategy being used by the Department of State to respond to the Government of the People's Republic of China’s increased economic coercion against countries who have strengthened their ties with, or support for, Taiwan. </text></subsection><subsection id="idE8456DD2EDB64C309C08332A832937CD" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Assistance for Lithuania</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of State shall provide assistance to Lithuania to support its supply chain resilience efforts.</text></subsection></section></subtitle><subtitle id="id83677B92BECA430A863D149762ACDF05" style="OLC"><enum>B</enum><header>Investment security</header><section id="id3ff4d1aeb47b48ff9b488dc86ad2611d"><enum>111.</enum><header>Provision of assistance to allies and partners with respect to reviewing foreign investment</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, in consultation with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury, shall, to protect the national security of the United States and countries that are allies or partners of the United States, establish a formal process for—</text><paragraph id="id93fd43d85eb748cfb8d0d26fbd345dfe"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the exchange of information relating to foreign investment with the governments of such countries; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2b0f845378f143d7afbd901889bd9ecc"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the provision of assistance to those countries with respect to—</text><subparagraph id="id3797d745e6d544a8ba6cebc6549339a9"><enum>(A)</enum><text>reviewing foreign investment transactions in such countries;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1a6444887f964b9bb73d31c08d848467"><enum>(B)</enum><text>determining the beneficial ownership of parties to such transactions; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idcd2c48147e554a2b9bb64039de80d31c" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>(C)</enum><text>identifying trends in investment and technology that could pose risks to the national security of the United States and such countries. </text></subparagraph></paragraph></section></subtitle><subtitle id="idBA8707D6A8D248F99A785411DC567EF2" style="OLC"><enum>C</enum><header>Anti-competition</header><section id="id1d67a22ea5304bc887f393803a27a867"><enum>121.</enum><header>Improvement of anti-counterfeiting measures</header><subsection id="id2301a0114c7443a9844ce1e9fa3261e8"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Increased inspections</header><paragraph id="id43296BF4F38D4F46AEC4DFEB9FEC7FF2"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Report on seizures of counterfeit goods</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall submit to the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives a report on seizures by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of counterfeit goods during the one-year period preceding submission of the report, including the number of such seizures disaggregated by category of good, source country, and mode of transport.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id95242c0f1e1a486696b27d15f272fb4d"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Increased inspections of goods from certain countries</header><text>The Commissioner shall increase inspections of imports of goods from each source country identified in the report required by subsection (a) as one of the top source countries of counterfeit goods, as determined by the Commissioner.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id83367adc27e841f7bc93296ace082835"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Publication of criteria for notorious markets list</header><text>Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 5 years thereafter, the United States Trade Representative shall publish in the Federal Register criteria for determining that a market is a notorious market for purposes of inclusion of that market in the list developed by the Trade Representative pursuant to section 182(e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/19/2242">19 U.S.C. 2242(e)</external-xref>) (commonly known as the <quote>Notorious Markets List</quote>).</text></subsection></section><section id="idc60897b6ee11469fafc40cb9b66322f6"><enum>122.</enum><header>Intellectual property violators list</header><subsection id="id7e3e78c3ae9b484997e1f63547022b1d"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the <quote>intellectual property violators list</quote>) that identifies— </text><paragraph id="id034a6cff35c1448aba1e4885ceba834c"><enum>(1)</enum><text>all centrally administered state-owned enterprises incorporated in the People’s Republic of China that have benefitted from— </text><subparagraph id="id1fb6d7f5361c44de81b25fd4c72454b0"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a significant act or series of acts of intellectual property theft that subjected an economic sector of the United States or a company incorporated in the United States to harm; or </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3236a90460644a51b46a73dc7763e1e8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the United States; and </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idcf9dfdc21b3e450e8106c2800921da74"><enum>(2)</enum><text>any corporate officer of, or principal shareholder with controlling interests in, an entity described in paragraph (1).</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id30a3bad323b1443c96ddb327dad74cd1"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Rules for identification</header><text>To determine whether there is a credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall consider— </text><paragraph id="id883789e14907469aa3a228d04c24e88c"><enum>(1)</enum><text>any finding by a court in the United States that the entity has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; or </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf05f3a39d2814b9aa9125938f5171edf"><enum>(2)</enum><text>substantial and credible information received from any entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id3b74314e354c4324944403a813c2c7ae"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Consultation</header><text>In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with— </text><paragraph id="idef81f88a66504fa79d7d9e89969b6968"><enum>(1)</enum><text>other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id26a7a20756ba4568b97234765ccf30a9"><enum>(2)</enum><text>entities in the private sector;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idad075c6d48384713a9b395e5955c3106"><enum>(3)</enum><text>civil society organizations with relevant expertise; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id0d0c2cf6462a4090bc8e7570afab84e9"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the Governments of Australia, Canada, countries in the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id74cc825c61ca4049a207e9ae236f4892"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Report</header><paragraph id="iddf3bb92070884f88afe949d917197d64"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a report that— </text><subparagraph id="id40c9543e4b524e1a95cf70fa9d5242d0"><enum>(A)</enum><text>lists the entities described in subsection (a)(1);</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idad5637b4bd9a4dad9115fb46081f9b79"><enum>(B)</enum><text>describes the circumstances surrounding acts or policies described in subsection (a)(1)(B), including any role of the Government of the People’s Republic of China; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3be369bbb55440fbaf1c434cdba5e4d3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>assesses, to the extent practicable, the economic advantage derived by entities described in subsection (a)(1); and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id05b2fb5b002e43d9b94148863eadbb12"><enum>(D)</enum><text>assesses whether each entity described in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen intellectual property in commercial activity in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United States. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idff16e3eb43da49a48bda883fb5183331"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The report published under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida43f651a60c34558ab63ee86cd93b169"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Declassification and release</header><text>The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published under paragraph (1). </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idabb5740c24f1470c8d6151629c46132d"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Requirement To protect confidential business information</header><paragraph id="id76656c607ac54a0b9f8d7c613a1d1ffc"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of State and the head of any other Federal agency involved in the production of the intellectual property violators list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private sector party and marked as confidential business information, unless the party submitting the information— </text><subparagraph id="id3b06e0c37df5481fb686dfa49639ca65"><enum>(A)</enum><text>had notice, at the time of submission, that such information would be disclosed by the Secretary; or </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id4a784386a42d45e0a139e5da5ef31789"><enum>(B)</enum><text>subsequently consents to the disclosure of such information. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id27033fb8f82c467b9bd5f4a59a428442"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Nonconfidential version of report</header><text>If confidential business information is provided by a private sector party in connection with the production of the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State shall publish a nonconfidential version of the report under subsection (d) in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business information. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id7b237c70a00844218544726aa712cd53"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Treatment as trade secrets</header><text>Proprietary information submitted by a private sector party under this section— </text><subparagraph id="idc1aa590f77d74006a94a8b8105ab6379"><enum>(A)</enum><text>shall be considered to be trade secrets and commercial or financial information exempt under subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, from being made available to the public under subsection (a) of that section; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id602c51e1c24c47d0bf835294bede991b"><enum>(B)</enum><text>shall be exempt from disclosure without the express approval of the party. </text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idd04f371f339b41e5b78748d5246c84e9"><enum>123.</enum><header>Report on subsidies provided by Government of People’s Republic of China</header><subsection id="id1c368ebad18f48ff9da9b4ba8e298165"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies— </text><paragraph id="id70d27d6ad7534b6284b4070e59f17775"><enum>(1)</enum><text>subsidies provided by the central government of the People’s Republic of China to enterprises in the People’s Republic of China; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id590ce4e8d61e47cf8660f00d2fb7606f"><enum>(2)</enum><text>discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the People’s Republic of China over foreign market participants. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id72f0e1a9ae4e4d53b42b9ecd0c3125de"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Elements of report</header><text>In compiling each report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consider— </text><paragraph id="id9ddf93e3972a4470b52bd69c1a75f7c9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by the central government of the People’s Republic of China that— </text><subparagraph id="idfce364b2789d41bb87a93e917d03085b"><enum>(A)</enum><text>discriminate in favor of enterprises in the People’s Republic of China at the expense of foreign market participants; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8e012ec0709647fdb153cc9e24e139c0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>shield centrally administered, state-owned enterprises from competition; or </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd25a246a27bb464181a5e5520bee0749"><enum>(C)</enum><text>otherwise suppress market-based competition;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id96881170c1554aceab08c67f63953307"><enum>(2)</enum><text>financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, from or promoted by the central government of the People’s Republic of China or centrally administered, state-owned enterprises in the People’s Republic of China that materially benefit enterprises in the People’s Republic of China over foreign market participants in contravention of generally accepted market principles; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id08308136e4a74e20a63bcdd8bec0130b"><enum>(3)</enum><text>any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/19/3511">19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)</external-xref>). </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id76BF8F605A9C456781D0CBDEE510B4B4"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Form of report</header><text>Each report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.</text></subsection><subsection id="ide55741d8a57a49b49515d9b383220ffd"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Consultation</header><text>In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with— </text><paragraph id="idc309886cfa3544b3aa41dc4cebbab40f"><enum>(1)</enum><text>other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida486d96c6fbf4a978bacad47df0652a1"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the private sector; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id478bf60f3af2426c8e2a726f128c3cee" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>(3)</enum><text>civil society organizations with relevant expertise. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id82C54DACC7824EE7BE8351114AD44553"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text><paragraph id="id9D7F18A895274F56BD8F359FD0F87CC1"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idF22B10EC6D49420A95341CF141407B25"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.</text></paragraph></subsection></section></subtitle><subtitle id="id4A91FC8A1D3A4875A7F8557BBDFD1074" style="OLC"><enum>D</enum><header>Supply chains</header><section id="id11c7e21b4a4e4050b9846517cf8094fd"><enum>131.</enum><header>Definitions</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">In this subtitle:</text><paragraph id="id17c6565f88c443f184814093d141ef00"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Covered item</header><text>The term <term>covered item</term> includes semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including extreme ultraviolet photolithography equipment and argon fluoride immersion photolithography equipment.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9661722E3DB34134A0671B68623BAA6F"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Critical mineral</header><text>The term <term>critical mineral</term> has the meaning given the term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/30/1606">30 U.S.C. 1606(a)</external-xref>).</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf903cbc4bf7e478abc23951fd2b74779"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Export; in-country transfer; reexport</header><text>The terms <term>export</term>, <term>in-country transfer</term>, and <term>reexport</term> have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/4801">50 U.S.C. 4801</external-xref>). </text></paragraph></section><section id="idB0A38BC2255F4ED8BD531D1DDB89FB28"><enum>132.</enum><header>Department of State diplomatic strategy on semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls</header><subsection id="id8c1ca8be2f64437488503e190332def6"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Required strategy</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, and private sector entities, shall develop a strategy to diplomatically engage the governments of the Netherlands, Japan, and other appropriate countries for the purposes of coordinating, developing, and instituting controls on the export of covered items to the People's Republic of China.