113 HR 4495 IH: Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act
U.S. House of Representatives
2014-04-28
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EN
Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
1.Short title; table of contents
(a)This Act may be cited as the Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act
.
(b)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees.
Title I—Matters relating to the Department of Defense
Sec. 101. Report on Department of Defense munitions strategy for United States Pacific Command.
Sec. 102. Establishment of Department of Defense unmanned systems office.
Sec. 103. Independent assessment on countering anti-access and area-denial capabilities in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 104. Assessment of the maritime balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 105. Missile defense cooperation.
Sec. 106. Department of Defense Space Security and Defense Program.
Sec. 107. Space situational awareness.
Sec. 108. Sense of Congress on access to training ranges within United States Pacific Command area
of responsibility.
Sec. 109. Sense of Congress on Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii.
Sec. 110. Special easement acquisition authority, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands,
Kauai, Hawaii.
Title II—Matters relating to foreign nations
Sec. 201. Statement of policy on maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 202. Sense of Congress reaffirming security commitment to Japan.
Sec. 203. Report on opportunities to strengthen relationship between the United States and the
Republic of Korea.
Sec. 204. Maritime capabilities of Taiwan and its contribution to regional peace and stability.
Sec. 205. Modifications to annual report on military and security developments involving the
People’s Republic of China.
2.
(a)Congress finds the following:
(1)The United States has a national interest in maintaining the stability and security of the global
commons in the Asia-Pacific region.
(2)In October 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out an enduring vision for continued
United States involvement in the Asia-Pacific region throughout the coming
century through strengthened security alliances, deeper relations with
emerging powers, broader engagement with regional multilateral
institutions, greater trade and investment, a broad-based security
posture, and the pursuit of democracy and protection of human rights.
(3)In November 2011, President Barack Obama stated before the Australian Parliament that the United
States will stand for security as the foundation of peace and prosperity,
the rights and responsibilities of all nations and people, international
law enforcing agreements and norms, freedom of commerce and navigation,
integration of emerging powers into a regional security architecture, and
the peaceful resolution of disputes.
(4)In January 2012, the Defense Strategic Guidance, released by the Department of Defense, emphasized
the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, citing U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending
from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and
South Asia,
and accordingly, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region
.
(5)In June 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reaffirmed at the Shangri-La Dialogue that the
United States remains committed to the principles of open and free
commerce, a just international order that emphasizes rights and
responsibilities of all nations and a fidelity to the rule of law, open
access by all to the shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyberspace,
and the resolution of disputes without coercion or the use of force.
(6)The United States relationships with its treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, are at
the heart of United States policy and engagement in the region, and these
countries share a common approach to supporting peace and stability,
freedom of navigation, and other internationally lawful uses of sea and
airspace in the region.
(7)The United States continues to work with these and other regional countries on a range of
transnational security and humanitarian issues, including countering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, encouraging the peaceful
resolution of territorial disputes, responding to and mitigating
humanitarian disasters, halting the illicit trafficking of people, drugs,
and weapons, coordinating to monitor and combat the risk of pandemic
disease, and fighting the disruptive activities of state and non-state
actors for the betterment of regional stability and prosperity.
(8)The United States military continues to work closely with the armed forces of these and other
regional countries to maintain vigilance against threats to the global
commons and international order, deter against acts of aggression, and
field capabilities to mitigate risks to allied and partner states in the
Asia-Pacific region.
(9)Security shifts in the Asia-Pacific region over the past decade have prompted a reassessment of the
forces and capabilities necessary to provide domain awareness, credible
deterrence, and effective defense in future decades to uphold the United
States security commitments to the region and to maintain regional
stability.
(10)As provided in written testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
in March 2014, Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command,
noted that, North Korea remains our most dangerous and enduring challenge … North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles, in contravention of its international
obligations, constitutes a significant threat to peace and security on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
.
(11)As provided in written testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
in November 2013, Dr. Larry Wortzel, Commissioner, United States–China
Economic and Security Review Commission, noted that, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is undergoing an extensive modernization
program that presents significant challenges to U.S. security interests in
Asia.
.
(12)As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. Frank Kendall,
testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives on January 28, 2014, Anti-access aerial denial capabilities that concern us cover a range of conventional capabilities.
In the case of China in particular, for example, they include space
control investments, offense cyber capabilities, conventional ballistic
and cruise missiles with precision-seekers designed both fixed land
installations and surface ships, including aircraft carriers; air-to-air
capabilities, including fifth-generation fighters, long-range missiles
with advance technologies seekers, and electronic warfare systems.
.
(b)It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)the security, stability, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region is vital to United States
national interests;
(2)security and stability, largely provided by United States forces and their forward presence,
underwrite United States national interests in the Asia-Pacific region;
(3)the United States remains unwavering in its commitment and support for allies and partners in the
Asia-Pacific region;
(4)efforts by the Department of Defense to realign forces, commit additional assets, and increase
investments to the Asia-Pacific region are welcome signs of the United
States continued commitment to the region;
(5)to counter anti-access and area-denial capabilities, deter regional aggression, assure allies and
partners, sustain military balance in the Asia-Pacific region, and enable
more effective operations in contested and denied environments, the
Department of Defense will need to—
(A)develop new concepts and initiatives, such as Air-Sea Battle (ASB) and the Strategic Capabilities
Office (SCO);
(B)invest in a new generation of military capabilities, in areas such as undersea warfare,
power-projection, munitions, amphibious capabilities, resilient space
architectures, and missile defenses; and
(C)nurture technologies, in areas such as electromagnetics, directed energy, hypersonics, and
electronic warfare; and
(6)the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting, the
East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, should be
supported to build practical cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and
reinforce the role of international law.
