[Hinds' Precedents, Volume 3]
[Chapter 72 - The Impeachment and Trial of Samuel Chase]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


               THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE.

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    1. Preliminary investigation as to Judges Chase and Peters. 
     Sections 2342, 2343.
    2. Preparation of articles. Section 2344.
    3. Appointment of managers. Section 2345.
    4. Articles and their presentation. Section 2346.
    5. Writ of summons. Section 2347.
    6. Rules of the trial. Section 2348.
    7. Appearance and answer of respondent. Sections 2849-2351.
    8. Replication of the House. Section 2352.
    9. Presentation of testimony. Sections 2353-2354.
   10. Order of final arguments. Section 2355.
   11. Arguments as to nature of impeachment. Sections 2356--2362.
   12. Final judgment. Section 2363.

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  2342. The impeachment and trial of Samuel Chase, associate justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1804.
  The investigation of the conduct of Richard Peters, United States 
district judge for Pennsylvania, in 1804.
  The impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase was set in motion on the 
responsibility of one Member of the House, sustained by the statement 
of another Member.
  In the case of Mr. Justice Chase the House, after long debate and a 
review of precedents, decided to order investigation, although Members 
could give only hearsay evidence as to the facts.
  English precedents reviewed in the Chase case on the question of 
ordering an investigation on the strength of common rumor.
  The House declined to state by way of preamble its reason for 
investigating the conduct of Mr. Justice Chase and Judge Peters.
  Form of resolution authorizing the Chase and Peters investigation in 
1804.
  Two of the seven Members of the committee for the Chase investigation 
were from the number opposing the investigation.
  Mr. John Randolph, who had moved the Chase investigation, was made 
chairman of the committee.
                                                            Sec. 2342
  On January 5, 1804,\1\ Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, arising in his 
place in the House, spoke of the necessity of ``preserving unpolluted 
the fountain of justice,'' and then said:

  At the last session of Congress a gentleman from Pennsylvania did, in 
his place (on the bill to amend the judicial system of the United 
States), state certain facts in relation to the official conduct of an 
eminent judicial character, which I then thought, and still think, the 
House bound to notice. But the lateness of the session (for we had, if 
I mistake not, scarce a fortnight remaining) precluding all possibility 
of bringing the subject to any efficient result, I did not then think, 
proper to take any steps in the business. Finding my attention, 
however, thus drawn to a consideration of the character of the officer 
in question, I made it my business, considering it my duty as well to 
myself as to those whom I represent, to investigate the charges then 
made, and the official character of the judge, in general. The result 
having convinced me that there exists ground of impeachment against 
this officer, I demand an inquiry into his conduct, and therefore 
submit to the House the following resolution:
  ``Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the 
official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, and to report their opinion whether 
the said Samuel Chase hath so acted in his judicial capacity as to 
require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House.'

  Objection being made that the House should have further information 
before taking a step, which would cast discredit on the character of a 
judge, Mr. John Smilie, of Pennsylvania, who had made the statement in 
the preceding Congress referred to by Mr. Randolph, arose and, in the 
course of his remarks, said:

  A man of the name of Fries was prosecuted for treason in the State of 
Pennsylvania. Two of the first counsel at that bar, Mr. Lewis and Mr. 
Dallas, without fee or reward, undertook his defense. I mention their 
names to show that there could have been no party prejudices that 
influenced them. When the trial came on the judge behaved in such a 
manner that Mr. Lewis declared that he would not so far degrade his 
profession as to plead under the circumstances imposed upon him. Mr. 
Dallas declared that the rights of the bar were as well established as 
those of the bench; that he considered the conduct of the judge as a 
violation of those rights and refused to plead. The facts were these: 
The judge told the jury and the counsel that the court had made up 
their minds on what constituted treason; that they had committed their 
opinion to writing, and that the counsel must therefore confine 
themselves to the facts in the cue before the court. The counsel 
replied that they did not dispute the facts, but that they were able to 
show that they did not constitute treason. The end of the affair was 
that the counsel retired from court, and the man was tried without 
counsel, convicted, and sentenced to death.
  After this the Attorney-General wrote a letter to Messrs. Dallas and 
Lewis, requesting them to furnish their notes and opinions for the use 
of the President. They drew up an answer, in which they stated that the 
acts charged against Fries did not amount to treason, but were only 
sedition, and that they were so considered in the British courts. This 
letter was read to me by Mr. Dallas. After receiving the letter the 
President pardoned the man.

  A lengthy debate ensued as to whether or not, upon the facts before 
it, the House would be justified in agreeing to the resolution. It was 
objected \2\ that the statements of the Member from Pennsylviana, Mr. 
Smilie, were not entitled to much weight, since they were not what he 
knew himself, but only what he had received from others. Moreover, he 
had charged only what amounted at most to an error of judgment on the 
part of the judge. Some facts, it was argued \3\ ought to be adduced, 
and so important a step should not be taken hastily. It was stated \4\
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  \1\ First session Eighth Congress, House Journal, p. 516, Annals, pp. 
805-874.
  \2\ By Mr. Joseph Clay, of Pennsylvania, Annals, p. 810.
  \3\ By Mr. Roger Griswold, of Connecticut, Annals, p. 813.
  \4\ By Mr. John Dennis, of Maryland, Annals, p. 814.
Sec. 2342
that the most parliamentary way would be for a gentleman to state in 
the form of a resolution the grounds of impeachment and then to refer 
such a resolution to a select committee for investigation. But it would 
be novel and unprecedented for the House to institute, without facts 
before it, an inquiry into the character of a high officer of the 
Government. The voting of an inquiry, so it was declared,\1\ would be 
considered equivalent to the expression of an opinion that the House 
had evidence of the probable guilt of the judge. It had been urged that 
the House, in this case, had all the powers of a grand jury. But a 
grand jury had only the right to receive testimony. They might not send 
for it. If there was evidence in this case they might act on it, even 
though it be ex parte, although that would be going far. But so far 
there had been no statement satisfactorily showing probable cause. It 
was asserted \2\ that the opinion of any one Member, without 
presentation of facts, should not avail to set in motion this 
proceeding. The gentleman from Pennsylvania might have misconceived the 
information given to him. Objection was further made \3\ that the 
proposed form of procedure was not warranted by the precedents. The 
case of Bolingbroke was not in point, since that impeachment was based 
on disclosures made during examination of the conduct of the ministry. 
In the Blount and Pickering cases the Executive had transmitted 
documents to the House. But in this case it was proposed to appoint a 
committee to search in the first instance for an accusation and then to 
look for proofs to justify it. The assertion was made \4\ that there 
were no precedents to justify an assertion that common fame was 
sufficient ground for impeachment. The precedent of the Earl of 
Stratford was a gloomy and terrible precedent, unsusceptible of 
application under a Republican form of government. It was true that a 
member had risen in his place in the Commons and impeached Warren 
Hastings, but at the same time he exhibited specific charges of 
misconduct. The House was the grand inquest of the nation, and its 
practice ought to be in many respects analogous to that of a grand 
jury. It should not listen to murmurs and seek for guilt. The 
resolution before the House did not allege a single fact. It was urged 
\5\ that never, so far as any precedents so far cited had shown, had an 
inquiry been commenced in Parliament without a statement of the facts 
to accompany the motion, and it was objected \6\ that even if common 
rumor had once been ground for beginning proceedings in a period of 
rudeness and violence, the more improved system of modem jurisprudence 
should discard such a doctrine.
  In favor of the resolution it was urged \7\ that the purpose of the 
inquiry was to procure evidence. If the House already had the evidence 
there would be no need of the inquiry. The statement of a Member in his 
place, even though hearsay, was sufficient to cause inquiry. It was 
pointed out 11 that under the rules of the House such was the respect 
due to a Member of the House--the statement of a Member
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  \1\ By Mr. George W. Campbell, of Tennessee, Annals, p. 817.
  \2\ By Mr. Thomas Lowndes, of South Carolina, Annals, p. 825.
  \3\ By Mr. R. Griswold, of Connecticut, Annals, p. 837.
  \4\ By Mr. James Elliott, of Vermont, Annals, p. 846.
  \5\ By Mr. Thomas Griffin, of Virginia, Annals, p. 860.
  \6\ By Mr. Samuel W. Dana, of Connecticut, Annals, p. 870.
  \7\ By Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, Annals, p. 811.
  \8\ By Mr. Smilie, of Pennsylvania, Annals, p. 821.
                                                            Sec. 2342
that he possessed information proper to be communicated to the House 
was sufficient to cause the doors to be closed at once; and surely the 
request of a Member for a committee of inquiry ought to be of equal 
force. It was further urged \1\ that the right to move an inquiry was 
one of the most important pertaining to the Representative. And it was 
pointed out \2\ that the motion to inquire should not be confounded 
with the motion to impeach. There was, it was urged,\3\ a great 
difference between the inquiry and the impeachment. The analogy between 
the function of the House in this matter and that of a grand jury was 
correct and forcible. Before a grand jury it was the right of any 
individual to apply for and demand an inquiry into the conduct of any 
person within their cognizance, and it was more especially the right of 
any member of the jury to make such a demand. In addition to Mr. 
Smilie, another Member, Mr. John W. Eppes, of Virginia, stated \4\ his 
belief that in his State a general opinion prevailed that Judge Chase 
had acted indecently and tyranically in a case tried there. Mr. Eppes 
said he was not personally present at the trial; but he related what he 
believed to be the facts as to the case. It was urged I that in England 
common report was considered sufficient authority for similar 
inquiries. In this case common report from Maine to Georgia condemned 
the conduct of the judge, not only in the case of Fries, but in the 
case of a grand jury in Delaware and in the case of Callender in 
Virginia. The general sentiment of the country condemned \6\ the judge. 
Moreover, the Representatives of two States lately came forward and 
opposed his being assigned to circuits which embraced their States. 
This single fact ought to make an impression on the House. But in this 
case a Member in his place had impeached the judge, and it was not 
necessary to rely on common report. As to precedents for the proposed 
action, the impeachments of Strafford, Bolingbroke, Oxford, and Ormond, 
Eyres and Hastings were referred to in English history. From American 
history a case of proceedings against certain judges in North Carolina 
in 1796 was cited.\7\
  In the course of the debate it was agreed by the House that Judge 
Richard Peters, who was associated in the case with Judge Chase, should 
be included in an inquiry, should one be made. This amendment was 
agreed to, yeas 79, nays 37.\8\
  On January 7,\9\ Mr. John Dennis, of Maryland, proposed an amendment 
to the resolution, by prefixing the following preamble:

  Whereas information has been given to the House by one of its 
Members, that, in a certain prosecution for treason on the part of the 
United States against a certain John Fries, pending in the circuit 
court of the United States in the State of Pennsylvania, Samuel Chase, 
one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and Richard Peters, district judge for the district of 
Pennsylvania, by whom the said circuit court was then holden, did 
inform the counsel for the prisoner, that as the court
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  \1\ By Messrs. William Findley, of Pennsylvania, and Joseph H. 
Nicholson, of Maryland, Annals, pp. 826, 838.
  \2\ By Mr. Nicholson, Annals, p. 844.
  \3\ By Mr. Samuel Thatcher, of Massachusetts, Annals, pp. 861, 862.
  \4\ Annals, p. 863.
  \5\ By Mr. William Findley, Annals, p. 834.
  \6\ Statement by Mr. Smilie, Annals, p. 823.
  \7\ By Mr. James Holland, of North Carolina, Annals, p. 848.
  \8\ House Journal, p. 518.
  \9\ House Journal, p. 520; Annals, p. 874.
Sec. 2342
had formed their opinion upon the point of law, and would direct the 
jury thereupon, the counsel for the prisoner must confine their 
argument before the jury to the question of fact only; and whereas it 
is represented that, in consequence of such determination of the court, 
the counsel did refuse to address the jury on the question of fact, and 
the said John Fries was found guilty of treason and sentenced by the 
court to the punishment in such case by the laws of the United States 
provided, and was pardoned by the President of the United States.

  It was urged in behalf of this preamble that the Journal should show 
the grounds for the adoption of the resolution.
  Mr. Joseph H. Nicholson, of Maryland, moved to amend the proposed 
preamble by striking out all after the word ``whereas,'' where it first 
occurred, and inserting:

  Members of this House have stated in their places that they have 
beard certain acts of official misconduct alleged against Samuel Chase, 
one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and Richard Peters, judge of the district court of the district 
of Pennsylvania.

  A division of the motion to strike out and insert was made,\1\ and on 
striking out there appeared yeas 79, nays 41. Then the motion to insert 
was agreed to without division.
  Mr. Randolph and others opposed the preamble, urging that it would 
tend to limit the general inquiry desired.
  The question being taken on the preamble as amended, it was disagreed 
to without a division.
  The original resolution, as it had previously been amended, was then 
agreed to 2 as follows, the yeas being 81, the nays 40:

  Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official 
conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of 
the district of Pennsylvania, and to report their opinion whether the 
said Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, or either of them, have so acted, 
in their judicial capacity, as to require the interposition of the 
constitutional power of this House.

  Thereupon the committee was appointed as follows: Messrs. John 
Randolph, jr., of Virginia; Joseph H. Nicholson, of Maryland; Joseph 
Clay, of Pennsylvania; Peter Early, of Georgia; Roger Griswold, of 
Connecticut; Benjamin Huger, of South Carolina, and John Boyle, of 
Kentucky.\3\
  On January 10,\4\ the House passed a resolution that the committee 
``be authorized to send for persons and papers.''
  On January 30 \5\ Mr. J. Randolph, in the name of the committee 
appointed to inquire into the conduct of Samuel Chase and Richard 
Peters, stated that documents had been received by them which occupied 
a considerable bulk, the printing of which would considerably assist 
their investigation, by rendering them more convenient for perusal. He 
added that it would probably be necessary to print these papers for the 
information of the House when the report of the committee was made. He 
therefore moved the vesting in them authority to cause to be printed
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  \1\ The rule at present does not permit such a division.
  \2\ House Journal, pp. 522, 523; Annals, p. 875.
  \3\ It is to be observed that two of the seven members of this 
committee represented the minority, who had opposed the investigation.
  \4\ House Journal, p. 525.
  \5\ House Journal, p. 558; Annals, p. 959.
                                                            Sec. 2343
such papers as they might conceive proper. It was objected that the 
printing of a part of the documents might prejudice the case in 
advance; but on the part of the committee it was replied that it was 
not necessary that the printed documents be made public until the 
report should be made. The motion of Mr. Randolph was then agreed to.
  2343. Chase's impeachment, continued.
  The report recommending the impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase was 
considered in Committee of the Whole House.
  The investigation which resulted in the impeachment of Mr. Justice 
Chase was entirely ex parte.
  The House found that Judge Richard Peters had not so acted as to 
require impeachment.
  The impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase was carried to the Senate by a 
committee of two.
  Form of declaration used by the committee in presenting the 
impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase in the Senate.
  Verbal report made by the committee that had carried the impeachment 
of Mr. Justice Chase to the Senate.
  Form of the resolution directing the carrying of the Chase 
impeachment to the Senate.
  The committee appointed to prepare articles in the Chase case were 
all of those who had favored the impeachment.
  The articles of impeachment in the Chase case were reported just 
before the close of the first session of the Congress.
  On March 6 \1\ Mr. Randolph submitted the report of the committee; 
which was referred to a Committee of the Whole House. On March 8 \2\ 
Mr. Randolph submitted to the House an additional affidavit, which was 
referred also to the Committee of the Whole House.
  On March 12 \3\ the report of the committee was taken up in Committee 
of the Whole House for consideration. This report was as follows:

  That in consequence of the evidence collected by them, in virtue of 
the powers with which they have been invested by the House, and which 
is hereunto subjoined, they are of opinion--
  1. That Samuel Chase, esq., one of the associate justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
  2. That Richard Peters, district judge of the district of 
Pennsylvania, has not so acted in his judiciary capacity as to require 
the interposition of the constitutional powers of this House.

  Accompanying this report was a volume of printed testimony. Two 
members of the committee, Messrs. Huger and Griswold, did not concur in 
the report; but as it was not the practice in the House at that time to 
permit minority views, their dissent appears only from the debate. Mr. 
Huger declared \4\ that the testimony on which it was proposed to 
proceed was ``entirely ex parte.'' This was not denied. Mr. Huger based 
his opposition to the report on this ground.
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  \1\ House Journal, p. 620; Annals, p. 1093.
  \2\ House Journal, p. 630; Annals, p. 1124.
  \3\ House Journal, p. 643; Annals, pp. 1171-1181.
  \4\ Annals, p. 1180.
Sec. 2343
  The Committee of the Whole House, after considering the report, 
recommended the following:

  Resolved, That Samuel Chase, esq., one of the associate justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
  Resolved, That Richard Peters, district judge of the district of 
Pennsylvania, hath not so acted, in his judicial capacity, as to 
require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House.

  The House agreed to the first resolution, yeas 73, nays 32. The 
second resolution was then agreed to without division.
  Thereupon it was

  Ordered, That Mr. John Randolph and Mr. Early be appointed a 
committee to go to the Senate, and, at the bar thereof, in the name of 
the House of Representatives and of all the people of the United 
States, to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors; 
and acquaint the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due 
time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make 
good the same.
  Ordered, That the committee do demand that the Senate take order for 
the appearance of the said Samuel Chase to answer to the said 
impeachment.

  On March 13,\1\ in the Senate, a message from the House of 
Representatives, by Messrs. J. Randolph and Early, two of their 
Members, was received, as follows:

  Mr. President: We are ordered, in the name of the House of 
Representatives and of all the people of the United States, to impeach 
Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors; and to acquaint the 
Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit 
particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same.
  We are also ordered to demand that the Senate take order for the 
appearance of the said Samuel Chase to answer to the said impeachment.

  On the same day,\2\ in the Senate, it was ordered that the message be 
referred to Messrs. Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia; Joseph Anderson, of 
Tennessee, and William C. Nicholas, of Virginia, ``to consider and 
report thereon.''
  On March 13,\3\ in the House, Mr. John Randolph, from the committee 
appointed on the 12th instant, reported--

  That, in obedience to the order of the House, the committee had been 
to the Senate, and in the name of the House of Representatives, and of 
the people of the United States, had impeached Samuel Chase, one of the 
associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, of high 
crimes and misdemeanors; and had acquainted the Senate that the House 
of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles 
against him and make good the same.
  And further: That the committee had demanded that the Senate take 
order for the appearance of the said Samuel Chase to answer to the said 
impeachment.

  On motion it was--

  Resolved, That a committee be appointed to prepare and report 
articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the associate 
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who has been 
impeached by this House, during the present session, of high crimes and 
misdemeanors; and that the said committee have power to send for 
persons, papers, and records.
  Ordered, That Mr. John Randolph, Mr. Nicholson, Mr. Joseph Clay, Mr. 
Early, and Mr. Boyle be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said 
resolution.