</text></subsection><subsection id="idb6e28f2c8fca4ff284956ebfd64c228e"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Aspects of the strategy</header><text>The diplomatic strategy required by subsection (a) shall include—</text><paragraph id="ida859809788214845bb5ea556765c671c"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a review of United States technological assets and capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including photolithography;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idd0fdeaa4c85145e6b1a7777a224de80e"><enum>(2)</enum><text>an assessment of how export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment can be integrated into a broader United States technology strategy that includes support for—</text><subparagraph id="id890AC8029B324AC9BE84702E275C3BDD"><enum>(A)</enum><text>research and development; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id551B7D06CF5645C09F8ECD6CE04073FD"><enum>(B)</enum><text>investment screening;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9D574FE28AD349518D15340DD4F62A77"><enum>(C)</enum><text>talent recruitment and retention; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id38C98FF1B31A4005ACC192D90490C44D"><enum>(D)</enum><text>standard setting; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id87A80F12F19F4FD9937584BE12FD3847"><enum>(E)</enum><text>international partnerships; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idF7407EBCD8124829B4DCFB99864F9F9C"><enum>(F)</enum><text>supply chain security;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id01ea3fb568f4468fa7ceacfb805c42a3"><enum>(3)</enum><text>a plan of action to guide relevant United States engagement with the Netherlands, Japan, and other appropriate countries, including conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements to formulate export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc063566479bc473892f0d285a26b37d7"><enum>(4)</enum><text>a plan of action to guide United States engagement with foreign entities that develop, construct, and export semiconductor manufacturing equipment;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id49d14eb11e834f66834f9b7ab09ee3d6"><enum>(5)</enum><text>a review of the potential diplomatic, economic, and security effects of implementing export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id409cb74e22fa4af798163dc3dd2319a7"><enum>(6)</enum><text>an analysis of the impact of export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment on the semiconductor manufacturing industry and artificial intelligence chipmaking capabilities of the People's Republic of China;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id0ccf65ac66104ec6841ac0c16e8760f8"><enum>(7)</enum><text>a review of the potential economic impacts on United States entities if export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment are implemented; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9abaa914ae334574935f641479d5439b"><enum>(8)</enum><text>specific, measurable metrics of success for United States diplomatic activities related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idfe806b5f1d744384bba32dba0454ac7b"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Objectives of the strategy</header><text>The objectives of the diplomatic strategy required by subsection (a) are—</text><paragraph id="id9d2b979284a14b70b6ee4b2d3e7dda6d"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to formulate a political arrangement among the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and other appropriate countries for the control of exports of covered items to the People's Republic of China;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id66a9a00cffd440c1935743bfb0c1b382"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to maintain United States and allied technological advantages in semiconductor manufacturing equipment;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idd8fc219c52f9442c8160726da6d42811"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to protect the interests of United States and allied companies operating in the field of semiconductor manufacturing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id44c889e5d8d9456e89879cf65d712aba"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to ensure the United States continues to engage with allies on efforts involving the development and protection of a free, equitable, open, secure, and stable digital domain.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idbdab0cbba0e948e7b63bfe180a618704"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.</text></subsection><subsection id="id8756d94c33be410aba2ec0191925fb8e"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text><paragraph id="id54492a9df90d46b482789246b464614a"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf96b0cdfa3cb455287f51c1a908ca3bc"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce. </text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id3b6772f8fac14fccaa7805acc4788ee6"><enum>133.</enum><header>Prohibition on commercial export of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to People's Republic of China</header><subsection id="id8479b24b02324f82bf519acad3e7cb98"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Following the completion of the strategy required by section 132, the President shall prohibit the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of covered items to the People's Republic of China.</text></subsection><subsection id="idcc8104d527ea40d093cc8a44e79ec132"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Additional controls</header><text>The President may prescribe such additional regulations and export controls as are necessary to carry out the strategy required by section 132.</text></subsection><subsection id="id9f7ebe38c75d474f9796af05e6053c1a"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Waivers</header><text>The President may waive the application of controls under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to a covered item if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of the covered item is in the national security interests of the United States.</text></subsection><subsection id="id0D857061A9B64E169B27FE6946F77EBF"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text><paragraph id="idBDA131B19E8749E1BDEE0EF2DD79E763"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idE327596116B5463DB9597135B9A34BF8"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. </text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id396f4aebfd6f4dd4b7fef456c8aec613"><enum>134.</enum><header>Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People's Republic of China</header><subsection id="id642f3c33bff44c4ab0006d371ee6a12f"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report required</header><text>Not later than May 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, in concurrence with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China. </text></subsection><subsection id="idA8764BFF81374F3FB63BBEF588F684AD"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents</header><text>The report required by subsection (a) shall include—</text><paragraph id="ide8764aa5828d4c63965e22a8240d5bbe"><enum>(1)</enum><text>a detailed assessment of the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb9036d8d1f024be8915bb9e636c35c81"><enum>(2)</enum><text>a detailed assessment of year-by-year technological development efforts by the People's Republic of China in the fields of semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans and initiatives;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idbe2bc42920c440778585cdcc178f79db"><enum>(3)</enum><text>a detailed assessment of engagement between the People's Republic of China and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id07d91921583647ed978dceb14fcad518"><enum>(4)</enum><text>an analysis of the impact of United States and allied export controls on covered items on development of semiconductor manufacturing in the People's Republic of China; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9a07f5ca17ca4cc4a00feebf388a93b9"><enum>(5)</enum><text>an assessment of whether such export controls remain effective in curbing the development of semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities in the People's Republic of China.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id4b1a1f0b138c450788e4d6f5420c2499"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Form</header><paragraph id="id8173495568FB461FB353C1447DFD48B2"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idEAD9F78C612A4A07B207E9817C7CC59D"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Public availability</header><text>The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly accessible internet website of the Federal Government.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id3F7077C77383448B96EA01207AFF7947"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text><paragraph id="id9FAB920762524B079BAC7B257670E479"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2E1917E4242B4BC2BC7609E418176B46"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. </text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idc19fb516730046069b226f82ab99cb9f"><enum>135.</enum><header>Supply chain coordination</header><subsection id="id23AAC05553BB47FBA1A21B4EB9A35C29"><enum>(a)</enum><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the United States is coordinating with its partners and allies—</text><paragraph id="idE179CC73B3884A129A5758F738B715B2"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to secure global supply chains, including supply chains for—</text><subparagraph id="id86B2E43E74B442A78AFD6499096E58D3"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2C7620AA57F1482695D0EBEB8C1C6785"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">large capacity batteries, including batteries for electric vehicles;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idAE3BC6E56C78438C91A45C92712E1E3E"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">critical minerals; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idBF6C3A58651642619C56483EF9F5CEC4"><enum>(D)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients; </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id1C52E3C83264430ABA35DF4FE181FEFD"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to develop common standards for transparent, trusted, and sustainable supply chains; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id5A3066497D354C5BA7822D8E78D7852B"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to end reliance on the People's Republic of China for such supply chains.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idDD776AD72A6E4303AB4A7F3F5FB47D1E"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text><paragraph id="id433D5A5B162B4318838D227C2D25444A"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id8EB22C3D53CA43A98D15E54A4869718E"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. </text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="ided6c6bd0a8524ecbbc218683f7f986a2"><enum>136.</enum><header>Statement of policy on international cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and coordinate with foreign governments (at the national and subnational levels), civil society, international organizations, international financial institutions, subnational communities, commercial and recreational mining industry leaders, and the private sector, in a concerted effort—</text><paragraph id="ida592e00d65b940cc90459ef29feb3c96"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to increase knowledge and raise awareness of the links between mining and refining of critical minerals, national security, climate change, and clean energy development;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id56ae47bd146a4c7da57bb554431923ef"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to improve, in countries in which such mining and refining is conducted, resource mobilization and processing, transport, and mineral refining capacity; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idA7EFE190E8C945E3B2F5D1CA69DC0079"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to develop other strategies to maximize economic benefits from critical mineral resource development for the countries and communities in which such development takes place; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb2141814b2834c37875d549dfd8194cd"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to promote transparency and combat— </text><subparagraph id="idA9FAE4B7DE9C410181B1F7B7E23B280E"><enum>(A)</enum><text>human rights abuses, exploitive labor practices, and corruption within the critical mineral extraction industry; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id81BC7927D3444A29BAF481E812C32DB0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the influence the industry has on poor governance, democratic backsliding, and declines in the rule of law;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id866ea4812e744406a50342ae78378507"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to support—</text><subparagraph id="id7f90a7f311c84a0190979f1c31d045d8"><enum>(A)</enum><text>strengthening systems and bilateral and multilateral partnerships for reducing the monopolization of critical minerals and the exploitation of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry and reducing corruption as a means—</text><clause id="idee5e7e0c7fdd4e3fa95cbf36702c8e12"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to ensure the availability of critical minerals at competitive market-rate costs;</text></clause><clause id="id82bae06d7fd84481bb8ff7e29f36d9b1"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to uphold adequate labor standards to ensure critical minerals are not produced at the expense of the lives and livelihoods of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry; and</text></clause><clause id="idb85511b873d14fe3b3b3100dcaeba8f6"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>to maintain the integrity of institutions governing the extraction and refinement of critical minerals;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf6691033aa6440439b4f06c52363521a"><enum>(B)</enum><text>deployment of and access to advanced technologies to recycle critical minerals to extend use and application beyond a single use; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0c1c3ac8d5ac41b78e987917a9607f2a"><enum>(C)</enum><text>implementation of management measures to track and report instances of corruption and exploitation in the critical mineral extraction industry; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id4938f27d61f7426eabe0fba05634eb7d"><enum>(6)</enum><text>to work cooperatively with international partners—</text><subparagraph id="id4328c9708f9e42168605c85d4a00923d"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to ensure that the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has full unimpeded and uninfluenced access to global critical mineral industrial operations;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7df447b4098144e38cec8a6e81364d3d"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to establish—</text><clause id="id7a7d93a6727343e48a0f7dbd03a47812"><enum>(i)</enum><text>an alliance to counter any state or private monopolization on the control, supply chains, or industrial processing and extraction of critical mineral resources;</text></clause><clause id="id4169a375c9e445a7bf689c562f164c84"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>measurable targets for reducing corruption and exploitation of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry; and</text></clause><clause id="ida35e720e3f194c6884e0b20803319be8"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>action plans to achieve such targets and a mechanism to provide regular reporting;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id253b8d4f25334f3091eb884a71494649"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to promote consumer education, awareness, and outreach on exploitation of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="iddca00a60ef8447d58dd9b2637a9644d9"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to share best practices in materials management and industrial systems operations to maximize the benefit of critical mineral resources.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="idf0b9984943bf45d2ad8223c91fa189b6"><enum>137.</enum><header>Prioritization of efforts and assistance to secure critical mineral supply chains</header><subsection id="id8b272af2040d49efb3bffa6fdeff5e9f"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies—</text><paragraph id="ida651e236d6d4406db73d58ace624eed6"><enum>(1)</enum><text>lead and coordinate efforts to implement the policy described in section 136; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id993ce5b8235c4feea8fd7c58a72002d6"><enum>(2)</enum><text>develop strategies and implement programs that prioritize engagement and cooperation with foreign governments, subnational, national, and local stakeholders and the private sector to expedite efforts and assistance in foreign countries—</text><subparagraph id="id7e867eef3de442e4a4f076cd9697f19e"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to partner with, encourage, and advise national and subnational governments on the development and execution, where practicable, of projects, programs, and initiatives—</text><clause id="id483a2a1a41fc48b886eb32d49da6e6a4"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to improve the capacity, security, and standards of operations of critical minerals supply chains;</text></clause><clause id="id78d9094c3917413aacbc68d7dd787d01"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to monitor and track how well critical minerals supply chains are functioning internationally, based on uniform and transparent standards developed in cooperation with municipal, industrial, and civil society stakeholders; and</text></clause><clause id="id059b8c4c41c24462875f56132e5aa501"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>to conduct outreach campaigns to raise public awareness of the importance of proper management and oversight of critical mineral supply chains;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id60d0a799e3494f0d9412b4b85f86b520"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to partner with and provide technical assistance to investors and national and international institutions, including private sector actors, to develop new business opportunities and solutions to uphold the highest standards in critical mineral supply chains and implement best practices in foreign countries by—</text><clause id="idc570ed0830164a6a9aa78f8f9a41c262"><enum>(i)</enum><text>improving and expanding the capacity of foreign industries to responsibly employ extractive industry management practices;</text></clause><clause id="id7afbffe638f24c3ca2bd895ec29c8ecc"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>improving and expanding the capacity and transparency of tracking mechanisms for critical minerals to reduce exploitation and corruption;</text></clause><clause id="id9f5037a8dae548f88b396ff911507dbb"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>eliminating incentives that undermine responsible supply chain management; and</text></clause><clause id="id2e96e58b55e744279d5fc52cc0fdcb9e"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>building the capacity of countries—</text><subclause id="id3e849a0463f544489be6edf1ece724dd"><enum>(I)</enum><text>to reduce, monitor, regulate, and manage the extraction, refinement, and transport of critical minerals appropriately and transparently; and</text></subclause><subclause id="idd36563f102fd424fa7b5ba78a9fb3b5a"><enum>(II)</enum><text>to encourage private investment in critical mineral extraction and refinement.