3.Congressional defense committeesIn this Act, the term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
<enum>I</enum><header>Matters relating to the Department of Defense</header>
<section id="H0AF4231B2F6E4988946F9D3521492B9C"><enum>101.</enum><header>Report on Department of Defense munitions strategy for United States Pacific Command</header>
<subsection id="HEC5B5827971F44D98DE41603B610DD6F"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report required</header><text>Not later than April 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the munitions strategy for the United States
Pacific Command, including an identification of munitions requirements, an
assessment of munitions gaps and shortfalls, and necessary munitions
investments. Such strategy shall cover the 10-year period beginning with
2015.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H547C7487DE1C47B4A2154C93335F7597"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report on munitions strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:</text>
<paragraph id="HE04DBE490D6C48AA9213ACFAED0D22EF"><enum>(1)</enum><text>An identification of current and projected munitions requirements, by class or type.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H06F8A7948BFF4B78A6679B1E450473DD"><enum>(2)</enum><text>An assessment of munitions gaps and shortfalls, including a census of current munitions
capabilities and programs, not including ammunition.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6E6D7329A8A4411695A9370CAC0FCFDB"><enum>(3)</enum><text>A description of current and planned munitions programs, including with respect to procurement,
research, development, test and evaluation, and deployment activities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7CD60D94F85C48A290EAD3300BA10ED3"><enum>(4)</enum><text>Schedules, estimated costs, and budget plans for current and planned munitions programs.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF4585A1B7E9B43D5BBEDCF0D65755F11"><enum>(5)</enum><text>Identification of opportunities and limitations within the associated industrial base.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3F39701B33E54C86980AD3FFF998415B"><enum>(6)</enum><text>Identification and evaluation of technology needs and applicable emerging technologies, including
with respect to directed energy, rail gun, and cyber technologies.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFD733D51551A4AD5A4397670ACC65399"><enum>(7)</enum><text>An assessment of how current and planned munitions programs, and promising technologies, may affect
existing operational concepts and capabilities of the military departments
or lead to new operational concepts and capabilities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC4926C4EA2664AA29433B13D0CCFCCA5"><enum>(8)</enum><text>An assessment of programs and capabilities by other countries to counter the munitions programs and
capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States, not including with
respect to ammunition, and how such assessment affects the munitions
strategy of each military department.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H33FCF6C044F44A05B8D4CDDAA50DC364"><enum>(9)</enum><text>Any other matters the Secretary determines appropriate.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H0D81B96D0EC6412BB3BB2BC48FB911EB"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="HDCA68FC8DAF34783B09897C0A62A05CF"><enum>102.</enum><header>Establishment of Department of Defense unmanned systems office</header>
<subsection id="H583F0E1DF69E4CC09842F8619AE6D23F"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Policy</header><text>It is the policy of the United States to maintain an independent organization within the Department
of Defense to develop and coordinate the unmanned air, land, and sea
capabilities of the United States to ensure unity of effort and the
prudent allocation of resources in accordance with military needs.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H85DBCAFDE7EE4C7C97A1A3792AF7310F"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Establishment</header>
<paragraph id="H8917753538B848B598FBE07543F723AC"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text><external-xref legal-doc="usc-chapter" parsable-cite="usc-chapter/10/4">Chapter 4</external-xref> of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following next
section:</text>
<quoted-block id="H9A49FE3805D94C08911C7531B39B1703" style="USC">
<section id="H71732C37606B4F199615AF7995F2E94C"><enum>145.</enum><header>Director of Defense Unmanned Systems</header>
<subsection id="H52555DF2923943A798EDC0E08C18A8E0"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Appointment</header>
<paragraph commented="no" display-inline="yes-display-inline" id="H72AE8CD9B4A34205B49767CF17E347D8"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There is a Director of Defense Unmanned Systems in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense and who shall report
directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H982AA62FE0FF4C22ADB31FA6D9553F6B" indent="up1"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The Director shall be a member of the Senior Executive Service or a general officer or flag
officer.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H06E6FD7CE2A543079A2A6AEAE204D241"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Responsibilities</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Director of Defense Unmanned Systems shall serve as—</text>
<paragraph id="H580B316ADDAC4E67A23BFD5689FA4913"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the principal advisor to both the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on matters
relating to unmanned systems described in subsection (c); and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H58567A7353B64AC9866C79CEC7497DE2"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the principal Department of Defense liaison to other Federal agencies, the defense industry, and
centers of research on such matters.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H73A3EE64BC9B4582AF6E4B27F1ED3631"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Matters described</header><text>The Director shall advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on, at a minimum, following:</text>
<paragraph id="H06115558C3414F25A0E5F667658DCEF5"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Policy and oversight of all matters related to unmanned systems within the Department of Defense,
including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military
departments, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the Defense
Agencies.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HB21D516DA8E74D6EB463224F7C75F35C"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Coordination of acquisition and research, development, technology, and engineering efforts relating
to the development, experimentation, and fielding of unmanned systems to
ensure unity of effort and interagency awareness of emerging capabilities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBCC25AC7F9B544929D969F5A1EA65822"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Recommendations regarding budget matters pertaining to unmanned systems programs and resources
across the military departments.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA4EE67DCB200457F9CD404DA79CDE080"><enum>(4)</enum><text>Recommendations, in collaboration with the Joint Staff and other strategic planning offices, to
