<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="billres.xsl"?>
<!DOCTYPE bill PUBLIC "-//US Congress//DTDs/bill.dtd//EN" "bill.dtd">
<bill bill-stage="Introduced-in-Senate" dms-id="A1" public-private="public">
	<metadata xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<dublinCore>
<dc:title>114 S3509 IS: South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2016</dc:title>
<dc:publisher>U.S. Senate</dc:publisher>
<dc:date>2016-12-06</dc:date>
<dc:format>text/xml</dc:format>
<dc:language>EN</dc:language>
<dc:rights>Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.</dc:rights>
</dublinCore>
</metadata>
<form>
		<distribution-code display="yes">II</distribution-code>
		<congress>114th CONGRESS</congress><session>2d Session</session>
		<legis-num>S. 3509</legis-num>
		<current-chamber>IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES</current-chamber>
		<action>
			<action-date date="20161206">December 6, 2016</action-date>
			<action-desc><sponsor name-id="S350">Mr. Rubio</sponsor> introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the <committee-name committee-id="SSFR00">Committee on Foreign Relations</committee-name></action-desc>
		</action>
		<legis-type>A BILL</legis-type>
		<official-title>To impose sanctions with respect to the People's Republic of China in relation to activities in the
			 South China Sea and the East China Sea, and for other purposes.</official-title>
	</form>
	<legis-body>
		<section id="S1" section-type="section-one"><enum>1.</enum><header>Short title; table of contents</header>
 <subsection id="idC7F7101C182D45C69683E1D416EFC7D2"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Short title</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">This Act may be cited as the <quote><short-title>South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2016</short-title></quote>.</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="id82585EEE72804D4BA96242E994BE87C2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Table of contents</header><text>The table of contents for this Act is as follows:</text><toc><toc-entry idref="S1" level="section">Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id398c8d176a3748738b339659580ecce7" level="section">Sec. 2. Findings.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="idaa1dda3626f74dd1962d6c5658589e19" level="section">Sec. 3. Definitions.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id1165dbedcfd142658fb5c62e7ca4397f" level="section">Sec. 4. Policy of the United States with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id8fc9b9d7d0274b1a8c60a0156f80a072" level="section">Sec. 5. Sense of Congress with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id5b3f04f82a1c495c88fe67ff6f810dc3" level="section">Sec. 6. Sanctions with respect to Chinese persons responsible for China’s activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id371109fcd8c64892a434aabbf6c1122e" level="section">Sec. 7. Determinations and report on Chinese companies active in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="idd6dea6a0581f41718587b0ce45afe21a" level="section">Sec. 8. Prohibition against documents portraying the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id1289c65b8d724475871bfc60bb18e75a" level="section">Sec. 9. Prohibition on facilitating certain investments in the South China Sea or the East China Sea.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="idcd3968a689ec4e35b8e33942516e9fa0" level="section">Sec. 10. Department of Justice affirmation of non-recognition of annexation.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="id2dd594d0b25c412c995697299b3e7720" level="section">Sec. 11. Non-recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or the East China Sea.</toc-entry> <toc-entry idref="ida7d33c9c935e46eaa1de4b88c1c47a57" level="section">Sec. 12. Prohibition on certain assistance to countries that recognize Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or the East China Sea.</toc-entry> </toc> </subsection></section><section id="id398c8d176a3748738b339659580ecce7"><enum>2.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following findings:</text>
 <paragraph id="idee2c5d0bd2244f429ec788dc2b8c1050"><enum>(1)</enum><text>According to the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy issued by the Department of Defense in August 2015, <quote>Although the United States takes no position on competing sovereignty claims to land features in the region, all such claims must be based upon land (which in the case of islands means naturally formed areas of land that are above water at high tide), and all maritime claims must derive from such land in accordance with international law.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="ided1707b15a6f4fad94cf8175630cc430"><enum>(2)</enum><text>According to the annual report of the Department of Defense to Congress on the military power of the People's Republic of China submitted in April 2016, <quote>Throughout 2015, China continued to assert sovereignty claims over features in the East and South China Seas. In the East China Sea, China continued to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in order to challenge Japan’s claim. In the South China Sea, China paused its land reclamation effort in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the archipelago. Although these artificial islands do not provide China with any additional territorial or maritime rights within the South China Sea, China will be able to use them as persistent civil-military bases to enhance its long-term presence in the South China Sea significantly.