</text></subclause></clause></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idE3258592BBC94DECA6C5D88A41C3546D"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Prioritization</header><text>In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall prioritize assistance to countries and regional organizations in regions with—</text><paragraph id="id77ff2878e0644fd78a97c19ae9d1651f"><enum>(1)</enum><text>rapidly developing economies; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc4876342e4a246479d52dd2793097e58"><enum>(2)</enum><text>past instances of human rights abuses, exploitation, and corruption.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id21b3d5d1e10d4593900c593eee309e37"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Effectiveness measurement</header><text>In prioritizing and expediting efforts and assistance under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of assistance in achieving the policy described in section 136.</text></subsection></section><section id="ide4a0cff233ae471e941ce2ab2c01bf2a"><enum>138.</enum><header>Leveraging international support</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">In implementing the policy described in section 136, the President shall direct the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent with the broad development goals of the United States—</text><paragraph id="id77fb47d704df456b948dcdfad7ca7993"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to work with countries and the private sector to break up the monopolization of critical mineral industries;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id33503c708c304c2c932738e52227f199"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to commit to promoting transparent private sector development in the critical minerals sector;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9e7dd788a8684ee1ab6919d7b651d4d5"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to enhance coordination with the private sector to increase access to critical minerals;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id19174b8adc6c49949814ecba1ff9a5a3"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to provide technical assistance to the regulatory authorities of countries that are members of the body to remove unnecessary barriers to investment; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id503f1398e5e64c8b81179ca97d7c03a6" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of such actions. </text></paragraph></section></subtitle><enum>II</enum><header>Compete</header><subtitle id="id08BB26DE2A6E4806B115C074BD5365C1" style="OLC"><enum>A</enum><header>Infrastructure</header><section id="id6f8a9e1dd49c407abd45dfe821433c80"><enum>201.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on the Build Back Better World initiative</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="id7432e18f53304f00874eb9df5e639d09"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States should exercise leadership in the Build Back Better World initiative of the Group of Seven (G7) to mobilize public and private sector capital and expertise toward meeting the infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries, estimated to exceed $40,000,000,000,000, over the next two decades;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id35801CB2B7F849119B35D1E7951C160D"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the initiative should also advance strategic objectives, including—</text><subparagraph id="id20796ffc4acc4ba495ec54c1724c2ce0"><enum>(A)</enum><text>strengthening partnerships with emerging market and developing countries to promote quality, transparent infrastructure investment that also supports good governance and the rule of law;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id522b734d5a604e739ccd0c7eef63a349"><enum>(B)</enum><text>combating climate change through sustainable infrastructure projects that aid partner countries in the transition to net zero emissions, reduce their vulnerabilities to climate change, and improve their resilience;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id89b3c8d4e16840ce9878ee3de9be0b99"><enum>(C)</enum><text>promoting public health and health security through infrastructure projects that increase the availability, accessibility, and affordability of health care in partner countries;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6dcd6d3a26164953b5e70dbbe79d34ea"><enum>(D)</enum><text>increasing internal and external connections in digital, transportation, and energy infrastructure in partner countries;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idedb5287ae24645ae8faa27954fce4da7"><enum>(E)</enum><text>improving education, economic opportunities, and standards of living in marginalized communities in partner countries, including for women and girls, racial and ethnic minorities, individuals with disabilities, individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (commonly referred to as <quote>LGBTQ+</quote>), and individuals with low incomes; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0687700128e94f53bd0aa2a121e4a673"><enum>(F)</enum><text>providing partners a principled, sustainable alternative to exploitative, coercive, and harmful infrastructure investments; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id0ead485a4cb4476087799cbb85bcb6fe"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States should establish a Build Back Better World Task Force—</text><subparagraph id="id87a147cfe11941fd9e2e4ec8d4b3e2ec"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to coordinate its development finance agencies, such as the United States International Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Trade and Development Agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the United States Agency for International Development;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id77a84b3d6829404eba7a34aaad159ab9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to engage international partners such as the G7, multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, multinational corporations and banks, non-governmental organizations, and other industrial-country partners;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id009911be59b94f5fafcb13aa4a412b0d"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to leverage other development finance institutions, such as the Blue Dot Network, the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, and the Transaction Advisory Fund; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc286a61d5bee4b1c8b3b13ea9f98923a"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to produce strategic guidance that identifies international infrastructure projects and details implementation plans, including—</text><clause id="idd2c896bc153d4b85867dd2d5d0013c66"><enum>(i)</enum><text>an explanation of how each infrastructure project advances the strategic objectives described in paragraph (2);</text></clause><clause id="id25fb4a2bb2924d8594a6897e89ffaadb"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>a description of consultations, criteria, and justification for such projects;</text></clause><clause id="idef0c88569ee746e7930f1afa5c22ea48"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>distribution of such projects across economic sectors and geographical regions;</text></clause><clause id="id7e7e82d7d131455bacb415a4bb4ef46e"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>budget estimates, proposed sources of financing, and required appropriations for such projects;</text></clause><clause id="idb0f902e2b8d94f4d99539e348e10d9d1"><enum>(v)</enum><text>lists of timelines and contractual parties and their respective rights and responsibilities with respect to such projects; and</text></clause><clause id="id7385512a7cdd4354a6c9635b6a0463cc" commented="no"><enum>(vi)</enum><text>certification that such projects—</text><subclause commented="no" id="idA1FAFF82AC264AC1BD0E94E166733709"><enum>(I)</enum><text>meet specified standards, such as those of the Blue Dot Network; and </text></subclause><subclause commented="no" id="id0BDD1DE5B70E4FFAB7E31A6F6B36CE92"><enum>(II)</enum><text>will not have negative impacts on the environment, local communities, national sovereignty, or economic growth.</text></subclause></clause></subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="idD00587905A834015AF06928BCE59E365"><enum>202.</enum><header>Office of Strategic Investments in United States International Development Finance Corporation</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline"> The BUILD Act of 2018 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/9601">22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.</external-xref>) is amended—</text><paragraph id="idBC21A5B784834AE89710E97D7D8E6ABF"><enum>(1)</enum><text>in section 1413 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/9613">22 U.S.C. 9613</external-xref>)—</text><subparagraph id="ida768cf0a17e44b948b6c17a9372e6fb8"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in subsection (a), by inserting <quote>a Strategic Investments Officer,</quote> after <quote>Development Officer,</quote>; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id01913EE5C1B64168B30B1D0D24CECCE0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>in subsection (g)(2)(F), by striking <quote>subsection (i)</quote> and inserting <quote>subsection (j)</quote>;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id29dc58a7cfa04063857a036486af5599"><enum>(C)</enum><text>by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections (i) and (j), respectively; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8D69A7CBDEE6450DA2E57017ADEA0DBA"><enum>(D)</enum><text>by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id153e13cfde7741289333790cb342688f"><subsection id="id24f9b9cde73343cc903888a755cd5b23"><enum>(h)</enum><header>Strategic Investments Officer</header><paragraph id="idf7a8592aa01b455a9caeac1878163aec"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Appointment</header><text>Subject to the approval of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer shall appoint a Strategic Investments Officer from among individuals with experience in international economic policy, who—</text><subparagraph id="ideb18014ac849485c8aa325994d3cfc46"><enum>(A)</enum><text>shall report directly to the Board; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2501fa3943ab40dd965578c3855c774c"><enum>(B)</enum><text>shall be removable only by a majority vote of the Board.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="iddb5e76c23ef8489294694a56b253332c"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Duties</header><text>The Strategic Investments Officer shall—</text><subparagraph id="idef390000af9d496dad3ff2fd74bc358b"><enum>(A)</enum><text>coordinate efforts to develop the Corporation’s initiatives—</text><clause id="idF07867ADD8F14A1C8EBBB2F7713003BE"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to counter predatory state-directed investment and coercive economic practices of adversaries of the United States; and </text></clause><clause id="id198ED103275740548724E4E4F869BE0B"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to preserve the sovereignty of partner countries;</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2db6875af5ad4807807271c092f9a6a9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>coordinate the Corporation's strategic investment policies and implementation efforts with the Department of State, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Trade and Development Agency, and other relevant United States Government departments and agencies, including by directly liaising with missions of the Department of State to ensure that departments, agencies, and missions have training, awareness, and access to the Corporation's tools with respect to strategic investment policy and projects;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id64679262e72c4fa6a0b747cbe26c740f"><enum>(C)</enum><text>manage the responsibilities of the Corporation under section 1442(b)(5) and paragraphs (1)(C) and (3)(C) of section 1443(b);</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd1f83842605e48b3b321734b8a61b365"><enum>(D)</enum><text>support the Chief Development Officer in coordinating and implementing the activities of the Corporation under section 1445; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id97cb026af006418ca83dacf7e4cef7db"><enum>(E)</enum><text>be an ex officio member of the Development Advisory Council established under subsection (j), and attend each meeting of the Council.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><after-quoted-block>; </after-quoted-block></quoted-block></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id67b23feb05fe446fbdcca023075bf928"><enum>(E)</enum><text>in subsection (i)(3)(C), as so redesignated, by striking <quote>subsection (i)</quote> and inserting <quote>subsection (j)</quote>; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5F9E6CB815C44267A12B66F1A44699F2"><enum>(F)</enum><text>by adding at the end the following new subsection:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id9d3fac394e59431bbed9719a83e2e9c6"><subsection id="id327825efb74349b18dbb32363fdf7226"><enum>(k)</enum><header>Strategic Investments Advisory Council</header><paragraph id="id81bec3e16dbf48d6aa46e6decc4f42e3"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>There is established a Strategic Investments Advisory Council (in this subsection referred to as the <quote>Council</quote>) to advise the Board on strategic investment objectives of the Corporation.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ide772591399b04764a0d3b4b9f07d27f8"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Membership</header><text>Members of the Council shall be appointed by the Board, on the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer and the Strategic Investment Officer, and shall be composed of not more than 9 members from the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idcbc084ebc91b447d9eee46f806f7fded"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Functions</header><text>The Board shall call upon members of the Council, either collectively or individually, to advise the Board regarding the extent to which the Corporation is meeting the strategic investment goals of the United States and any suggestions for improvements with respect to such goals, including opportunities in countries and project development and implementation challenges and opportunities.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idd9c0311dd60c4e80bbc61d880eb9e251"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Federal Advisory Committee Act</header><text>The Council shall not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).</text></paragraph></subsection><after-quoted-block>;</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id1647c9ab841544058ef19a2d248c3864"><enum>(2)</enum><text>in section 1442 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/9652">22 U.S.C. 9652</external-xref>)—</text><subparagraph id="id5CE69E9321834962A129E1394EAB71B0"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in subsection (b)—</text><clause id="idFF388872507245BE9C7D0EEFC5C9A97E"><enum>(i)</enum><text>in paragraph (3), by striking <quote>; and</quote> and inserting a semicolon;</text></clause><clause id="id382478B3FF8247B9A118747C96D7FB05"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>in paragraph (4)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting <quote>; and</quote>; and</text></clause><clause id="idBE22B60C12EA45C2AEA44ECB8D1E6E34"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>by adding at the end the following new paragraph:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id562e84c35eec4096a329070a03e42b36"><paragraph id="id47a8f03c6b9c4fdfa87b7b14b84ff45b"><enum>(5)</enum><text>develop standards for, and a method for ensuring, appropriate strategic investment metrics of the Corporation’s portfolio.</text></paragraph><after-quoted-block>; and</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id545BFA70CC8041DF878FB742AA96F7CC"><enum>(B)</enum><text>in subsection (d), by striking <quote>1413(i)</quote> and inserting <quote>1413(j)</quote>; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="ide167e0a68a284b8fba7b858406691326"><enum>(3)</enum><text>in section 1443 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/9653">22 U.S.C. 9653</external-xref>)—</text><subparagraph id="id2057826C065E4C5E8FAF09ECC9811F11"><enum>(A)</enum><text>in subsection (a)—</text><clause id="id7BCE1C90D0C74C9AAE2D079528A4DC74"><enum>(i)</enum><text>in paragraph (3), by striking <quote>; and</quote> and inserting a semicolon;</text></clause><clause id="id3F9E8FD3A9B64C0698247245A6418B4A"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting <quote>; and</quote>; and </text></clause><clause id="idC5AE913C730C4ED9B1F5F846DD80CF8C"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>by adding at the end the following new paragraph: </text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idca99dcd667cf44d28eb9f2c7a687438a"><paragraph id="idb88b1aafcccb46f2a4e0e377ccf50796"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the impact of the strategic investments made by the Corporation, which shall be included in a classified annex.