Congressional findings and declaration of purposes

(a)

Findings

Congress finds the following: (1)In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 98–417) (referred to in this Act as the 1984 Act), was enacted with the intent of facilitating the early entry of generic drugs while preserving incentives for innovation. (2)Prescription drugs make up 10 percent of the national health care spending but for the past decade have been one of the fastest growing segments of health care expenditures. (3)Until recently, the 1984 Act was successful in facilitating generic competition to the benefit of consumers and health care payers—although 67 percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States are generic drugs, they account for only 20 percent of all expenditures. (4)Generic drugs cost substantially less than brand name drugs, with discounts off the brand price sometimes exceeding 90 percent. (5)Federal dollars currently account for an estimated 35 percent of the $263,000,000,000 spent on prescription drugs, and this share is expected to rise to 42 percent by 2021. (6)(A)In recent years, the intent of the 1984 Act has been subverted by certain settlement agreements between brand companies and their potential generic competitors that make reverse payments which are payments by the brand company to the generic company. (B)These settlement agreements have unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic drugs contrary to free competition, the interests of consumers, and the principles underlying antitrust law. (C)Because of the price disparity between brand name and generic drugs, such agreements are more profitable for both the brand and generic manufacturers than competition, and will become increasingly common unless prohibited. (D)These agreements result in consumers losing the benefits that the 1984 Act was intended to provide. (b)

Purposes

The purposes of this Act are— (1)to enhance competition in the pharmaceutical market by stopping anticompetitive agreements between brand name and generic drug manufacturers that limit, delay, or otherwise prevent competition from generic drugs; and (2)to support the purpose and intent of antitrust law by prohibiting anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry that harm consumers.

Unlawful compensation for delay

The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44 et seq.) is amended by— (1)redesignating section 28 as section 29; and (2)inserting before section 29, as redesignated, the following:

28.

Preserving access to affordable generics

(a)

In general

(1)

Enforcement proceeding

The Federal Trade Commission may initiate a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section against the parties to any agreement resolving or settling, on a final or interim basis, a patent infringement claim, in connection with the sale of a drug product. (2)

Presumption

(A)

In general

Subject to subparagraph (B), in such a proceeding, an agreement shall be presumed to have anticompetitive effects and be unlawful if— (i)an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and (ii)the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any period of time. (B)

Exception

The presumption in subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the parties to such agreement demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement. (b)

Competitive factors

In determining whether the settling parties have met their burden under subsection (a)(2)(B), the fact finder shall consider— (1)the length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent, compared with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product; (2)the value to consumers of the competition from the ANDA product allowed under the agreement; (3)the form and amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling the patent infringement claim; (4)the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by winning the patent litigation; (5)the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if it had lost the patent litigation; (6)the time period between the date of the agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer and the date of the settlement of the patent infringement claim; and (7)any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems relevant to its determination of competitive effects under this subsection. (c)

Limitations

In determining whether the settling parties have met their burden under subsection (a)(2)(B), the fact finder shall not presume— (1)that entry would not have occurred until the expiration of the relevant patent or statutory exclusivity; or (2)that the agreement's provision for entry of the ANDA product prior to the expiration of the relevant patent or statutory exclusivity means that the agreement is pro-competitive, although such evidence may be relevant to the fact finder's determination under this section. (d)

Exclusions

Nothing in this section shall prohibit a resolution or settlement of a patent infringement claim in which the consideration granted by the NDA holder to the ANDA filer as part of the resolution or settlement includes only one or more of the following: (1)The right to market the ANDA product in the United States prior to the expiration of— (A)any patent that is the basis for the patent infringement claim; or (B)any patent right or other statutory exclusivity that would prevent the marketing of such drug. (2)A payment for reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed $7,500,000. (3)A covenant not to sue on any claim that the ANDA product infringes a United States patent. (e)

Regulations and enforcement

(1)

Regulations

The Federal Trade Commission may issue, in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, regulations implementing and interpreting this section. These regulations may exempt certain types of agreements described in subsection (a) if the Commission determines such agreements will further market competition and benefit consumers. Judicial review of any such regulation shall be in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to section 706 of title 5, United States Code. (2)

Enforcement

A violation of this section shall be treated as a violation of section 5. (3)

Judicial review

Any person, partnership or corporation that is subject to a final order of the Commission, issued in an administrative adjudicative proceeding under the authority of subsection (a)(1), may, within 30 days of the issuance of such order, petition for review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the ultimate parent entity, as defined at 16 CFR 801.1(a)(3), of the NDA holder is incorporated as of the date that the NDA is filed with the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration, or the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the ultimate parent entity of the ANDA filer is incorporated as of the date that the ANDA is filed with the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration. In such a review proceeding, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. (f)