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idd88584b53b0845f0952d7be5957d6fea"><enum>(3)</enum><text>On May 30, 2015, at the Shangri-la Dialogue of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that <quote>with its actions in the South China Sea, China is out of step with both the international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific’s security architecture, and the regional consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes coercion</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id1faa255693ef43b1a1823e8afd849e1c"><enum>(4)</enum><text>On July 24, 2015, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., noted at a forum in Colorado that each year more than $5,300,000,000,000 in global sea-based trade passes through the South China Sea.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idC9F73C77A15C49FABC8E3533BD8DFB2D"><enum>(5)</enum><text>On June 4, 2016, at the Shangri-la Dialogue, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated: <quote>[T]he United States will stand with regional partners to uphold core principles, like freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes through legal means and in accordance with international law. As I affirmed here last year, and America’s Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea have demonstrated, the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, so that everyone in the region can do the same.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id9eaff3f0c8944c72992821b7c73ac90b"><enum>(6)</enum><text>On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Tribunal organized pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea issued its unanimous award in the arbitration instituted by Republic of the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China. The Tribunal noted that its award is final and binding under that Convention.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idd4f684595e714f2296420bba45af970e"><enum>(7)</enum><text>Also according to the award, the Tribunal <quote>concluded that, to the extent China had historical rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the <quote>nine-dash line</quote>.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id54736e46de974998a261878762627ece"><enum>(8)</enum><text>Also according to the award, the Tribunal <quote>held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="ida3a8fd53b1d94af9add5bd1041890572"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Also according to the award, the Tribunal <quote>found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id4c65cfba700547b4b7092d50c53d34f9"><enum>(10)</enum><text>On July 12, 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China issued a statement that China <quote>declares that the [Tribunal] award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it. … China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards. China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id85095c7088834e1e8ac6312967038cc9"><enum>(11)</enum><text>On July 12, 2016, the Government of the People’s Republic of China issued the fifth statement in the name of that Government since 1979 that—</text>
 <subparagraph id="id777768BEA7CA498D9E95C530473691A7"><enum>(A)</enum><text>stated that the People's Republic of China has sovereignty over the 4 rocks and shoals in the South China Sea;</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id42466DA3242B45D4ACEBE255AD2AF410"><enum>(B)</enum><text>claims internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, one or more exclusive economic zones, and a continental shelf based on that sovereignty claim; and</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idC0301E7B85DF492F9DAF02D47967F728"><enum>(C)</enum><text>continues to claim historic rights in the South China Sea.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id5c739223722243b0a55965335eeba147"><enum>(12)</enum><text>On July 12, 2016, Assistant Secretary of State and Department of State Spokesperson John Kirby noted that the <quote>United States strongly supports the rule of law. We support efforts to resolve territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea peacefully, including through arbitration. … we urge all claimants to avoid provocative statements or actions. This decision can and should serve as a new opportunity to renew efforts to address maritime disputes peacefully.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id86dee005a5614b2fa02f29cd66b1bfb0"><enum>(13)</enum><text>On July 13, 2016, the Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Liu Zhenmin, said that declaring an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea would depend on the threat China faces and stated that <quote>[i]f our security is threatened, we of course have the right to set it up</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id790ba7253b314e31b700dd365c8e319d"><enum>(14)</enum><text>On July 18, 2016, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force of the People's Republic of China stated that it had conducted a <quote>combat air patrol</quote> over the South China Sea and that it would become <quote>regular practice</quote> in the future. A spokesperson stated that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force <quote>will firmly defend national sovereignty, security and maritime interests, safeguard regional peace and stability, and cope with various threats and challenges</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id7f88c02f891f44e08e62f44a07dbe2c2"><enum>(15)</enum><text>On August 2, 2016, the Supreme People’s Court of the People's Republic of China issued a judicial interpretation that people caught illegally fishing in Chinese waters could be jailed for up to one year.