113 S960 RS: Syria Transition Support Act of 2013 U.S. Senate 2013-05-15 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.

II Calendar No. 147 113th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 960 [Report No. 113–79] IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 15, 2013 Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Corker, Mr. Coons, and Mr. Casey) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations July 24, 2013 Reported by Mr. Menendez, with amendments Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic A BILL To foster stability in Syria, and for other purposes.

1.

Short title; table of contents

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Syria Transition Support Act of 2013. (b)

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Appropriate congressional committees defined. Sec. 3. Findings. Sec. 4. Sense of the Senate. Sec. 4.5. Purposes of assistance. Sec. 5.6. No authorization for the use of military force. TITLE I—United States strategy and congressional oversight Sec. 101. Report on United States strategy on Syria. Sec. 102. Congressional oversight of United States Government activities in Syria. TITLE II—Humanitarian assistance Sec. 201. Humanitarian assistance to the people of Syria. Sec. 202. Humanitarian and development assistance through international organizations. Sec. 203. Bilateral assistance to countries that host Syrian refugees. Sec. 202.204. Sense of Congress. Sec. 203.205. Report on strategy to communicate to the Syrian people about assistance provided by the United States Government. Sec. 206. No authorization for new humanitarian funds. TITLE III—Promoting an effective transition Sec. 301. Syria Transition Fund. Sec. 302. Adjusting sanctions provisions in preparation for a political transition. Sec. 303. Report on Syrian weapons stockpiles. Sec. 304. Pre-transition international consensus. Sec. 305. International support for a peaceful transition. TITLE IV—Sanctions Sec. 401. Definitions. Sec. 402. Imposition of sanctions with respect to selling, transferring, or transporting defense articles, defense services, or military training to the Assad regime of Syria. Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons providing petroleum or petroleum products to the Assad regime of Syria. Sec. 402. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the sale, transfer, or transportation of defense articles, defense services, or military training to the Assad regime of Syria. Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the provision of petroleum or petroleum products to the Assad regime of Syria. Sec. 404. Sanctions described. Sec. 405. Waivers. Sec. 405. National security waiver. Sec. 406. Sense of Congress on sanctions. TITLE V—Increased support for the opposition Sec. 501. Lethal and increased non-lethal support for the vetted opposition. Sec. 502. Prohibition on aid to Free Syrian Army in event of chemical weapons use. Sec. 503. Prohibition on aid to Free Syrian Army in event of sale or illegal transfer of United States defense articles or services.

2.

Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this Act, except as specifically provided in title IV of this Act, the term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

3.

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)Since mass peaceful demonstrations started in Syria on March 15, 2011, the Government of Syria, led by Bashar al-Assad, has responded by committing human rights abuses and launching a violent crackdown that has claimed an estimated 70,000 lives and degenerated into a civil war. (2)The civil war has caused a humanitarian crisis. According to the United Nations, there are more than 1,400,000 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq and more than 2,600,000 Syrians displaced within the country. More than three-quarters of refugees and internally displaced persons are women and children. (3)The refugee crisis threatens the stability of the Middle East, putting immense burdens on Syria’s neighbors, most notably Lebanon and Jordan, but also Turkey and Iraq. (4)The civil war has increased the danger that the Assad regime could lose control of its chemical weapons stockpile, with the chemical weapons potentially falling into the hands of terrorist groups like Hizballah and al Qaeda. (5)On April 25, 2013, the White House issued a letter to Congress stating that our intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent Sarin. (6)The security vacuum in Syria has created a safe haven for both Shia and Sunni extremists, which could threaten the security of the United States and its partners in the region. (7)Instability in Syria has threatened Israel’s security, particularly on the shared border along the Golan Heights. (8)A change of government in Syria could be a significant blow to the Government of Iran and Hizballah, which would lose a strong ally and which have also been aggressively providing military and other assistance to Bashar al-Assad’s forces, including through the trafficking of weapons and supplies on commercial flights originating from or terminating in Iran. (9)The commitments made by the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces at the international meeting in Istanbul on April 20 and 21, 2013, constitute an important endorsement of shared principles and objectives that should guide United States Government cooperation with the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and affiliated forces. These principles include a commitment to the territorial integrity of Syria, a rejection of sectarianism and extremism, and pledges to secure chemical weapons and support nonproliferation efforts. (10)It is vital to the national security interests of the United States to ensure that the United States planning and programs, specifically those conducted under the authorities or funding provided in or authorized under this Act, are focused on ensuring a stable and appropriate political transition in Syria and limiting the threats posed by extremist groups, weapons proliferation, sectarian and ethnic violence, and refugee flows in the aftermath of the current conflict. (11)The President’s goals of Assad leaving power, an end to the violence, and a negotiated political settlement in Syria are prerequisites for a stable, democratic future for Syria and regional peace and security, but absent decisive changes to the present military balance of power on the ground in Syria, sufficient incentives do not yet exist for the achievement of such goals. (12)The leadership of many United States friends and allies, including the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the President of France, the Prime Minister of Turkey, the King of Jordan, the King of Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince of the United Arab Emirates, and the Amir of Qatar, have stated their strong support for more robust international response to change the military balance of power on the ground in Syria. (13)The President should increase his consultations with Congress regarding what additional resources and authorities may be necessary to support United States national security interests in Syria, including the defense of United States allies and partners in the Middle East.