integrate unmanned systems with existing operational concepts and
determining new concepts enabled by advances in unmanned capabilities,
including—</text>
<subparagraph id="HAFFC608F459C4F11B2DC883CB1B740A0"><enum>(A)</enum><text>advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance opportunities;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H8B45BAAC2E474470B729159389E0D361"><enum>(B)</enum><text>new or greater roles in power projection responsibilities;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HFE287EF9EBDE4783A1B990D606D9E9DA"><enum>(C)</enum><text>support for deterrence posture and capabilities;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H3918D822B20343409697A386F247CDBA"><enum>(D)</enum><text>cost imposition strategies;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HBA3205EC040F4C1780C5BD2D1BF9A3FC"><enum>(E)</enum><text>force protection; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H94CF6D75653346278FE473D04399EB53"><enum>(F)</enum><text>compliance with the requirements set forth in 142 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/109/163">Public Law 109–163</external-xref>; 119 Stat. 3164), as amended by
section 141 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/109/364">Public Law 109–364</external-xref>; 120 Stat. 2116), including the
unmanned systems roadmap, which includes a technology appendix clarifying
key areas for Department of Defense research, development, testing, and
evaluation and areas to encourage independent research and development
investment by private companies.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H6C5CCD283D704CA1AEA0AB6D5F341AEB"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Unmanned systems defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>unmanned systems</term> means platforms without human occupants that are directed by some combination of human input or
autonomous function and that are used in furtherance of military
objectives.</text></subsection></section><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H10598E5A1F6A47CEB1A251C7D974C67B"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Clerical amendment</header><text>The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 4 of such title is amended by adding at the end
the following new item:</text>
<quoted-block id="H266F248B99C645CE827CB6155F0CB177" style="USC">
<toc regeneration="no-regeneration">
<toc-entry level="section">145. Director of Defense Unmanned Systems.</toc-entry></toc><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HAF6987D49DB846C2ADAAD9D7A1133388"><enum>103.</enum><header>Independent assessment on countering anti-access and area-denial capabilities in the Asia-Pacific
region</header>
<subsection id="H6812EE0795E44F95AAA700CC99CDE9DC"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Assessment required</header>
<paragraph id="H5B4ACC44502347B099A24883C0FFF4A0"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Secretary of Defense shall enter into an agreement with an independent entity to conduct an
assessment of anti-access and area-denial capabilities that pose a threat
to the United States and its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific
region and strategies to mitigate such threats.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H076821923A3C48FE8962386128A0A3B5"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Matters to be included</header><text>The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall include—</text>
<subparagraph id="HE06AD102ADF24B61A70036BF1B152DDE"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">identification of anti-access and area-denial capabilities;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HCB28A94BA3AB4DA8AB822CFC0F12722A"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">assessment of gaps and shortfalls in the ability of the United States to address anti-access and
area-denial capabilities identified under subparagraph (A) and plans of
the Department of Defense to address such gaps and shortfalls;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HB77530D78C8948EF9D6239A766999086"><enum>(C)</enum><text>assessment of Department of Defense strategies to effectively deter aggression in the Asia-Pacific
region; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H4E0C51FFF9A14A2CA84AD0B88D4756DC"><enum>(D)</enum><text>any other matters the independent entity determines to be appropriate.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H4C267A8B1BAF4B278B8DE5477BAC3F20"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report required</header>
<paragraph id="HA59AC15036A648BA839EDE59665E6976"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than March 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report that includes the assessment and strategies required
under subsection (a) and any other matters the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H93048880CCED44069101F4F97213B9F7"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Form</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex if necessary.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H967336412A274C3DB9C05AE5D089F611"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Department of defense support</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The Secretary of Defense shall provide the independent entity described in subsection (a) with
timely access to appropriate information, data, and analysis so that the
entity may conduct a thorough and independent assessment as required under
subsection (a).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H55135C3035D147ABAE02CB3A2C5676BC"><enum>104.</enum><header>Assessment of the maritime balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region</header>
<subsection id="H0FA5193A6AEB44A694431839AB0AC167"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Assessment required</header>
<paragraph id="H5F80ABE655624ADBAD070E8E3E47055B"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The Director of the Office of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense shall conduct an
assessment of the maritime balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region
for the 10-year period beginning on the date of the initiation of the
assessment, with a focus on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and State
Oceanic Administration.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="HE5B7F387BF9C4B8A86F8A1E236EF63A1"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Matters to be included</header><text>The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall include the following:</text>
<subparagraph commented="no" id="HBE4167E2B30D409A9E78FEF8FD1F94D8"><enum>(A)</enum><text>An identification and projection of maritime balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region based on—</text>
<clause id="HE956CE5923484974B08B1BA45CEAF4F3"><enum>(i)</enum><text>a thorough assessment of the military capabilities, readiness, and strategies of each assessed
state; and</text>
</clause><clause commented="no" id="HC76FCC85A3284654AB120388E2D531FA"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>current and planned United States security initiatives and acquisition efforts, in comparison with
the efforts of regional states.</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" id="HCC3B8CA7EA384114A6B4804F46F81EA6"><enum>(B)</enum><text>The implications of pursuing such strategies for the United States defense posture, to include