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id55b6ed7af3494474a43de4be24bb2133"><enum>(16)</enum><text>In the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands with Related Arrangements, signed at Washington and Tokyo June 17, 1971 (23 UST 446), between the United States and Japan (commonly referred to as the <quote>Okinawa Reversion Treaty</quote>), the United States agreed to apply the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, with Agreed Minute and Exchanges of Notes (11 UST 1632), signed at Washington January 19, 1961, between the United States and Japan, to the area covered by the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, including the Senkaku Islands.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="iddb3fa42c53fe46298496d783503bc8fb"><enum>(17)</enum><text>On October 30, 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that <quote>… with respect to the Senkaku Islands, the United States has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idb49cc9d24e1c435c91dce81f08f5e75d"><enum>(18)</enum><text>In April 2014, President Barack Obama stated, <quote>The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.</quote>.</text>
 </paragraph></section><section id="idaa1dda3626f74dd1962d6c5658589e19"><enum>3.</enum><header>Definitions</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">In this Act:</text> <paragraph id="id8d054c32c80e46109c7eb0e070473fd2"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Account; correspondent account; payable-through account</header><text>The terms <quote>account</quote>, <quote>correspondent account</quote>, and <quote>payable-through account</quote> have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id5e0e2be612cc435dbb0f67ae042c9c7e"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Appropriate congressional committees</header><text>The term <term>appropriate congressional committees</term> means—</text> <subparagraph id="idf1e2204c266e484bbaa545c8288f6f91"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2ce0730b6a9f4bf382a337b9e306acbe"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.</text>
 </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idb4bfb5b7ea5d45d99a115bb6838d3182"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Chinese person</header><text>The term <term>Chinese person</term> means—</text> <subparagraph id="id1b0c9f82df5f4bfcb3e8144f335e7f75"><enum>(A)</enum><text>an individual who is a citizen or national of the People's Republic of China; or</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8e661664db5d45028174c776ef9597bd"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the People's Republic of China.</text>
 </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idb4142e9a725d466c82145b6ffc9a2843"><enum>(4)</enum><header>Financial institution</header><text>The term <term>financial institution</term> means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idc2185379995842eaac08db1fef5d180a"><enum>(5)</enum><header>Foreign financial institution</header><text>The term <term>foreign financial institution</term> has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id45f1e5f29db3407a9f35227144f81f78"><enum>(6)</enum><header>Knowingly</header><text>The term <term>knowingly</term>, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id8add750f293d4bf69016dbcfaa4140a1"><enum>(7)</enum><header>Person</header><text>The term <term>person</term> means any individual or entity.</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id9801ab21e78840a489c918721616ee1a"><enum>(8)</enum><header>United States person</header><text>The term <term>United States person</term> means—</text>
 <subparagraph id="id8e5fbe0c3ea84920bb4662dc11010c2d"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id6A6865A690DC4A81A2A76DD617B7CA20"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.</text>
 </subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="id1165dbedcfd142658fb5c62e7ca4397f"><enum>4.</enum><header>Policy of the United States with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States—</text> <paragraph id="idd8dadb14a15f497cbcf47f7814cad275"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to support the principle that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully consistent with international law;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id10388023b1534f2a9281959856bcb764"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy—</text>
 <subparagraph id="idBC4F105F386F40E29B728049C0492E5B"><enum>(A)</enum><text>regarding Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed at Washington August 30, 1951 (3 UST 3947), between the United States and the Philippines; and</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idDDA9AB2B784A483BA42179CC80CD6577"><enum>(B)</enum><text>that Article V of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954 (5 UST 661), between the United States and Japan, applies to the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan; and</text>