4.

Sense of the Senate

It is the sense of the Senate that the United States— (1)strongly condemns the ongoing violence and widespread human rights violations perpetrated against the Syrian people by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad; (2)should support civilians and innocent victims of the conflict in Syria, particularly women and children who are displaced and vulnerable to physical and psychological exploitation; (3)affirms the neutrality of medical professionals providing humanitarian assistance and health care on a non-political basis and condemns attacks against such personnel or interference in the provision of medical care; (4)should support efforts of democratically oriented political opposition groups in Syria to agree upon a political transition plan that is inclusive and protects the rights of all minority ethnic groups in the country; (5)welcomes the pledges of humanitarian assistance made by the Governments of Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and members of the European Union, and encourages prompt delivery of those pledges, which will contribute to meeting the needs of the victims of this conflict, and encourages all donors to coordinate with the United Nations; (6)should help ensure that, once a stable transitional government is established in Syria, it is committed to multiparty democracy, open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious freedom, protection of refugees and asylees, promoting peace and stability with its neighbors, enhancing the rule of law, and rehabilitating and reintegrating former combatants; and (7)should fully implement existing sanctions on Syria, including Executive Order 13606, dated April 22, 2012, which sanctions any individual or entity that assists or enables the commission of serious human rights abuses, through computer or network disruption, tracking, or monitoring, by the Government of Syria or the Government of Iran.

4.5.

Purposes of assistance

The purposes of assistance authorized by this Act are— (1)to support transition from the current regime to a just and democratic state that is inclusive and protects the rights of all Syrians regardless of religion, ethnicity, or gender; (2)to assist the people of Syria, especially internally displaced persons and refugees, in meeting basic needs including access to food, health care, shelter, and clean drinking water; (3)to provide political and economic support to those neighboring countries who are hosting refugees fleeing Syria and to international organizations that are providing assistance and coordinating humanitarian relief efforts; (4)to oppose the unlawful use of violence against civilians by all parties to the conflict in Syria; (5)to use a broad array of instruments of national power to expedite a negotiated solution to the conflict in Syria, including the departure of Bashar al-Assad; (6)to recognize the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (in this Act referred to as the Syrian Opposition Coalition or SOC) as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people; (7)to engage with opposition groups that reflect United States interests and values, most notably the Syrian Opposition Coalition, any legitimate successor groups, including appropriate subgroups within the opposition that are representative of the Syrian people, as well as the broader international community, that are committed to facilitating an orderly transition to a more stable democratic political order, including— (A)protecting human rights, expanding political participation, and providing religious freedom to all Syrians, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, or gender; (B)supporting the rule of law; (C)rejecting terrorism and extremist ideologies; (D)subordinating the military to civilian authority; (E)protecting the Syrian population against sectarian violence and reprisals; (F)cooperating with international counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts, as well as securing, dismantling, and eventual destruction of any inherited nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or WMD-related programs; (G)supporting regional stability and avoiding interference in the affairs of neighboring countries; and (H)establishing a strong justice system and ensuring accountability for conflict-related crimes; (8)to promote the territorial integrity of Syria and continuity of the Syrian state by supporting a post-Assad government that is capable of providing security, services, and political and religious rights to its people; (9)to provide foreign assistance, defense articles, defense services, and training to specific members of the Syrian Supreme Military Council, particular units of the Free Syrian Army, and other Syrian entities opposed to the government of Bashar al-Assad that have been properly and fully vetted and share common values and interests with the United States; (10)to closely coordinate with key partners on contingency planning, including Turkey, Jordan, Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the European Union, to ensure that these partners are prepared for an appropriate response to the evolving situation in Syria, including being ready and capable of securing of chemical or biological weapons or other proliferation emergencies, preventing the flow of fighters and weapons out of Syria into neighboring countries, or taking other measures against the Government of Syria, including contingency planning for a no-fly zone; (11)to support efforts to identify and document the activities of those individuals who target or lead units or organizations that target civilian populations and vulnerable populations, including women and children, or have engaged in otherwise unlawful acts, and to ensure that they are held accountable for their actions; and (12)to ensure a stable and appropriate political for their actions; (12)to support programs that provide scholars, scientists, and tertiary level students in Syria and their families, whose lives, health, and freedoms are at risk as a result of their academic pursuits, fellowship and scholarship opportunities at safe host universities outside Syria in order to ensure that they can be an asset to the rebuilding of a stable and democratic Syria;and (13)to ensure a stable and appropriate political transition in Syria and limit the threats posed by extremist groups, weapons proliferation, sectarian and ethnic violence, and refugee flows in the aftermath of the current conflict.

5.6.

No authorization for the use of military force

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as providing authorization for the use of military force by the United States Armed Forces.

July 24, 2013 Reported with amendments