capabilities, force posture, and the role of allies and partners.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HB97A9B0626FB4CCCA2E02355BE3DD75B"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report required</header>
<paragraph id="H83A7C4ED9C3E4415A28245FF287DD543"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than March 1, 2015, the Director of the Office of Net Assessment shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that includes the assessment
required under subsection (a).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCB1D3B50AC034BE0BE371CF7EEB2D694"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex if necessary.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="HD1B0D9B3EA8B453698430C5F889DE239"><enum>105.</enum><header>Missile defense cooperation</header>
<subsection id="H45AB623C50C64B5EB170D8420CF3E470"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H61576205E65E4B13806C07F4E4CCC6BC"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the United States Pacific Command, testified before the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on March 5,
2014, that in the spring of 2013, North Korea <quote>conducted another underground nuclear test, threatened the use of a nuclear weapon against the
United States, and concurrently conducted a mobile missile deployment of
an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, reportedly capable of ranging our
western most U.S. territory in the Pacific.</quote>;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF3B680BE7B5141EFA8E8C18CD1089983"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of the United States Forces Korea, testified before such
committee on April 2, 2014, that <quote>CFC [Combined Forces Command] is placing special emphasis on missile defense, not only in terms of
systems and capabilities, but also with regard to implementing an Alliance
counter-missile strategy required for our combined defense.</quote>; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3B149E7F55284EC0B9B194F988034558"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">increased emphasis and cooperation on missile defense among the United States, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea, enhances the security of allies of the United States in
Northeast Asia, increases the defense of forward-based forces of the
United States, and enhances the protection of the United States.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H5477DA5FB1974B799C9E825B01DBF203"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Assessment Required</header><text>The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an assessment to identify opportunities for increasing
missile defense cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea, and to evaluate options for short-range missile,
rocket, and artillery defense capabilities.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HE09560FCB1144B7EAD9F79CF5DA508E5"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The assessment under subsection (b) shall include the following:</text>
<paragraph id="HCD3843A45DBD4BC0AC265E29B5E124DF"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Candidate areas for increasing missile defense cooperation, including greater information sharing,
systems integration, and joint operations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HAD3F11B6CAE749309B915A07B194BA6A"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Potential challenges and limitations to enabling such cooperation and plans for mitigating such
challenges and limitations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H3CB05E6B7FCF49B2BBCAFD5935A7EB3A"><enum>(3)</enum><text>An assessment of the utility of short-range missile defense and counter-rocket, artillery, and
mortar system capabilities, including with respect to—</text>
<subparagraph id="H74BB3BA172CE4B35A941CC1E48CD0164"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the requirements for such capabilities to meet operational and contingency plan requirements in
Northeast Asia;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H81F51F1CC8C44621A4AB45B167568DBB"><enum>(B)</enum><text>cost, schedule, and availability;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H6D64D10CE1854773BCD5854F3D7223E5"><enum>(C)</enum><text>technology maturity and risk; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H8A4B8CEBB63F49A8838F9D4B4DB42D7D"><enum>(D)</enum><text>consideration of alternatives.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HEAAA0525FC36455B9DCB1861911415B3"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Briefing Required</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the
assessment under subsection (b).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="HCBEEC3A1C40E44DD918C121FCD21BB30" section-type="subsequent-section"><enum>106.</enum><header>Department of Defense Space Security and Defense Program</header>
<subsection id="H763A699F588A496EBBB09F075FC8045E"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the Sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="HE05BFF4082674AC095468AC43A539A0F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>critical United States national security space systems are facing a serious growing foreign threat;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE5B12B2E4020477284E7F007D5AF57BC"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are both developing capabilities to
disrupt the use of space by the United States in a conflict, as recently
outlined by the Director of National Intelligence in testimony before
Congress; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H61361E55A4274FF6933869F650F1ED99"><enum>(3)</enum><text>a fully developed multi-faceted space security and defense program is needed to deter and defeat
any adversaries’ acts of space aggression.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HE06C0BB8D62F477C8E9E08FA6854D8DD"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report on ability of the United States To deter and defeat adversary space aggression</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an
assessment of the ability of the Department of Defense to deter and defeat
any act of space aggression by an adversary.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H7D7570E504F04DCCA8EC1FD98FC6FD6E"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Study on alternative defense and deterrence strategies in response to foreign counterspace
capabilities</header>
<paragraph id="H51D5EE7738834EFD910E8B317EF3D638"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Study required</header><text>The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Office of Net Assessment, shall conduct a study of
potential alternative defense and deterrent strategies in response to the
existing and projected counterspace capabilities of China and Russia. Such
study shall include an assessment of the congruence of such strategies
with the current United States defense strategy and defense programs of
record, and the associated implications of pursuing such strategies.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8C3523A764D246DDA967C468343B718B"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees the results of the study
required under paragraph (1).</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section commented="no" id="H8EB0EBB5D8234DED9DEEC30BA3FEE827"><enum>107.</enum><header>Space situational awareness</header>