  All of this committee had favored the report in favor of impeachment.
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  \1\ Senate Journal, p. 374; Annals, p. 271.
  \2\ Senate Journal, p. 375; Annals, p. 374.
  \3\ House Journal, p. 645; Annals, p. 1182.
                                                            Sec. 2344
  On March 26 \1\ Mr. Randolph reported articles of impeachment, which 
were ordered printed. These articles do not appear in the Journal of 
the House.
  Then, on March 27,\2\ the Congress adjourned to the first Monday in 
November next.
  2344. Chase's impeachment, continued.
  The proceedings in the Chase impeachment were continued after a 
recess of Congress; but in deference to the practice at that time the 
articles were recommitted for a new report.
  The articles impeaching Mr. Justice Chase were considered article by 
article in Committee of the Whole.
  Practice in considering and amending articles of impeachment in 
Committee of the Whole.
  The House decided to retain in the articles of the Chase impeachment 
the old reservation of liberty to exhibit further articles.
  The articles of impeachment in the Chase case appear in the House 
Journal in full at the time of their adoption.
  Method by which the House amended and voted on the articles of 
impeachment in the Chase case.
  On the second day of the next session, November 6,\3\ Mr. Randolph 
raised a question as to the status of the articles of impeachment, it 
being then the practice of the House that pending business should begin 
anew at the first of a session.\4\ As a result of this inquiry the 
report made at the last session was referred to a select committee, 
composed of the same members as the select committee of the preceding 
session, except that Mr. John Rhea, of Tennessee, succeeded Mr. 
Nicholson.
  On November 30,\5\ Mr. Randolph, from the select committee, reported 
articles of impeachment, which were nearly the same as those reported 
at the last session, with the addition of two new articles. The 
articles were referred to a Committee of the Whole House. An objection 
was made that the committee reporting in this case had been given no 
power of investigation, and yet that they had reported new articles not 
reported by the former committee, which had expired. This objection was 
not considered by the House.
  On December 3,\6\ the report was considered in Committee of the Whole 
House. The articles having been read, a question arose as to procedure, 
especially as to amendment; and the Chairman \7\ gave it as his opinion 
that the proper method would be to take up the report by articles. This 
was done accordingly.
  The first article being read, a motion was made to strike it out, 
whereupon, the Chairman, with the approval of the committee so far as 
expressed, decided that, while the motion to strike out the first 
section of a bill would be in order, yet it seemed to him that in 
considering independent articles it would be preferable to
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  \1\ House Journal, pp. 689, 690; Annals, pp. 1237-1240.
  \2\ House Journal, p. 696.
  \3\ Second session Eighth Congress, House Journal, p. 6; Annals, p. 
680.
  \4\ The rule in this respect was modified in 1818.
  \5\ House Journal, p. 29; Annals, pp. 726-731.
  \6\ Annals, p. 728.
  \7\ Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, Chairman.
Sec. 2344
take the sense of the Committee of the Whole on each article on a 
motion to concur with the action of the select committee which had 
reported the articles. This method was thereupon adopted.
  Thereupon the Committee of the Whole House went through the report 
article by article, amending, and where an article had several 
paragraphs, reading by paragraphs for amendment. And on each article, 
after an opportunity for amendment and after reading of testimony 
relating to it on demand of a Member, the question was put on 
concurring.\1\ The committee decided, ayes 40, noes 50, that the 
testimony should not be read as a whole on each article, but only as 
called for by Members.
  When the last article was read, Mr. James Mott, of New Jersey, moved 
\2\ to strike out the words, declaring that the House ``saved to itself 
the liberty of exhibiting at any time hereafter any further articles, 
or other accusation or impeachment against the said Samuel Chase,'' and 
further, that part which saved to the House ``the right of replying to 
any such articles of impeachment or accusation which shall be exhibited 
to them.'' It seemed to him unfair that the House should reserve such a 
right to themselves. If there was anything more with which he ought to 
be charged, it ought to be now brought forward, and the accused should 
be informed at once how far they meant to go, in order to enable him 
the better to make his defense.
  Mr. Randolph argued that these reservations had been made in the 
articles of the Blount and Pickering impeachments, and he did not wish 
to see the liberties of the people or the rights of the House abridged. 
Mr. Mott admitted the practice, which had been followed in his own 
State.
  Mr. Mott's motion was disagreed to.
  The last article having been concurred in, the Committee of the Whole 
House rose and reported the articles with amendments.
  On December 4,\3\ the articles were considered in the House, the 
Journal containing them in full as reported originally by the select 
committee. Each article was considered by itself, and after opportunity 
to amend the question was taken ``that the House do agree'' to the 
article. On the last article a division was demanded, as it contained 
both a charge against Judge Chase and the protestation whereby the 
House reserved to themselves the ``liberty of exhibiting at any time 
hereafter any further articles.'' The first portion of the article was 
agreed to, and then the question being taken on the second portion, it 
was agreed to, yeas 78, nays 32. The other votes on agreeing to the 
several articles had ranged as follows: yeas 70 to 84, nays 34 to 45. 
All amendments made in Committee of the Whole had been disagreed to, 
and no new ones were agreed to by the House.
  The question having been taken on each article, the House then voted 
affirmatively on the question--

  That the House do concur with the select committee in their agreement 
to the said articles of impeachment, as originally proposed, and 
hereinbefore recited.
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  \1\ Annals, pp. 731-746.
  \2\ Annals, p. 743.
  \3\ House Journal, pp. 31-44; Annals, pp. 747-762.
                                                            Sec. 2345
  2345. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The House appointed seven managers, by ballot, for the trial of Mr. 
Justice Chase.
  The managers chosen for the trial of Mr. Justice Chase had each voted 
for a portion, at least, of the articles.
  The House overruled the Speaker and decided that a manager of an 
impeachment should be elected by a majority and not by a plurality.
  Forms of resolutions directing the managers to exhibit in the Senate 
the articles of impeachment against Mr. Justice Chase.
  In the Chase impeachment the message notifying the Senate that 
articles would be exhibited does not appear to have included the names 
of the managers.
  The Senate notified the House of the day and hour when it would 
receive the managers to exhibit the articles impeaching Mr. Justice 
Chase.
  The Senate as a court adopted a rule prescribing the ceremonies at 
the presentation of articles impeaching Mr. Justice Chase.
  On December 5,\1\ it was--

  Resolved, That seven managers be appointed by ballot, to conduct the 
impeachment exhibited against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

  Thereupon the following were elected: Messrs. John Randolph, jr., of 
Virginia; Caesar A. Rodney, of Delaware; Joseph H. Nicholson, of 
Maryland; Peter Early, of Georgia; John Boyle, of Kentucky; Roger 
Nelson, of Maryland, and George W. Campbell, of Tennessee.
  Each of these managers had voted for a portion or all of the articles 
of impeachment.
  On the first ballot the six first Members on the list had each a 
majority of the ballots; but Mr. Campbell had only a plurality.
  A question arising, the Speaker,\2\ after referring to the rule of 
the House, ``In all other cases of ballot than for committees, a 
majority of the votes given shall be necessary to an election,'' held 
that Mr. Campbell was duly chosen.
  A question arose, and after reference to precedents, which did not 
seem conclusive, Mr. Randolph appealed from the decision. And the 
question being taken, the decision of the Speaker was overruled, ayes 
25, noes 50. Thereupon a second ballot was taken, at which Mr. Campbell 
received a majority.
  Thereupon, on motion of Mr. Nicholson, it was--

  Resolved, That the articles agreed to by this House, to be exhibited 
in the name of themselves and of the people of the United States, 
against Samuel Chase, in maintenance of their impeachment against him 
for high crimes and misdemeanors, be carried to the Senate by the 
managers appointed to conduct the said impeachment.
  Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that 
this House have appointed managers to conduct the impeachment against 
Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and have directed the said managers to carry to the 
Senate the articles agreed upon by this House to be exhibited in 
maintenance of their impeachment against the said Samuel Chase; and 
that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ House Journal, p. 44; Annals, pp. 762, 763.
  \2\ Nathaniel Macon, of North Carolina, Speaker.
Sec. 2346
  On December 6 \1\ in the Senate the Clerk of the House delivered the 
message as follows:

  Mr. President, I am directed to inform the Senate that the House of 
Representatives have appointed managers to conduct the impeachment 
against Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, and have directed the said managers to 
carry to the Senate the articles agreed upon by the House to be 
exhibited in maintenance of their impeachment against the said Samuel 
Chase.

  On December 7 \2\ Mr. William B. Giles, of Virginia, from a committee 
appointed on November 30 ``to prepare and report proper rules of 
proceeding to be observed by the Senate in cases of impeachment,'' made 
a report, which was read. With Mr. Giles on this committee were Messrs. 
Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia, John Breckenridge, of Kentucky, David 
Stone, of North Carolina, and Israel Smith, of Vermont.
  Also on December 7 \3\ it was--

  Resolved, That the Senate will, at 1 o'clock this day, be ready to 
receive articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the 
associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to be 
presented by the managers appointed by the House of Representatives.
  Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives 
accordingly.

  Immediately thereafter, in the high court of impeachment,\4\ it was--

  Resolved, That when the managers of the impeachment shall be 
introduced to the bar of the Senate and shall have signified that they 
are ready to exhibit articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, the 
President of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to make 
proclamation, who shall, after making proclamation, repeat the 
following words: ``All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain 
of imprisonment, while the grand inquest of the nation is exhibiting to 
the Senate of the United States articles of impeachment against Samuel 
Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.'' After which the articles shall be exhibited; and then the 
President of the Senate shall inform the managers that the Senate will 
take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due 
notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.\5\

  2346. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The articles of impeachment of Mr. Justice Chase.
  Ceremonies at the presentation of the articles before the high court 
of impeachment in the Chase case.
  In presenting to the court the articles impeaching Mr. Justice Chase, 
the chairman of the managers read them and then delivered them at the 
table.
  The managers having carried to the Senate the articles impeaching Mr. 
Justice Chase, reported verbally to the House.
  On the same day the message from the Senate announcing its readiness 
to receive the articles of impeachment was received in the House,\6\ 
and the managers
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate Journal, p. 421.
  \2\ Senate Journal, p. 422.
  \3\ Senate Journal, p. 422; Annals, p. 21.
  \4\ Journal of High Court of Impeachment, Senate Journal, pp. 509, 
510.
  \5\ This is the exact form of resolution adopted on January 4, 1804, 
for the presentation of the articles of impeachment against Judge John 
Pickering. Senate Journal, Eighth Congress, pp. 494, 495.
  \6\ House Journal, p. 47; Annals, p. 89.
                                                            Sec. 2346
repaired at 1 o'clock to the Senate Chamber. They were admitted,\1\ and 
Mr. Randolph, the chairman, announced that they were--

the managers instructed by the House of Representatives to exhibit 
certain articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the 
associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

  The managers were requested by the President to take seats assigned 
them within the bar, and the Sergeant-at-Arms was directed to make 
proclamation in the words following:

  Oyes! Oyes! Oyes!
  All persons are commanded to keep silence, etc. [In words as 
prescribed by the resolution.]

  After the proclamation the managers rose, and Mr. Randolph, their 
chairman, read the articles of impeachment, as follows:

      Articles exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United 
                      States, in the name of themselves and of all the 
                    people of the United States, against Samuel Chase, 
                  one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of 
                      the United States, in maintenance and support of 
                     their impeachment against him for high crimes and 
                                                          misdemeanors.
  Art. 1. That unmindful of the solemn duties of his office, and 
contrary to the sacred obligation by which he stood bound to discharge 
them, ``faithfully and impartially, and without respect to persons,'' 
the said Samuel Chase, on the trial of John Fries, charged with 
treason, before the circuit court of the United States, held for the 
district of Pennsylvania, in the city of Philadelphia, during the 
months of April and May, one thousand eight hundred, whereat the said 
Samuel Chase presided, did, in his judicial capacity, conduct himself 
in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, viz:
  1. In delivering an opinion in writing, on the question of law, on 
the construction of which the defense of the accused materially 
depended, tending to prejudice the minds of the jury against the case 
of the said John Fries, the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in 
his defense;
  2. In restricting the counsel for the said Fries from recurring to 
such English authorities as they believed apposite, or from citing 
certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative 
of the positions upon which they intended to rest the defense of their 
client;
  3. In debarring the prisoner from his constitutional privilege of 
addressing the jury (through his counsel) on the law, as well as on the 
fact, which was to determine his guilt or innocence, and at the same 
time endeavoring to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to 
hear argument and determine upon the question of law, as well as the 
question of fact, involved in the verdict which they were required to 
give.
  In consequence of which irregular conduct of the said Samuel Chase, 
as dangerous to our liberties as it is novel to our laws and usages, 
the said John Fries was deprived of the right, secured to him by the 
eighth article amendatory of the Constitution, and was condemned to 
death without having been heard by counsel, in his defense, to the 
disgrace of the character of the American bench, in manifest violation 
of law and justice, and in open contempt of the right of juries, on 
which ultimately rest the liberty and safety of the American people.
  Art. 2. That, prompted by a similar spirit of persecution and 
injustice, at a circuit court of the United States, held at Richmond, 
in the mouth of May, 1800, for the district of Virginia, whereat the 
said Samuel Chase presided, and before which a certain James Thompson 
Callender was arraigned for a libel on John Adams, then President of 
the United States, the said Samuel Chase, with intent to oppress and 
procure the conviction of the said Callender, did overrule the 
objection of John Basset, one of the jury, who wished to be excused 
from serving on the trial, because he had made up his mind as to the 
publication from which the words, charged to be libelous in the 
indictment, were extracted; and the said Basset was accordingly sworn, 
and did serve on the said jury, by whose verdict the prisoner was 
subsequently convicted.
  Art. 3. That with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the 
prisoner, the evidence of John Taylor, a material witness on behalf of 
the aforesaid Callender, was not permitted by the said Samuel Chase to 
be given in, on pretense that the said witness could not prove the 
truth of the whole of one of the charges contained in the indictment, 
although the said charge embraced more than one fact.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate Impeachment Journal, pp. 509, 510.
Sec. 2346
 Art. 4. That the conduct of the said Samuel Chase was marked, during 
the whole course of the said trial, by manifest injustice, partiality, 
and intemperance, viz:
  1. In compelling the prisoner's counsel to reduce to writing, and 
submit to the inspection of the court, for their admission or 
rejection, all questions which the said counsel meant to propound to 
the above-named John Taylor, the witness.
  2. In refusing to postpone the trial, although an affidavit was 
regularly filed stating the absence of material witnesses on behalf of 
the accused; and although it was manifest that, with the utmost 
diligence, the attendance of such witnesses could not have been 
procured at that term.
  3. In the use of unusual, rude, and contemptuous expressions toward 
the prisoner's counsel; and in falsely insinuating that they wished to 
excite the public fears and indignation, and to produce that 
insubordination to law to which the conduct of the judge did at the 
same time manifestly tend.
  4. In repeated and vexatious interruptions of the said counsel, on 
the part of the said judge, which at length induced them to abandon 
their cause and their client, who was thereupon convicted and condemned 
to fine and imprisonment.
  5. In an indecent solicitude, manifested by the said Samuel Chase, 
for the conviction of the accused, unbecoming even a public prosecutor, 
but highly disgraceful to the character of a judge, as it was 
subversive of justice.
 Art. 5. And whereas it is provided by the act of Congress passed on 
the 24th day of September, 1786, entitled ``An act to establish the 
judicial courts of the United States,'' that for any crime or offense 
against the United States the offender may be arrested, imprisoned, or 
bailed, agreeably to the usual mode of process in the State where such 
offender may be found; and whereas it is provided by the laws of 
Virginia that upon presentment by any grand jury of an offense not 
capital the court shall order the clerk to issue a summons against the 
person or persons offending to appear and answer such presentment at 
the next court; yet the said Samuel Chase did, at the court aforesaid, 
award a capias against the body of the said James Thompson Callender, 
indicted for an offense not capital, whereupon the said Callender was 
arrested and committed to close custody, contrary to law in that case 
made and provided.
 Art. 6. And whereas it is provided by the thirty-fourth section of the 
aforesaid act, entitled ``An act to establish the judicial courts of 
the United States,'' that the laws of the several States, except where 
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as the rules of 
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in 
cases where they apply; and whereas by the laws of Virginia it is 
provided that in cases not capital the offender shall not be held to 
answer any presentment of a grand jury until the court next succeeding 
that during which such presentment shall have been made, yet the said 
Samuel Chase, with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the 
said James Thompson Callender, did, at the court aforesaid, rule and 
adjudge the said Callender to trial during the term at which he, the 
said Callender, was presented and indicted, contrary to law in that 
case made and provided.
 Art. 7. That at a circuit court of the United States for the district 
of Delaware, held at Newcastle, in the month of June, 1800, whereat the 
said Samuel Chase presided, the said Samuel Chase, disregarding the 
duties of his office, did descend from the dignity of a judge and stoop 
to the level of an informer by refusing to discharge the grand jury, 
although entreated by several of the said jury so to do; and after the 
said grand jury had regularly declared through their foreman that they 
had found no bills of indictment, nor had any presentments to make, by 
observing to the said grand jury that he, the said Samuel Chase, 
understood ``that a highly seditious temper had manifested itself in 
the State of Delaware among a certain class of people, particularly in 
Newcastle County, and more especially in the town of Wilmington, where 
lived a most seditious printer, unrestrained by any principle of 
virtue, and regardless of social order, that the name of this printer 
was ''--but checking himself, as if sensible of the indecorum which he 
was committing, added ``that it might be assuming too much to mention 
the name of this person, but it becomes your duty, gentlemen, to 
inquire diligently into this matter,'' or words to that effect; and 
that with intention to procure the prosecution of the printer in 
question the said Samuel Chase did, moreover, authoritatively enjoin on 
the district attorney of the United States the necessity of procuring a 
file of the papers to which he alluded (and which were understood to be 
those published under the title of ``Mirror of the Times and General 
Advertiser''), and, by a strict examination of them, to find some 
passage which might furnish the groundwork of a prosecution against the 
printer of the said paper,
                                                            Sec. 2347
thereby degrading his high judicial functions and tending to impair the 
public confidence in and respect for the tribunals of justice so 
essential to the general welfare.
 Art. 8. And whereas mutual respect and confidence between the 
Government of the United States and those of the individual States, and 
between the people and those governments, respectively, are highly 
conducive to that public harmony without which there can be no public 
happiness, yet the said Samuel Chase, disregarding the duties and 
dignity of his judicial character, did, at a circuit court for the 
district of Maryland, held at Baltimore in the month of May, 1803, 
pervert his official right and duty to address the grand jury then and 
there assembled on the matters coming within the province of the said 
jury, for the purpose of delivering to the said grand jury an 
intemperate and inflammatory political harangue, with intent to excite 
the fears and resentment of the said grand jury and of the good people 
of Maryland against their State government and constitution, a conduct 
highly censurable in any, but peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in a 
judge of the Supreme Court of the United States; and, moreover, that 
the said Samuel Chase then and there, under pretense of exercising his 
judicial right to address the said grand jury, as aforesaid, did, in a 
manner highly unwarrantable, endeavor to excite the odium of the said 
grand jury and of the good people of Maryland against the Government of 
the United States by delivering opinions which, even if the judicial 
authority were competent to their expression on a suitable occasion and 
in a proper manner, were at that time, and as delivered by him, highly 
indecent, extrajudicial, and tending to prostitute the high judicial 
character with which he was invested to the low purpose of an 
electioneering partisan.
  And the House of Representatives, by protestation, saving to 
themselves the liberty of exhibiting, at any time hereafter, any 
further articles, or other accusation or impeachment against the said 
Samuel Chase, and also of replying to his answers which he shall make 
unto the said articles, or any of them, and of offering proof to all 
and every the aforesaid articles, and to all and every other articles, 
impeachment, or accusation, which shall be exhibited by them as the 
case shall require, do demand that the said Samuel Chase may be put to 
answer the said crimes and misdemeanors, and that such proceedings, 
examinations, trials, and judgments may be thereupon had and given as 
are agreeable to law and justice.

  After the reading of the articles \1\ the President notified the 
managers that the Senate would take proper order on the subject of the 
impeachment, of which due notice should be given to the House of 
Representatives.
  The managers delivered the articles of impeachment at the table and 
withdrew.
  Thereupon the high court of impeachments adjourned.
  The managers having returned to the House, Mr. Randolph, their 
chairman, reported \2\ that they did this day carry to the Senate the 
articles of impeachment agreed to by this House on the 4th instant, and 
that the said managers were informed by the Senate that their House 
would take proper measures relative to the said impeachment, of which 
this House should be duly notified.
  2347. Chase's impeachment continued.
  Form prescribed for the writ of summons in the Chase impeachment.
  Form of precept to be indorsed on the writ of summons in the Chase 
impeachment.
  The Senate having fixed a day for the return of the writ of summons 
in the Chase impeachment, informed the House thereof.
  On December 10 \3\ the high court of impeachments considered the 
report of the committee appointed November 30 to prepare and report 
proper rules of proceedings, and after consideration agreed to the 
following:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ The articles are not given in the Senate Journal (p. 510) on the 
day of their presentation, so the signatures of the Speaker and Clerk 
do not appear.
  \2\ House Journal, p. 47.
  \3\ Senate Impeachment Journal, pp. 510, 511; Annals, pp. 89, 90.
Sec. 2347
  A summons shall issue, directed to the person impeached, in the form 
following:
``The United States of America, ss:
  ``The Senate of the United States to----, greeting:
  ``Whereas, the House of Representatives of the United States of 
America did, on the ------ ------ day of ------, exhibit to the Senate 
articles of impeachment against you, the said, in the words following, 
viz: [here recite the articles] and did demand that you, the said ----
-- ------ should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said 
articles; and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and 
judgments might be thereupon had as are agreeble to law and justice: 
You, the said ------ ------, are therefore hereby summoned, to be and 
appear before the Senate of the United States of America, at their 
Chamber in the city of Washington, on the ------ day of ------, then 
and there to answer to the said articles of impeachment, and then and 
there to abide by, obey, and perform such orders and judgments as the 
Senate of the United States shall make in the premises, according to 
the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hereof you are not to 
fail.
  ``Witness, ------ ------, Vice-President of the United States of 
America and President of the Senate thereof, at the city of Washington, 
this ------ day of ------, in the year of our Lord ------ and of the 
Independence of the United States the ------.''
  Which summons shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and 
sealed with their seal, and served by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the 
Senate, or by such other person as the Senate shall specially appoint 
for that purpose, who shall serve the same, pursuant to the directions 
given in the form next following:
  A precept shall be indorsed on said writ of summons, in the form 
following, viz:
``United States of America, ss:
  ``The Senate of the United States to ------, greeting:
  ``You are hereby commanded to deliver to, and leave with ------, if 
to be found, a true and attested copy of the within writ of summons, 
together with a like copy of this precept, showing him both; or in case 
he can not with convenience be found, you are to leave true and 
attested copies of the said summons and precept at his usual place of 
residence, and in whichsoever way you perform the service let it be 
done at least ------ days before the appearance day mentioned in said 
writ of summons. Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and 
precept, with your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the 
appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons.
  ``Witness, ------ ------, Vice-President of the United States of 
America and President of the Senate thereof, at the city of Washington, 
this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ------ and of the 
Independence of the United States the ------.''
  Which precept shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate and 
sealed with their seal.

  It was then

  Resolved, That the secretary be directed to issue a summons to Samuel 
Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, to answer certain articles of impeachment, exhibited against 
him by the House of Representatives on Friday last; that the said 
summons be returnable the second of January next, and be served at 
least fifteen days before the return day thereof.
  Ordered, That the secretary notify the House of Representatives of 
this resolution.

  On the same day the message was delivered in the House,\1\ and on the 
succeeding day was read, in form as follows:

  In Senate of the United States--High Court of Impeachments, Monday, 
                           December 10, 1804.

The United States v. Samuel Chase.