Antitrust laws

Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify, impair or supersede the applicability of the antitrust laws as defined in subsection (a) of the 1st section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)) and of section 5 of this Act to the extent that section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition. Nothing in this section shall modify, impair, limit or supersede the right of an ANDA filer to assert claims or counterclaims against any person, under the antitrust laws or other laws relating to unfair competition. (g)

Penalties

(1)

Forfeiture

Each person, partnership or corporation that violates or assists in the violation of this section shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty sufficient to deter violations of this section, but in no event greater than 3 times the value received by the party that is reasonably attributable to a violation of this section. If no such value has been received by the NDA holder, the penalty to the NDA holder shall be sufficient to deter violations, but in no event greater than 3 times the value given to the ANDA filer reasonably attributable to the violation of this section. Such penalty shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Federal Trade Commission, in its own name by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose, in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership or corporation that violates this section. In such actions, the United States district courts are empowered to grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate. (2)

Cease and desist

(A)

In general

If the Commission has issued a cease and desist order with respect to a person, partnership or corporation in an administrative adjudicative proceeding under the authority of subsection (a)(1), an action brought pursuant to paragraph (1) may be commenced against such person, partnership or corporation at any time before the expiration of one year after such order becomes final pursuant to section 5(g). (B)

Exception

In an action under subparagraph (A), the findings of the Commission as to the material facts in the administrative adjudicative proceeding with respect to such person's, partnership's or corporation's violation of this section shall be conclusive unless— (i)the terms of such cease and desist order expressly provide that the Commission's findings shall not be conclusive; or (ii)the order became final by reason of section 5(g)(1), in which case such finding shall be conclusive if supported by evidence. (3)

Civil penalty

In determining the amount of the civil penalty described in this section, the court shall take into account— (A)the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation; (B)with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of violations, the ability to pay, any effect on the ability to continue doing business, profits earned by the NDA holder, compensation received by the ANDA filer, and the amount of commerce affected; and (C)other matters that justice requires. (4)

Remedies in addition

Remedies provided in this subsection are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy provided by Federal law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any other provision of law. (h)

Definitions

In this section: (1)

Agreement

The term agreement means anything that would constitute an agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1) or section 5 of this Act. (2)

Agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim

The term agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim includes any agreement that is entered into within 30 days of the resolution or the settlement of the claim, or any other agreement that is contingent upon, provides a contingent condition for, or is otherwise related to the resolution or settlement of the claim. (3)

ANDA

The term ANDA means an abbreviated new drug application, as defined under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(j)). (4)

ANDA filer

The term ANDA filer means a party who has filed an ANDA with the Food and Drug Administration. (5)

ANDA product

The term ANDA product means the product to be manufactured under the ANDA that is the subject of the patent infringement claim. (6)

Drug product

The term drug product means a finished dosage form (e.g., tablet, capsule, or solution) that contains a drug substance, generally, but not necessarily, in association with 1 or more other ingredients, as defined in section 314.3(b) of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations. (7)

NDA

The term NDA means a new drug application, as defined under section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(b)). (8)

NDA holder

The term NDA holder means— (A)the party that received FDA approval to market a drug product pursuant to an NDA; (B)a party owning or controlling enforcement of the patent listed in the Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as the FDA Orange Book) in connection with the NDA; or (C)the predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by, controlling, or under common control with any of the entities described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) (such control to be presumed by direct or indirect share ownership of 50 percent or greater), as well as the licensees, licensors, successors, and assigns of each of the entities. (9)

Patent infringement

The term patent infringement means infringement of any patent or of any filed patent application, extension, reissue, renewal, division, continuation, continuation in part, reexamination, patent term restoration, patents of addition and extensions thereof. (10)

Patent infringement claim

The term patent infringement claim means any allegation made to an ANDA filer, whether or not included in a complaint filed with a court of law, that its ANDA or ANDA product may infringe any patent held by, or exclusively licensed to, the NDA holder of the drug product. (11)

Statutory exclusivity

The term statutory exclusivity means those prohibitions on the approval of drug applications under clauses (ii) through (iv) of section 505(c)(3)(E) (5- and 3-year data exclusivity), section 527 (orphan drug exclusivity), or section 505A (pediatric exclusivity) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.