<subsection commented="no" id="HC8BD3F04A6E94880A45504444CBF1D25"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress finds the following:</text>
<paragraph commented="no" id="HC65EA2A0872B41CB944F129E86E46309"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">As General William Shelton testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives on April 3, 2014, <quote>[Space Situational Awareness] underpins everything we do in space</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" id="H646BCBC4B5CE427688B03CB357776B49"><enum>(2)</enum><text>At the same hearing, Lieutenant General John Raymond, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command
for Space, further testified that, <quote>Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is fundamental to effective operation and defense of our
capabilities. SSA allows us to maintain the current and predictive
knowledge of the space domain and the operational environment upon which
space operations depend. We rely on SSA to provide timely and accurate
warning to alert national and military leaders and our partners of
impending threats and hostile actions.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection commented="no" id="HD34702344FB547FB9DD96780645CA2B6"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Defense $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2015
for research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force, for enhancing
the space situational awareness capabilities of the Air Force. Such
authorization is in addition to any other authorization of appropriations
for the Secretary for such fiscal year.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="H46D31D5A58F84C23B083E1F4CAED83B9"><enum>108.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on access to training ranges within United States Pacific Command area of
responsibility</header>
<subsection id="HC2E7EF548D7A4D69824841A62710D7D4"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Congress makes the following findings:</text>
<paragraph id="H1B97773A072A4A9A96627F450D20241B"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Reliable access to military training ranges is an essential component of military readiness.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBD033A56F3344E929B40EA01D8B8F5FD"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The training opportunities provided by military training ranges are critical to maintaining the
technical and operational superiority of the Armed Forces.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HC50457F7064943E3B1815252856EED87"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review states that the operational readiness of the Armed Forces
hinges on unimpeded access to land, air, and sea training and test space.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6846F8AF94B247B5AA276F7C1FB204FF"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">A number of critical military training ranges are located within the United States Pacific Command
area of responsibility.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9A636CAC6D0D4A2D991C450EA126855C"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Due to the <quote>tyranny of distance</quote> in the Asia-Pacific region, there are significant challenges in transporting equipment and
personnel to the various military training ranges within the United States
Pacific Command area of responsibility.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HFDE15F1D904D4A4DB8188D2A34F6C812"><enum>(6)</enum><text>The Department of Defense continues a number of efforts aimed at preserving military training
ranges, while also minimizing the environmental effects of training
activities.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HF5A58C783C454D15B4A98399204F3B5B"><enum>(7)</enum><text>The Department of Defense has a variety of authorities that may be used to mitigate encroachment on
military testing and training missions.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HDD2DAD11641246B08DB5046DC035F9C2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In light of the findings specified in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of Defense should—</text>
<paragraph id="H6C459283361B4D13B3C6FA72B29E3167"><enum>(1)</enum><text>ensure that members of the Armed Forces continue to have reliable access to military training
ranges;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8D37D0BE3DBF434B9DEEC24114658669"><enum>(2)</enum><text>optimize the use of multilateral, joint training facilities overseas in order to increase readiness
and interoperability with allies and partners of the United States;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H0A3219BE0C1C4CE599DD24F1BDF14B9E"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">utilize a full range of assets, including both air- and sea-based assets, to improve accessibility
to military training areas within the United States Pacific Command area
of responsibility;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA88692313935440E9C7D4BDDEA092DEB"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">provide stable budget authority for long-term investment in range and test center infrastructure,
prioritizing those within the United States Pacific Command area of
responsibility; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBBC58DE2D4B34BDBB95E28B47FD69669"><enum>(5)</enum><text>take appropriate action to identify and mitigate encroachment or other challenges that have the
potential to impact access or operations on military training ranges.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H10A3BAC7DA36460A81276E66C02CC0B1"><enum>109.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii</header>
<subsection id="H8CCC0ED8B57C42F48F505C0CD0C9A68A"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text>
<paragraph id="HC844AEA0DCAE4C25B6FA5EBF9C83C53F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii is a premier military training area in the Pacific region,
providing units from all United States military services, as well as
militaries of allies and partners with realistic joint and combined arms
training opportunities not found elsewhere in the world.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA0D7BB7D83584CEBBA7F42A320D64077"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review states that United States forces in the Asia-Pacific region <quote>will resume regular bilateral and multilateral training exercises, pursue increased training
opportunities to improve capabilities and capacity of partner nations, as
well as support humanitarian, disaster relief, counterterrorism, and other
operations that contribute to the stability of the region.</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE82CD674A9D34AC7AB25A5DE692F3311"><enum>(3)</enum><text>There are significant challenges in transporting equipment and personnel to the Pohakuloa Training
Area from the Island of Oahu, where all United States Pacific Command
service components are permanently based.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H101A13ECCC014E97B5FEF0FBF2B0ED2F"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of congress</header><text>In light of the findings specified in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of Defense should—</text>
<paragraph id="HC81B61F8DA2B4EE78D65B6DB441037C0"><enum>(1)</enum><text>maximize the use of the Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii by all Armed Forces components, and
increase its use for bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional
allies and partners;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H1732CC97B3DA49BDA8AAE42604BB83AC"><enum>(2)</enum><text>utilize a full range of assets to improve access to the Training Center, including both air- and
sea-based assets such as inactive Joint High Speed Vessels;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA91E0EDD7DBE4B7E8CAE29D84C2C42A3"><enum>(3)</enum><text>invest in capabilities and modest improvements to lower the cost of access to the Training Center,
such as construction of a C–17 capable runway; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2F296DC98CC14A6CA5EA5F3BB1E71F5B"><enum>(4)</enum><text>take appropriate action to leverage existing authorities and programs, as well as work with the
State of Hawaii and municipalities to leverage their authorities, to
address any challenges that have the potential to impede future access to
or operations on military training ranges.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H5611D8F04E2041FE876030A9B9FC2D56"><enum>110.</enum><header>Special easement acquisition authority, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai,
Hawaii</header>
<subsection id="H830DCB79AD0C4C068A6B659DA5BC74B0"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Easement acquisition authority</header><text>Subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of the Navy may use the authority provided by section
2684a of title 10, United States Code, to acquire from willing sellers
easements and other interests in real property in the vicinity of the
Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii, for the
purpose of—</text>
<paragraph id="HCF1E06E1F5D446D9A4B14FACE97A5B8E"><enum>(1)</enum><text>limiting encroachments on military training, testing, and operations at that installation; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HA86504C84B534212B2E06226BC2DC512"><enum>(2)</enum><text>facilitating such training, testing, and operations.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H234FE9B3C9B44A7EB39B17DC61705D55"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Eligible entities</header><text>Notwithstanding subsection (c) of <external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/10/2684a">section 2684a</external-xref> of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary may
enter into an agreement authorized by such section with any private entity
for the acquisition of an easement or other interest in real property in
the vicinity of the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="HA898E134704B415EAE70CFB8A23DADC2"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Consideration</header><text>As consideration for the acquisition of an easement or other interest in real property under this
section, the Secretary of the Navy may not pay an amount in excess of the
fair market value of the interest to be acquired.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H355644C4DCFF450A9B8FE339284CF4A5"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Conditions on use of authority</header>
<paragraph id="H4CD8A4F6A8A34D7091861C3333897104"><enum>(1)</enum><header>No use of condemnation</header><text>An easement or other interest in real property may be acquired under this section only from a
willing seller.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCB4AA919059A439A8D969EF55416EA87"><enum>(2)</enum><header>No acquisition of complete title</header><text>Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the Secretary of the Navy to use this section
as authority to acquire all right, title, and interest in and to real
property in the vicinity of the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking
Sands.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HBB130A95900B40949CB0823E619511D4"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Vicinity defined</header><text>In this section, the term <term>vicinity</term> means the area within 30 miles of the boundaries of the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking
Sands.</text>
</subsection></section><enum>II</enum><header>Matters relating to foreign nations</header>
<section id="H2F493DFA6CB74D2B802BF79B3BC9BC58"><enum>201.</enum><header>Statement of policy on maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region</header>
<subsection id="H11C5481F459F44BE80EA7257D980D202"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress finds the following:</text>
<paragraph id="H18B29A286026417AA12AC5D45F120534"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The United States has a national interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, freedom of the
seas, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce,
including in the East China and South China Seas.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HCBA63FDBDBD74FA883391E67CB978F2F"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There has been an unprecedented increase in aggressive actions by the Government of the People’s
Republic of China in the East China Sea, to include—</text>
<subparagraph id="H42D2776E3A814AE386B5EFB3A8DCB0C2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas near the Senkaku islands, including the
intrusion of between 6 and 25 Chinese ships into Japanese administered
territory in the East China Sea each month since September 2012, between
26 and 124 ships into the <quote>contiguous zone</quote> in the same time period, and 9 ships into Japanese administered territory and 33 ships into the
contiguous zone in February 2014; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H5FC4CA771748494DA45BEB0191F8EDDC"><enum>(B)</enum><text>a unilateral declaration on November 23, 2013, without prior consultations with the United States,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, or other nations of the Asia-Pacific region,
of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HC4408C213AD74B959BF1135A7E14F2EE"><enum>(3)</enum><text>In recent years, there have also been numerous dangerous and destabilizing incidents in the South
China Sea, specifically in waters near the coasts of the Philippines, the
People’s Republic of China, Malaysia, and Vietnam, where the use of
coercion, intimidation, and military force by claimants seeking to change
the status quo have raised tensions in the region. Such unilateral actions
include—</text>
<subparagraph id="H3C193F40327B4DFD82D3E61CEB3FD5DE"><enum>(A)</enum><text>continued restrictions on access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing Philippine
presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the People’s Republic of China;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H5FB084AF8F10492B8DD5585244843344"><enum>(B)</enum><text>establishing hydrocarbon blocks up for bid in areas that are under dispute;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H44F252DFEDCF448A952C07D88C01CD4D"><enum>(C)</enum><text>announcing administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H23ECBDD118BF4A1EA88FB64BDEA53AF8"><enum>(D)</enum><text>imposing new fishing regulations covering disputed areas.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="H106158FE5BEA4CD48E61B69C01AC1D26"><enum>(4)</enum><text>On December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully operating in international waters in the South
China Sea when a People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel crossed its bow at a
distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the water, forcing the USS
Cowpens to take evasive action to avoid a collision. Such action appears