  Resolved, That the Secretary be directed to issue a summons to Samuel 
Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, to answer certain articles of impeachment exhibited against him 
by the House of Representatives, on Friday last. That the said summons 
be returnable the second day of January next and be served at least 
fifteen days before the return day thereof.
  Ordered, That the Secretary carry this resolution to the House of 
Representatives.
  Attest:
                                      Sam. A. Otis, Secretary.    

  Ordered, That the said proceedings of the Senate do lie on the table.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ House Journal, pp. 49, 50, Annals, p. 791.
                                                            Sec. 2348
  On December 14,\1\ in the High Court of Impeachments, ``Return was 
made by the Sergeant-at-Arms on the summons issued.''
  2348. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The rules agreed to by the high court of impeachment to govern the 
trial of Mr. Justice Chase.
  On December 24 \2\ the High Court of Impeachments concluded its 
consideration of the report of the committee and the rules stood as 
follows:

  1. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of 
Representatives that managers are appointed on their part to conduct an 
impeachment against any person, and are directed to carry such articles 
to the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate shall immediately inform the 
House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the 
managers for the purpose of exhibiting such articles of impeachment, 
agreeably to the said notice.
  2. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced to the bar 
of the Senate, and shall have signified that they are ready to exhibit 
articles of impeachment against any person, the President of the Senate 
shall direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to make proclamation, who shall, 
after making proclamation, repeat the following words: ``All persons 
are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the grand 
inquest of the nation is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States 
articles of impeachment against ------ ------;'' after which the 
articles shall be exhibited, and then the President of the Senate shall 
inform the managers that the Senate will take proper order on the 
subject of the impeachment, of which due notice shall be given to the 
House of Representatives.
  3 and 4. [As adopted on December 10--Forms of summons and precept.]
  5. Subpoenas shall be issued by the Secretary of the Senate, upon the 
application of the managers of the impeachment, or of the party 
impeached, or his counsel, in the following form, to wit:
To ------ ------, greeting:
  ``You, and each of you, are hereby commanded to appear before the 
Senate of the United States, on the ------ day of ------, at the Senate 
Chamber, in the city of Washington, then and there to testify your 
knowledge in the cause which is before the Senate, in which the House 
of Representatives have impeached ------ ------. Fail not.
  ``Witness, ------ ------, Vice-President of the United States of 
America and President of the Senate thereof, at the city of Washington, 
this ------ day of ------, in the year of our Lord ------ and of the 
Independence of the United States the ------.''
Which shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate and sealed with 
their seal.
  Which subpoenas shall be directed, in every case, to the marshal of 
the district where such witnesses respectively reside, to serve and 
return.
  6. The form of direction to the marshal, for the service of the 
subpoena, shall be as follows:
  ``The Senate of the United States of America to the Marshal of the 
District of ------:
  ``You are hereby commanded to serve and return the within subpoena, 
according to law.
  ``Dated at Washington, this ------ day of ------, in the year of our 
Lord--and of the Independence of the United States the ------.
                                              ------ ------,      
                                  ``Secretary of the Senate.''    
  7. That the President of the Senate shall direct all necessary 
preparations in the Senate Chamber, and all the forms of proceeding, 
while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, 
and all forms during the trial not otherwise specially provided for by 
the Senate.
  8. He shall also be authorized to direct the employment of the 
marshal of the District of Columbia, or any other person or persons, 
during the trial, to discharge such duties as may be prescribed by him.
  9. At 12 o'clock of the day appointed for the return of the summons 
against the person impeached the legislative and executive business of 
the Senate shall be suspended, and the Secretary of the Senate shall 
administer an oath to the returning officer, in the form following, 
viz: ``I, ------ ------, do solemnly swear that the return made and 
subscribed by me, upon the process issued on the ------ day of ------, 
by
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 511.
  \2\ Senate Impeachment Journal, pp. 511-513, Annals pp. 89-92.
Sec. 2349
the Senate of the United States, against ------ ------, is truly made, 
and that I have performed said services as therein described. So help 
me God.'' Which oath shall be entered at large on the records.
  10. The person impeached shall then be called to appear and answer 
the articles of impeachment exhibited against him. If he appears, or 
any person for him, the appearance shall be recorded, stating 
particularly if by himself or if by agent or attorney, naming the 
person appearing and the capacity in which he appears.
  11. At 12 o'clock of the day appointed for the trial of an 
impeachment the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall 
be postponed. The Secretary shall then administer the following oath or 
affirmation to the President:
  ``You solemnly swear, or affirm, that in all things appertaining to 
the trial of the impeachment of ------ ------, you will do impartial 
justice according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.''
  12. And the President shall administer the said oath or affirmation 
to each Senator present.
  The Secretary shall then give notice to the House of Representatives 
that the Senate is ready to proceed upon the impeachment of ------ ----
--, in the Senate Chamber, which Chamber is prepared with 
accommodations for the reception of the House of Representatives.
  13. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear, and be heard 
upon an impeachment.
  14. All motions made by the parties or their counsel shall be 
addressed to the President of the Senate, and if he shall require it, 
shall be committed to writing, and read at the Secretary's table; and 
all decisions shall be had by yeas and nays, and without debate, which 
shall be entered on the records.
  15. Witnesses shall be sworn in the following form, to wit: ``You, --
---- ------, do swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that the evidence 
you shall give in the case now depending between the United States and 
------ ------, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. So help you God.'' Which oath shall be administered by the 
Secretary.
  16. Witnesses shall be examined by the party producing them, and then 
cross-examined in the usual form.
  17. If a Senator is called as a witness, he shall be sworn, and give 
his testimony, standing in his place.
  18. If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, it shall 
be reduced to writing and put by the President.
  19. At all times, whilst the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an 
impeachment, the doors of the Senate Chamber shall be kept open.

  The nineteenth rule was agreed to on December 31.\1\
  2349. Chase's impeachment continued.
  Form of return made and oath taken by the Sergeant-at-Arms in the 
Chase impeachment.
  Mr. Justice Chase appeared to answer the articles of impeachment ``in 
his own proper person.''
  On his appearance to answer articles of impeachment Mr. Justice Chase 
was furnished with a chair.
  Mr. Justice Chase, in appearing, was permitted by the Vice-President, 
without objection of the Senate, to read a paper giving reasons for 
delaying his answer.
  Mr. Justice Chase, in asking time to prepare his answer to the 
articles, was called to order by the Vice-President for expressions 
used.
  It was decided that members of the court should be sworn before 
considering respondent's motion for time to answer in the Chase case.
  Mr. Justice Chase's application for a time to answer was accompanied 
by a sworn statement of reasons.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate impeachment, Journal, pp. 513, 514.
                                                            Sec. 2349
  The Senate having fixed the day for Mr. Justice Chase to file his 
answer, informed the House that the trial would proceed on that day.
  Neither the managers nor the House attended on the appearance of Mr. 
Justice Chase in answer to the summons.
  On January 2, 1805,\1\ the high court of impeachment having been 
opened by proclamation, the return made by the Sergeant-at-Arms was 
read, as follows:

  I, James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate of the United 
States, in obedience to the within summons to me directed, did proceed 
to the residence of the within-named Samuel Chase, on the 12th day of 
December, 1804, and did then and there leave a true copy of the said 
writ of summons, together with a true copy of the articles of 
impeachment annexed, with him, the said Samuel Chase.

                                                James Mathers.    
  After which the Secretary administered to him the oath, as follows:

  You, James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate of the United 
States, do solemnly swear that the return made and subscribed by you 
upon the process issued on the 10th day of December last, by the Senate 
of the United States, against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court, is truly made, and that you have 
performed said services as therein described. So help you God.

  Samuel Chase was then solemnly called,\2\ who appeared ``in his own 
proper person.''
  The President of the Senate \3\ informed him that the Senate was 
ready to receive any answer that he had to make.\4\
  Mr. Chase requested the indulgence of a chair, which was immediately 
furnished. The report of the trial intimates that in accordance with 
the parliamentary practice of England no chair was assigned to him 
previously to his appearance, but that an informal intimation was made 
to him that, on his request, it would be furnished.
  After being seated for a short time Judge Chase rose and commenced 
reading from a paper which he held in his hand.
  After reading far enough to show that the paper was proceeding in 
general denial of the charges, the President reminded him that this was 
the day appointed to receive any answer he might make to the articles 
of impeachment. Thereupon Judge Chase said it was his purpose to 
request the allowance of further time to put in his answer.
  The reading was then proceeding, when the President interrupted and 
asked if the paper was intended as his answer. If so, it would be put 
on file. If it was a prelude to a motion he meant to make praying to be 
allowed further time for putting, in his answer, he would confine 
himself strictly to what had relation to that object.
  Judge Chase said it was not his answer that he was reading, but that 
he was
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate impeachment, Journal, p. 514.
  \2\ The form of this call is not given, but in the Blount trial it 
was as follows: ``Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! William Blount, late a 
Senator from the State of Tennessee, come forward and answer the 
articles of impeachment against you by the House of Representatives.'' 
Senate Journals, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Congresses, p. 486.
  \3\ Aaron Burr, of New York, Vice-President, and President of the 
Senate.
  \4\ Annals, pp. 92-98.
Sec. 2349
assigning reasons why he could not now answer, in order to show that he 
was entitled to further time to prepare and put in his answer.
  The President replied:

  You, who are so conversant in the practice of courts of law, know 
very well that a motion for time must not be founded on mere 
suggestions, but must be founded on some facts to prove the propriety 
of the motion.

  Judge Chase said he meant to show the impracticability of his 
answering at this time, from the articles themselves, and it was for 
that purpose that he made an allusion to them.
  The President said that with the caution he had given he might 
proceed, provided no objection were made by any gentleman of the 
Senate.
  Judge Chase proceeded in his address.
  Later in the reading the following paragraph occurred:

  And acrimonious as are the terms in which many of the accusations are 
conceived; harsh and opprobrious as are the epithets wherewith it has 
been thought proper to assail my name and character, by those who were 
``puling in their nurses' arms'' whilst I was contributing my utmost 
aid to lay the groundwork of American liberty, I yet thank my accusers, 
whose functions as members of the Government of my country I highly 
respect, for having at length put their charges into a definitive form, 
susceptible of refutation; and for having thereby afforded me an 
opportunity of vindicating my innocence, in the face of this honorable 
court, of my country, and of the world.

  On using the expressions marked in italics,
  The President interrupted Judge Chase and said that observations of 
censure or recrimination were not admissible; it would be very improper 
for him to listen to observations on the statements of the House of 
Representatives before an answer was filed.
  Judge Chase said he had very few words more to add, which would 
conclude what he had to say at the present time.
  With the permission of the President he proceeded.
  The address being concluded, the President requested him to reduce to 
writing any motion which he wished to make.
  Thereupon Judge Chase submitted the following:

  I solicit this honorable court to allow me until the first day of the 
next session to put in my answer and prepare for my trial.

  The President informed Mr. Chase that the court would take time to 
consider the motion.
  During these proceedings incident to the return on the summons and 
the appearance of Judge Chase, neither the House of Representatives nor 
its managers were present.
  After Judge Chase had submitted his motion the Senate withdrew to a 
private apartment, where debate arose as to whether or not the Senators 
should take the oath required by the Constitution before they took into 
consideration the motion of Judge Chase; and at the conclusion of the 
debate it was

  Resolved, That on the meeting of the Senate to-morrow, before they 
proceed to any business on the articles of impeachment before them, and 
before the decision of any question, the oath prescribed by the rules 
shall be administered to the President and Members of the Senate.
                                                            Sec. 2349
  On January 3 \1\ the high court of impeachments was duly opened with 
proclamation, and the oath was administered to the President and 
Senators in the manner prescribed by the rule.
  Thereupon the President stated that he had received a letter from the 
defendant, inclosing an affidavit that further time was necessary for 
him to prepare for trial; which affidavit \2\ was read, as follows:

City of Washington, ss:

  Samuel Chase made oath on the Holy Evangels of Almighty God, that it 
is not in his power to obtain information respecting the facts alleged 
in the articles of impeachment to have taken place in the city of 
Philadelphia in the trial of John Fries; or of the facts alleged to 
have taken place in the city of Richmond in the trial of James T. 
Callender, in time to prepare and put in his answer, and to proceed to 
trial, with any probability that the same could be finished on or 
before the 5th day of March next. And, further, that it is not in his 
power to procure information of the names of the witnesses, whom he 
think it may be proper and necessary for him to summon, in time to 
obtain their attendance, if his answer could be prepared in time 
sufficient for the finishing of the said trial, before the said 5th day 
of March next; and the said Samuel Chase further made oath that he 
believes it will not be in his power to obtain the advice of counsel, 
to prepare his answer, and to give him their assistance on the trial, 
which he thinks necessary, if the said trial should take place during 
the present session of Congress; and that he verily believes, if he had 
at this time full information of facts, and of the witnesses proper for 
him to summon, and if he had also the assistance of counsel, that he 
could not prepare the answer he thinks he ought to put in, and be ready 
for his trial, within the space of four or five weeks from this time. 
And, further, that his application to the honorable the Senate, for 
time to obtain the information of facts, in order to prepare his 
answer, and for time to procure the attendance of necessary witnesses, 
and to prepare for his defense in the trial, and to obtain the advice 
and assistance of counsel, is not made for the purpose of delay, but 
only for the purpose of obtaining a full hearing of the articles of 
impeachment against him in their real merits.
                                                 Samuel Chase.    
  Sworn to this 3d day of January, 1805, before
                                              Samuel Hamilton.    
  Whereupon the following motion was made by Mr. Stephen R. Bradley, of 
Vermont:

  Ordered, That Samuel Chase file his answer, with the Secretary of the 
Senate, to the several articles of impeachment exhibited against him, 
by the House of Representatives, on or before the ------ day ------.

  A motion was made by Mr. William B. Giles, of Virginia, to amend the 
motion and to strike out all that follows the word ``Ordered,'' and 
insert ``That ------ next shall be the day for receiving the answer, 
and proceeding on the trial of the impeachment against Samuel Chase.
  The motion to strike out was agreed to, yeas, 20, nays 10. And then 
the motion to insert was also agreed to, yeas 22, nays 8.
  The motion to fill the blank with the words ``first Monday of 
December next'' was disagreed to, yeas 12, nays 18. Then a motion to 
insert ``the fourth day of February next'' was agreed to, yeas 22, nays 
8. Then the resolution as amended was agreed to, yeas 21, nays 9.

  It was then

  Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives and 
the said Samuel Chase thereof.

  Thereupon the high court of impeachments adjourned.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate impeachment, Journal, pp. 514, 515; Annals, pp. 98-100.
  \2\ This affidavit does not appear in full in the Journal of the high 
court of impeachments.
Sec. 2350
  On January 4 \1\ the House was informed by message, which was read in 
form, as follows:
In Senate of the United States--High court of impeachments, January 3, 
                                                                  1805.
                                         United States v. Samuel Chase.
  Ordered, That the 4th day of February next shall be the day for 
receiving the answer, and proceeding on the trial of the impeachment 
against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme 
Court of the United States.
 Attest:
                                       Sam A. Otis, Secretary.    

  Ordered, That the said proceedings of the Senate do lie on the table.

  2350. Chase's impeachment continued.
  A Manager of the Chase impeachment being excused, the House chose 
another by ballot and informed the Senate thereof.
  The House determined to attend as a Committee of the Whole the 
proceedings of the trial of Mr. Justice Chase.
  On January 25,\2\ in the House--

  Resolved, That Mr. Nelson be excused from serving as one of the 
Managers appointed on the 5th ultimo, on the part of this House, to 
conduct the impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

  On January 28 \3\ the House elected by ballot Mr. Christopher Clark, 
of Virginia, to succeed Mr. Nelson, and informed the Senate thereof by 
message, delivered as follows by the Clerk:

  Mr. President, I am directed to acquaint the Senate that the House of 
Representatives have elected Mr. Clark a manager to conduct the 
impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in the place of Mr. Nelson, who 
hath been excused that service.

  Mr. Clark had voted in favor of all of the articles of impeachment 
save one, which he had voted against.
  On February 4,\4\ in the House, it was

  Resolved, That, during the trial of the impeachment now depending 
before the Senate, this House will attend, at 10 o'clock in the 
forenoon, and proceed on the legislative business before the House 
until the hour at which the Senate shall appoint each day to proceed on 
the trial of the impeachment now pending before that body, and that the 
House then resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole and attend the 
said trial.

  2351. Chase's impeachment continued.
  Attendance of the House in Committee of the Whole at the ceremonies 
of the beginning of Chase's trial.
  Description of the arrangement of the Senate chamber for the Chase 
trial.
  Mr. Justice Chase introduced his counsel at the time he gave in his 
answer.
  The Senate granted the request of Mr. Justice Chase for permission to 
read his answer by himself and counsel.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ House Journal, p. 78; Annals, p. 872.
  \2\ House Journal, p. 105; Annals, p. 1011.
  \3\ House Journal, p. 108: Senate Journal, pp. 442, 516.
  \4\ House Journal, p. 118; Annals, p. 1174.
                                                            Sec. 2351
  The answer of Mr. Justice Chase to the articles of impeachment.
  The answer of the respondent in the Chase trial does not appear in 
the journal of the court.
  On request of the managers the Senate directed its Secretary to carry 
to the House an attested copy of Mr. Justice Chase's answer.
  The answer of Mr. Justice Chase being received in the House was 
referred to the managers.
  Form of proceedings when the House attends an impeachment trial as 
Committee of the Whole.
  On the same day,\1\ the high court of impeachments was duly opened 
with proclamation, and it was then--

  Ordered, That the Secretary give notice to the House of 
Representatives that the Senate are in their public Chamber and are 
ready to proceed on the trial of Samuel Chase; and that seats are 
provided for the accommodation of the Members.

  This message being received in the House,\2\ that body resolved 
itself into a Committee of the Whole House, with Mr. Joseph B. Varnum, 
of Massachusetts, as Chairman, and proceeded to the Senate Chamber with 
the managers. Soon after they entered the Chamber and took their seats.
  The Senate Chamber was fitted up in a style of appropriate elegance. 
Benches covered with crimson, on each side, and in a line with the 
chair of the President, were assigned to the Members of the Senate. On 
the right and in front of the chair, a box was assigned to the 
managers, and on the left a similar box to Mr. Chase and his counsel, 
and chairs allotted to such friends as he might introduce. The residue 
of the floor was occupied with chairs for the accommodation of the 
Members of the House of Representatives, and with boxes for the 
reception of the foreign ministers, and civil and military officers of 
the United States. On the right and left of the Chair, at the 
termination of the benches of the members of the court, boxes were 
assigned to stenographers. The permanent gallery was allotted to the 
indiscriminate admission of spectators. Below this gallery and above 
the floor of the House a new gallery was raised and fitted up with 
peculiar elegance, intended primarily for the exclusive accommodation 
of ladies. But this feature of the arrangement, made by the Vice-
President, was at an early period of the trial abandoned, it having 
been found impracticable. At the termination of this gallery, on each 
side, boxes were specially assigned to ladies attached to the families 
of public personages. The preservation of order was devolved on the 
marshal of the District of Columbia, who was assisted by a number of 
deputies.\3\
  Samuel Chase being called to make answer to the articles of 
impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, 
appeared and requested that Robert G. Harper, Luther Martin, Philip B. 
Key, and Joseph Hopkinson, esqs., might be admitted and considered as 
counsel for him, the said Samuel Chase, and thereupon submitted a 
motion, which was read at the table as follows:

  Samuel Chase moves for permission to read his answer, by himself and 
his counsel, at the bar of this honorable court.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 516; Annals, p. 101.
  \2\ House Journal, p. 119.
  \3\ Annals, p. 100.
Sec. 2352
  The President asked him if it was the answer on which he meant to 
rely? To which he replied in the affirmative.
  The question being taken on the motion, it passed in the affirmative.
  Then Judge Chase began the reading of his answer, and before its 
conclusion was assisted by Messrs. Harper and Hopkinson. The answer 
began as follows: \1\

  This respondent, in his proper person, comes into the said court, and 
protesting that there is no high crime or misdemeanor particularly 
alleged in the said articles of impeachment to which he is or can be 
bound by law to make answer, and saving to himself now, and at all 
times hereafter, all benefit of exception to the insufficiency of the 
said articles, and each of them, and to the defects therein appearing 
in point of law or otherwise, and protesting also that he ought not to 
be injured in any manner, by any words, or by any want of form in this 
his answer, he submits the following facts and observations by way of 
answer to the said articles.

  The answer then proceeds to answer the charges, article by article.
  At the conclusion of the reading, Mr. Randolph, chairman of the 
managers, moved that they have time to consult the House of 
Representatives on a replication, and that they be furnished with a 
copy of the answer.
  To this the President replied that the motion would be taken into 
consideration and the House of Representatives should be notified of 
the result.
  Thereupon the high court of impeachments adjourned and the Members of 
the House of Representatives returned to their Hall, and the Committee 
of the Whole House rose and their Chairman reported.\2\
  On February 5,\3\ in the high court of impeachments--

  Ordered, That the Secretary carry to the House of Representatives an 
attested copy of the answer of Samuel Chase, one of the associate 
justices of the Supreme Court, to articles of impeachment against him 
by the House of Representatives.