</text></paragraph><after-quoted-block>; and</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc7bc350d98b84f65a5ecb1a02f3e9535"><enum>(B)</enum><text>in subsection (b)—</text><clause id="idB50A6CF5C1574AE580ADA698A33DF8FC"><enum>(i)</enum><text>in paragraph (1)—</text><subclause id="idE41927D226FA454280C268A13E163FDE"><enum>(I)</enum><text>in subparagraph (A), by striking <quote>; and</quote> and inserting a semicolon;</text></subclause><subclause id="idC18A93F22D504B8383FF8BCA92B8D98A"><enum>(II)</enum><text>in subparagraph (B), by adding <quote>and</quote> at the end; and</text></subclause><subclause id="idD577A7A9290043C58CFA66D156CB6768"><enum>(III)</enum><text>by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id6f132d6f3d32475f999a75a5102d38ee"><subparagraph id="id1c8731ac768d4e10a4b2db2211b30fd4"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the impact of the Corporation’s strategic investment efforts on United States foreign policy goals;</text></subparagraph><after-quoted-block>; and</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></subclause></clause><clause id="id556ca2ea001d465189a8513ee6e82c3a"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>in paragraph (3)—</text><subclause id="idA5BFDA4078134ACC95DB3C18FC713B1C"><enum>(I)</enum><text>in subparagraph (A), by striking <quote>; and</quote> and inserting a semicolon; and</text></subclause><subclause id="idD96106F2E0C04F00AAFC84C97C4A92D7"><enum>(II)</enum><text>by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id2d40d761682b4e9fb8dd9fa8416ce368"><subparagraph id="id2267ebb6ac7d4718ab4c22532be3cde1"><enum>(C)</enum><text>outcomes of the strategic investments portfolio, and whether or not such investments are meeting the foreign policy objectives of the United States; and</text></subparagraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></subclause></clause></subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="id153979ec30b64e02b15b407a74eba73b"><enum>203.</enum><header>Prohibition on transfer of sovereign loan guarantees to United States International Development Finance Corporation</header><subsection id="id9f8122ccc7084c898e2671aa2837f3eb"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Section 1463(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/9683">22 U.S.C. 9683(c)(1)</external-xref>) is amended by striking <quote>the Corporation or any other appropriate department or agency of the United States Government</quote> and inserting <quote>any appropriate department or agency of the United States Government (other than the Corporation)</quote>.</text></subsection><subsection id="ide3d3c8eade0d4daeac523243d0634b81"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Effective date</header><text>The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/9601">22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.</external-xref>).</text></subsection></section><section id="id699B108C48794D88A1BDAD3EABFBBF80"><enum>204.</enum><header>Strategy for promoting and strengthening nearshoring</header><subsection id="id3b6ebc8f904a4e3c82687e3267a156cf"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text><paragraph id="id1101e546a920457696ebbb7357bccc2c"><enum>(1)</enum><text>In 2019, the People’s Republic of China was the top supplier of goods imported into the United States, providing significant quantities of rare earth minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, medical equipment, and other goods vital to the economic prosperity and national security of the United States.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idee5a574e594e4e638585fa43810fc884"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The COVID–19 pandemic and production outages and shipping disruptions in the People’s Republic of China have jeopardized worldwide access to critical goods, contributing to an unprecedented, ongoing supply chain crisis that has exposed the severe risks of concentrating global supply chains in the People’s Republic of China and demonstrated the need for the United States to increase supply chain resiliency and diversity through reshoring and nearshoring initiatives.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf0731a9befa54c509e76008d7ac01f48"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Relocating supply chains from the People’s Republic of China to Latin America and the Caribbean is in the commercial and security interests of the United States and offers several significant advantages for the United States Government and United States entities, including—</text><subparagraph id="idb8217289ecb04177bdc873cb9171ac85"><enum>(A)</enum><text>reduced transit times to markets in the United States, which will lower freight costs, enable quicker adaptability to fluctuating consumer demand, and lessen the large carbon footprint of current supply chains;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idca9328fda1d741b4a26a5fca41ec7e60"><enum>(B)</enum><text>having supply chains located in countries with which the United States has longstanding bilateral ties and shared democratic values, lessening the risk of geopolitical disruptions to supply chains; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id553d10827b614526bd40a049aa3b4143"><enum>(C)</enum><text>having supply chains located in countries with existing comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing key critical goods that cannot be entirely sourced from or manufactured in the United States, including rare earth minerals, pharmaceuticals, medical goods, and semiconductors.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idfb9f1e7634ab4f76a2737bb8e8936597"><enum>(4)</enum><text>Switching 15 percent of United States imports from its top 10 source countries outside of the Western Hemisphere to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would increase the exports of the region by approximately $72,000,000,000 annually, helping the region recover from the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic while also reducing pressures encouraging migration to the United States.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idaa66b81c167e4f1f9c5dc4aeaf2acdfe"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Statement of policy</header><text>It shall be the policy of the United States— </text><paragraph id="idb8a445420671412cb5e45dbe59bcf278"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to work with allies and partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere to achieve more resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idbd4c5a444c434462a6b8252f13d68074"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to pursue nearshoring initiatives to relocate supply chains to Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly for products unlikely to be sourced or manufactured in the United States, while simultaneously pursuing reshoring initiatives to increase domestic production in the United States; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idafa25caae946406ca45ca7251d196e5a"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to engage with regional governments, multilateral development banks, and the private sector to develop and advance joint efforts to incentivize entities to relocate supply chains to, and strengthen supply chains within, the Western Hemisphere.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idab9c6769196e475284cc0fb2e5d8aaaa"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Strategy</header><text>The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall develop and implement a strategy to increase supply chain resiliency and security by promoting and strengthening nearshoring efforts to relocate supply chains from the People’s Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.</text></subsection><subsection id="id85e853f6013249aa9fcb3827a48d11f7"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The strategy required under subsection (c) shall—</text><paragraph id="id6c697ffd926241e8937f0effd8633037"><enum>(1)</enum><text>be informed by consultations with the governments of allies and partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and labor organizations and trade unions in the United States;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idbc80bb186c1544639498f335383d8614"><enum>(2)</enum><text>provide a description of how reshoring and nearshoring initiatives can be pursued in a complementary fashion to strengthen the national interests of the United States;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id0ec5a9a06ec447edba65c8bd21bfac6e"><enum>(3)</enum><text>include an assessment of—</text><subparagraph id="id5E80E9C7A13E481F885C7535A4FC9B5A"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the status and effectiveness of current efforts by regional governments, multilateral development banks, and the private sector to promote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0A1655DFECF34026998200AF64E99505"><enum>(B)</enum><text>major challenges hindering those efforts; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idB82FAA5ECEED4991A6832F29724EB1F2"><enum>(C)</enum><text>how the United States can strengthen the effectiveness of those efforts;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id1c453e6fd9b84243b2d9d5372f5a3a71"><enum>(4)</enum><text>identify countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing critical goods and countries with the greatest nearshoring opportunities;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idfae112d4c4fc4c14aea3f5ac5a0024d3"><enum>(5)</enum><text>identify how activities by the United States Agency for International Development and the United States International Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to strengthen and promote nearshoring to Latin America and the Caribbean;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf337a9ecf4e34729af4b18c0ea4d3397"><enum>(6)</enum><text>advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific national commitments by governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions for nearshoring in the region, including commitments—</text><subparagraph id="idE8239B7DC53A431DB9CCD2C8971A6B95"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to develop formalized national nearshoring strategies;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id978AB4EFC0284F25B8FD893A2EC343F0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to address corruption and rule of law concerns; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2BA1F280E78A48179D32FE5A5EED6676"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to modernize digital and physical infrastructure;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id951450B145F04B0E857E53AE8A8A5644"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to lower trade barriers;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idCB0BB693D3F6406CBEB95508D0BC681E"><enum>(E)</enum><text>to improve ease of doing business; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id32253A3FA7FB40D9A41AF3B1A1655016"><enum>(F)</enum><text>to finance and incentivize nearshoring initiatives;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id8da38acdafb2402cb56f1352d2650a75"><enum>(7)</enum><text>advance diplomatic initiatives to harmonize standards and regulations, expedite customs operations, and facilitate economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id61200ed7aa454718bf3fe0056cf9790e"><enum>(8)</enum><text>develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize, or otherwise promote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the assessments and identifications made pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs—</text><subparagraph id="id7B6133079E2647098B3F4B0DE8847B9E"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to develop physical and digital infrastructure;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idECF20AD20DBD4340BB5B500104D24956"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to promote transparency in procurement processes;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3927AD89D8F94DA99E9B06C68DC07568"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to provide technical assistance in implementing national nearshoring strategies;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2B035828724442928650C6868A5999FD"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to mobilize private investment; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id80E46432191D4556ADE513ACA875E3C0"><enum>(E)</enum><text>to secure commitments by private sector entities to relocate supply chains from the People’s Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id212d49a82f6149e684a2892a0b23c584"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Coordination with multilateral development banks</header><text>In implementing the strategy required under subsection (c), the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall coordinate with the United States Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank and the United States Executive Director to the World Bank.</text></subsection><subsection id="id62faf07fc6334b4ca663cf081efcbccc" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Annual report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives the strategy required under subsection (c) and a description of progress made in the implementation of that strategy. </text></subsection></section><section id="iddf76488d3d63434e837c9d81ad6c9635"><enum>205.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on the Blue Dot Initiative</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline"> It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="ide7e663868cb249cab7b6200da1064333"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Blue Dot Network helps public and private investors finance infrastructure projects that are inclusive, transparent, sustainable, environmentally and socially responsible, and compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb657d0cdfea0446b8af0f58e0c92f653"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Blue Dot Network helps mitigate threats such as the predatory infrastructure investment practices of the People's Republic of China and critical shortfalls in global infrastructure financing;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc143036fddaf49d8973eb27e8c2af6eb"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the Blue Dot Network advances the interests of the United States through setting principal international standards, but also requires sufficient investments in other tools of economic statecraft such as the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to be effective;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id7e7f0693f3214c66b2272ba99956b821"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States International Development Finance Corporation should deepen its cooperation with Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia to promote the Blue Dot Network and finance certified projects;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id001059c643cb40a3a3155be4885e9876"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development must continue to update and refine its methodologies and metrics for infrastructure project certification based on guidelines such as the Group of Twenty (G20) Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id289601529a7843fd8ee7b9251e714a85"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the Blue Dot Network must complement other principled development finance initiatives such as the Infrastructure Technology and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory Fund of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id4908C19CB68D40858320DCDE35EFE927"><enum>(7)</enum><text>future development finance initiatives should build on the foundations of the initiatives described in paragraph (6); and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9bfdb0981a6e409ab2208cc591fbe807"><enum>(8)</enum><text>the governments of other countries committed to good governance, international law, and infrastructure investment should work with the Blue Dot Network to certify infrastructure projects and attract public and private sector investments.</text></paragraph></section><section id="id8ca42bbe772044b38cb44a2412b92ddb"><enum>206.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on the Three Seas Initiative</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="id7f8c13c294f94dcd9ddb5852ebd2d236"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Three Seas Initiative promotes security, economic integration, modernization, and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe through critical investments energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id1377a46527f14b7690b1ef1e8ccadccd"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States International Development Finance Corporation should finalize its approved investment of $300,000,000 and approve an additional $700,000,000 investment in the Three Seas Initiative to fulfill its 2020 commitments;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2f35866485054f4b9588cb03fe8548c8"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Central and Eastern Europe must develop better north-south infrastructure and economic integration to break the dominance by the Russian Federation of east-west trade corridors and regional energy supplies;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id644c674fb43b4097ba891a12ba9ce414"><enum>(4)</enum><text>in the wake of the premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the Three Seas Initiative has never been more important for the security of its 12 participants: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id0627b5cb87224398970e45c456d5c9c3"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the Three Seas Initiative should prioritize construction of regional liquid natural gas terminals that can help diversify the region’s energy supplies and reduce the malign influence of the Russian Federation;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idbe44a3b25b124f79b2a36470855bc276"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the People’s Republic of China’s $14,000,000,000 of infrastructure investments in the region have degraded the environment, eroded the rule of law, infringed upon state sovereignty, and pose a national security threat;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida374b7f3d3a941a5a4365ae420b44fa3"><enum>(7)</enum><text>the Digital Economy Cooperation Initiative should cooperate with the Three Seas Initiative to further modernize the region’s economy and develop the regions digital, communications, and financial infrastructure;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id642de77d5a49427fa154d2567882d77c"><enum>(8)</enum><text>the European Union has made substantial contributions to the objectives of the Three Seas Initiative and should continue to do so through mechanisms such as the Connecting Europe Facility; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9477f56eee104bc5b858d5679fc726bd"><enum>(9)</enum><text>the United States should encourage regional initiatives such as the Three Seas Initiative to galvanize public and private sector investments in regional infrastructure projects that adhere to environmental, equitable, social, and sustainable standards. </text></paragraph></section></subtitle><subtitle id="idD5CCCB9908544D02B6EE65A876EB3670" style="OLC"><enum>B</enum><header>Energy</header><section id="id56310F68ABE442A68382A5173AE667F9"><enum>211.