contrary to the international legal obligations of the People’s Republic
of China under International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREGs).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H65D34EC32093432E940DD9F578D585C9"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The increasing frequency and assertiveness of patrols and competing regulations over disputed
territory and maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk of
miscalculation and confrontation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE129B0CA8B044006A4CAE8E29179FB48"><enum>(6)</enum><text>The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has promoted multilateral talks on disputed
areas without settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with
the People’s Republic of China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea that committed all parties to those
territorial disputes to <quote>reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the
South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles
of international law</quote> and to <quote>resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the
threat or use of force</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H97A02850C7594E1193E552EA1AD08E19"><enum>(7)</enum><text>The United States Government has a clear interest in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed
maritime claims in accordance with international law and is firmly opposed
to coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HBFE75A6E4F5141B998487CD357DC6AC2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Statement of policy</header><text>The United States—</text>
<paragraph id="HBB4F7A027A194091A36CE4C5D17A2D04"><enum>(1)</enum><text>reaffirms its unwavering commitment and support for allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region,
and for the longstanding United States policy that Article V of the United
States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered
Senkaku Islands;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9CFAD5C90505458392E03764C9910F43"><enum>(2)</enum><text>opposes claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea that belong to all
nations and urges all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing
activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert
administration over disputed claims;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H28D9D9F9838A40529D70A4439521F52E"><enum>(3)</enum><text>supports the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum, to increase regional cooperation and ensure that disputes
are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HD82D51E2D6B14DE79BB4335DB058EFED"><enum>(4)</enum><text>continues United States military operations in, and transit through, international waters and
airspace in the Asia-Pacific region, in accordance with established
principles and practices of international law.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H7C43A878009F420E8DAA602BE65AB35F"><enum>202.</enum><header>Sense of Congress reaffirming security commitment to Japan</header>
<text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H504B46276F3A431F8F9E3241A9367CFE"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States highly values its alliance with the Government of Japan as a cornerstone of
peace and security in the region, based on shared values of democracy, the
rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights in order
to promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H767138A355E740619CD2B12041454101"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States welcomes Japan’s determination to contribute more proactively to regional and
global peace and security;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H6BB930391AD94CDF9FDFE08BC2824191"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States supports recent increases in Japanese defense funding, adoption of a National
Security Strategy, formation of security institutions such as the Japanese
National Security Council, re-examination of the legal basis for its
security including the matter of exercising its right of collective
self-defense and other moves that will enable Japan to bear even greater
alliance responsibilities;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H217AF00102BA4D5890ADB21208B13926"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States and Japan should continue to improve joint interoperability and collaborate on
developing future capabilities with which to maintain regional stability
in an increasingly uncertain security environment;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H2E2F7A61429A4D5A99C941F4E0D6C9C1"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the United States and Japan should continue efforts to strengthen regional multilateral
institutions that promote economic and security cooperation based on
internationally accepted rules and norms;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H24E4B5B5EEE74DDEB3A07FDB2781150A"><enum>(6)</enum><text>the United States acknowledges that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and
opposes any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such
administration, affirms that unilateral actions of a third party will not
affect the United States acknowledgment of the administration of Japan
over the Senkaku Islands, and remains committed under the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security to respond to any armed attack in the territories
under the administration of Japan; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H7B138C1B42CD46328D0C461A92E02867"><enum>(7)</enum><text>the United States reaffirms its commitment to the Government of Japan under Article V of the Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security that <quote>[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional provisions and processes</quote>.</text>
</paragraph></section><section commented="no" id="H82768C55C3B14A20B7BB7A886200104C"><enum>203.</enum><header>Report on opportunities to strengthen relationship between the United States and the Republic of
Korea</header>
<subsection id="HB9451C927D45435680BD8E8A4A7B3681"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="H6379DCAEE4E942BF9B3F8818977E63B6"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States and the Republic of Korea have forged a strong security alliance over the last 60
years;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H145ACFB0EDD0409885F139674BA45FF9"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the alliance has been strengthened in joint missions to fight the global war on terror and has been
further bolstered through a continuous trend of meaningful sales of United
States military hardware to Korea;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H8DA90AFFEEAE482B87FFFFE9E8AEAD11"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the relationship between the two countries was further solidified in 2011 through the United
States–Korea Free Trade Agreement which has led to growth in trade of
goods and services; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H837A29C1657741B38C18BF97EE2240AB"><enum>(4)</enum><text>additional opportunities should be identified to ensure that this relationship continues to grow in
the long term and more closely reflects United States relationships with