  The message being delivered in the House the same day,\4\ the copy of 
the answer was read and ordered to be referred to the managers.
  2352. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The replication of the House to the answer of Mr. Justice Chase to 
the articles of impeachment.
  In the Chase case the House refused to strike from its replication 
certain words reflecting on the motives of the respondent.
  Forms of resolutions relating to the adoption of the replication in 
the Chase case and the carrying thereof to the Senate.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 101-150. The Journal of the Court of Impeachments 
does not have the answer; and prints the articles only as they are 
voted on.
  \2\ The Journal of the House has the following entry, showing the 
form used while the trial progressed:
  ``The House then, in pursuance of a resolution agreed to this day, 
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole House, and proceeded in 
that capacity to the Senate Chamber to attend the trial by the Senate 
of the impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States; and, after some time spent 
therein, the committee returned into the Chamber of the House, and Mr. 
Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. Varnum, from the said Committee 
of the Whole, reported that the committee had, according to order, 
attended the trial by the Senate of the said impeachment, and that some 
progress had been made therein.'' (House Journal, p. 119.)
  \3\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 516.
  \4\ House Journal, pp. 123, 124; Annals, pp. 1181-1184.
                                                            Sec. 2352
  The replication in the Chase impeachment was signed by the Speaker 
and attested by the Clerk.
  The replication in the Chase case was read to the Senate by the 
chairman of the managers.
  Counsel for respondent were furnished a copy of the House's 
replication by direction of the Presiding Officer.
  Later, on the same day, Mr. Randolph, chairman of the managers, 
submitted to the House the following report:

  That they have considered the said answer, and do find that the said 
Samuel Chase has endeavored to cover the crimes and misdemeanors laid 
to his charge by evasive insinuations and misrepresentation of facts; 
and that the said answer does give a gloss and coloring, utterly false 
and untrue, to the various criminal matters contained in the said 
articles; and do submit to the judgment of the House their opinion 
that, for avoiding any imputation of delay to the House of 
Representatives, in a case of so great moment, a replication be 
forthwith sent to the Senate, maintaining the charge of this House; and 
that the committee had prepared a replication accordingly, which they 
herewith report to the House, as follows:
  ``The House of Representatives of the United States have considered 
the answer of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, to the articles of impeachment 
against him by them exhibited, in the name of themselves and of all the 
people of the United States; and observe--
  ``That the said Samuel Chase has endeavored to cover the high crimes 
and misdemeanors laid to his charge by evasive insinuations and 
misrepresentation of facts; that the answer does give a gloss and 
coloring, utterly false and untrue, to the various criminal matters 
contained in the said articles; that the said Samuel Chase did, in 
fact, commit the numerous acts of oppression, persecution, and 
injustice of which he stands accused; and the House of Representatives, 
in full confidence of the truth and justice of their accusation and of 
the necessity of bringing the said Samuel Chase to a speedy and 
exemplary punishment, and not doubting that the Senate will use all 
becoming diligence to do justice to the proceedings of the House of 
Representatives, and to vindicate the honor of the nation, do aver 
their charge against the said Samuel Chase to be true; and that the 
said Samuel Chase is guilty in such manner as he stands impeached; and 
that the House of Representatives will be ready to prove their charges 
against him, at such convenient time and place as shall be appointed 
for that purpose.''

  Mr. Roger Griswold, of Connecticut, moved that the report be 
committed to a Committee of the Whole House, which motion was disagreed 
to.
  Mr. John Dennis, of Maryland, moved to amend the replication by 
striking out therefrom after the words ``and observe,'' the following 
words:

  That the said Samuel Chase has endeavored to cover the high crimes 
and misdemeanors laid to his charge by evasive insinuations and 
misrepresentation of facts; that the said answer does give a gloss and 
coloring, utterly false and untrue, to the various criminal matters 
contained in the said articles.

  This amendment was disagreed to, yeas 41, nays 70.
  Then the question being taken that the House do agree to the said 
replication, it passed in the affirmative, yeas 77, nays 34.
  Thereupon, it was

  Resolved, That the replication annexed to the report of the managers 
be put into the answer and pleas of the aforesaid Samuel Chase, on 
behalf of this House; and that the managers be instructed to proceed to 
maintain the said replication at the bar of the Senate, at such time as 
shall be appointed by the Senate.
  Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that 
this House have agreed to a replication, on their part, to the answer 
of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited to the 
Senate against him by this
Sec. 2353
House, and have directed the managers appointed to conduct the said 
impeachment to carry the said replication to the Senate; and to proceed 
to maintain the same at the bar of the Senate, at such time as shall be 
appointed by the Senate.

  On February 7, 1805,\1\ in the high court of impeachments, the Clerk 
of the House delivered the message, as above directed.
  Then it was

  Ordered, That the Secretary inform the House of Representatives that 
the Senate will be ready to proceed on the trial of the impeachment of 
Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court, at 
half past 2 o'clock this day.

  The high court of impeachments being duly opened at 2 o'clock the 
managers attended, and the replication was read by Mr. Randolph, in the 
form given above, with the following attestation:

  Signed by order and in behalf of the said House.
                                         Nath. Macon, Speaker.    
 Attest:
 John Beckley, Clerk.

  Mr. Hopkinson requested a copy of the replication, which, the 
President replied, would be furnished by the Secretary.
  Mr. Breckenridge moved a resolution to the following effect:

  That the Secretary be directed to inform the House of Representatives 
that the Senate will, tomorrow, at 12 o'clock, proceed with the trial 
of Samuel Chase;

which was agreed to without one dissenting voice, 34 members voting for 
it.
  Whereupon the Senate withdrew to their legislative apartment.
  2353. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The answer and replication being filed in the Chase impeachment, the 
court proceeded to hear testimony.
  Proclamation made by the Sergeant-at-Arms at the opening of the Chase 
trial for presentation of evidence.
  Witnesses on both sides were called at the opening of the Chase 
trial.
  The managers not being ready to present testimony at the opening of 
the Chase trial, the court granted their motion to postpone.
  On February 8 \2\ the high court of impeachments having met, it was

  Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives that 
the Senate are ready to proceed further on the trial of the impeachment 
of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court.

  The managers, accompanied by the House of Representatives in 
Committee of the Whole House, accordingly attended.
  Samuel Chase, the respondent, attended with his counsel.
  Proclamation was made to keep silence, and also as follows:

  Oyes! Oyes! Oyes!
  Whereas a charge of high crimes and misdemeanors hath been exhibited 
by the House of Representatives of the United States, in the name of 
themselves and of all the people of the United States, against Samuel 
Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court, all persons 
concerned are to take notice that he now stands upon his trial, and 
they may come forth in order to make good the said charge.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 516.
  \2\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 517; Annals, p. 152.
                                                            Sec. 2354
  The President informed the managers that they were at liberty to 
proceed in support of the articles of impeachment exhibited.
  On request of Mr. Randolph the witnesses on behalf of the managers 
were called.
  On request of Mr. Hopkinson, counsel for the respondent, his 
witnesses were called.
  Mr. Randolph observed that various considerations, which it was 
unnecessary to detail, induced him, on behalf of the managers, to move 
a postponement of the trial till to-morrow, when they hoped to be 
prepared to proceed with it.
  Mr. Harper said that, on behalf of Judge Chase, he would not object 
to the motion.
  The President informed the managers that the Senate acceded to their 
request, and added, that the Senate would attend to-morrow at 12 
o'clock, for the purpose of proceeding with the trial.
  The court thereupon adjourned.
  2354. Chase's impeachment continued.
  During the Chase trial the House attended daily without notice from 
the court, except on a special occasion, when the hour was changed.
  Order of proceeding in the Chase trial during the introduction of 
evidence.
  The journal of an impeachment trial records the names of witnesses, 
but not their testimony, except when it is subject of objection.
  By consent, during the Chase trial, a witness for respondent was 
examined while the managers were presenting testimony.
  In an impeachment trial the discharge of witnesses is determined by 
the Senate, sometimes in conformity with the consent of the parties.
  Mr. Justice Chase, after attending during much of his trial, asked 
leave to retire, and was informed that the rules did not require his 
attendance.
  Mr. Justice Chase did not, after reading his reply, participate 
personally in the conduct of his case, beyond waiving objection to one 
question.
  The Presiding Officer of the Senate frequently put questions to 
witnesses during the Chase trial.
  In the Chase impeachment the respondent introduced additional counsel 
during the trial.
  On February 9,\1\ and thereafter during the continuation of the 
trial, the high court met daily at 12 o'clock, and until February 23, 
near the end of the session, the House of Representatives in Committee 
of the Whole House attended with the managers without notice from the 
court. A single exception is noticed, however. On February 13 \2\ the 
two Houses met at noon to count the electoral vote. After that duty was 
concluded, the Secretary of the Senate presented the following message:

  Mr. Speaker: I am directed to inform this House that the Senate will, 
at half past 2 o'clock on this day, be ready to proceed on the trial of 
the impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Journal of Impeachments, p. 517; Annals, p. 153.
  \2\ House Journal, p. 137; Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 518.
Sec. 2354
  Accordingly the managers and the House attended.
  The trial proceeded in this order:
  On February 9,\1\ Mr. Randolph, chairman of the managers, opened the 
cause. Then witnesses for the managers were sworn, gave testimony, and 
were crossexamined. The Journal states the name of each witness, but 
not his testimony, unless any portion was objected to and became the 
subject of decision by the court. On February 13,\2\ while the managers 
were still presenting their testimony, at the request of Mr. Harper, 
counsel for the respondent, and with the consent of the managers, John 
Basset, a witness on the part of Judge Chase, was sworn and examined, 
in consequence of the peculiar situation of his family requiring his 
immediate return home.
  On February 14,\3\ while the managers were putting in their 
testimony, the respondent requested that Charles Lee, esq., might also 
be allowed to appear as one of his counsel.
  On February 15,\4\ the managers having completed their testimony, the 
respondent was notified that he might proceed to make his defense. 
Thereupon Mr. Harper, in his defense, addressed the court, and then 
proceeded to adduce witnesses.
  On February 19,\4\ on request, and with consent of parties, David 
Robinson, a witness, was discharged.
  Also on February 19,\5\ the following occurred:

  Mr. Harper. I am desired by Judge Chase to make of this honorable 
court the request contained in the following letter, which I will read:
  ``Mr. President: The state of my health will not permit me to remain 
any longer at this bar. It is with great regret I depart before I hear 
the judgment of this honorable court. If permitted to retire, I shall 
leave this honorable court with an unlimited confidence in its justice; 
and I beg leave to present my thanks to them for their patience and 
indulgence in the long and tedious examination of the witnesses. 
Whatever may be the ultimate decision of this honorable court, I 
console myself with the reflection that it will be the result of mature 
deliberation on the legal testimony in the case, and will emanate from 
those principles which ought to govern the highest tribunal of justice 
in the United States.''

  The President observed that the rules of the Senate did not require 
the personal attendance of the respondent; whereupon Judge Chase bowed 
in a very respectful manner and withdrew. Until this time the 
respondent had attended each day. Thereafter he did not attend. While 
in attendance he had not, after the reading of his reply, participated 
personally in the conduct of the defense, except in one instance to say 
that he had no objection to a question which his counsel had 
challenged.\6\
  The President of the Senate frequently put questions to the witnesses 
as the trial proceeded.
  On February 20\7\ at the conclusion of the testimony, a request was 
made that a certain witness, a Mr. Tilghman, be discharged, and the 
following took place:
  Mr. Harper said the counsel for the respondent would have no 
objection to discharge all the witnesses, but must object to 
discharging part of them.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 517.
  \2\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 519; Annals, p. 222.
  \3\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 519.
  \4\ Senate Impeachment Journal, p. 522.
  \5\ Journal, p. 522; Annals, p. 310.
  \6\ Annals, p. 171.
  \7\ Annals, p. 312.
                                                            Sec. 2355
  The President. If the gentlemen do not agree upon the discharge of 
the witnesses, I will take the sense of the Senate upon the point.
  Mr. Harper. The particular situation of Mr. Tilghman's family 
requires his return to Philadelphia. I must therefore request that his 
further attendance be dispensed with.

  The managers consented, and Mr. Tilghman was discharged.
  The question was then taken by the President on the discharge of the 
witnesses, and lost; there being 16 votes in the affirmative and 17 in 
the negative.
  Mr. Rodney requested the discharge of the witnesses from Delaware; 
which being consented to by the respondent's counsel, they were 
discharged.
  It may be proper here to notice that, from time to time, during the 
trial, witnesses were discharged with consent of the parties.
  2355. Chase's impeachment, continued.
  In the Chase impeachment, by agreement, the managers had the opening 
and close of the final arguments.
  Those making the final arguments of the Chase trial were limited 
neither as to time nor numbers.
  On February 19,\1\ the following occurred as to the concluding 
arguments:

  The President. Is the course of the arguments on each side 
understood?
  Mr. Nicholson. We understand that the managers will open; that reply 
will be made by the counsel for the respondent, and that the managers 
will then close.
  Mr. Key. This is the usual course, and we have no objection to it.

  The testimony being closed, on February 20,\2\ Mr. Early commenced 
for the managers the argument in support of the articles, and was 
followed by Mr. Campbell, also in behalf of the managers, and then by 
Mr. Clark, also a manager.
  Then Messrs. Hopkinson, Key, Lee, Martin, and Harper were severally 
heard for the respondent.
  Finally Messrs. Nicholson, Rodney, and Randolph concluded for the 
managers.
  2356. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The managers of the Chase impeachment resisted strenuously the 
argument that impeachment might be invoked only for indictable 
offenses.
  The argument of Mr. Manager Campbell in the Chase trial on the nature 
of the power of impeachment.
  In their arguments the managers and counsel for the respondent 
considered not only the evidence as tending to substantiate the charges 
set forth in the articles, but discussed at length the meaning and 
application of the Constitution in those clauses establishing the 
remedy of impeachment.
  Mr. Campbell, of the managers, said: \3\

  The first provision in the Constitution on this subject (art. 1, see. 
3,), declares that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all 
impeachments. Here we discover the great wisdom of the framers of the 
Constitution. The highest and most enlightened tribunal in the nation 
is charged with the protection of the rights and liberties of the 
citizens against oppression from the officers of Government under the 
sanction of law; unawed by the power which the officer may possess, or 
the dignified station he may fill, complete justice may be expected at 
their hands. The accused is called upon before the same tribunal, and 
in many instances, before the same men, who sanctioned his official 
elevation, to answer for abusing the powers with which he had been 
intrusted. Men who are presumed to have had
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, p. 311.
  \2\ Senate Impeachment Journal, pp. 522, 523.
  \3\ Annals, p. 331.
Sec. 2356
a favorable opinion of him once are to be his judges; no inferior or 
coordinate tribunal is to decide on his case, which might from motives 
of jealousy interest be prejudiced against him and wish his removal. 
No, sir; his judges, without the shadow of temptation to influence 
their conduct, are placed beyond the reach of suspicion.
  The next provision in the Constitution declares that judgment in 
cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, 
trust, or profit under the United States.
  Here the Constitution seems to make an evident distinction between 
such misdemeanors as would authorize a removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold any office, and such as are criminal, in the 
ordinary sense of the word, in courts of common law, and punishable by 
indictment. So far as the offense committed is injurious to society, 
only in consequence of the power reposed in the officer being abused in 
the exercise of his official functions, it is inquirable into only by 
impeachment, and punishable only by removal from office and 
disqualification to hold any office; but so far as the offense is 
criminal, independent of the office, it is to be tried by indictment, 
and is made punishable according to the known rules of law in courts of 
ordinary jurisdiction. As, if an officer take a bribe to do an act not 
connected with his office, for this he is indictable in a court of 
justice only. Impeachment therefore, according to the meaning of the 
Constitution, may fairly be considered a kind of inquest into the 
conduct of an officer, merely as it regards his office; the manner in 
which he performs the duties thereof; and the effects that his conduct 
therein may have on society. It is more in the nature of a civil 
investigation than of a criminal prosecution. And though impeachable 
offenses are termed in the Constitution high crimes and misdemeanors, 
they must be such only so far as regards the official conduct of the 
officer; and even treason and bribery can only be inquired into by 
impeachment, so far as the same may be considered as a violation of the 
duties of the officer, and of the oath the officer takes to support the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and of his oath of office; 
and not as to the criminality of those offenses independent of the 
office. This must be inquired into and punished by indictment.
  This position is strongly supported by the mode of proceeding adopted 
by this honorable court in cases of impeachment. You issue a summons to 
give notice to the accused of the proceeding against him; you do not 
consider his personal appearance necessary; you issue no compulsory 
process to enforce his personal attendance; and you pass sentence, or 
render judgment on him in his absence. But, in all criminal 
prosecutions, compulsory process must issue at some stage of it to 
enforce the defendant's appearance; unless outlawry in England be 
considered an exception, which, it is believed, is not resorted to in 
this country, and his personal appearance is considered absolutely 
necessary; and in almost every case he must be present when sentence is 
pronounced against him. This construction of the Constitutional 
provision appears to be absolutely necessary, to avoid the absurd 
consequence that would arise from a different construction; that of 
punishing a man twice for the same offense, which could not have been 
intended by the framers of the Constitution. The nature of the judgment 
which you are bound to render, and not to exceed, appears also 
conclusive on this head. You can only remove and disqualify an 
individual from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit. This can 
not be considered a criminal punishment; it is merely a deprivation of 
rights; a declaration that the person is not properly qualified to 
serve his country. Hence I conceive that, in order to support these 
articles of impeachment, we are not bound to make out such a case as 
would be punishable by indictment in a court of law. It is sufficient 
to show that the accused has transgressed the line of his official 
duty, in violation of the laws of his country; and that this conduct 
can only be accounted for on the ground of impure and corrupt motives. 
We need not hunt down the accused as a criminal, who had committed 
crimes of the deepest die; and this honorable court are not authorized 
to inflict a punishment adequate to such crimes, if they had been 
committed and could be established. With this view of the meaning of 
the Constitutional provision relative to impeachments, I shall proceed 
to examine the articles now under consideration, and the evidence given 
to support them. In the course of this examination, we apprehend it 
will clearly appear that the whole conduct of the judge in the several 
transactions, for which charges are alleged against him, had its origin 
in a corrupt partiality and predetermination unjustly to oppress, under 
the sanction of legal authority, those who became the objects of his 
resentment in consequence of differing from him in political 
sentiments; turning the judicial power, with which he was vested, into 
an engine of political oppression.
                                                            Sec. 2357
  2357. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The argument of Mr. Manager Nicholson on the nature of the power of 
impeachment.
  Mr. Manager Nicholson said: \1\