 </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idb5f293672432448b98b3b36c0eb61be7"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to support the principle of freedom of the seas and to continue to use the sea and airspace wherever international law allows.</text>
 </paragraph></section><section id="id8fc9b9d7d0274b1a8c60a0156f80a072"><enum>5.</enum><header>Sense of Congress with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id03ffb552834843ca9d72cad8b3db3120"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the People's Republic of China cannot and should not be allowed to interfere in any way with the free use of waters and airspace in the South China Sea and the East China Sea by civilian and military ships and aircraft of all countries consistent with international law;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id315e1bf1d6814e3ba646c28018047db4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the People's Republic of China should not be allowed to continue to pursue illegitimate claims and to militarize an area that is essential to global security;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idac7c91219d324f6ab2b57f02c30b60e3"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States should—</text> <subparagraph id="id9f6ee34bb17b4160b5e18cf9830ba243"><enum>(A)</enum><text>continue and expand freedom of navigation operations and overflights;</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idba40f3755f3f4e80bef6d460deb75985"><enum>(B)</enum><text>reconsider the traditional policy of not taking a position on individual claims; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5d1f563e99214199b5fa00e5296174a9"><enum>(C)</enum><text>respond to provocations by the People's Republic of China with commensurate actions that impose costs on any attempts to undermine security in the region;</text>
 </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="ida7b7e5447b6242c79da2800c7d756b90"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the Senkaku Islands are covered by Article V of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954 (5 UST 661), between the United States and Japan; and</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="ide550609a49d946889a3a0c41182e42a7"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the United States should firmly oppose any unilateral actions by the People's Republic of China that seek to undermine Japan’s control of the Senkaku Islands.</text>
			</paragraph></section><section id="id5b3f04f82a1c495c88fe67ff6f810dc3"><enum>6.</enum><header>Sanctions with respect to Chinese persons responsible for China’s activities in the South China Sea
			 and the East China Sea</header>
 <subsection id="id54b851267a804034bcf4d6cce8ae43f6"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Initial imposition of sanctions</header><text>On and after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to—</text>
 <paragraph id="id87B4BF0D76114E1DA90843E7AA037E59"><enum>(1)</enum><text>any Chinese person that contributes to construction or development projects, including land reclamation, island-making, lighthouse construction, building of base stations for mobile communications services, building of electricity and fuel supply facilities, or civil infrastructure projects, in areas of the South China Sea contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idd9bbccccaaae4ecba5a9c8856fc0665f"><enum>(2)</enum><text>any Chinese person that is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of areas of the South China Sea contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan, including through the use of vessels and aircraft to impose the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China in those areas;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id26e4519cbe00425ba9b7d72452248642"><enum>(3)</enum><text>any Chinese person that engages, or attempts to engage, in an activity or transaction that materially contributes to, or poses a risk of materially contributing to, an activity described in paragraph (1) or (2); and</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idfc15c4100d9c4c70b914051522fe7353"><enum>(4)</enum><text>any person that—</text> <subparagraph id="ide1072dea05a14f9f97981ac659afa6a5"><enum>(A)</enum><text>is owned or controlled by a person described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3);</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id182211f16c134e19acfe1f87f2fbcf55"><enum>(B)</enum><text>is acting for or on behalf of such a person; or</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id610059fe971e4039945ef5e2b0808407"><enum>(C)</enum><text>provides, or attempts to provide—</text>
 <clause id="idC33CA950533B4E988DB995BE9AE98F41"><enum>(i)</enum><text>financial, material, technological, or other support to a person described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or</text>
 </clause><clause id="id54504573A9004E8A8F9397C5D22C49CA"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>goods or services in support of an activity described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).</text>
						</clause></subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id11c998bc47054b31b766fd626fcbbe00"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sanctions described</header>