</enum><header>Sense of Congress regarding United States engagement at the World Economic Forum</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should make climate finance commitments at the World Economic Forum.</text></section><section id="id404D6D63AF7046E8AD2CAC74545CDC96"><enum>212.</enum><header>Clean energy efforts of the United States International Development Finance Corporation</header><subsection id="id9C9B4ED7246E4CCB82B8CA51F801ABE2"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation shall strive to reduce the net carbon footprint of the Corporation’s entire investment portfolio to zero by 2028.</text></subsection><subsection id="id090B7EB409224ECBABB51E83E3FDDEEA"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Priority</header><text>In carrying out the goal described in subsection (a), the Chief Executive Officer shall prioritize projects in countries struggling with transitioning from carbon intensive electricity to clean energy.</text></subsection><subsection id="id84166239B5B741F0AD61FEC534A1438A"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Report</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Chief Executive Officer shall submit a report to Congress that describes the Corporation’s efforts to meet the goals described in subsections (a) and (b).</text></subsection></section><section id="id398C7BBB23C9462FB731DBD3D9CE9853"><enum>213.</enum><header>Consistency in United States policy on development finance and climate change</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States to ensure that its engagement with multilateral international financial institution’s is consistent with United States policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to achieve worldwide net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.</text></section><section id="idA3D45C3B35B3408799F2EA82EBDE9D8C"><enum>214.</enum><header>Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/2651a">22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)</external-xref>) is amended—</text><paragraph id="idDEDF070DE61440A29253361D4E08E0F0"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">in paragraph (1), by striking <quote>24</quote> and inserting <quote>25</quote>; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id3FDA4281D0F740FDB68F2D43FD378F81"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id5531B3BDBEBC4AEC8826D1FBBEE2FD0B"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id947D4566176E4EB8BCE362B5E0154DF0"><paragraph id="id15D31934ED5040EE8C50F2C124816489"><enum>(5)</enum><header>Assistant secretary of state for energy resources</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Subject to the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1), there is authorized to be established in the Department of State an Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources who shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for matters pertaining to the formulation and implementation of international policies—</text><subparagraph id="id678E908ECCC34F0685CB5FD486DA4C65"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to protect United States energy security interests; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id571F965956F345E8B23F074822BABED3"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to promote responsible global clean energy production.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></paragraph></section><section id="id354AFAB1AD0C482786B4F487DA1B12E5" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>215.</enum><header>United States and European Union cooperation on climate finance for developing countries</header><subsection id="id3221a5cab1a345d3af630341b4679800"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States should restore its historic alliance with countries of the European Union regarding climate action by renewing the commitment to advancing shared values, principles, goals, and global cooperation for addressing climate change and achieving the goals of the decision of the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in Paris December 12, 2015 (commonly known as the <quote>Paris Agreement</quote>).</text></subsection><subsection id="idb6c6b70264754879a2de583b988eb57c"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Discretionary clean energy development finance fund</header><text>The Chief Executive Officer of United States International Development Finance Corporation shall partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to establish the Discretionary Clean Energy Development Finance Fund.</text></subsection><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id239C91A581884C0B87C0BFB43FCD296D"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Energy transition assistance for Eastern Europe</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Title V of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/5451">22 U.S.C. 5451 et seq.</external-xref>) is amended by adding at the end the following:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id57C1ED9B09AF40508BFBA7F3E9E7F734"><section commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id76C4B11B74FA467C9DED78FAE6D95CF9"><enum>504.</enum><header>Assistance for Eastern European countries transitioning from fossil fuels to clean energy</header><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idD97D11DEFA814E7CAC3A74838AF55279"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Authorization of assistance</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to support workers and communities in Eastern European countries that are struggling with the transition from fossil fuel dependent economies to clean energy economies.</text></subsection><subsection display-inline="no-display-inline" commented="no" id="id8D19A4C771224658A45638A11318D79D"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2027, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the program authorized under subsection (a).</text></subsection></section><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></subsection><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id8273E5ED8CA74F45875CC7E9BA59E5BA"><enum>(d)</enum><header>United States-European Union Working Group</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Energy, shall seek to establish a formal United States-European Union Working Group that will develop a strategy to respond to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. </text></subsection></section></subtitle><subtitle id="id1F05A9A704BB48E4B152900A11B71C93" style="OLC"><enum>C</enum><header>Technology</header><section id="id12cb7bb4528149659b251f1d597b4172" commented="no"><enum>221.</enum><header>United States leadership and representation in standards-setting bodies</header><subsection id="id69195ed5d19843a08aa4d88c4d42476e" commented="no"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Statement of policy</header><text>It is the policy of the United States to ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—</text><paragraph id="id803dafebce1c4dfabedaa338c0f99587" commented="no"><enum>(1)</enum><text>providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id6aaf125da7e54258be8140c9b64269b9" commented="no"><enum>(2)</enum><text>modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idf0f42ecfed7e4980a6ecefb3ea82b0b4" commented="no"><enum>(3)</enum><text>enhancing United States leadership in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb563bc0f3a44453e8f20b38e009b6180" commented="no"><enum>(4)</enum><text>reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id59c3526f59c842d3af1143aea9b70c60" commented="no"><enum>(5)</enum><text>collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—</text><subparagraph id="idcbae782f333a443bb44953fb357ea662" commented="no"><enum>(A)</enum><text>crafting multilateral export control measures;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idb5ba968662714c44870b5d89955d99b6" commented="no"><enum>(B)</enum><text>building capacity for defense technology security;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0a1ecedd9b534fd38b98cb9ade1222c2" commented="no"><enum>(C)</enum><text>safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id99645c7c2baa40ecbbc9dda463b8afe4" commented="no"><enum>(D)</enum><text>ensuring diversification; and</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idb30110dd5bc94b6d92261966920edd11" commented="no"><enum>(6)</enum><text>designing major defense capabilities for export to allies and partners.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id5302049ad24c4764837c15f81b15456d" commented="no"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph commented="no" id="id07FC64C684354ECC9E984D31CB4F45CC"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States must lead in international bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that those technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2eb6b193d7af49d5af3499e97cd02228" commented="no"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as <quote>digital authoritarianism</quote>); </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idded0dea97d2042f9818ff97ef616e58d" commented="no"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida591875bacf3430fb49bcf786faf72b6" commented="no"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether those actors are governments or other entities, and that those actors do not threaten democratic governance or human rights; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id594a15dc6766479a9e2c6e9a87139742" commented="no"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the United States and its allies and partners should maintain participation and leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id02eec58a59194d68abf0cd2300899ed9" commented="no"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the United States should work with its allies and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc3f1bae8e3b640c2b6a18a5e4924fed3" commented="no"><enum>(7)</enum><text>the maintenance of a high standard of security in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners is a national security interest of the United States. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ida43a789f17b84f73a07fa18516b1dc4b" commented="no"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Enhancing representation and leadership of United States at international standards-Setting bodies</header><paragraph id="id76d8fb9e478e4ee8a44db56b604c96cb" commented="no"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President shall—</text><subparagraph id="id71554d1dd78f4e5c88f219b6f73a0ff1" commented="no"><enum>(A)</enum><text>establish an interagency working group to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id67e842ca9ef841edacfe9757124c3f34" commented="no"><enum>(B)</enum><text>work with allies, partners, and the private sector to increase productive engagement with respect to the standards described in subparagraph (A).</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="ide9e32fc8a5854e149321c8a12e7d391a" commented="no"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Interagency working group</header><text>The interagency working group described in paragraph (1) shall—</text><subparagraph id="id95484e8db625434ab78c5c147dcc5dd3" commented="no"><enum>(A)</enum><text>be chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5f4abb3d006f4d469c5c37ab78eb9a19" commented="no"><enum>(B)</enum><text>consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id93221c04647f42f98330db4dab459084" commented="no"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Briefings</header><subparagraph id="idb37653ee98d44213878b1c0f35a432c2" commented="no"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the interagency working group described in paragraph (1) shall provide a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that addresses—</text><clause id="id6082deb6e22a4661b8cd90b66e291e54" commented="no"><enum>(i)</enum><text>promotion of United States leadership at international standards-setting bodies for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, taking into account the different processes followed by the various international standard-setting bodies;</text></clause><clause id="id80448f32c2284ca7a8da62adcadb3768" commented="no"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks;</text></clause><clause id="idf9c2e4b1e7e5420390282dca6976d78d" commented="no"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>China’s presence and activities at international standards-setting bodies relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, including information on the differences in the scope and scale of China’s engagement at such bodies compared to engagement by the United States or its allies and partners and the security risks raised by Chinese proposals in such standards-setting bodies; and</text></clause><clause id="id23dadc8be134493e99b01a191ca3aff9" commented="no"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>engagement with private sector communications and information service providers, equipment developers, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and other private sector stakeholders to propose and develop secure standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure.</text></clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf8dd9e3efe594475a84fd6a0400efe71" commented="no"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Subsequent briefings</header><text>Upon receiving a request from the appropriate congressional committees, or as determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency working group described in paragraph (1), the interagency working group shall provide such committees an updated briefing that covers the matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A). </text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="ideb3df8cc310a4e61857ab84d0cc30f86"><enum>222.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on cooperation with the G20 Digital Economy Working Group</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="id45C89C8F92A2418B8B07C93FD2083392"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Group of Twenty (G20) Digital Economy Working Group advances national and international interests through promoting principled and practical standards; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id1CE259EAEE404135BD34C51FCF319F12"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the United States should continue to support, engage, and exercise leadership in the working group—</text><subparagraph id="idf5577263e07d41f58cc865ca5407a4f9"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of the $70,000,000,000 and growing global digital economy;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3ae5d73653e94ed88ba88858828bb54c"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to increase international digital connectivity and trade;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9e6952bcfa244c48a9aac1f3850bc7b3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to modernize the global economy with new technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, and machine learning;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd4303fa8db214257b12e5648f4d07595"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to protect cross border data flow and data free flow with trust;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9eba1d736577494abf3af23cebff4d5b"><enum>(E)</enum><text>to promote social inclusion through digital quality control, consumer protection, child protection, and equitable access to new technologies;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7a83711d06a24760a821753fc3a54e5a"><enum>(F)</enum><text>to improve efficiency and interoperability for technologies and regulations in the public sector; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3113331813fa4d9b9a65c73338f2ad9a"><enum>(G)</enum><text>to advance the past initiatives of the working group such Smart Cities, Digital Security, and the Connecting Humanity 2030 Initiative; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id851F78FB84C64C7391B4D96B02258113"><enum>(H)</enum><text>to enable progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="id96bec61f10264cd1a547a1c094b22841"><enum>223.