  But, sir, there is one principle upon which all the counsel for the 
accused have relied, upon which they have all dwelt with great force, 
and to the maintenance of which they have directed all their powers, 
that we can not assent to; we mean to contend against it, because we 
believe it to be totally untenable, and because it is of the first 
importance in the decision of the question now under discussion. We do 
not contend that, to sustain an impeachment, it is not necessary to 
show that the offenses charged are of such a nature as to subject the 
party to an indictment, for the learned counsel have said that the 
person now accused is not guilty, because the misdemeanors charged 
against him are not of a nature for which he might be indicted in a 
court of law.
  To show how entirely groundless this position is, I need only pursue 
that course which has been pointed out to us by the respondent himself 
and his counsel. I might refer to English authorities of the highest 
respectability, to show that officers of the British Government have 
been impeached for offenses not indictable under any law whatever. But 
I feel no disposition to resort to foreign precedents. In my judgment, 
the Constitution of the United States ought to be expounded upon its 
own principles, and that foreign aid ought never to be called in. Our 
Constitution was fashioned after none other in the known world, and if 
we understand the language in which it is written, we require no 
assistance in giving it a true exposition. As we speak the English 
language, we may, indeed, refer to English authorities for definitions, 
as we should refer to English dictionaries for the meaning of English 
words; but upon this, as upon all occasions, where the principles of 
our Government are to be developed, I trust that the Constitution of 
the United States will stand upon its own foundation, unsupported by 
foreign aid, and that the construction given to it will be, not an 
English construction, but one purely and entirely American.
  The Constitution declares that ``the judges both of the supreme and 
inferior courts shall hold their commissions during good behavior.'' 
The plain and correct inference to be drawn from this language is, that 
a judge is to hold his office so long as he demeans himself well in it; 
and whenever he shall not demean himself well, he shall be removed. I 
therefore contend that a judge would be liable to impeachment under the 
Constitution, even without the insertion of that clause which declares, 
that ``all civil officers of the United States shall be removed for the 
commission of treason, bribery, and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' The nature of the tenure by which a judge holds his 
office is such that, for any act of misbehavior in office, he is liable 
to removal. These acts of misbehavior may be of various kinds, some of 
which may, indeed, be punishable under our laws by indictment; but 
there may be others which the lawmakers may not have pointed out, 
involving such a flagrant breach of duty in a judge, either in doing 
that which he ought not to have done, or in omitting to do that which 
he ought to have done, that no man of common understanding would 
hesitate to say he ought to be impeached for it.
  The words ``good behavior'' are borrowed from the English laws, and 
if I were inclined to rest this case on English authorities, I could 
easily show that, in England, these words have been construed to mean 
much more than we contend for. The expression durante se bene gesserit, 
I believe, first occurs in a statute of Henry VIII, providing for the 
appointment of a custos rotulorum, and clerk of the peace for the 
several countries in England. The statute recites, that ignorant and 
unlearned persons had, by unfair means, procured themselves to be 
appointed to these offices, to the great injury of the community, and 
provides that the custos shall hold his office until removed, and the 
clerk of the peace shall hold his office durante se bene gesserit. The 
reason for making the tenure to be during good behavior was that the 
office had been held by incapable persons, who were too ignorant to 
discharge the duties; and it was certainly the intention of the 
legislature that such persons should be removed whenever their 
incapacity was discovered. Under this statute, therefore, I think it 
clear that the officer holding his office during good behavior might be 
removed for any improper exercise of his powers, whether arising from 
ignorance, corruption, passion, or any other cause. To this extent, 
however, we do not wish to go. We do not charge the judge with 
incapacity. His learning and his ability are
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 562-567.
Sec. 2357
acknowledged on all hands; but we charge him with gross impropriety of 
conduct in the discharge of his official duties, and as he can not 
pretend ignorance we insist that his malconduct arose from a worse 
cause.
  If, however, a judge were not made liable to removal, from the very 
nature of the tenure by which he holds his office, we still insist that 
every judge conducting himself improperly in office comes under that 
clause of the Constitution which declares that ``the President, Vice-
President, and civil officers of the United States shall be removed 
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
  We do not mean to contend against a position which one of the learned 
counsel took so much pains to prove, that the word ``high'' applies as 
well to misdemeanors as to crimes; nor do we deem it important at this 
time to inquire whether a civil officer of the United States can be 
removed for offenses not committed in the discharge of his official 
duties. It will be time enough to make this inquiry when the case 
presents itself. At present we aver that the party charged has been 
guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and that he ought to be removed 
for it.
  Here, however, we are met by being told, that although his conduct 
may have been improper, yet that he is not liable to impeachment, 
unless the offense is of such a nature as that he might be indicted for 
it in a court of law.
  If this be true, as it relates to a judge, the Constitution, to be 
consistent with itself, must make it universally true; and yet, if the 
doctrine be admitted, the Constitution will be found to be at variance 
with itself. Treason is an offense which may or may not be committed in 
the discharge of official duty, and no doubt the party committing it 
may be indicted. Bribery is an offense for which a judge may be 
indicted in the courts of the United States, because an act of Congress 
makes provision for it, and declares the punishment; but there is no 
law by which any other officer of the United States can be indicted for 
bribery. If, therefore, the President of the United States should 
accept a bribe, he certainly can not be indicted for it, and yet no man 
can doubt that he might be impeached. If one of the heads of 
Departments should undertake to recommend to office for pay, he 
certainly might be impeached for it, and yet, I would ask, under what 
law, and in what court could he be indicted?
  To this, perhaps, it might be answered, that bribery is one of those 
offenses for which the Constitution expressly provides that the officer 
may be impeached. This is true; but let us proceed further, and inquire 
whether there are not other offenses for which an officer may be 
impeached, and for which he can not be indicted?
  If a judge should order a cause to be tried with eleven jurors only, 
surely he might be impeached for it, and yet I believe there is no 
court in which he could be indicted. You, Mr. President, as Vice-
President of the United States, together with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Chief Justice, and the Attorney-General, as commissioners 
of the sinking fund, have annually at your disposal $8,000,000, for the 
purpose of paying the national debt. If, instead of applying it to this 
public use, you should divert it to another channel, or convert it to 
your own private uses, I ask if there is a man in the world who would 
hesitate to say that you ought to be impeached for this misconduct? And 
yet there is no court in this country in which you could be indicted 
for it. Nay, sir, it would amount to nothing more than a breach of 
trust, and would not be indictable under the favorite common law.
  But, sir, this ground, which was so strenuously fought for, will 
probably be abandoned, and instead of our adversaries maintaining that 
the offense must be of an indictable nature, they will, like one of the 
honorable counsel (Mr. Harper), go a step back and say that it must be 
a breach of some known positive law. Thus they will endeavor to shelter 
their client by saying that there is no act of Congress declaring it 
illegal for a judge to deliver his opinion on the law before counsel 
have been heard, or to make political harangues from the bench.
  There are offenses for which an officer may be impeached, and against 
which there are no known positive laws. It is possible that the day may 
arrive when a President of the United States, having some great 
political object in view, may endeavor to influence the legislature by 
holding out threats or inducements to them. A treaty may be made which 
the President, with some personal view, may be extremely anxious to 
have ratified. The hope of office may be held out to a Senator; and I 
think it can not be doubted, that for this the President would be 
liable to impeachment, although there is no positive law forbidding it. 
Again, sir, a Member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives 
may have a very dear friend in office, and the President may tell him 
unless you vote for my measures your friend shall be dismissed. Where 
is the positive law forbidding this, yet where is the man who
                                                            Sec. 2357
would be shameless enough to rise in the face of the country and defend 
such conduct, or be bold enough to contend that the President could not 
be impeached for it?
  It was said by one of the counsel that the offense must be a breach 
either of the common law, a State law, or a law of the United States, 
and that no lawyer would speak of a misdemeanor, but as an act 
violating some one of these laws. This doctrine is surely not 
warranted, for the Government of the United States have no concern with 
any but their own laws. In a State court, I would speak of a 
misdemeanor as an offense against a State law; in the courts of the 
United States, I would speak of it as an offense against an act of 
Congress; but, sir, as a member of the House of Representatives, and 
acting as a manager of an impeachment before the highest court in the 
nation, appointed to try the highest officers of the Government, when I 
speak of a misdemeanor, I mean an act of official misconduct, a 
violation of official duty, whether it be a proceeding against a 
positive law, or a proceeding unwarranted by law.
  If the objection that the offense must be of an indictable nature, or 
against some positive law, means anything, it must be that the 
misconduct for which a judge or any other officer may be impeached, is 
either made punishable by, or is a violation of an act of Congress, for 
we are not to be regulated either by the common law or a State law. 
What, then, would be the result? I have pointed out several instances 
of gross misconduct in violation of no act of Congress, and yet under 
this doctrine he is to be permitted to pursue his wicked courses until 
every possible offense is defined by statute. This, too, would teach us 
that we have done wrong heretofore, for at the last session a judge was 
impeached and removed from office for drunkenness and profane swearing 
on the bench, although there is no law of the United States forbidding 
them. Indeed, I do not know that there is any law punishing either in 
New Hampshire, where the offense was committed. If it was said by one 
of the counsel that these were indictable offenses. I, however, do not 
know where; certainly not in England. Drunkenness is punishable there 
by the ecclesiastical authority, but the temporal magistrate never had 
any power over it until it was given by a statute of James I, and even 
then the power was not to be exercised by the courts, but only by a 
justice of the peace, as is now the case in Maryland, where a small 
fine may be imposed.
  But the attorney-general of Maryland (Mr. Martin) admits that 
offenses may be of so heinous a nature that their punishment carries 
infamy with them, and that, though not committed in the discharge of 
official duty, yet if against a State law, the party may be impeached 
and removed from office. This, though not very material to the present 
question, may serve us in showing how inapplicable the doctrine is, 
that the offense must be against a State law or the common law. I will 
suppose that in New Hampshire there is no law punishing profane 
swearing. In Maryland a magistrate is authorized to impose a fine of 33 
cents, and if this is not paid instantly the offender may be put in the 
pillory and receive thirty-nine lashes. The punishment is infamous, and 
if inflicted on a judge, according to the idea of this gentleman, he is 
to be impeached and removed from office. If the same offense is 
committed in New Hampshire, the judge is not to be removed, not because 
he has been guilty of a lighter offense, but because there is no State 
law punishing it. If, then, the State law is to be made the criterion, 
a judge in Maryland is to be removed from office for that which he 
might do with impunity in another State.
  To carry this idea a little further: There was once in the State of 
Connecticut, and may be yet for aught I know, a celebrated code called 
the Blue Laws. Under the provisions of this code, I believe it is a 
fact that a captain of a ship was tied up and publicly whipped, 
because, on returning from a long voyage, he met his wife on a Sunday 
at the front door and kissed her. This was deemed a high offense, and 
was ignominiously punished. Now, if we are to be governed by the State 
laws, I trust the Blue Laws of Connecticut will be rejected, and that 
our grave judges may be allowed to kiss when and where they please, as 
to their wisdom shall seem meet, without incurring the pains and 
penalties of an impeachment. This, sir, may be somewhat ludicrous, but 
I hope it is not, therefore, the less illustrative of the absurdity of 
the doctrine contended for. It has been said that the offenses for 
which a judge or other officer is to be impeached ought to be defined 
by act of Congress. This is impossible. Such is the multiplicity of 
passions that sway the human heart, such is the variety of human 
action, that a code of laws never did and never can exist in which all 
human offenses are defined. The Constitution is sufficiently definite 
when it declares that a judge shall hold his office during good 
behavior, and that all civil officers shall be removed for high crimes 
and misdemeanors. The law of good behavior is the law of truth and 
justice. It is confined to no soil and to no climate. It is written on 
the heart
Sec. 2358
of man in indelible characters, by the hand of his Creator, and is 
known and felt by every human being. He who violates it violates the 
first principles of law. He abandons the path of rectitude, and by not 
listening to the warning voice of his conscience, he forsakes man's 
best and surest guide on this earth. The best and ablest judge will 
often err in mere matters of law, but as to principles of duty, in 
discharging acts of common justice to his fellow-men, he can never err 
so long as he follows conscience as his guide, and suffers justice to 
be the only object which he has in view.

  2358. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The argument of Mr. Manager Rodney on the nature of the power of 
impeachment.
  Mr. Manager Rodney, at greater length, discussed this question: \1\