 <paragraph id="id24a95d35e0a0466697d3f108c41b38bf"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Blocking of property</header><text>The President shall block, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.</external-xref>), all transactions in all property and interests in property of any person subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idf51d020611b54993985d0d7d42384f04"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Exclusion from united states</header><text>The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to subsection (a) that is an alien.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id8926b9a356e24ef582a62af39966537b"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Current visa revoked</header><text>The issuing consular officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued to any person subject to subsection (a) that is an alien, regardless of when issued. The revocation shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.</text>
				</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id05f63a6ffb344729a38e801533a9b405"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Exceptions; penalties</header>
 <paragraph id="id55df1047f02d49599a2d863febc19741"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Inapplicability of national emergency requirement</header><text>The requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref>) shall not apply for purposes of subsection (b)(1).</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="ide6c9bb810903496ebd7d65e0681dd27a"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Compliance with united nations headquarters agreement</header><text>Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall not apply if admission to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id15bc852184ae4724b835e6c3c737002b"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Penalties</header><text>The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1705">50 U.S.C. 1705</external-xref>) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed under subsection (b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.</text>
				</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idfe53ba8734794b59a99b87e471e9935f"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Additional imposition of sanctions</header>
 <paragraph id="id614ff784987e4ca5973d68ef318a31ee"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly, on or after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person subject to subsection (a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that the Government of the People’s Republic of China has—</text>
 <subparagraph id="id2789c12be68c42bc830c6367d7d8ae2c"><enum>(A)</enum><text>declared an air defense identification zone over any part of the South China Sea;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id94d36dc9665c4a2da7c4ff44551c314e"><enum>(B)</enum><text>initiated reclamation work at another disputed location in the South China Sea, such as at Scarborough Shoal;</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id4d2c0465381e4ce382c3df43f831ef6b"><enum>(C)</enum><text>seized control of Second Thomas Shoal;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idfa0132ab18e24711a6d973ccccbd0adb"><enum>(D)</enum><text>deployed surface-to-air missiles to any of the artificial islands the People's Republic of China has built in the Spratly Island chain, including Fiery Cross, Mischief, or Subi Reefs;</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5B05A95443194B33BE4DDC989E0D37C4"><enum>(E)</enum><text>established territorial baselines around the Spratly Island chain;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc3b8ccb668aa4c95b561f3b9f91e5f2c"><enum>(F)</enum><text>increased harassment of Philippine vessels; or</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id4198a80b7bac4826b5dcacc30a79587c"><enum>(G)</enum><text>increased provocative actions against the Japanese Coast Guard or Maritime Self-Defense Force or U.S. forces in the East China Sea.</text>
					</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id9dadc7fa27444455a9e965fc4e021f0a"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Report</header>
 <subparagraph id="idf4bdfd90cc7443d5bc200b2cff484709"><enum>(A)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The determination of the Director of National Intelligence referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in a report to the President and the appropriate congressional committees.</text>
 </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id84ba7d5e71d5442abad5a6f1305aa559"><enum>(B)</enum><header>Form of report</header><text>The report required by subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.</text>
					</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id371109fcd8c64892a434aabbf6c1122e"><enum>7.</enum><header>Determinations and report on Chinese companies active in the South China
			 Sea and the East China Sea</header>
 <subsection id="id894d98f0ef5844b8b8bc096cd5e1f494"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies each Chinese person the Secretary determines is engaged in the activities described in section 6(a).</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="id9814ca3dd3cf4612925cfaf35b942f8b"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Consideration</header><text>In preparing the report required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall make specific findings with respect to—</text>