other free trade agreement partner countries.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HBC97D239B3DC4F5DB8C8335015DF3128"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report required</header><text>Not later than October 1, 2014, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, a report on
opportunities to further strengthen the relationship between the United
States and the Republic of Korea with an emphasis on matters relating to
security and trade.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="HC28F95D7FA7A4C02A687ACA36D462CEA"><enum>204.</enum><header>Maritime capabilities of Taiwan and its contribution to regional peace and stability</header>
<subsection id="H3436496FE7724872802040201FB03664"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report required</header><text>Not later than April 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to the congressional defense committees,
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on—</text>
<paragraph id="H3847E361611E4FC197C63A6AB9B9DF37"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the maritime balance of forces between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HE97C00BA155E49409D8415C90F5B7D5F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the posture and readiness of the navy of Taiwan to respond to an attack or other contingency
against the territory of Taiwan.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H1FB33DBE3F614BBB92616763880236F8"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:</text>
<paragraph id="HE11942463F1A43BBA1B9872DB96EE574"><enum>(1)</enum><text>A description and assessment of the posture and readiness of elements of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army expected or available to threaten the maritime or
territorial security of Taiwan, including an assessment of—</text>
<subparagraph id="H2E78A0B14C5343FAB0AEB73984A5DFF6"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the undersea and surface warfare capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the littoral
areas in and around the Taiwan Strait;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H48143EB7C0EA4E55836283ECA863838C"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the amphibious and heavy sealift capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HE4B8F803E0FF440F87206604F4A9D64D"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force to establish air dominance over Taiwan;
and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="HAE6C83A099964A59A74346397B97742E"><enum>(D)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps to suppress or destroy the
forces of Taiwan necessary to defend the security of Taiwan.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="HC018E1E5CEAA494C9420C8D1850DE16F"><enum>(2)</enum><text>A description and assessment of the posture and readiness of elements of the armed forces of Taiwan
expected or available to maintain the maritime or territorial security of
Taiwan, including an assessment of—</text>
<subparagraph id="H798CCA19FBD14A93BEDFF70912436A1C"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the undersea and surface warfare capabilities of the navy of Taiwan;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H99D8D279A1744510A2538D51464ED3C2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the land-based anti-ship cruise missile capabilities of Taiwan; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="H55C854A96B5E40B9A52CD5EB9BA43C2D"><enum>(C)</enum><text>other anti-access or area-denial capabilities, such as mines, that contribute to the deterrence of
Taiwan against actions taken to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="HECB73B9673254A10A9D4BE9E0BBA55A4"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Form</header><text>The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="H7C47D95427C44C05A2553DDDBF6B5757"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Sense of congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="HB7169964CC2B498CBDCB729FE24A6B4C"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/96/8">Public Law 96–8</external-xref>), should continue
to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="HBCE651C87EA44D5381529FBC4F176D12"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the growth and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, including its focus on <quote>preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait [which] appears to remain the principal focus
and primary driver of China’s military investment</quote>, as noted in the 2013 Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, requires
greater attention to the needed defense capabilities of Taiwan; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H9B648925841D468BAE95D40E1F02AC06"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States should consider opportunities to help enhance the maritime capabilities and
nautical skills of the Taiwanese navy that can contribute to Taiwan’s
self-defense and to regional peace and stability, in areas such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, including
extending an invitation to Taiwan to participate in the 2014 Rim of the
Pacific international maritime exercise.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="H329B132225D34E62A8AC44C32398AF6B"><enum>205.</enum><header>Modifications to annual report on military and security developments involving the People’s
Republic of China</header>
<subsection id="HD8E045190F0D476B955DDB85D41A678A"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Matters To be included</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Subsection (b) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
(<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/106/65">Public Law 106–65</external-xref>; 113 Stat. 781; <external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/10/113">10 U.S.C. 113</external-xref> note) is amended—</text>
<paragraph id="H4DF6FEF9D044460CA79D687E8BBD6061"><enum>(1)</enum><text>by redesignating paragraphs (10) through (20) as paragraphs (11) through (21), respectively; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="H06CFF7B2E04F4326B2E2DAB18A432E47"><enum>(2)</enum><text>by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:</text>
<quoted-block display-inline="no-display-inline" id="H5983A4BCEB234A13A3F36631538B63BD" style="OLC">
<paragraph id="H893EFE0DA0924D9F96C0104475CFC4C7"><enum>(10)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The developments in maritime law enforcement capabilities and organization of the People’s Republic
of China, focusing on activities in contested maritime areas in the South
China Sea and East China Sea. Such analyses shall include an assessment of
the nature of China’s maritime law enforcement activities directed against
United States allies and partners. Such maritime activities shall include
activities originating or suspect of originating from China and shall
include government and nongovernment activities that are believed to be
sanctioned or supported by the Chinese government.</text></paragraph><after-quoted-block>.</after-quoted-block></quoted-block>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="H10E2A8EA5D744F6BBCE2B39F0F98B60C"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Effective Date</header><text>The amendments made by this section take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply
with respect to reports required to be submitted under subsection (a) of
section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, as so amended, on or after that date.</text>
</subsection></section>