  We have been told by that able lawyer, the attorney-general of 
Maryland, that a judge can not be impeached for any offense which is 
not indictable; nor, indeed, for an indictable offense, unless it be a 
high crime or misdemeanor; and not even for a high crime or 
misdemeanor, except such as stamp infamy on the character and brand the 
soul with corruption. A variety of cases have been put to explain his 
ideas. The law books and the Constitution have been relied on to 
support those positions, which it becomes my duty to examine. Without 
troubling you to remove the lumber of the books, let me call your 
attention, in the first place, to the Constitution. The Constitution 
shall be my text. I think I shall be able to demonstrate that, in order 
to render an offense impeachable, it is not necessary that it should be 
indictable. But, I will go further and prove that, agreeably to the 
learned counsel's own principles, Judge Chase has committed indictable 
offenses. Taking his own explanation of crimes and misdemeanors, and 
recurring to his authority, I will prove that, within the strictest 
terms of the definition on which he relies, Judge Chase is guilty, not 
merely of misdemeanors in the various acts of judicial misbehavior, but 
of aggravated crimes against the express language of the laws and the 
positive provisions of the Constitution.
  In adverting to the Constitution, when looking at one part, we should 
take a view of the whole instrument to fix the proper construction. In 
examining any provision, we should consider the bearing and tendencies 
of all the rest. By adopting this rule we shall preserve order and 
harmony throughout the system.
  The first place in which the subject of impeachment is mentioned in 
the Constitution is in the first section of the first article. The 
language used by those who framed it is, in my humble opinion, too 
plain to be misconceived, and too clear to be misunderstood: ``The 
House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, 
and shall have the sole power of impeachment.''
  This section vests the exclusive authority to impeach in the 
immediate representatives of the people. The power thus delegated is 
general and comprehensive. It is not limited to any particular acts or 
transgressions, but is coextensive with every proper object or subject 
of impeachment. The House of Representatives is thus constituted, most 
emphatically, the grand jury of the nation: A high and responsible 
authority, which, I trust, will always be exercised with prudence and 
discretion, directed with impartiality and justice. But I do 
confidently hope that there will ever be found sufficient spirit and 
firmness to arraign the guilty delinquent, however elevated his 
station, when the Constitution or laws have been infringed, the tenure 
of office broken, or its duties violated.
  The next passage in order which touches this topic and to which I 
shall refer is the third section of the same article: ``The Senate 
shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for 
that purpose they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President 
of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside. And no 
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
Members present.''
  This clause establishes a tribunal for the trial of impeachments. To 
the Senate this important trust is wisely confided. It prescribes the 
manner in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised, directs that the 
Members shall be under oath or affirmation, and fixes the number 
necessary to convict. Let us proceed a step further in the path: 
``Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office 
of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party 
convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, 
trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 591-610.
                                                            Sec. 2358
  The part I have just read contains two very salutary provisions. The 
first limits the extent of the punishment to be inflicted by the 
Senate. The second, as a necessary consequence of the former, reserves 
to the ordinary tribunal of law the right to proceed by indictment. 
This last provision has been a fruitful source of argument to the 
learned counsel. They have very ingeniously played upon these terms, 
and, in the zeal of their imaginations, have fancied that they proved 
to a demonstration the position, that an offense must be indictable or 
it is not impeachable. There may be magic in their argument, but I do 
not perceive there is any logic. The superstructure which they have 
erected on this basis is easily demolished. From the language of this 
clause they draw the inference that the framers of the Constitution 
intended that no person should be impeached for any offense for which 
he was not liable to be indicted. Is this the fair import of the 
expressions? The text of this instrument is remarkably free from 
ambiguity. Clearness, correctness, and precision are its leading 
characteristics. With a very few exceptions it speaks a language 
intelligible by all. Had it been the design and wish of the authors of 
the Constitution that no offenses should be impeachable which were not 
indictable, they would have declared so in express and positive terms, 
and left nothing for inference or conjecture. This they have not done, 
and we may reasonably presume they did not intend to do. They prudently 
looked into the volume of history, where they saw the shocking purposes 
to which, in evil times, the power of impeachments had been basely and 
inhumanly prostituted. They read in those instructive pages the dear-
bought lessons of experience. and wisely ordained limits which the 
authority to punish should not exceed. They fixed a ne plus ultra for 
the tribunal that they established which their severest judgments 
should not pass. They knew, at the same time, that crimes might be 
perpetrated and offenses committed which would demand additional 
chastisement. The loss of office, and disqualification to hold any in 
future, the maximum of punishment which they had prescribed, would be 
very inadequate and bear little proportion to the atrocious guilt which 
might be incurred. Under the influence of these impressions they 
reserved to the tribunals established by law the right to inflict the 
just penalties annexed to this class of cases. Without any intention 
whatever, when any acts had been committed which manifested an 
unfitness for office, or when there had been a breach of the tenure by 
which it was held, by malconduct or misbehavior, to prevent the 
proceedings by impeachment, although the case might not be such as to 
warrant any additional punishment at law. This, I apprehend, is the 
object they had in view, and this is the fair, easy, natural, and 
obvious sense of the words they have used.
  Those conversant with the juridical history of England, or who have 
studied her political annals, must be sensible of the deplorable 
situation to which that country has been reduced, at different periods, 
by the abuse of the power of impeachment. The revengeful exercise of 
this authority has too often deluged the scaffold with blood. In that 
country the proceeding by impeachment for any offense supersedes all 
other modes. The person accused, whether he be acquitted or condemned, 
can not afterwards be indicted for the same offense, or called to an 
account before the ordinary tribunals. The former course is a complete 
bar to the latter. To prevent those consequences flowing from a 
proceeding by impeachment under the Constitution, those who formed that 
instrument, at the same time that they limited the punishment, have 
expressly declared it shall have no effect to bar a trial before the 
ordinary courts, but that the party shall be liable to indictment and 
punishment according to law. Without this positive provision, as we are 
almost as much in the habit of drawing on the Bank of England for law 
as our merchants are for cash or credit, we might have incorporated a 
principle into our code totally repugnant to the system. The 
Constitution has drawn the true line on this subject. From a mere 
reprimand or temporary suspension, the court may ascend in the scale of 
punishment to removal and disqualification. But thus far can they go 
and no farther. They can not pass the Rubicon. If the crime deserves a 
more exemplary sentence recourse must be had to the ordinary mode of 
proceeding, and then their judgment is not pleadable in bar to an 
indictment. By this means adequate punishment may in all cases be 
inflicted.
  In England every person, in a public or private capacity, either as 
an officer or an individual, is liable to be proceeded against by 
impeachment. In this country the sphere of impeachment is properly 
limited. The attorney-general of Maryland has taken a long, tedious, 
and circuitous march to arrive at this point, which I would readily 
have yielded without an argument. I do not recollect that any of my 
colleagues contended for the position that every man in this country, 
in his individual capacity, might be an object of impeachment. For 
myself I utterly disclaim the idea. Admitting, as I do, in its fullest 
extent, this wide distinction between the power delegated by the 
Constitution and that exercised in England, which embraces every 
subject of that kingdom, how does it bear on the case or affect the
Sec. 2358
argument? After laboring for a considerable time, and employing all his 
talents, and that fund of legal knowledge which is inexhaustible, to 
prove that the House of Representatives can not impeach every citizen 
indiscriminately, the learned attorney-general has not favored us with 
any application of his principle to the present cause. It proves 
certainly one among many other broad lines of difference which exist 
between the British doctrines on the subject of impeachment and the 
constitutional provisions of this country. In this respect it adds to 
the weight of our scale. It shows how cautious we should be in bowing 
down to British precedents which can not be perfectly applicable. I 
hope I have satisfied the court that the gentlemen are mistaken in 
their argument on this part of the Constitution. In the general wreck 
of their defense I conceive this sinking plank, to which they have 
clung, can not afford them the most distant prospect of safety. We will 
now proceed a little further in the broad and plain road of the 
Constitution, carefully examining the ground on which we move.
  By the fourth section of the second article of the Constitution it is 
provided that ``The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers 
of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, 
and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
  The learned counsel have placed great reliance on this passage to 
prove that an officer must be guilty, not merely of an indictable 
offense (as they concede every crime or misdemeanor to be), but must 
have committed a high crime or high misdemeanor to justify an 
impeachment. One of the learned gentlemen, to fix the true construction 
of the term ``or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' commented at 
great length on the expressions. To illustrate the subject his fancy 
readily formed an objection which with logical accuracy he removed. He 
demonstrated that, agreeably to the strictest grammatical construction 
and the nicest propriety of speech, the epithet high was to be 
considered as prefixed to misdemeanors as well as to crimes. In this 
manner the phantom which his own imagination raised was laid not by a 
spell, but by the exertion of his argumentative powers. We would 
willingly have conceded the point and spared him his labor and his 
breath. We mean not to cavil about trifles or dispute for straws.
  Taking it for granted that he has given the proper construction to a 
part, let us examine what is the just sense of the whole of this 
passage. In plain English it commands upon the conviction by 
impeachment of certain atrocious offenses that the guilty officer shall 
be removed at all events. Depriving the court thus far of the 
discretion which they would otherwise have possessed as to the judgment 
they might pass. Having previously limited, in general cases, the 
punishment which they might inflict, according to their discretion, by 
establishing a maximum which they should not exceed in this particular 
grade of flagrant offenses, they have fixed the sentence which they 
shall pass. The language of the Constitution is peremptory and 
imperative. Those convicted of such daring enormities of those high 
crimes or high misdemeanors must be removed from office, which they 
have justly forfeited. This is the minimum of punishment to be 
inflicted. Perhaps those who penned the great charter of the Union 
apprehended that in evil times some high officer of the United States 
clothed with power and armed with influence might be proved to have 
committed the base and detestable crime of bribery, or some other 
equally great, by evidence too strong and too powerful to be resisted, 
and in an unfortunate hour, awed by fear or seduced by favor, the 
constitutional judges would not hurl him at once from the seat which he 
was unworthy to occupy, but permit him to remain in his station, to the 
disgrace of the country and to the injury of the people. Hence they 
were induced to make this wholesome provision which left nothing to the 
discretion of the judges. But is there a word in the whole sentence 
which expresses an idea or from which any fair inference can be drawn 
that no person shall be impeached but for ``treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors?'' It does not pretend to specify the 
various acts of an officer which may subject him to an impeachment: its 
whole object is to define and fix the punishment which he shall incur 
on the commission of particular offenses, which is removal from office. 
This is the least penalty they can inflict in such cases, and God knows 
it would be much too little had they not in the former part provided 
that after stripping the traitorous impostor of the insignia of office 
and power the ordinary tribunals may add to the constitutional sentence 
of the Senate the fines or forfeitures imposed by law.
  From the most cursory and transient view of this passage I submit 
with due deference that it must appear very manifest that there are 
other cases than those here specified for which an impeachment will lay 
and is the proper remedy. In these particular cases the punishment is 
ascertained, to wit, removal from office; but in a clause to which I 
have sometime since adverted it is discretionary. Where was the 
necessity or use of that, if this defined all the impeachable offenses 
and specified the punishment?
                                                            Sec. 2358
We must, if possible, give effect to every sentence of this instrument. 
We must not suppose that its authors made nugatory provisions. The 
sense and meaning which I have given to their language and the 
constructions which I have maintained will give force and effect to 
every word.
  The system of impeachment thus understood, and I humbly submit 
rationally explained, is perhaps as little liable to exception as any 
branch of the Constitution. It is stripped of those terrible 
instruments of death and destruction which have made such dreadful 
havoc and carnage in the ages that have preceded us. We have been 
benefited by the sanguinary precedents of barbarous times. We have been 
taught wisdom ourselves by the folly of others. We have improved the 
advantages we possessed, and thus, according to his own inscrutable 
ways, has the benevolent Author of our existence brought good out of 
evil.
  In guarding effectually against the cruel and vindictive punishments 
which the extraordinary tribunal of impeachment might inflict, in the 
exacerbations of party violence and personal animosity, the fathers of 
the Constitution took care to provide that a certain grade of offenses 
should deprive the guilty incumbent of his office, thereby rendering 
him a harmless object to the community when dispossessed of his abused 
authority. Nay, they went further. Their wisdom and prudence led them 
to make a specific declaration that, after being deprived of his power, 
he should be subject to the legal consequences of his guilt upon trial 
and conviction before the ordinary tribunals at law. Thus rendering the 
system perfect and complete.
  There is an important provision contained in the Constitution, 
intimately connected with this subject, to which I now beg leave to 
refer. It will be found in the first section of the third article:
  ``The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and 
inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.''
  With this particular part of the Constitution the learned judge must 
have been more especially acquainted when he accepted of his present 
office, and must then have expressly accepted it on the terms 
specified. No man can seriously say that for a judge to continue in the 
exercise of his authority and the receipt of his salary after any acts 
of misbehavior is not a violation of this essential provision of the 
Constitution. He holds his office explicitly and expressly during good 
behavior. The instant he behaves bad he commits a breach of the tenure 
by which he holds the possession, and the office becomes forfeited. The 
people have leased out the authority upon certain specified terms. So 
long as he complies with them, and not a moment longer, is he entitled 
to exercise the power which was not intended for his individual 
advantage, but for their benefit. But, sir, who is to take notice of 
these acts of misbehavior? How are they to be ascertained, and what 
shall be considered as such? Are the people in their individual 
capacity, ipso facto, on the commission of the act to declare the 
office forfeited, and is a judge then to cease from his labors? Or must 
it not be officially, or rather judicially, ascertained? This, I 
conceive, would be the proper mode of procedure. Has the Constitution 
provided no tribunal for this purpose? I answer it has, most 
indubitably. By the Constitution the Senate, as the court, and jury, 
too, in cases of impeachment, has the sole power of removing from 
offices those who hold them by the tenure of good behavior. If a judge 
misbehave, he ought to be removed, because agreeably to the plainest 
provision he has forfeited his right to hold the office. The 
Constitution having established this single mode of removal, and having 
declared that a judge shall hold his office only during good behavior, 
it becomes the duty of the representatives of the people, as the grand 
inquest of the nation, vested with the general power of impeachment, 
when they know, of their own knowledge or from the information of their 
constituents, that acts of misbehavior have been committed, to present 
the delinquent to this high tribunal, whose powers are competent to 
inquire into the case and apply the remedy; whose authority is 
coextensive with the complaint, commensurate with the object, and 
adequate to the redress of the evil. Shall it be said that it is true 
the Constitution has declared that a judge shall hold his office no 
longer than he behaves himself well, and that though he behaves never 
so ill it has provided no means to turn him out of office if he has the 
hardihood to remain in his seat? If such a doctrine be contended for, 
it is too preposterous to receive the sanction of this court. It would 
render this provision nugatory indeed. It would do more. It would be 
establishing the principle that whether they behave well or ill they 
must continue in office, because there was no mode fixed for removing 
them. This would be the strongest construction that plain language, 
obvious to the common sense of the most unlettered man, ever received 
in a court of justice. The method I have
Sec. 2358
pointed out solves all difficulties at once and releases us from every 
embarrassment on this subject. It makes the Constitution consistent 
with itself and preserves uniformity throughout all the parts.
  The learned counsel were compelled to make a show in maintenance of 
unsound doctrines to give the appearance of support to positions 
equally untenable.
  I flatter myself that every member of this court is by this time 
convinced that if a judge misbehave, he should be deprived of his 
office, because guilty of a breach of the tenure by which it is held; 
that any acts of misbehavior must be judicially inquired into and 
ascertained; that the Constitution, having delegated to the House of 
Representatives exclusively the general power to impeach, acts of 
misbehavior are proper subjects of impeachment, upon conviction of 
which the Senate has the authority to remove an officer, and is bound 
to exercise it. Shall we be told, then, that no matter how gross the 
acts of judicial misbehavior, or how flagrant the misconduct of a 
judge, he can not be removed from office, nay, he can not be impeached, 
unless guilty of treason or bribery or some crime equally great? Sir, 
it is impossible that the intelligent understandings and the mature 
judgments of this court could countenance for a moment such an idea.
  The terms ``during good behavior'' appear to have been considered as 
very vague and indefinite by the learned counsel for the defendant, 
from the manner in which they have argued the case. When, in the 
strong, nervous language of my honorable friend, the conduct of the 
accused has been described in the most appropriate terms in the 
articles of impeachment, they have treated them with levity, as if they 
did not understand their import, because they admitted of no serious 
refutation. The clear explanation of the expression ``during good 
behavior,'' and the lucid exposition of this passage contained in the 
charges themselves, they seem unwilling to comprehend. The commentary 
is as unintelligible as the text. When to such conduct as was never 
before witnessed in a court of justice is applied the epithet of novel, 
we have been told by one counsel that the term is too uncertain to be 
comprehended--no precise idea can be affixed to it, nor is the language 
sufficiently technical to constitute a criminal charge. When behavior 
the most rude and contumelious, disgraceful on any occasion, but truly 
degrading on the bench and unquestionably criminal, because calculated 
to bring the judiciary into the lowest contempt and to excite universal 
indignation against the tribunals of the country, is portrayed in the 
impressive style of truth, the age of captious sophistry or technical 
bigotry is resorted to for proving there is no sense or meaning in the 
charge. Upon what an ocean of uncertainty have we embarked when the 
plainest language is not understood! If sound, solid common sense were 
to be confounded by technical jargon, the tower of Babel would not 
present a greater confusion of tongues. Sir, when the gentlemen can not 
but feel the force of these charges, with what admirable ingenuity do 
they attempt to evade them! Is this tribunal, say they, to erect itself 
into a court of honor, or assume the chair of chivalry, and form a 
scale by which decorum and good manners may be nicely graduated? Is 
every slight deviation from the line of politeness at an assembly or 
drawing-room to be marked with accuracy and chastised with severity? 
The testimony furnishes apt and ready answers to those questions. The 
learned judge is not arraigned because he does not possess the polished 
manners of an accomplished gentleman, but for outraging all the rules 
of decency and decorum by conduct at which the plain sense of every 
honest man would revolt.
  I beg this court seriously to consider whether a judge may not be 
guilty of acts of misbehavior inferior in criminality to treason or 
bribery for which he ought to be impeached, though no indictment would 
lay for the same. When gentlemen talk of an indictment being a 
necessary substratum of an impeachment I should be glad to be informed 
in what court it must be supported. In the courts of the United States 
or in the State courts? If in the State courts, then in which of them? 
Or, provided it can be supported in any of them, will the act warrant 
an impeachment? If an indictment must lay in the courts of the United 
States, in the long catalogue of crimes there are very few which an 
officer might not commit with impunity. He might be guilty of treason 
against an individual State, of murder, arson, forgery, and perjury, in 
various forms, without being amenable to the Federal jurisdiction, and 
unless he could be indicted before them he could not be impeached. Are 
we then to resort to the erring data of the different States? In New 
Hampshire drunkenness may be an indictable offense, but not in another 
State. Shall a United States judge be impeached and removed for getting 
intoxicated in New Hampshire, when he may drink as he pleases in 
another State with impunity? In some States witchcraft is a heinous 
offense, which subjects the unfortunate person to indictment and 
punishment; in several other States it is unknown as a crime. A greater 
variety of cases might be put to expose the fallacy of the principle 
and to prove how improper it would be for this court to be governed
                                                            Sec. 2358
by the practice of the different States. The variation of such a 
compass is too great for it to be relied on. This honorable body must 
have a standard of their own, which will admit of no change or 
deviation. The test by which they will try an impeachment can not be 
that of indictment. Even in England, to whose practice and whose 
precedents such constant recourse has been had, the learned counsel 
have not adduced a single case where a judge of one of their superior 
courts has been indicted for any malconduct in office. Nay, I believe I 
may defy them to show an example of the kind. The best authorities tell 
us they are not subject to indictment, but may be proceeded against by 
impeachment. They have been impeached, convicted, and punished for 
giving opinions which they knew to be contrary to law, and for a 
variety of misdeeds, but never in a solitary instance that I know of 
have they been indicted. I think I can put so many striking cases of 
misconduct in a judge for which it must be admitted that an impeachment 
will lay, though no indictment could be maintained, that the learned 
counsel themselves must be compelled at length to surrender this post 
at discretion, without any term of capitulation. I will not state the 
case of a judge willfully and designedly neglecting to hold a court on 
the day prescribed by law, for I am aware of the answer gentlemen would 
give, that it is an offense against a particular provision. But let use 
suppose Judge Chase, to comply with the forms of the law at the time 
appointed, should appear and open the court, and notwithstanding there 
was pressing business to be done he should proceed knowingly and 
willfully to adjourn it until the next stated period. He would be 
guilty of no violation of any positive law for which he might be 
punished by indictment; but ought he not to be impeached? Suppose he 
proceeded in the dispatch of business, and from prejudice against one 
party or favor to his antagonist he ordered on the trial of a cause, 
though legal grounds are exhibited for postponement. Is this not a 
proper subject of impeachment? And yet there is no express law 
infringed. If when the jury return to the bar to give the verdict, he 
should knowingly receive the verdict of a majority, is there any 
positive provision by which a jury shall be composed of twelve men and 
that their decision shall be unanimous? I believe even the learning of 
that profound lawyer (Mr. Martin), from the reading of laborious years 
and the indefatigable researches of a life devoted to the pursuit of 
his profession, could not show any positive provision in the 
Constitution of the United States or any statute of Congress on the 
subject. So far from it being originally necessary in civil cases that 
a jury should be unanimous, the late Judge Wilson (a great and 
venerable authority), magnum et memorabile nomen, asserts that a 
majority always decided agreeably to the primary principles of that 
valuable institution.
  Again, there is no man so ignorant as to be insensible to manifest 
violations of the sanctuary of a court. It was never intended as a 
stage for the exhibition of pantomimes or plays. Were a judge to 
entertain the suitors with a farce or a comedy, instead of hearing 
their causes, and turn a jester or buffoon on the bench, I presume he 
would subject himself to an impeachment; and yet there is no positive 
law preventing a court from being converted into a theater or of 
preferring the buskin to the sock. If he should exhibit a tragic scene, 
in which an unfortunate fellow-citizen might find himself really no 
actor in the part which he bore, I presume his conduct would claim the 
attention of the House of Representatives, as the grand inquest of the 
nation. It must be unnecessary to multiply examples of misconduct in a 
judge against the known law of his duty, so manifest at first blush 
that the most callous conscience can not be insensible to them, not 
minutely specified and described (for that would be impossible) by 
particular provision in any legislative act, but all embraced and 
comprehended in the solemn oath which he takes to perform his duty 
faithfully and impartially as a judge. As a judge he is bound to 
execute the laws. Every opinion which he gives and every sentence which 
he passes must be in conformity to law and be authorized by it. It 
ought to be the judgment of the law and not his own individual opinion. 
If he willfully make a decree not sanctioned by law, he is guilty of 
misbehavior as a judge, for it is a glaring violation of the 
fundamental principles of his office. I shall have occasion in the 
course of my argument to advert to judicial opinions delivered by the 
accused which there was no legislative act to warrant, no precedent to 
authorize, no principle to sanction, and which the utmost latitude of 
legal discretion would not justify. In such a case, if this court be 
satisfied that he acted innocently wrong, that it was an honest error 
of judgment which led him astray, he will no doubt stand acquitted. But 
if, from a concurrence of circumstances, they are convinced that he 
erred through design, from prejudiced and partial motives, though he 
may not have been corrupted by a bribe, they will consider him as a 
proper subject of their jurisdiction, and a proper object for the 
exercise of their authority.
Sec. 2358
  The doctrines of the learned counsel for the defendant would lead to 
a conclusion which they may not have contemplated, but which the 
country would feel. Time would fail me to enumerate the different 
offenses of various grades which a judge might commit, and for which he 
ought most assuredly to be impeached, though no indictment could be 
maintained in any of the Federal courts. If their positions were 
correct, a judge might violate all the Ten Commandments without 
subjecting himself to impeachment and removal; for I know of no method 
of removal but through the medium of impeachment. There is no law of 
the United States prohibiting drunkenness on the bench, or indeed 
punishing this vice at all, unless we look into the laws of a naval or 
military court-martial, and yet a judge ought certainly to be removed 
from office if guilty of habitual intoxication. The use of profane or 
obscene language by a judge is not expressly proscribed by any act of 
Congress with which I am acquainted, though if it were forbidden in 
general terms gentlemen might say with as much propriety as they have 
done in other cases, in the course of their argument, that every term, 
considered as such, ought to be enumerated, and yet, I believe, should 
a judge, in his place, be guilty of taking the name of his God in vain, 
of cursing and swearing on the bench, or using the obscene language of 
Billingsgate or St. Giles, he ought to be impeached and removed. The 
sancity of a court should he preserved unsullied, and the officer 
displaced who was capable of exhibiting so shocking an example, 
calculated to destroy all respect for, and confidence in, the judicial 
establishment of the country, and to corrupt the morals of the nation. 
But, sir, why need I enlarge on this subject? The counsel for the 
defendant have appeared at one stage of their argument to possess great 
respect and deference for precedent. To consider cases solemnly argued 
or deliberately adjudged as fixing the law so perfectly as to justify a 
court in absolutely preventing any counsel, even though concerned for a 
criminal, and that, too, in a capital case, from questioning principles 
thus established. If precedent will furnish us with a clue to the 
intricate labyrinth in which they have attempted to involve us, we are 
in possession of one equal to that of Ariadne.
  Suffer me again to refer them to the precedent which I cited a few 
days since. I allude to the case of Judge Addison, in Pennsylvania. One 
of the counsel (Mr. Martin), for whose legal erudition I feel the 
greatest respect, has endeavored to impeach the authority of the 
highest tribunal in that State, and has asked if that decision is to be 
a precedent for this court? I was the more surprised at this, because 
his colleague (Mr. Lee) had cited, in the course of his argument, a 
case from Kirby's Connecticut Reports, decided by Chief Justice 
Ellsworth and his associates. I ask, sir, in reply, whether, when a 
case determined in one of the ordinary courts of Connecticut has been 
produced by the opposite counsel as entitled to consideration, the 
decision of the senate of Pennsylvania, the highest court of criminal 
judicature in that Commonwealth, ought not to be respected. Permit me 
to add that, in my humble opinion, there is as much propriety in 
referring to such examples as in recurring to British precedents. I 
have said, and with increasing confidence I repeat it, that this case, 
under the constitution of Pennsylvania, is emphatically stronger than 
the present, under the Constitution of the United States, on the much-
litigated question whether a judge can be impeached for any act for 
which he can not be indicted. In the constitution of Pennsylvania, 
article 5 and section 2, there is a provision not to be found in the 
Constitution of the United States, by which a judge, for any reasonable 
cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, may be 
removed by the governor, on the address of two-thirds of each branch of 
the legislature. This provision would seem to be intended to meet the 
distinction which the learned counsel have labored to establish. In 
this light Judge Addison himself on his trial considered it, and 
pressed the point most forcibly on the senate of Pennsylvania. He had 
the strongest interest in so doing. If this course had been pursued, he 
would have merely lost his office, but upon conviction by impeachment 
he dreaded the disqualification to hold any office which the senate 
might annex to the judgment of removal. But, sir, this is not the only 
reason, cogent as it is, for considering the case of Judge Addison 
particularly applicable to the present. It so happens that we have a 
decision of the supreme court of Pennsylvania on the very objection 
which the gentlemen now take, when the conduct of Judge Addison was 
brought before them previous to his being impeached. If the learned 
counsel will not give full faith and credit to the determination of the 
senate of Pennsylvania, perhaps they will admit the authority of her 
supreme court. I hope this tribunal, at least, will give it equal 
weight with that of the supreme court of Connecticut. A very correct 
account of the case will be found in the statement of the attorney-
general on the trial of Judge Addison, taken in connection with a 
printed report of the case, which was produced by Mr. Dallas on that 
occasion. I will not detain this honorable court with reading all which 
is there recorded on this subject, but will
                                                            Sec. 2358
refer to pages 51, 52, 64, and 69 of Addison's trial, and endeavor to 
present them an accurate view of the case.
  On the ground of an application filed by J. B. C. Lucas, then an 
associate judge of the same court in which Judge Addison presided, 
stating that Judge Addison, on a particular occasion, after having 
delivered a charge to the grand jury himself, had prevented Judge Lucas 
from addressing them, by ordering a constable to be sworn and the jury 
to be taken from the box, the attorney-general moved for leave to file 
an information against Mr. Addison.
  The attorney-general made two points: First, that Judge Lucas had an 
equal right with the presiding judge to deliver a charge to the grand 
jury, on principle and authority. The chief justice, Shippen, 
immediately observed that it was unnecessary to speak to that point or 
to read authorities; speak to the second point--Is this conduct the 
subject of an information?''
  After the argument was closed, the opinion of the court (Judge 
Breckenridge taking no part) was delivered by the chief justice, who 
stated that the proceeding was arbitrary, unbecoming, unhandsome, 
ungentlemanly, unmannerly, and improper, but ``but that it was not 
indictable, nor the subject of an information,'' and that there was 
another remedy, referring no doubt to an impeachment; for the attorney-
general states, in page 52, ``That from what fell from the judges of 
the supreme court, when the case was before them, it might be easily 
inferred that impeachment was the proper mode to correct the evil 
complained of.''
  Thus we have the solemn adjudication of the supreme court that 
conduct in a judge may be impeachable, though no indictment can be 
maintained for it. 'We could not have formed for ourselves a precedent 
more apposite.
  An impeachment was accordingly presented against Judge Addison by the 
constitutional authority to the senate of Pennsylvania. Pardon me for 
trespassing so much on your time as to read distinctly the articles, in 
order to put this court in possession of the whole case:
  ``Article 1. That the said Alexander Addison, being duly appointed 
and commissioned president of the several courts of common pleas, in 
the circuit consisting of the said counties of Westmoreland, Fayette, 
Washington, and Allegheny, within the territory of the said 
Commonwealth, while acting as president of the said court of common 
pleas of the said county of Allegheny, on Saturday, the 28th day of 
March, in the year of our Lord 1801, in open court of common pleas, 
then and there holden, in and for the county last aforesaid, did, after 
John Lucas, otherwise John B. C. Lucas, also duly appointed and 
commissioned one of the judges of the court of common pleas of the 
county last aforesaid, had, in his official character and capacity of 
judge as aforesaid, and as of right he might do, addressed a petit 
jury, then and there duly impaneled, and sworn or affirmed, 
respectively, as jurors, in a cause then pending, then and there, 
openly declare and say to the said jury, `that the address delivered to 
them by the said John Lucas, otherwise John B. C. Lucas, had nothing to 
do with the question before them, and that they ought not to pay any 
attention to it;' thereby degrading or endeavoring to degrade and 
vilify the said John Lucas, otherwise John B. C. Lucas, and his 
character and office as aforesaid, to the obstruction of the free, 
impartial, and due administration of justice, and contrary to the 
public rights and interests of this Commonwealth.
  ``Art. 2. That the said Alexander Addison, being duly appointed and 
commissioned president as aforesaid, did, at a court of quarter 
sessions of the peace and court of common pleas, holden in and for the 
county of Allegheny aforesaid, on Monday, the 22d day of June, in the 
year of our Lord, 1801, under the pretense of discharging and 
performing his official duties as president aforesaid, unjustly, 
illegally, and unconstitutionally claim, usurp, and exercise authority 
not given or delegated to him by the constitution and laws of this 
Commonwealth, inasmuch as he, the said Alexander Addison, president as 
aforesaid, did, under pretense as aforesaid of discharging and 
performing his official duties, then and there, in time of open court, 
unjustly, illegally, and unconstitutionally stop, threaten, and prevent 
the said John Lucas, otherwise John B. C. Lucas, also duly appointed 
and commissioned one of the judges of the said courts, from addressing, 
as of right he might do, a grand jury of the said county of Allegheny, 
then and there assembled and impaneled, and sworn or affirmed, 
respectively, concerning their rights and duties as grand jurymen, 
thereby abusing and attempting to degrade the high offices of president 
and judge as aforesaid, to the denial and prevention of public right, 
and of the due administration of justice, and to the evil example of 
all others in the like case offending.''
  You have now a clear and comprehensive view of the grounds on which 
the impeachment was supported. The first charge accuses Judge Addison 
of speaking, in terms very unjustifiable for a presi-
Sec. 2358
dent of a court, of an address delivered to a petit jury by his 
associate, Judge Lucas. The language which he used, and the manner in 
which it was proved to have been delivered, are equally exceptionable. 
His conduct was rude, ungentlemanly, and utterly inconsistent with that 
decorum and respect which should be inculcated and practiced on the 
bench, to preserve the credit and the character of a court of justice. 
Its object and tendency was to deter Mr. Lucas from exercising his 
judgment and expressing his opinion from the bench, and to reduce him 
to a perfect cipher.
  The other charge was for preventing Judge Lucas from addressing a 
grand jury. This was effected in the same rude and insolent manner, as 
will appear from the testimony of Judge Lucas himself, in pages 33 and 
37 of the printed trial.
  To support the first article, I believe it would not be possible to 
find any positive act or special provision prescribing what particular 
language a president of a court may use, and what he shall not, in 
reference to the opinion which an associate justice may have delivered. 
There is no legal barometer for weighing words, nor any particular law 
embracing all the variety of cases of lighter and darker shades which 
may occur. The learned counsel who supported the prosecution did not 
cite a single precedent, even, of the kind. There may have been a law 
to be found in the breast of every man of common sense and common 
manners, with which Judge Addison was not unacquainted, and upon which 
the Senate considered themselves perfectly justified in convicting him. 
This was the general, but clear and comprehensive law which marked his 
rights and duties as a judge--the law of his office, prescribed by his 
oath.
  The second article, for preventing an associate judge from delivering 
a charge to the grand jury after they had received one from the 
president of the court, could not have been maintained on the ground of 
any express statute or legal usage. It is the first time I ever heard 
of such a case. The uniform practice in the courts to which I have been 
accustomed is for the chief justice or president to deliver the charge. 
This was more especially the case in the court in which Judge Addison 
presided, for it appears they had adopted a positive rule on the 
subject. The practice of a court of justice is generally considered as 
the law of that court. But the senate, believing on principle (and 
believing correctly) that the power of all the judges of the court was 
equal, pronounced a sentence of condemnation.
  With these plausible circumstances to countenance him, Judge Addison, 
a gentleman of considerable celebrity both in the legal and political 
world, and of unquestionable talents, conducted his own defense. His 
principal reliance was on the very objection which the learned counsel 
for the present defendant now make. He contended that he had committed 
no act for which he was liable to indictment, and that he was, 
therefore, not subject to impeachment. In the position that his conduct 
was not indictable, he was supported by the opinion of the supreme 
court, who had, nevertheless, considered it a fit subject for 
impeachment. His argument was able and ingenious; but, sir, his 
objection was anticipated or answered in such a masterly manner, by a 
chain of reasoning so irresistible, that it produced complete 
conviction on the minds of the senate of Pennsylvania. This honorable 
court know the result. He has been not only removed, but disqualified 
to hold the office of judge in any court of law in that State. We have, 
then, the deliberate opinion of the senate of Pennsylvania, upon solemn 
argument, confirming the decision made by her supreme court. If these 
cases do not furnish us with lessons of instruction, I know not where 
such lessons are to be read.
   I will remark, sir, further, in relation to this case, that had it 
not been for the extreme anxiety of Judge Addison to propagate his 
political dogmas from the bench, he would never have been reduced to 
this serious dilemma. Like the defendant, he converted the sacred 
edifice of justice into a theater for the dissemination of doctrines to 
which I hope I shall never subscribe. If I have a desire relative to 
the administration of justice, paramount to all others, it is that 
party and party spirit should banished from every court. My sincere and 
fervent prayer is that the laws, like the providence of God, may shed 
their protecting influence equally over all, without respect to persons 
or opinions.
  I have been requested by the attorney-general of Maryland to state 
another and a recent case which has happened in Pennsylvania. For his 
satisfaction I will briefly inform this honorable court of all that 
took place on that occasion, in the least degree applicable to the 
present trial. Three of the judges of their supreme court were accused 
of fining and imprisoning, without the intervention of a jury, a 
fellow-citizen, for publishing a paper which they considered as a 
contempt of court. The judges were defended by two most able and 
eloquent counsel, who contended that the constitution, the laws, and 
the practice of Pennsylvania, by adopting the common law doctrines on 
the subject, justified the proceeding; and that if there was no law to 
justify it, their conduct flowed from an honest error in judgment, for 
which they were not liable to impeachment. But, sir, they did not 
attempt to maintain the
                                                            Sec. 2358
position contended for on this occasion, that to support an impeachment 
the conduct of a judge must be such as to subject him to an indictment. 
Nor could they, with any consistency, have supported such a doctrine, 
for their clients had before in the case of Mr. Addison decided that 
his conduct was not a proper subject of impeachment though it might be 
of indictment.
  This precedent, then, fortifies the former decisions on this point, 
and adds another authority to those which previously existed, and to 
which I have adverted.
  The judges were acquitted, I acknowledge, and were I to hazard an 
opinion, I would say because some of the members of the senate of 
Pennsylvania thought their conduct proceeded from an honest error of 
judgment. If this court shall be of the same opinion with respect to 
the conduct of Judge Chase, I trust they will follow the precedent and 
acquit him, and I shall cheerfully acquiesce in the decision.
  I fear I shall fatigue this honorable court by noticing the various 
cases on this subject, but I can not omit pressing on their attention a 
decision of the most authoritative and binding nature, because it is 
one of their own. The case to which I allude and its attending 
circumstances must be fresh in the recollection of every Member of the 
Senate. The district judge of New Hampshire was impeached for habitual 
drunkenness on the bench, and for using profane and indecent language. 
It was not in evidence to the court that drunkenness or profane and 
indecent language were indictable by any law of that State. There is no 
law of the United States, unless we recur to the naval or military 
code, punishing these vices as offenses. Of course, sir, it was not 
pretended by the managers on that occasion, of whom I had the honor to 
be one, that any indictment could be maintained against Judge Pickering 
in any civil court of the United States, or of the individual State of 
which he was a citizen. I appeal to your recollection, sir, for the 
accuracy of this statement; and, let me ask, what was the result? A 
constitutional majority of the senate pronounced a verdict of guilty 
and passed a judgment of removal.
  One of the counsel (Mr. Harper), of whose argument I may be permitted 
to observe, without disparagement to the talents and learning of his 
colleagues, that it contained an able and masterly defense of the 
conduct of the accused, sunk beneath the weight of this stubborn and 
conclusive precedent. It was a stumbling block which he could not 
remove out of his way, and he seemed compelled, reluctantly, to yield 
the principle to the decisive authority and pointed application of the 
case.
  We have, then, the whole weight of American authority in our scale, 
whilst the learned counsel have not been able to adduce a single 
precedent, foreign or domestic, against us. When I speak of precedents, 
I do not allude to the obscure dicta which may be found by turning over 
the dark lantern of tradition in remote ages of antiquity, or to the 
interpolations which may be scattered through the marginal references 
to the abridgments, by unknown editors; but to some authoritative case 
which has occurred since the regular date of parliamentary 
impeachments. The fines which Edward I imposed on some of his judges, 
in what manner is not certainly known, to replenish, as many have 
supposed, an exhausted treasury, are familiar to every student. But 
from the period of impeachment to the present time, I believe no 
instance of an indictment can be shown against a judge of the Common 
Pleas, Exchequer, or King's Bench in England, nor against a Lord Keeper 
or Lord Chancellor, who hold their offices to this day, let it be 
remembered, during pleasure. The civil business of the Court of 
Chancery is more important than that of all the other courts, and the 
decisions of that tribunal have been as impartial I believe as any, 
notwithstanding the high sounding doctrines of judicial independence. 
There have been many impeachments, the judges have sometimes been 
complained of by information in the execrable Star Chamber, but there 
have been no indictments at law. The Star Chamber has been long since 
abolished, and the sole method of proceeding against judges of the 
superior court now is by impeachment. The best writers agree, ``that 
judges of record are freed from all presentations whatever, except in 
Parliament, where they maybe punished for anything done by them in such 
courts as judges.'' Numerous authorities might be cited on this 
subject, but I shall content myself with barely referring to them.--1 
Hawk., 192, chap. 73, sec. 6; 1 Salk., 396; Woodeson, 596; Jacob's Law 
Dictionary, title Judges, 12 Co., 25, 26.
  Were I to rest the point here, I confidently believe we should be 
perfectly safe; but I will proceed further, agreeably to my engagement 
in the commencement of my argument, and demonstrate that, according to 
their own principles and authorities, Judge Chase has been guilty of 
crimes and misdemeanors, in the strictest technical sense of the terms, 
for which he ought to be punished in an exemplary manner.
  In contesting the principles that no act is impeachable unless it 
also be indictable, I have not contended for the position attributed to 
me by the learned attorney-general of Maryland, that a judge may
Sec. 2358
be impeached for conduct which is not criminal. On the contrary, we 
rely on supporting this as a criminal proceeding, and the gentlemen are 
entitled to every advantage which they can reap from this declaration.
  I have had occasion to state that I considered every act of 
misbehavior in a judge as a misdemeanor, and the attorney-general of 
Maryland has expressed in strong terms his perfect agreement in the 
opinion that misbehavior is synonymous with misdemeanor. He appeared to 
imagine that he gained a great advantage by making this concession, and 
I am content to give him the fall benefit to be derived from it. I 
shall not shrink from the position, but meet the gentleman with 
pleasure and confidence on this ground. I love to break, a lance in the 
open field of discussion, and disdain every kind of ambush in argument.
  As we agree in one point, that misbehavior and misdemeanor are 
convertible terms, Jacob's Law Dictionary, which quotes the language of 
Judge Blackstone in his Commentaries, has been recurred to for a 
definition of a misdemeanor. Let us try the conduct Judge Chase by his 
text. ``A crime or misdemeanor (says Judge Blackstone) is an act 
committed or omitted, in violation of a public law either forbidding or 
commanding it.'' ``This general definition comprehends both crimes and 
misdemeanors, which properly speaking are mere synonymous terms.''
  There is a public law that prescribes the following oath which Judge 
Chase took on his entrance into office (1 vol., p. 53): ``I do solemnly 
swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do 
equal right to the poor and the rich, and that I will faithfully and 
impartially perform all the duties incumbent on me as a judge of the 
Supreme Court according to the best of my abilities and understanding, 
agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States.''
  Who that reads this solemn and impressive provision, and looks at the 
plenary evidence we have before us, can hesitate to pronounce the 
respondent guilty of violating a public law, which he was bound by the 
most sacred of all human obligation to execute with fidelity? His oath 
informed him that the law, like the gospel, was no respecter of 
persons, and yet what have we beheld in his conduct, when a poor 
unfortunate Fries or a wretched Callender was before him, upon a 
criminal charge? I appeal to the testimony which I shall by and by 
comment upon, whether his acts do not prove that he marked them out as 
victims to be sacrificed on the altar of party? Sir, I can not believe 
that gentlemen will seriously contend that the expressions ``faithfully 
and impartially to perform his duties,'' have no definite meaning; that 
conduct grossly prejudiced, and the most shameless partiality shall be 
considered as no violations of his solemn oath. If they did, I have too 
exalted an opinion of the good sense and discernment of the court to 
believe they would countenance such an idea. Their import is certainly 
plain and obvious without recurring to the black-lettered lore for 
explanation. What then was the conduct of the respondent to Fries, if 
testimony not only unimpeached but unimpeachable is to be believed? Was 
he not prejudiced both against the unhappy prisoner and his case, which 
he had from a superabundance of zeal completely prejudged? Or, sir, 
when he declared Callender ought to be hung and set off with his 
miserable pamphlet in his pocket, ready scored for his purpose, and 
proceeded in the most arbitrary manner with his trial, was he 
impartial, or was he not guilty of the most manifest and daring 
partiality? Shall he be guilty of all these outrages against the plain 
language of a public statute, which combines the obligation of an oath 
with the sanction of a law, and yet be innocent of any crime or 
misdemeanor? If gentlemen will hold up the acts of Congress in one 
hand, and the acts of Judge Chase, proved by the testimony, in the 
other, they will see and be satisfied, that within the strictest legal 
definition he has been guilty of repeated and aggravated violations of 
public law, and therefore unquestionably of crimes and misdemeanors.
  The Constitution, however, is declared to be emphatically the supreme 
law of the land. This sacred instrument he was bound by a twofold oath 
to preserve inviolate. All executive and judicial officers of the 
United States, independent of their oaths of office, are bound by oath 
to support the Constitution. (Art. 6, see. 3.)
  By the seventh article of the amendments of the Constitution, which 
have been duly ratified and therefore now form part of that instrument, 
it is declared, that ``In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense.''
                                                            Sec. 2359
  This article secures to every accused individual the right of a trial 
by an impartial jury. Without their unanimous consent, no matter how 
eager the Government are for conviction, no person can be punished. 
Where any man is charged in due form with the commission of a crime, 
and pleads he is not guilty, the jury are to decide on the whole case 
whether he be innocent or not. Their verdict must be commensurate with 
the issue joined, which involves both fact and law, which they have 
indubitably the right to decide, agreeably to the express and positive 
provision of the Constitution. This right, therefore, is an original 
right, flowing from the highest authority. It is beyond doubt a 
principle and not an incidental right. It is not a right incidental to 
the trial, but it constitutes the trial itself; for there can be no 
other trial in the case but by jury.
  This same amendment guarantees to the accused the assistance of 
counsel. How important is this privilege, when it is recollected that 
veterans of the bar are generally selected to prosecute. The situation, 
too, of an innocent man, charged with the commission of a crime, is 
delicate and embarrassing. It excites frequently apprehensions which 
unfit him for making a defense. I feel myself compelled to declare, 
upon the authority of the testimony in this case, that the respondent 
has been proved guilty of violating the supreme law of the land in 
those great essential provisions. He has deprived accused individuals 
of a trial by jury, for he wound not suffer the jury to decide, or even 
to hear argument on the subject of the law, and he has deprived them of 
the benefit of counsel by conduct which drove counsel from the bar. 
This has happened in more than one instance, and above all, an injured 
fellow-citizen has been stripped of his invaluable privileges in a 
capital case. Is this imagination or is it reality? Let the recorded 
testimony determine. If, however, I am correct, must I not have 
satisfied this honorable court, agreeably to my promise that taking the 
learned counsel's own definition, and relying upon his authorities, I 
have demonstrated that the accused has been guilty of crimes and 
misdemeanors? But have I not gone further, and shown that he has been 
guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, and such as disqualify him for 
a seat on the bench, so as to come fully within the rule which he has 
laid down?
  God forbid that it should be said, when a judge is guilty of grossly 
violating not merely a public law, but the supreme law of the land, 
nay, a law which he was bound by two solemn oaths to support, he is not 
guilty of any crime or misdemeanor; or that when he violated this 
supreme law which he is thus obligated to respect, for the purpose of 
depriving a fellow-citizen, accused of a capital crime, of the benefit 
of counsel, and the inestimable right of trial by jury, he shall not be 
declared guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, which evince a want of 
integrity, and mark a depravity of heart that completely disqualify him 
for a judicial office.
  I have now finished my observations in reply to the preliminary 
objections which have been made to this mode of proceeding, and have 
been reluctantly compelled to discuss them at much greater length than 
I at first contemplated, from the zeal and pertinacity with which they 
have been urged and insisted on by the learned counsel opposed to us. 
Under the impression that I have been successful in this undertaking, I 
shall hasten to the investigation of the articles themselves.