 <paragraph id="id830AAE742B044AF981CC137D4EA3409B"><enum>(1)</enum><text>CCCC Tianjin Dredging Co., Ltd.;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idCCA2168C94E74EA4BE28CA4C4966C84C"><enum>(2)</enum><text>CCCC Dredging (Group) Company, Ltd.;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id56C2EF17FB1F47EC9813680372F8C181"><enum>(3)</enum><text>China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), Ltd.;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idF3B407BDF90D4D0C8CAE03F855967724"><enum>(4)</enum><text>China Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec Group);</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id0830E42BAABF4B7A994B8D7DB9ABB730"><enum>(5)</enum><text>China Mobile;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idC466550A893E4FEFBEB46D59AD5E9FCE"><enum>(6)</enum><text>China Telecom;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id42E477FFC251437384A1DD2B89472F04"><enum>(7)</enum><text>China Southern Power Grid;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id176099212EC6463A8A998A447DAD6121"><enum>(8)</enum><text>CNFC Guangzhou Harbor Engineering Company;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id75AA790278084B538D9444DDCF5BD3B1"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Zhanjiang South Project Construction Bureau;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idC7A39B9721444E668029D5009BAE7E55"><enum>(10)</enum><text>Hubei Jiangtian Construction Group;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id3f927a76e2ec4aa794872c3be148e386"><enum>(11)</enum><text>China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC);</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idee5a46ecb9184f2e80721636ae47773b"><enum>(12)</enum><text>Guangdong Navigation Group (GNG) Ocean Shipping;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id29ea7e2c641d4b5287be28437244f7ae"><enum>(13)</enum><text>Shanghai Leading Energy Shipping;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idf09dcfe7baf347b5859fa6419763d928"><enum>(14)</enum><text>China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC);</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="ide9ff89455eed479a8dd95d66f6ad39bd"><enum>(15)</enum><text>China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL);</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id00dc9c2653ea4cd9824ef07baeaa0117"><enum>(16)</enum><text>China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC);</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idcfb61f57afcf48fabb8a8b9efc62cb3b"><enum>(17)</enum><text>China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC);</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id7d314885cb6f4bf2a35832bc531b9683"><enum>(18)</enum><text>Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC);</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id1f6a5d1f295b49de93133069ed79b3bd"><enum>(19)</enum><text>Shenyang Aircraft Corporation;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id804443cdd6eb49f69b6f7f62946e3753"><enum>(20)</enum><text>Shaanxi Aircraft Corporation;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idb9b2391295914c69b111da65a2272421"><enum>(21)</enum><text>China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO);</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idf71bad1a3592494f85834c61b47da75f"><enum>(22)</enum><text>China Southern Airlines;</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id3c20aa393c7044219507c0a1fc029894"><enum>(23)</enum><text>Zhan Chaoying;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id98a0f046b0f349c5abc5c3727390a5c6"><enum>(24)</enum><text>Sany Group; and</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="idB9E1EDC9A87C4000B4CBD6B837DD3B26"><enum>(25)</enum><text>affiliated Chinese persons.</text> </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id3da6a4bf28204cb3b5f989cb9ed9cf7d"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Submission and form</header> <paragraph id="idec295de65f714471aa8e6ecb9efa36ba"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Submission</header><text>The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days until the date that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="ide4a06fbea0da4546816c64d6c6f3eed6"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Secretary of State determines it is necessary for the national security interests of the United States to do so.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id0a4d53bb03764f829877c2f12f3dd3e5"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Public availability</header><text>The Secretary of State shall publish the unclassified part of the report required by subsection (a) on a publicly available website of the Department of State.</text>
 </paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idd6dea6a0581f41718587b0ce45afe21a"><enum>8.</enum><header>Prohibition against documents portraying the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Government Publishing Office may not publish any map, document, record, electronic resource, or other paper of the United States (other than materials relating to hearings held by committees of Congress or internal work product of a Federal agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is the position of the United States that the territory or airspace in the South China Sea contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan is part of the territory or airspace of the People’s Republic of China.</text>
		</section><section id="id1289c65b8d724475871bfc60bb18e75a"><enum>9.</enum><header>Prohibition on facilitating certain investments in the South China Sea or the East China Sea</header>