</enum><header>Statement of policy on artificial intelligence and the global economy</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States—</text><paragraph id="idAFA0A532D37E44F49EEF267F9E18092C"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to prioritize diplomacy and international engagement in the artificial intelligence strategies and policies of the United States;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id59E7752B8BB34FC58684DA1231799219"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to prioritize artificial intelligence issues in United States diplomacy;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idC5B35749B27E4BF8AD8DE117F98D4188"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to collaborate with allies and partners to—</text><subparagraph id="id59ED3688750E40A7B0DC9D850F0F1807"><enum>(A)</enum><text>research, develop, produce, and invest in artificial intelligence technologies that support economic prosperity, collective security, democracy, and human rights;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idea923953b4d140479a778f403cb0da8d"><enum>(B)</enum><text>promote commitments and international law related to artificial intelligence that reflect shared values;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idD3737D72AC9A40A195828562D244699A"><enum>(C)</enum><text>ensure that artificial intelligence technologies are safe, secure, and trustworthy;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id68B936F4424D46EAA565C6C1CFF22753"><enum>(D)</enum><text>create and maintain artificial intelligence-related technical and institutional infrastructure;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id303E1FA83D62405D9893B5C9D39D121F"><enum>(E)</enum><text>share artificial intelligence-related data, technology, and knowledge, subject to appropriate safeguards and restrictions;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id610EDBFD90A54870852E8F2AC628468D"><enum>(F)</enum><text>prevent the unwanted transfer of sensitive artificial intelligence-related technical information;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id4BA4D24278824D98B12C3E72B2E67517"><enum>(G)</enum><text>coordinate artificial intelligence-related export controls and investment screening procedures; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idB93E09CD4D354693B5DAC03B6E168777"><enum>(H)</enum><text>educate and train new cohorts of artificial intelligence researchers, developers, and practitioners; </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id25ADAE15F2114D05BF2B2F6575069AF6"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to incorporate perspectives and expertise from industry, academia, and civil society into United States diplomatic activities related to artificial intelligence;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idcf74e2d39dab472db97227dabbf50134"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to engage with bilateral and multilateral organizations active in artificial intelligence research, development, and policy; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id52475c9cf4b04642906b54be0eafd2c6"><enum>(6)</enum><text>to use diplomacy and foreign assistance to support activities for deploying artificial intelligence that create broadly shared prosperity, account for relevant artificial intelligence safety and security concerns, and uphold human rights and democratic values. </text></paragraph></section><section id="id8d4faa0db8924b88b7c355461f7ae7b0"><enum>224.</enum><header>Diplomatic strategy for artificial intelligence</header><subsection id="id584995faf8bb47c18c3b79fa9834a815"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for United States diplomacy related to artificial intelligence.</text></subsection><subsection id="id152112bf69a541ecb671ad9419666214"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Contents</header><text>Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:</text><paragraph id="id0c315226443f42f1ad7f2a483cde36d5"><enum>(1)</enum><text>A review of relevant prior and ongoing initiatives, the outcomes of those initiatives, and key ongoing challenges to those initiatives.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id6e682af3add743be8388b163dc324653"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The objectives and priorities that will be used to guide the diplomacy of the United States Government related to artificial intelligence, including objectives and priorities related to each of the following:</text><subparagraph id="id6710d95802fa4ae79752da7fa69849ab"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Promoting human rights and democratic values in the development and deployment of artificial intelligence technologies, including by advancing relevant international law and principles.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id49e799615bfa404697fd47529d8a623e"><enum>(B)</enum><text>Deterring and disrupting malicious and oppressive uses of artificial intelligence.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id03f7a3a7d40342a79a5f127d7c9e3060"><enum>(C)</enum><text>Fostering United States collaboration with allies and partners in artificial intelligence research and development.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf6c110dd18174bc39bb2e177dc85d36e"><enum>(D)</enum><text>Developing appropriate technical standards, metrics, and measurement techniques for artificial intelligence.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8596314f721c4e758483e69e3518fe5b"><enum>(E)</enum><text>Mitigating safety risks of artificial intelligence. </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf273adc0e3034c238630acc0e85164f0"><enum>(F)</enum><text>Maintaining secure supply chains for artificial intelligence technology and its inputs, including computing hardware.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id677fbb6641854eea9744e0f0ddb204d9"><enum>(G)</enum><text>Ensuring the integrity of the artificial intelligence research and development activities of the United States and its allies and partners.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5137eaf19f1a4905b6c923aa67c8d656"><enum>(H)</enum><text>Ensuring the equitable deployment and adoption of artificial intelligence technology, including through trade, foreign assistance, and development finance.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7be80068dea943608db49e70ee7e40bc"><enum>(I)</enum><text>Involving the private sector and civil society.</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1647f1ca0aa64a59a9f6782135db1bd4"><enum>(J)</enum><text>Responding to the artificial intelligence activities and strategies of other countries, including the People's Republic of China.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id40d5257ff1a942e89978bb918941bd1a"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Specific, measurable indicators of progress corresponding to the objectives and priorities described in paragraph (2). </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc4903b1c663949ff817461f7af03a4e4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>For each strategy other than the first strategy required by subsection (a), an assessment of whether and how progress with respect to each of the indicators identified in the preceding strategy was realized.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2e749c0391724d00970ef4057c4442b0"><enum>(5)</enum><text>A detailed implementation plan, including timelines, designations of lead and supporting implementing entities of the United States Government, budgetary estimates (as applicable), and descriptions of any additional budgetary resources, technical expertise, legal authorities, or personnel needed for implementation of the strategy.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idd70940ee3ecd469381f52ac0161342a4"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Any other matters the Secretary considers relevant.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id2028ff96d0a74cb4b503e5e75aaac6ba"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Consultation</header><text>In preparing each strategy required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with—</text><paragraph id="idE226731AB9F84428BEE1D4B76DB4567A"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Secretary of Defense;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idCF696367A99444B7A371F2D1AED668E2"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Secretary of Homeland Security; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idA1342B0856DF4B2BA3DEA1D8E449549D"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the Secretary of Commerce; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id51EEAAF3BF7247D08B4C482E2FE55110"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the Secretary of Energy; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id35F9D1BDC34C4ED2A128DADE4C3AA69D"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the Director of the National Science Foundation; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idB5F070F085AA4231A4DBCFDC682333A0"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id0DA8B9D30202492088FEC7B256C163A1"><enum>(7)</enum><text>the heads of such other relevant Federal agencies and departments as the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id8C20569F8E0E44E9A1F920F39C9279ED"><enum>(8)</enum><text>such nongovernmental partners as the Secretary considers appropriate.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idb4d99befce194c12a223feb8ce1d22cb"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Form</header><text>Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. </text></subsection><subsection id="id7B1E778A546947D59AAF498A8C4E08A5"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Publication</header><text>The Secretary of State shall make each strategy required by subsection (a) (without its classified annex, if any) available on a publicly accessible website.</text></subsection><subsection id="ida58ec4cf667343809309eb4cdd596ebf"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Definition of appropriate congressional committees</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. </text></subsection></section><section id="idafe84fb2f06a4750bb60fd6872ce9204"><enum>225.</enum><header>International collaboration on research and development</header><subsection id="ida02e75ab7a214aa9b5efdacf7ef27f73"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress finds the following:</text><paragraph id="id5131889b43a64db688c6d5a45b034af9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Innovation in artificial intelligence and other emerging technology domains has become increasingly global. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, worldwide spending on research and development more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but less than <fraction>1/3</fraction> in 2018.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id12574c142b9449989798215b7fe3946c"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Many allies and partners of the United States are technological powers in their own right, with robust research and development activities and world-leading capabilities in fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, robotics, and biotechnology.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idbf8292fb83e4487da6c718aa0235f63f"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Adversaries of the United States, including the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Iran, also emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to <quote>leapfrog</quote> the United States into global leadership.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id8241d7cf541a4b59b66b31002177c988"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The United States and its allies and partners collectively control a much larger share of research and development activity than the People's Republic of China. Together, the United States and 6 like-minded countries, namely, Japan, Germany, South Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, account for more than <fraction>1/2</fraction> of global spending on research and development, while the People's Republic of China accounts for approximately <fraction>1/4</fraction>.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="ide0053d10343e4d728c9ce83b01803654"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The National Science Board’s <quote>Vision 2030</quote> report, issued in May 2020, states, <quote>Staying at the frontiers of discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly given the nation’s falling share of global knowledge production, paired with the rising importance and impact of international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-intensive industries.</quote>.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id4248ec31651e424989b2f664e66ebc07"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board reported, <quote>The U.S. Government could play a more effective role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering) partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships. … No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S. agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in international relations.</quote>.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb34e2d81c326457ba15528b346196f70"><enum>(7)</enum><text>As of March 2022, numerous Federal departments and offices administer joint research and development activities with international partners, including the Office of International Science and Engineering within the National Science Foundation, the Division of International Relations within the National Institutes of Health, and the Office of International Science & Technology Cooperation within the Department of Energy.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idcd9d587ad7414bf686094270d883c0fe"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="idcfdfa5f9d8de4c25b35a9387b73509cb"><enum>(1)</enum><text>international collaboration on research and development is critical to maintaining United States leadership in artificial intelligence and other critical technologies; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id6afc78a820464ec09172cbbfb4c6c73f"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Federal initiatives related to international collaboration on research and development should be—</text><subparagraph id="id7B9726D621CB4E96A60AF4C4C4F3F158"><enum>(A)</enum><text>consistently and adequately funded; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idF82567459E664515A590F852346F70C8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>coordinated across agencies to increase impact, minimize undue duplication, and ensure alignment with policies and strategic objectives of the United States.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idcfbf7388d2ba45959575c649e8e1e69f"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Government Accountability Office report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall prepare and release to the public a report that—</text><paragraph id="idaafee4b59e16474eb5635c8eb0b1ec92"><enum>(1)</enum><text>enumerates and describes all significant Federal initiatives related to international collaboration on research and development in emerging technologies in existence as of the date on which the report is released;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id36fa21ca548b489fb459738b2ebedbe0"><enum>(2)</enum><text>assesses whether those initiatives are equipped to achieve their stated goals;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id7532e8b0ca034f03b7edfc0fab46749a"><enum>(3)</enum><text>assesses whether those initiatives are properly managed and coordinated within and across Federal agencies; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id70862306e15a4797b7d1a840f4ff238b"><enum>(4)</enum><text>recommends appropriate actions with respect to paragraphs (1) through (3).</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id7b0b7fbc29524e2496195e757ee64383"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Independent report</header><paragraph id="id8a511b76e7c14af19db3aa3b7b8ff438"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into a contract with an appropriately qualified independent research entity, such as a federally funded research and development center or other nonprofit organization, to produce a report on Federal activities related to international collaboration on research and development.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc69c557ee4f144caa8d26c131272ae5a"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report described in paragraph (1) shall—</text><subparagraph id="idfc4d138eb1b04c88954a13cda9a2ecfb"><enum>(A)</enum><text>assess the effectiveness of Federal activities related to international collaboration conducted as of the date on which the report is produced;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6d4f6dfc6ba6454a97c46dc4650a2177"><enum>(B)</enum><text>identify key opportunities for enhanced collaboration on research and development with allies and partners of the United States;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id86a3893682da48b781b6daad54926839"><enum>(C)</enum><text>identify key challenges to United States collaboration on research and development with allies and partners;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id17cd4d64d1054164ab9d35e10651501d"><enum>(D)</enum><text>propose a Federal strategy and corresponding implementation plan for future Federal activities related to international collaboration on research and development; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id744fa745fc0d46399e52f4ce0c088b85"><enum>(E)</enum><text>recommend other appropriate actions for the Secretary of State, other officials of the Department of State, Congress, and other relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors, and identify any additional resources or legal authorities necessary to carry out such actions.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id83be2e8e170742c4a8741cfddc073bf3"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Completion</header><text>The contract described in paragraph (1) shall require delivery of the report described in that paragraph not later than 1 year after the date on which the contract is executed.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idA7EE43AAA1704A098504AF9953D15D0C" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Publication</header><text>The Secretary of State shall make the report described in paragraph (1) available on a publicly accessible website. </text></paragraph></subsection></section></subtitle><subtitle id="id8CEA02C5E5744E0094F7B2C137820C45" style="OLC"><enum>D</enum><header>International financial institutions and multilateral economic organizations</header><section id="id7513cbaccc4e42b085d22c7e505588a5"><enum>231.