  2359. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The argument of Mr. Manager Randolph on the nature of the power of 
impeachment.
  And Mr. Manager Randolph said:

   It has been contended that an offense, to be impeachable must be 
indictable. For what then, I pray you, was it that this provision of 
impeachment found its way into the Constitution? Could it not have 
said, at once, that any civil officer of the United States, convicted 
on an indictment, should (ipso facto) be removed from office? This 
would be coming at the thing by a short and obvious way. If the 
Constitution did not contemplate a distinction between an impeachable 
and an indictable offense, whence this cumbrous and expensive process, 
which has cost us so much labor, and so much anxiety to the nation? 
Whence this idle parade, this wanton waste of time and treasure, when 
the ready intervention of a court and jury alone was wanting to rectify 
the evil? In addition to the instances adduced by my right worthy 
friend (Mr. Nicholson) who first addressed the court yesterday, permit 
me to cite a few others by way of illustration. The President of the 
United States has a qualified negative on all bills passed by the two 
Houses of Congress, that he may arrest the passage of a law framed in a 
moment of legistive delirium. Let us suppose it exercised, 
indiscriminately, on every act presented for his acceptance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 642, 643.
Sec. 2360
This surely would be an abuse of his constitutional power, richly 
deserving impeachment; and yet no man will pretend to say it is an 
indictable offense. The President is authorized by the Constitution to 
retain any bill presented for his approbation, not exceeding ten days, 
Sundays excepted, within which period he may return it to the House 
wherein it originated, stating his reasons for disapproving it. Now let 
us suppose that, at a session like the present, which must necessarily 
terminate on the third of March (and that day falls this year on a 
Sunday) the President should keep back until the last hour of an 
expiring Congress every bill offered to him for signature during the 
ten preceding days (and these are always the greater part of the laws 
passed at any session of the Legislature), and should then return them, 
stating his objections, whether good or bad is altogether immaterial. 
It is true that a vote of two-thirds of each branch may enact a law in 
despite of Executive opposition; but, in the case I have stated, it 
would be physically impossible for Congress to exercise its 
constitutional power. Indeed, over the bills presented to the President 
within nine days preceding its dissolution, the Legislature might be 
deprived of even the shadow of control, since the Executive is not 
bound to make any return of them whatever. Now, I ask whether such 
misconduct in the President be an indictable offense? And yet is there 
a man who hears me who will deny that it would be a flagrant abuse, 
under pretense of exercise of his constitutional authority, for which 
he ought to be impeached, removed, and disqualified? Sir, this 
doctrine, that impeachable and indictable are convertible terms, is 
almost too absurd for argument. Nothing but the high authority by which 
it is urged, and the dignified theater where it is advanced, could 
induce me to treat it seriously. Strip it of technical jargon, and what 
is it but a monstrous pretension that the officers of Government, so 
long as they steer clear of your penal statutes--so long as they keep 
without the letter of the law--may, to the whole length of the tether 
of the Constitution, abuse that power, which they are bound to exercise 
with a sound discretion and under a high responsibility for the general 
good? The counsel who closed the defense (Mr. Harper) felt that this 
ground trembled beneath his feet; and, fearing to be swallowed up in 
the yawning ruin, he precipitately abandoned it. He shifts from the 
position taken by his associates, and lays down this principle ``that 
an offense, to be impeachable, need not be indictable, yet it must have 
been committed against some known law.'' Well, take the question in 
this point of view, and there is no longer matter of dispute between 
us; it is reduced to a miserable quibble. For what do we contend?--that 
the respondent has contravened the known law of the land and of his 
duty, which required him ``to dispense justice faithfully and 
impartially, and without respect to persons.'' He stands charged with 
having sinned against this law and against his sacred oath, by acting 
in his judicial capacity unfaithfully, partially, and with respect to 
persons. These are our points. We do charge him with misdemeanor in 
office. Weaver that he hath demeaned himself amiss--partially, 
unfaithfully, unjustly, corruptly. This is the sum and substance of our 
accusation, and this we have established by undeniable proof. I will 
waste no more time in attempting to dislodge our opponents from a 
position which they have abandoned in the face of day.

  2360. Chase's impeachment continued.
  The counsel for Mr. Justice Chase argued elaborately that the power 
of impeachment applied only to indictable offenses.
  Argument of Mr. Joseph Hopkinson, counsel for Mr. Justice Chase, on 
the nature of the power of impeachment.
  On the other hand the counsel for the respondent argued at length 
that the power should be considered narrower.
  Mr. Hopkinson said: \1\