 <subsection id="id3C610889584D41CA900E97E1818F8A4F"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">No United States person may take any action to approve, facilitate, finance, or guarantee any investment, provide insurance, or underwriting in the South China Sea or the East China Sea that involves any person with respect to which sanctions are imposed under section 6(a).</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="idb5dcb5fcd5874b8e8a84c46ed28faed7"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Enforcement</header><text>The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of such rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="id53eabb8e3fbf4bafb33622ad3e305816"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Penalties</header><text>The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1705">50 U.S.C. 1705</external-xref>) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed under this section to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="id87a053aff3d3465182bd9a6f77bf65ec"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Exception</header><text>Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to humanitarian assistance, disaster assistance, or emergency food assistance.</text>
 </subsection></section><section id="idcd3968a689ec4e35b8e33942516e9fa0"><enum>10.</enum><header>Department of Justice affirmation of non-recognition of annexation</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">In any matter before any United States court, upon request of the court or any party to the matter, the Attorney General shall affirm the United States policy of not recognizing the de jure or de facto sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over territory or airspace contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan.</text>
		</section><section id="id2dd594d0b25c412c995697299b3e7720"><enum>11.</enum><header>Non-recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or the East China Sea</header>
 <subsection id="id62828bd70ed942fbb791fe859ba039ce"><enum>(a)</enum><header>United states armed forces</header><text>The Secretary of Defense may not take any action, including any movement of aircraft or vessels that implies recognition of the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over territory or airspace contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan.</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="id401124bfa6154d5aa436b9967c2ffe3a"><enum>(b)</enum><header>United states flagged vessels</header><text>No vessel that is issued a certificate of documentation under <external-xref legal-doc="usc-chapter" parsable-cite="usc-chapter/46/121">chapter 121</external-xref> of title 46, United States Code, may take any action that implies recognition of the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over territory or airspace contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan.</text>
 </subsection><subsection id="id532063c38acd4ebda2f3680428c21615"><enum>(c)</enum><header>United states aircraft</header><text>No aircraft operated by an air carrier that holds an air carrier certificate issued under <external-xref legal-doc="usc-chapter" parsable-cite="usc-chapter/49/411">chapter 411</external-xref> of title 49, United States Code, may take any action that implies recognition of the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over territory or airspace contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan.</text>
			</subsection></section><section id="ida7d33c9c935e46eaa1de4b88c1c47a57"><enum>12.</enum><header>Prohibition on certain assistance to countries that recognize Chinese sovereignty over the South
			 China Sea or the East China Sea</header>
 <subsection id="id9fbec46d42c54431b20eb05833944fc4"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Prohibition</header><text>Except as provided by subsection (c), no amounts may be obligated or expended to provide foreign assistance to the government of any country identified in a report required by subsection (b).</text>
			</subsection><subsection id="id42c45ccaa1a94559887d67bbfe1616dc"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report required</header>
 <paragraph id="idD8FA60497CAE403689D8143AE70196F7"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the date that is 3 years after such date of enactment, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying each country that the Secretary determines recognizes, after the date of the enactment of this Act, the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over territory or airspace contested by one or more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id7c586450e2214c488a45ef0a71ea1045"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Secretary of State determines it is necessary for the national security interests of the United States to do so.</text>
 </paragraph><paragraph id="id620c4f626f0d4b55a050f24c737bddf8"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Public availability</header><text>The Secretary of State shall publish the unclassified part of the report required by paragraph (1) on a publicly available website of the Department of State.</text>
 </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id53018e24f2d34c09a429c457308e023d"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Exception</header><text>This section shall not apply with respect to Taiwan, humanitarian assistance, disaster assistance, emergency food assistance, or the Peace Corps.</text></subsection></section></legis-body>
</bill>