</enum><header>Statement of policy on United States leadership at international financial institutions</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States—</text><paragraph id="id5ff7cfa657324818acbd1217dc469e2e"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to recognize rising debt stock in emerging market and developing countries as a national security and economic security threat and raise its importance in multilateral fora;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id75c88ef28ed84692934593f3ea69470a"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in international financial institutions to prevent future unsustainable debt stocks in emerging market and developing countries;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id3054a4d0eeea479a8674d423fe8dd953"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to promote rule-writing standards for transparency and disclosure that hold both debtors and creditors accountable, allow accurate debt sustainability assessments, and promote better debt management;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id135c33b83354423e924951ce3cfb6fd4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to lead the international community in translating the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (commonly known as the <quote>Common Framework</quote>) into tangible action, including effective standstill for debt payments and credit revisions for petitioner countries and finalizing the debt treatment for the petitioner countries, beginning with Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id79f2f40d98154fc3871ae8d9f365f690"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to reduce timelines and increase confidence in outcomes for the Common Framework so that private creditors continue to provide sufficient finances to petitioner countries and other countries witness the benefits of petitioning;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9387ad3a72e34416b970d9bef74adc7f"><enum>(6)</enum><text>to expand the Common Framework and offer its financial assistance to other heavily indebted lower-middle-income countries, beyond those currently covered;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idebc083e4801c47a8858160b0d153ad98"><enum>(7)</enum><text>to cooperate with counterparts in the Group of Twenty (G20), the International Monetary Fund, private credit rating agencies, and regulators, to explore and develop new bond and loan contract issuance standards that authorize temporary suspensions of debt services to both private and public creditors without triggering a default in crisis situations;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idcaecdced59fe448fac5dc6081b0c6194"><enum>(8)</enum><text>to engage with petitioner countries, before those countries exhaust their reserves, to strategize their ascension into the Common Framework and prevent further economic costs;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id71c9246c560146f08271f0c4286b53ad"><enum>(9)</enum><text>to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that the Fund and the Bank complete preliminary assessments of the debt relief needed by each country eligible for Common Framework treatment before such countries petition for debt relief;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id1D50A8AA7A004CC3B52F9BF19F9F59FA"><enum>(10)</enum><text>that assessments described in paragraph (9) should—</text><subparagraph id="id9132b796aca04750ab6f6c3f2e8617c8"><enum>(A)</enum><text>include realistic growth and fiscal projections;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id72cea4ca054d47ccb8930f9d1068e27d"><enum>(B)</enum><text>include implications of Common Framework debt relief; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc25e99af0bea4710994386bdb4d97e3e"><enum>(C)</enum><text>be based on accurate and comprehensive debt data;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id39751b522b9d4aa7986cfb9324ded062"><enum>(11)</enum><text>to support the International Monetary Fund lending into arrears for the Common Framework in the case that private lenders fail to uphold their initial commitments;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb0ae949925e4497b905a8d7abee14ebe"><enum>(12)</enum><text>to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in international financial intuitions to promote and finance international initiatives to procure and deploy more affordable and accessible COVID–19 vaccinations and treatments for emerging market and developing countries; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idabd62dfba17d4146b85225004db5957a"><enum>(13)</enum><text>to address the near-term problems associated with the pandemic-induced global recession and also longer term problems of unsustainable credit lending and borrowing that victimizes emerging market and developing countries; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idecc7dcc2efee43e9aca57f3b48ff594c"><enum>(14)</enum><text>to consider the impact of the monetary policies of the United States and future increases in interest rates on emerging market and developing countries and mitigate related harms. </text></paragraph></section><section id="idc964eb5e083c4cce99189c9ffa9e8ee3"><enum>232.</enum><header>Loans to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the International Monetary Fund</header><subsection id="idC504F88A16A64DF294A550FD5D393319"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><paragraph id="id37A6663A209B4EE0AD5121D64518F3F3"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury for fiscal year 2022 $102,000,000, for contribution to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idF826F8FB389A480D9D95D38AA6BD349F"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Availability of amounts</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) shall remain available until September 30, 2031. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idDD4505B8A6D24552A1B3FF05ECAF6C06"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Use of amounts</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) shall be available—</text><paragraph id="id9B652C756166471E88CA1FEAAE54A59E"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to cover the cost (as defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/2/661a">2 U.S.C. 661a</external-xref>)) of loans made by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idC21BCF60F2EB4F1CA60A21F1C9FB80B4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to subsidize gross obligations for the principal amount of direct loans not to exceed 15,000,000,000 Special Drawing Rights.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id01CBDAAD33164C23B776D55728B6DA91"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Nonapplicability of certain limitation</header><text>Section 5(f) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/286c">22 U.S.C. 286c(f)</external-xref>) shall not apply to any loans made pursuant to this section to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund on or before September 30, 2031. </text></subsection><subsection id="id034B9B2173814A8881F7FD9B44320625"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Authorization of certain transactions</header><text>The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the financing account corresponding to transactions with the International Monetary Fund are authorized to enter into such transactions as are necessary to effectuate loans made pursuant to this section and denominated in Special Drawing Rights to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund.</text></subsection></section><section id="id3ac2be9c9ced49e3a9ff7241e106db0b"><enum>233.</enum><header>Clearing World Bank Group arrears</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline"> Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide the World Bank Group with all necessary amounts to address the United States arrears in contributions from fiscal years 2019 and 2020. </text></section><section id="idb1d8dd06365b44c7ac62827c7dd81e78"><enum>234.</enum><header>10th general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank</header><subsection id="idd79435e5add94ba291e745571d16d476"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text><paragraph id="id21c92072ac354039a97d26f9de188237"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the spread of SARS–CoV–2, the virus that causes COVID–19, has had a significant impact on economic, social, and humanitarian conditions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id4917c29f007c4c34b0f44055125dcb05"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Inter-American Development Bank is the preeminent multilateral development bank dedicated to regional economic and social development and the betterment of lives across Latin America and the Caribbean;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id059734f2c58f4d43a0983cf71e2e00a9"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the Bank has played an integral role in supporting member countries with the coordination and implementation of policies to mitigate the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic, the Venezuelan refugee and migration crisis, and other crises in the Western Hemisphere;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idfa273e8254544bd5ad1e7df7a2618def"><enum>(4)</enum><text>a capital increase for the Bank would greatly increase its capacity to provide financing, institutional knowledge, and technical support to foster recovery and inclusion initiatives between regional governments, private sector entities, and international organizations; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idacaeec87f2a1417fbd3c920ef6248c40"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the United States, as a founding member of the Bank, should support a capital stock increase to ensure the Bank is prepared to offer additional support to member countries severely impacted by the COVID–19 pandemic and other crises.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id3aecb4bdb8d44e7086d988b97bc13d9a"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Tenth general capital increase</header><paragraph id="id4762197d8181405ba767e705e9e9608e"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Support for a general capital increase</header><text>The President shall take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idc38a32cd9eb147bcb7919595ba411a6f"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Diplomatic engagement</header><text>The President shall advance diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth general capital increase for the Bank in order to strengthen the capacity of the Bank—</text><subparagraph id="id660e5b499a1b4c12af24d38eda064280"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to support Latin American and Caribbean countries in their efforts to address the COVID–19 pandemic and the related economic impact; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0dac047e66e2458b92996bba7557f5d1"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to advance inclusive economic and social development in the Americas.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id36d81b1916b745d7981d6e5968ae6798"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Progress report</header><text>Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report detailing efforts to carry out paragraphs (1) and (2).</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id94f2256aed434d508c85cd409ac0a07b"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Tenth capital increase</header><text>The Inter-American Development Bank Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/283">22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.</external-xref>) is amended by adding at the end the following:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id33657873ca154b8988640bab0741bd70"><section id="id4095ebd5d13e432fa6d79f3276c35a1b"><enum>42.</enum><header>Tenth capital increase</header><subsection id="id6efafd115dd34783b738397d9ff8aee7"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Vote authorized</header><text>The United States Governor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years.</text></subsection><subsection id="id2c313e0580174dcc8afb7ef2bcc1e53e"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Subscription authorized</header><paragraph id="id5046ffb6d90041aa89ea032bca2bdd20"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The United States Governor of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id34319e742f5f4a81a9bdf628e364e414"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Limitation</header><text>Any subscription by the United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts.</text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id87ee53e967c24236a8eb367c4b272064"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Limitations on authorization of appropriations</header><paragraph id="ide794ad9fd37b42e29d79802f8e5051dc"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>In order to pay for the increase in the United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (b), there is authorized to be appropriated $24,014,857,191 for payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id992fea469fc045919e8987b18f9b60c6"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Allocation of funds</header><text>Of the amount authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1)—</text><subparagraph id="id2a237a4f0d3549cb8333b5dafa456586"><enum>(A)</enum><text>$600,371,430 shall be for paid in shares of the Bank; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0c797a422474483e87e5bcf38549c56e"><enum>(B)</enum><text>$23,414,485,761 shall be for callable shares of the Bank.</text></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="iddd3a18c280454ffaa31007038897a188"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Support for environmental sustainability initiatives of Inter-American Development Bank</header><paragraph id="idb6acc3b1f5a044a99e277d711cff386e"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the Inter-American Development Bank should—</text><subparagraph id="id9cc22df1fe604f06821fc569bbd8bd76"><enum>(A)</enum><text>establish its own environmental grant-making and financing facility in order to implement and expand environmental policies, metrics, and standards, to strengthen resilience and disaster preparedness, and to improve sustainability and conservation; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="ideb927a98cf904a4b990db990f5881a29"><enum>(B)</enum><text>continue to strengthen environmental safeguards as an element of economic development in the Western Hemisphere.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id5cd352ab5bd54e3caf59e86585fe0a7f"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Diplomatic engagement</header><text>The President shall advance diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries of the Bank for the creation of an environmental fund and financing facility as part of the tenth general capital increase for the Bank.</text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id5e305c23d93a4df7b6fadd3cc7c91822"><enum>235.</enum><header>Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank</header><subsection id="id776b7ba6ad034cbc9be7e04054af5e33"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings: </text><paragraph id="id80e1808687d349298785c70b69d04a1a"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The Inter-American Development Bank was established in 1959 and— </text><subparagraph id="id3ce4341c0c71418aad0de1f0888ff6bd"><enum>(A)</enum><text>is the premier multilateral development bank in the Western Hemisphere; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf8cf1ac18a2a4cf18252f8a71e3be1b0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>is the largest source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="ida985d0a6c78d4d2ab3f8bfc0ba31b937"><enum>(C)</enum><text>issued more than $140,000,000,000 in loans and grants between 2011 and 2021. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id9e532cfe3b914b33bd7e11f71264f4b0"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The Inter-American Development Bank—</text><subparagraph id="idbd0517d417e040bcabffb63c608ef1ab"><enum>(A)</enum><text>has 48 member states, of which 26 are borrowing members in the Latin America and the Caribbean region; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8cdf26787af84f598a6c32f2bc449399"><enum>(B)</enum><text>constitutes a critical forum for fostering collective action and meeting shared regional challenges, including COVID–19 recovery and response. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idf732ae21518f41228067b8a532a672a6"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic of China are among the 22 non-borrowing, non-Western Hemisphere members of the Inter-American Development Bank. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id0fe7b8db25c04661bc1b2eedd17179bc"><enum>(4)</enum><text>Taiwan—</text><subparagraph id="id61c70ec2f28c4e79aaaa27329c030610"><enum>(A)</enum><text>has been an observer at the Inter-American Development Bank since 1991;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8ffb2fb7c4754ab184cc9d095f7e9e73"><enum>(B)</enum><text>has contributed to a specialized financial intermediary development fund at IDB Lab since 2006; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9cfdb3288ea14e85a691adef7219b680"><enum>(C)</enum><text>has been a non-regional member of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration since 1992; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idfa720549118a4bfc983162a2a5ade25a"><enum>(D)</enum><text>is a member of the Asian Development Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the International Chamber of Commerce; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9d6ef8caf3c74440b818804a1d13c415"><enum>(E)</enum><text>is a participant of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Competition Committee, its Steel Committee, and its Fisheries Committee. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id7fb374d22f974878956432509de62608"><enum>(5)</enum><text>Taiwan's economy is the 7th largest in Asia and the 20th largest in the world by purchasing power parity. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id2791f1f3d3814da98f0aae7ca51ac381"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Taiwan has been a model contributor of foreign aid in Latin America and the Caribbean, allocating between 30 percent and 50 percent of its foreign aid budget to Latin America and the Caribbean. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id20ad9ea5d7e34c3bb9a3c16b7f136ea7"><enum>(7)</enum><text>Since 2010, Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund has funded 95 projects in Central America, 64 projects in the Caribbean, and 21 projects in South America. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id160e23cbb8d8483e83937d571a556e6d"><enum>(8)</enum><text>Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti as it confronts multiple simultaneous crises— </text><subparagraph id="id7c435a6bc1ae4734b124ab824a977efa"><enum>(A)</enum><text>by providing more than $145,000,000 in financing to modernize Haiti's electrical grid; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc6452dc54e1841d299c3df0e61434bab"><enum>(B)</enum><text>by delivering 280,000 masks at the height of the COVID–19 pandemic; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id87275f243352498b9b43dbf41ace095b"><enum>(C)</enum><text>by pledging $500,000 in disaster relief immediately after the August 14, 2021, earthquake in Haiti. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idba5bcf6fe783417f99d4c843bff65c86"><enum>(9)</enum><text>According to data from the Pan American Development Foundation, communities receiving assistance from Taiwan display increased— </text><subparagraph id="id000743966496426ead59a0cc83cd58ad"><enum>(A)</enum><text>food security;</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id44bbeb7e3ff94ecebfb594a586ae4875"><enum>(B)</enum><text>income generation; and</text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc44a0802b3134102989bc8c46a66b245"><enum>(C)</enum><text>capacity to recover from natural disasters.</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idf7bd1b3df46f4db0b4ce74be4ecdb125"><enum>(10)</enum><text>Taiwan has placed special emphasis on fostering development in Central America and in the Caribbean, including by signing the Agreement on the Republic of China (Taiwan)—Central America Economic Development Fund in 1998. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idee34abf42efe4c1d807dacaa79652456"><enum>(11)</enum><text>Through its non-regional member status at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Taiwan has provided $266,700,000 in financial assistance to help Central American countries respond to the COVID–19 pandemic. On April 22, 2021, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration announced the opening of its Representative Office in Taiwan, deepening investment ties between Taiwan and Central America. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id59e8dab526874331a1c65dcc757825dc"><enum>(12)</enum><text>Nine countries in Latin America and the Caribbean maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and Taiwan has 8 representative offices in 7 other countries in the region. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="ideefad0da08ff424d80669c5af1d78070"><enum>(13)</enum><text>Since 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China has engaged in aggressive economic diplomacy to compel the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, most notably in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, all of which have terminated longstanding and productive diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id1dd04e5c940c44b9be6cc737d8f4acb2"><enum>(14)</enum><text>The Government of the People's Republic of China—</text><subparagraph id="id154c3c9f82a8403db153953110a27d71"><enum>(A)</enum><text>announced a $1,100,000,000 construction project in Panama on the day that Panama switched from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the government of China; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7aa90556dae64e29b1b79804867eef51"><enum>(B)</enum><text>similarly offered assistance packages to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2018 in exchange for those countries ceasing their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id7a1f4aea160541a095495a6fc3ad820b"><enum>(15)</enum><text>Taiwan's international engagement has faced increased resistance from the Government of the People's Republic of China, which has used its influence to deny Taiwan's invitations to multilateral fora. For example, Taiwan was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest at ICAO's 2013 summit. Taiwan's requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (commonly known as <quote>INTERPOL</quote>) were also rejected. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id27d70c1c6a8a43b8baa6f85906bf95ed"><enum>(16)</enum><text>Taiwan's inclusion in multilateral organizations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, advances peace and stability in the world and in the Western Hemisphere specifically. </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id31166fe72fb944aba8f9107d7ae2fffe"><enum>(17)</enum><text>Congress has demonstrated a longstanding policy of supporting Taiwan's participation in international bodies that address shared transnational challenges by— </text><subparagraph id="idaaa38dd5070046c3baf68155f7ec63e5"><enum>(A)</enum><text>authorizing the Secretary of State, in <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/106/137">Public Law 106–137</external-xref>, <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/107/10">Public Law 107–10</external-xref>, and <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/108/235">Public Law 108–235</external-xref>, to initiate a United States plan for supporting Taiwan's participation as an observer in the activities of the World Health Organization; </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idcb9c323116e44f7d9d96877a2014bb57"><enum>(B)</enum><text>directing the Secretary of State, in <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/113/17">Public Law 113–17</external-xref>, to report on a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id4402e301205647978918cb55e0465bbf"><enum>(C)</enum><text>directing the Secretary of State, in <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/114/139">Public Law 114–139</external-xref>, to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. </text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="ida612f616051044dfab4c3796a54b1a80"><enum>(18)</enum><text>Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not received an invitation to attend as an observer any of the events of the international organizations referred to in paragraph (17) since 2016. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id6c62b4b9da4344c498044490d6f12a77"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that— </text><paragraph id="id4462c550fd0949ddaa624a270c44ded3"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States fully supports Taiwan's participation in, and contribution to, international organizations and underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan and the United States; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="idb82fad25108f4b29be104f4d9728bbf4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank's donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id972dc6e271aa42bb8758b73689c6c00b"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Taiwan's significant contribution to the development and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id5cbb0a4809754c95b73653596e20d30a"><enum>(4)</enum><text>non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of beneficiaries. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id08e539ed8325436c8e92b8b2dc5917f8"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Plan for the participation of taiwan in the inter-American development bank</header><text>The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized— </text><paragraph id="id61c4611051524eca86020cf4f62268d4"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for Taiwan; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id9dcbd408d23e4fb18b735413638c4823"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing member of the Bank. </text></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idb1b0cfbcaab54b6aa340c641ebe361f0"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Report concerning member state status for taiwan at the Inter-American Development Bank</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that— </text><paragraph id="id37b1ebcf594c42159ecc77463115dc34"><enum>(1)</enum><text>describes the United States plan to endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Inter-American Development Bank; </text></paragraph><paragraph id="ida903dd2dbbfa49a697c8be295e116774"><enum>(2)</enum><text>includes an account of the efforts that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have made to encourage member states of the Bank to promote Taiwan's bid to obtain non-borrowing membership at the Bank; and </text></paragraph><paragraph id="id8f89df3e40d0421aa780b5c5408d7169"><enum>(3)</enum><text>identifies the steps that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury will take to endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Bank in the following year. </text></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id66422b59a4674a9abd1e0c949bc3dc41"><enum>236.</enum><header>Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Secretary of State shall pursue the following objectives at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum:</text><paragraph id="id357CAE2B2F6C4F7CA90AE1C08875EC5C"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly semi-conductor supply chains.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idADA60B80EEF044858EAFE7F66D6A7F03"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with policymakers and promoting a common set of technology standards, including the possibility of a digital trade agreement.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id914FECA92D93472C83C319088D195F1C"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Promoting the development and use of policy recommendations for governments to support research and development of clean energy (both renewable and non-renewable) and adopting robust clean energy standards.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idA9204A2F4B5E48F7901D1AEE24565A0B"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-border investment into emerging and growing markets.</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idC1B4DE467E824BFFA7FA82A4B3FA4916"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats, including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks.</text></paragraph></section></subtitle><subtitle id="id1B679C9E8C524014B6CE1D880C22F572" style="OLC"><enum>E</enum><header>Resilience</header><section id="id08F2E67400FB460BA7773823CE5BEAE7"><enum>241.</enum><header>Sense of Congress regarding United States leadership in recovery and resiliency</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the United States must exercise leadership in the international community’s response to the COVID–19 pandemic regarding public health and economic recovery and resiliency, including by— </text><paragraph id="id661E9C3C95F24A38B6ECA1DBFD0B1CA3"><enum>(1)</enum><text>leveraging multilateral fora, such as the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20), which constitute more than 30 percent and 70 percent of the global economy, respectively, to coordinate an effective international response to persistent economic issues related to supply chains, inflation, and inequality;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id8854435BBCD04CC8BFCDA34C99940AEB"><enum>(2)</enum><text>revitalizing the United Nations and its associated institutions to coordinate and facilitate international initiatives that—</text><subparagraph id="id931BB36465D54F57B09E58F42CE6BF77"><enum>(A)</enum><text>promote global health and economic security; and </text></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idDF2F199FAF404BA5846636E8EF9B5410"><enum>(B)</enum><text>build resilience to present and forecasted shocks and stresses that impede economic growth or trigger, contribute to, result in, or cause backsliding;</text></subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idACB8C0AF963E42E6A1432B8F8246EB94"><enum>(3)</enum><text>empowering like-minded allies and partners to leverage their respective strengths and assume greater responsibilities in such international fora and institutions;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idEFB680EC1FDD414F9EE9EDC11852F9DC"><enum>(4)</enum><text>continuing to fund and finance international initiatives, such as COVAX, to provide and distribute life-saving vaccinations and medical treatments for COVID–19;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id63B3CFC0C8FB491FBD8EC3AB1472B0D0"><enum>(5)</enum><text>promoting an equitable international economic recovery that promotes building developing countries’ resilience capacities to address enduring disparities and challenges facing lower and middle income countries in addition to more recent challenges related to high-levels of global inflation and market volatility; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id6497C9337B8148178260FFB4CD8ED9FF"><enum>(6)</enum><text>supporting an impartial, independent, and international investigation into the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic to derive lessons learned and prevent similar international disasters in the future. </text></paragraph></section><section id="id3F6A3EC53EBE40899D9D297C42D8A3C6"><enum>242.</enum><header>Sense of Congress regarding improving resilience capacities through foreign assistance</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that United States foreign assistance and development finance must better suit its foreign assistance and development finance institutions to improve global resilience capacities and mitigate the harmful effects of international shocks and stresses, including by—</text><paragraph id="id7EE7FA11EFD34209B3903C5B8A291883"><enum>(1)</enum><text>equipping people, institutions, and international systems with the tools and resources necessary to avoid, cope with, and recover from modern threats, such as pandemic diseases, climate change, and extreme weather, cybersecurity compromises, and supply chain disruptions;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id076EC93C40094298B3A7DDC8B7151010"><enum>(2)</enum><text>partnering with other countries to better assess their vulnerabilities and risks to international shocks and identifying sustainable strategies for mitigating risk and improving resilience;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id576CEF5156F3491B83E3E9F768B6E4A3"><enum>(3)</enum><text>prioritizing funding for foreign assistance and development finance initiatives that seek to prevent, respond and reduce risks of international shocks;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id7308096F40AC4BBB91FCBCF16F937ADC"><enum>(4)</enum><text>expanding foreign capacity building initiatives in law enforcement, public health, cybersecurity, food and energy security;</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id5F3A8925216242A6BBDAC716E3225A6E"><enum>(5)</enum><text>strengthening institutions that facilitate economic cooperation and transparency in times of international crisis and uncertainty; and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="idefdc17dbfda54c719f15af4094f24724"><enum>(6)</enum><text>providing support for countries to strengthen domestic resource mobilization and access to effective and equitable development finance in order to reduce dependence on foreign assistance.</text></paragraph></section><section id="id442BF0C5B0234DFEA525635C548FDB4C"><enum>243.</enum><header>Office of Economic Resiliency</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/2651a">22 U.S.C. 2651a</external-xref>) is amended—</text><paragraph id="id525A7C6B3A74472E99356E597E466A81"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">by redesignating subsection (h) (as added by section 361 of <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/116/260">Public Law 116–260</external-xref>) as subsection (k); and</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id439230B402BB41CB862899069E960AAA"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">by adding at the end the following:</text><quoted-block style="OLC" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id307D130345504552BEFB36ADAD3597C2"><subsection id="idB4B336A1B2064EFCAC2A9FD1A283C4E1"><enum>(l)</enum><header>Office of Economic Resiliency</header><paragraph id="idFAB4DDC09ED34A9DB0E391F8A0A5B5ED"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There is established, within the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of the Department of State, the Office of Economic Resiliency (in this subsection referred to as the <quote>Office</quote>).</text></paragraph><paragraph id="id8AF924FCB5404A9E890AEEF2AF98B853"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Function</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Office, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, shall lead United States’ efforts to develop and implement credible national action plans with partner countries aimed at detecting, understanding, preventing impacts of, and responding to present and forecasted shocks and stresses that are destabilizing to countries' national security and economic growth, including epidemics, pandemics, natural disasters, and other destabilizing events.</text></paragraph></subsection><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block></paragraph></section><section id="idEAB688E15F144A8993F41CF48F7E1B0E" commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>244.</enum><header>Establishment of Resilience Trust Fund at the World Bank</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The United States Executive Director to the World Bank shall use the voice and vote of the United States to advocate for the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to incentivize countries to develop and implement credible national action plans aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to epidemics, pandemics, and other global destabilizing events. </text></section></subtitle>