  In England the impeachment of a judge is a rare occurrence. I 
recollect but two in half a century. But, in our country, boasting of 
its superior purity and virtue, and declaiming ever against the vice, 
venality, and corruption of the Old World, seven judges have been 
prosecuted criminally in about two years. A melancholy proof either of 
extreme and unequaled corruption in our judiciary, or of strange and 
persecuting times among us.
  The first proper object of our inquiries in this case is, to 
ascertain with proper precision what acts or offenses of a public 
officer are the objects of impeachment? This question meets us at the 
very threshold of the case. If it shall appear that the charges 
exhibited in these articles of impeachment are not, even if
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 356-364.
                                                            Sec. 2360
true, the constitutional subjects of impeachment; if it shall turn out 
on the investigation that the judge has really fallen into error, 
mistake, or indiscretion, yet if he stands acquitted in proof of any 
such acts as by the law of the land are impeachable offenses, he stands 
entitled to discharge on his trial. This proceeding by impeachment is a 
mode of trial created and defined by the Constitution of our country; 
and by this the court is exclusively bound. To the Constitution, then, 
we must exclusively look to discover what is or is not impeachable. We 
shall there find the whole proceeding distinctly marked out; and 
everything designated and properly distributed necessary in the 
construction of a court of criminal jurisdiction. We shall find (1) who 
shall originate or present an impeachment; (2) who shall try it; (3) 
for what offenses it may be used; (4) what is the punishment on 
conviction. The first of these points is provided for in the second 
section of the first article of the Constitution, where it is declared 
that ``the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of 
impeachment.'' This power corresponds with that of a grand jury to find 
a presentment or indictment. In the third section of the same article 
the court is provided before whom the impeachment thus originated shall 
be tried: ``The Senate shall have the sole power to try all 
impeachments.'' And the fourth section of the second article points out 
and describes the offenses intended to be impeachable, and the 
punishment which is to follow conviction, subject to a limitation in 
the third section of the first article.
  Have any facts, then, been given in evidence against the respondent 
which makes him liable to be proceeded against by this high process of 
impeachment? What are the offenses? What is the constitutional 
description of those official acts for which a public officer may be 
arraigned before this high court? In the fourth section of the second 
article of the Constitution it is declared that ``the President, Vice-
President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be 
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Treason or bribery is 
not alleged against us on this occasion. Our offenses, then, must come 
under the general description of ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' or 
we are not impeachable by the Constitution of the United States. I 
offer it as a position I shall rely upon in my argument, that no judge 
can be impeached and removed from office for any act or offense for 
which he could not be indicted. It must be by law in indictable 
offense. One of the gentlemen, indeed, who conduct this prosecution 
(Mr. Campbell), contends for the reverse of this proposition, and holds 
that for such official acts as are the subject of impeachment no 
indictment will lie or can be maintained. For, says he, it would 
involve us in this monstrous oppression and absurdity, that a man might 
be twice punished for the same offense, once by impeachment and then by 
indictment. And so most surely he may; and the limitation of the 
punishment on impeachment takes away the injustice and oppression the 
gentleman dreads. A slight attention to the subject will show the 
fallacy of this gentleman's doctrine. If the absurdity and oppression 
he fears will really ensue on indicting a man for the same offense for 
which he has already been impeached, they must be charged to the 
Constitution itself, which, in the third section of the first article, 
after limiting the extent of the judgment in cases of impeachment, goes 
on to declare that ``the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable 
and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to 
law.'' The idea of the honorable manager is that for acts done in the 
course of official duty a judge must be proceeded against exclusively 
by impeachment; and that no indictment will lie in such case. The 
incorrectness of this notion appears not only from a reference to the 
Constitution, but to the known law of England also. I will remind you 
of a case, stated, I believe, in the elementary books of the law, in 
which it is said that if a judge undertakes, of his own authority, to 
change the mode of punishment prescribed by law for any crime, he is 
indictable; for instance, should he sentence a man to be beheaded when 
the law directed him to be hanged, the judge is guilty of murder, and 
may be accordingly indicted. When, sir, I contend, that, in order to 
sustain an impeachment, an offense must be proved upon the respondent 
which would support an indictment, I do not mean to be understood as 
admitting that the converse of the proposition is true--that is, that 
every act or offense which is impeachable is indictable. Far from it. A 
man may be indictable for many violations of positive law which evince 
no mala mens, no corrupt heart or intention, but which would not be the 
ground of an impeachment. I will instance the case of an assault, which 
is an indictable offense, but will not surely be pretended to be an 
impeachable offense, for which a judge may be removed from office. It 
is true that the second section of the first article, which gives the 
House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment, does not in 
terms limit the exercise of that power. But its obvious meaning is not, 
in that place, to describe the kind of acts which are to be subjects of 
impeachment, but merely to declare in what branch of the Government it 
shall commence. The House of Representatives has the power of 
impeachment; but for what they
Sec. 2360
are to impeach, in what cases they may exercise this delegated power, 
depends, on other parts of the Constitution, and not on their opinion, 
whim, or caprice. The whole system of impeachment must be taken 
together, and not in detached parts; and if we find one part of the 
Constitution declaring who shall commence an impeachment, we find other 
parts declaring who shall try it, and what acts and what persons are 
Constitutional subjects of this mode of trial. The power of impeachment 
is with the House of Representatives--but only for impeachable 
offenses. They are to proceed against the offense in this way when it 
is committed, but not to create the offense, and make any act criminal 
and impeachable at their will and pleasure. What is an offense, is a 
question to be decided by the Constitution and the law, not by the 
opinion of a single branch of the legislature; and when the offense 
thus described by the Constitution or the law has been committed, then, 
and not until then, has the House of Representatives power to impeach 
the offender. So a grand jury possesses the sole power to indict; but 
in the exercise of this power they are bound by positive law, and do 
not assume under this general power to make anything indictable which 
they might disapprove. If it were so, we should indeed have a strange, 
unsettled, and dangerous penal code. No Man could walk in safety, but 
would beat the mercy of the caprice of every grand jury that might be 
summoned, and that would be crime to-morrow which is innocent to-day.
  What part of the Constitution then declares any of the acts charged 
and proved upon Judge Chase, even in the worst aspect, to be 
impeachable? He has not been guilty of bribery or corruption; he is not 
charged with them. Has he then been guilty of ``other high crimes and 
misdemeanors?'' In an instrument so sacred as the Constitution, I 
presume every word must have its full and fair meaning. It is not then 
only for crimes and misdemeanors that a judge is impeachable, but it 
must be for high crimes and misdemeanors. Although this qualifying 
adjective ``high'' immediately precedes and is directly attached to the 
word ``crimes,'' yet, from the evident intention of the Constitution 
and upon a just grammatical construction, it must be also applied to 
``misdemeanors.'' The repetition of this adjective would have injured 
the harmony of the sentence without adding anything to its perspicuity. 
How would this be in common parlance? Suppose it should be said that at 
this trial there are attending many ladies and gentlemen. Would it be 
doubted that the adjective many applies to gentlemen as well as ladies, 
although not repeated? Or, if there is anything peculiar in this 
respect in this word ``high,'' I will suppose it were said that among 
the auditors there are men of high rank and station. Would it not be as 
well understood as if it were said that men of high rank and station 
are here? There is surely no difference. So in the Constitution, it is 
said, that ``a regular statement of the receipts and expenditures of 
all public money shall be published from time to time.'' Is not the 
account to be regular as well as the statement? I should have deemed it 
unnecessary to have spent a word on so plain a point, had I not 
understood that a difficulty would probably be made upon it. If my 
construction of this part of the Constitution be not admitted, and the 
adjective ``high'' be given exclusively to ``crimes'' and denied to 
``misdemeanors,'' this strange absurdity must ensue--that when an 
officer of the Government is impeached for a crime, he can not be 
convicted unless it proves to be a high crime; but he may nevertheless 
be convicted of a misdemeanor of the most petty grade. Observe, sir, 
the crimes with which these ``other high crimes'' are classed in the 
Constitution, and we may learn something of their character. They stand 
in connection with ``bribery and corruption;'' tried in the same manner 
and subject to the same penalties. But if we are to lose the force and 
meaning of the word ``high'' in relation to misdemeanors, and this 
description of offenses must be governed by the mere meaning of the 
term ``misdemeanors,'' without deriving any grade from the adjective, 
still my position remains unimpaired, that the offense, whatever it is, 
which is the ground of impeachment, must be such a one as would support 
an indictment. ``Misdemeanor'' is a legal and technical term, well 
understood and defined in law; and in the construction of a legal 
instrument we must give to words their legal signification. A 
misdemeanor or a crime--for in their just and proper acceptation they 
are synonymous terms--is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a 
public law either forbidding or commanding it. By this test, let the 
conduct of the respondent be tried, and, by it, let him stand justified 
or condemned.
  Does not, sir, the court, provided by the Constitution for the trial 
of an impeachment give us some idea of the grade of offenses intended 
for its jurisdiction? Look around you, sir, upon this awful tribunal of 
justice--is it not high and dignified, collecting within itself the 
justice and majesty of the American people? Was such a court created--
does such a court sit--to scan and punish paltry errors and 
indiscretions, too insignificant to have a name in the penal code, too 
paltry for the notice of a court
                                                            Sec. 2360
of quarter sessions? This is indeed employing an elephant to remove an 
atom too minute for the grasp of an insect. Is the Senate of the United 
States solemnly convened and held together in the presence of the 
nation to fix a standard of politeness in a judge and mark the 
precincts of judicial decorum? The honorable gentleman who opened the 
prosecution (Mr. Randolph) has contended for a contrary doctrine, and 
held that many things are impeachable that are not indictable. To 
illustrate his position, he stated the cases of habitual drunkenness 
and profane swearing on the bench, which he held to be objects of 
impeachment and not of indictment. I do not desire to impose my 
opinions on this court as of any value. But surely I could not hesitate 
to say that both of the cases put by the gentleman would be indictable. 
Is there not known to us a class of offenses, not provided for indeed 
by the letter of any statute, but which come under the general 
protection which the law gives to virtue, decency, and morals in 
society? Any act which is contra bonos mores is indictable as such. And 
it is so, not by act of Congress, but by the pure and wholesome 
mandates of that common law which some men would madly drive from our 
jurisprudence, but which I most sincerely pray may live forever.
  If I am correct in my position that nothing is impeachable that is 
not also indictable, for what acts then may a man be indicted? May it 
be on the mere caprice or opinion of any ten, twenty, or one hundred 
men in the community; or must it not be on some known law of the 
society in which he resides? It must unquestionably be for some 
offense, either of omission or commission, against some statute of the 
United States--or some statute of a particular State, or against the 
provision of the common law. Against which of these has the respondent 
offended? What law of any of the descriptions I have mentioned has he 
violated? By what is be to be judged, by what is he to be justified or 
condemned, if not by some known law of the country; and if no such law 
is brought upon his case--if no such violation rises on this day of 
trial in judgment against him--why stands he here at this bar as a 
criminal? Whom has he offended? The House of Representatives--and is he 
impeached for this?
  I maintain as a most important and indispensable principle, that no 
man should be criminally accused, no man can be criminally condemned, 
but for the violation of some known law by which he was bound to govern 
himself. Nothing is so necessary to justice and to safety as that the 
criminal code should be certain and known. Let the judge, as well as 
the citizen, precisely know the path he is to walk in, and what he may 
or may not do. Let not the sword tremble over his unconscious head, or 
the ground be spread with quicksands and destruction which appear fair 
and harmless to the eye of the traveler. Can it be pretended there is 
one rule of justice for a judge and another for a private citizen; and 
that while the latter is protected from surprise, from the malice or 
caprice of any man or body of men, and can be brought into legal 
jeopardy only by the violation of laws before made known to him, the 
latter is to be exposed to punishment without knowing his offense, and 
the criminality or innocence of his conduct is to depend not upon the 
laws existing at the time, but upon the opinions of a body of men to be 
collected four or five years after the transaction? A judge may thus be 
impeached and removed from office for an act strictly legal, when done, 
if any House of Representatives for any indefinite time after, shall 
for any reason they may act upon, choose to consider such act improper 
and impeachable. The Constitution, sir, never intended to lay the 
Judiciary thus prostrate at the feet of the House of Representatives, 
the slaves of their will, the victims of their caprice. The Judiciary 
must be protected from prejudice and varying opinion, or it is not 
worth a farthing. Suppose a grand jury should make a presentment 
against a man, stating that most truly he had violated no law or 
committed any known offense; but he had violated their notions of 
common sense--for this was the standard of impeachment the gentleman 
who opened gave us--he had shocked their nerves or wounded their 
sensibility. Would such a presentment be received or listened to for a 
moment? No, sir; and on the same principle, no judge should be put in 
jeopardy because the common sense of one hundred and fifty men might 
approve what is thus condemned, and the rule of right, the objects of 
punishment or praise, would thus shift about from day to day. Are we to 
depend upon the House of Representatives for the innocence or 
criminality of our conduct? Can they create offenses at their will and 
pleasure, and declare that to be a crime in 1804 which was an 
indiscretion or pardonable error, or perhaps an approved proceeding, in 
1800? If this gigantic House of Representatives, by the usual vote and 
the usual forms of legislation, were to direct that any act heretofore 
not forbidden by law should hereafter become penal, this declaration of 
their will would be a mere nullity; would have no force and effect, 
unless duly sanctioned by the Senate and the approbation of the 
President. Will they then be allowed, in the exercise of their power of 
impeachment, to create crimes and inflict the most serious penalties on 
actions never before suspected to be criminal when they could not have 
swelled the same act into an offense in the
Sec. 2360
form of a law? If this be truly the case, if this power of impeachment 
may be thus extended without limit or control, then indeed is every 
valuable liberty prostrated at the foot of this omnipotent House of 
Representatives; and may God preserve us! The President may approve and 
sign a law, or may make an appointment which to him may seem prudent 
and beneficial, and it may be the general, nay the universal, sentiment 
that it is so; and it is undeniable that no law is violated by the act. 
But some four or five years hence there comes a House of 
Representatives whose common sense is constructed on a new model, and 
who either are or affect to be greatly shocked at the atrocity of this 
act. The President is impeached. In vain he pleads the purity of his 
intention, the legality of his conduct, in vain he avers that he has 
violated no law and been guilty of no crime. He will be told, as Judge 
Chase now is, that the common sense of the House is the standard of 
guilt, and their opinion of the error of the act conclusive evidence of 
corruption. We have read, sir, in our younger days, and read with 
horror, of the Roman Emperor who placed his edicts so high in the air 
that the keenest eye could not decipher them, and yet severely punished 
any breach of them. But the power claimed by the House of 
Representatives to make anything criminal at their pleasure, at any 
period after its occurrence, is ten thousand times more dangerous, more 
tyrannical, more subversive of all liberty and safety. Shall I be 
called to heavy judgment now for an act which, when done, was forbidden 
by no law, and received no reproach, because in a course of years there 
is found a set of men whose common sense condemns the deed? The 
gentlemen have referred us to this standard, and, being under the 
necessity to acknowledge that the respondent has violated no law of the 
community, they would on this vague and dangerous ground accuse, try, 
and condemn him. The code of the Roman tyrant was fixed on the height 
of a column, where it might be understood with some extraordinary 
pains; but here, to be safe, we must be able to look into years to 
come, and to foresee what will be the changing opinions of men or 
points of decorum for years to come. The rule of our conduct, by which 
we are to be judged and condemned, lies buried in the bosom of 
futurity, and in the minds and opinions of men unknown, perhaps unborn.
  The pure and upright administration of justice, sir, is of the utmost 
importance to any people; the other movements of Government are not of 
such universal concern. Who shall be President, or what treaties or 
general statutes shall be made, occupies the attention of a few busy 
politicians; but these things touch not, or but seldom, the private 
interests and happiness of the great mass of the community. But the 
settlement of private controversies, the administration of law between 
man and man, the distribution of justice and right to the citizen in 
his private business and concern, comes to every man's door, and is 
essential to every man's prosperity and happiness. Hence I consider the 
judiciary of our country most important among the branches of 
Government, and its purity and independence of the most interesting 
consequence to every man. Whilst it is honorably and fully protected 
from the influence of favor or fear, from any quarter, the situation of 
a people can never be very uncomfortable or unsafe. But if a judge is 
forever to be exposed to prosecutions and impeachments for his official 
conduct, on the mere suggestions of caprice, and to be condemned by the 
mere voice of prejudice, under the specious name of common sense, can 
he hold that firm and steady hand his high functions required? No! if 
his nerves are of iron they must tremble in so perilous a situation.
  In England the complete independence of the judiciary has been 
considered, and has been found the best and surest safeguard of true 
liberty, securing a government of known and uniform laws, acting alike 
upon every man. It has, however, been suggested by some of our 
newspaper politicians, perhaps from a higher source, that although this 
independent judiciary is very necessary in a monarchy to protect the 
people from the oppression of a court, yet that, in our republican 
institution, the same reasons for it do not exist; that it is indeed 
inconsistent with the nature of our Government that any part or branch 
of it should be independent of the people from whom the power is 
derived. And as the House of Representatives come most frequently from 
this great source of power, they claim the best right of knowing and 
expressing its will; and of course the right of a controlling influence 
over the other branches. My doctrine is precisely the reverse of this. 
If I were called upon to declare whether the independence of judges 
were more essentially important in a monarchy or a republic, I should 
certainly say, in the latter. All governments require, in order to give 
them firmness, stability, and character, some permanent principle, some 
settled establishment. The want of this is the great deficiency in 
republican institutions. Nothing can be relied upon; no faith can be 
given either at home or abroad to a people whose systems and operations 
and policy are constantly changing with popular opinion. If, however, 
the judiciary is stable and independent; if the rule of justice between 
men rests upon known and permanent principles, it gives
                                                            Sec. 2361
a security and character to a country which is absolutely necessary in 
its intercourse with the world and in its own internal concerns. This 
independence is further requisite as a security from oppression. All 
history demonstrates, from page to page, that tyranny and oppression 
have not been confined to despotisms, but have been freely exercised in 
republics, both ancient and modern--with this difference, that in the 
latter, the oppression has sprung from the impulse of some sudden gust 
of passion or prejudice, while in the former it is systematically 
planned and pursued as an ingredient and principle of the government. 
The people destroy not deliberately, and will return to reflection and 
justice, if passion is not kept alive and excited by artful intrigue, 
but, while the fit is on, their devastation and cruelty are more 
terrible and unbounded than the most monstrous tyrant. It is for their 
own benefit and to protect them from the violence of their own passions 
that it is essential to have some firm, unshaken, independent branch of 
government, able and willing to resist their frenzy. If we have read of 
the death of a Seneca under the ferocity of a Nero, we have read too of 
the murder of a Socrates under the delusion of a republic. An 
independent and firm judiciary, protected and protecting by the laws, 
would have snatched the one from the fury of a despot and preserved the 
other from the madness of a people.
  I have considered these observations on the necessary independence of 
the judiciary applicable and important to the case before this 
honorable court, to repel the wild idea that a judge may be impeached 
and removed from office although he has violated no law of the country, 
but merely on the vague and changing opinions of right and wrong--
propriety and impropriety of demeanor. For if this is to be the tenure 
on which a judge holds his office and character; if by such a standard 
his judicial conduct is to be adjudged criminal or innocent, there is 
an end to the independence of our judiciary. In opposition to this 
reasoning I have heard (not from the honorable managers) a sort of 
jargon about the sovereignty of the people, and that nothing in a 
republic should be independent of them. No phrase in our language is 
more abused or more misunderstood. The just and legitimate sovereignty 
of a people is truly an awful object, full of power and commanding 
respect. It consists in a full acknowledgment that all power originally 
emanates in some way from them, and that all responsibility is finally 
in some way due to them; and whether this is acknowledged or not, they 
have, if driven to the last resort, a physical force, to make it so. 
But, sir, this sovereignty does not consist in a right to control or 
interfere with the regular and legal operations and functions of the 
different branches of the Government at the will and pleasure of the 
people. Having delegated their power; having distributed it for various 
purposes into various channels, and directed its course by certain 
limits, they have no right to impede it while it flows in its intended 
directions. Otherwise we have no Government. In like manner the 
officers of Government are responsible in certain modes, and at certain 
periods, for the exercise of their duties and powers; but the people 
have no right to make them accountable in any other manner, or at any 
other period than that prescribed by the great compact of Government or 
Constitution. Having parted with their power under certain regulations 
and restrictions, they are done with it. They are bound by their own 
act, and having retained and declared the manner in which they will 
correct abuses in office, they have no right to claim any other sort of 
responsibility. If this be not the case, what government have we? What 
rule of conduct? What system of association? None; but we are truly in 
a state of savage anarchy and ruthless confusion, with all the vices 
incident to civilization without the restraints to control them.

  2361. Chase's impeachment continued.
  Argument of Mr. Luther Martin, counsel for Mr. Justice Chase, on the 
nature of the power of impeachment.
  Mr. Martin, counsel for the respondent, said:

  We have been told by an honorable manager (Mr. Campbell) that the 
power of trying impeachments was lodged in the Senate with the most 
perfect propriety; for two reasons--the one, that the person impeached 
would be tried before those who had given their approbation to his 
appointment to office. This certainly was not the reason by which the 
framers of the Constitution were influenced when they gave this power 
to the Senate. Who are the officers liable to impeachment? The 
President, the Vice-President, and all civil officers of Government. In 
the election of the two first the Senate have no control, either as to 
nomination or approbation. As to other civil officers who hold their 
appointments during good behavior, it is extremely probable that, 
though they were approved by one
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 429-437.
Sec. 2361
Senate, yet from lapse of time and the fluctuations of that body an 
officer may be impeached before a Senate not one of whom had sanctioned 
his appointment, not one of whom, perhaps, had he been nominated after 
their election would have given him their sanction.
  This, then, could not have been one of the reasons for thus placing 
the power over these officers. But as a second reason he assigned that, 
if any other inferior tribunal had been intrusted with the trial of 
impeachments, the members might have an interest in the conviction of 
an officer, thereby to have him removed in order to obtain his place; 
but that no Senator could have such inducement. I, sir, disclaim--I 
hold in contempt the idea--that the members of any tribunal would be 
influenced in their decision by so unworthy, so base a motive; but what 
is there to prevent this Senate more than any other court from being 
influenced? Is there anything to prevent any Member of this Senate or 
any of their friends from being appointed to the office of any person 
removed by their conviction?
  I speak not from any apprehension I have of this honorable Court. In 
their integrity I have the greatest confidence. I have the greatest 
confidence they will discharge their duty to my honorable client with 
uprightness and impartiality. I have only made these observations to 
show that the reasons assigned by the honorable manager for vesting the 
trials of impeachment in the Senate are fallacious.
  I see two honorable Members of this court [Messrs. Dayton and 
Baldwin] who were with me in convention, in 1787, who as well as myself 
perfectly know why this power was invested in the Senate. It was 
because, among all our speculative systems, it was thought this power 
could nowhere be more properly placed or where it would be less likely 
to be abused. A sentiment, sir, in which I perfectly concurred, and I 
have no doubt but the event of this trial will show that we could not 
have better disposed of that power.
  Let us now, sir, examine the Constitution on the subject of 
impeachments, and from thence learn in what cases, and in what only, 
impeachments will lie. To have correct sentiments on this subject is of 
infinite importance. An error here would be like what is called an 
error in the first concoction, and would pervade the whole system.
  By the Constitution it is declared that ``the House of 
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.'' That 
section, however, does not declare in what cases the power shall be 
exercised. This is designated in a subsequent part of the Constitution, 
and I shall contend that the power of impeachment is confined to the 
persons mentioned in the Constitution, namely, ``the President, Vice 
President, and all other civil officers.''
  Will it be pretended, for I have heard such a suggestion, that the 
House of Representatives have a right to impeach every citizen 
indiscriminately? For what shall they impeach them? For any criminal 
act? Is the House of Representatives, then, to constitute a grand jury 
to receive information of a criminal nature against all our citizens 
and thereby to deprive them of a trial by jury? This was never intended 
by the Constitution?
  The President, Vice-President, and other civil officers can only be 
impeached. They only in that case are deprived of a trial by jury; 
they, when they accept their offices, accept them on those terms, and, 
as far as relates to the tenure of their offices, relinquish that 
privilege; they, therefore, can not complain. Here, it appears to me, 
the framers of the Constitution have so expressed themselves as to 
leave not a single doubt on this subject.
  In the first article, section the third, of the Constitution it is 
declared that judgment in all cases of impeachment shall not extend 
further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any 
office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. This clearly 
evinces that no persons but those who hold offices are liable to 
impeachment. They are to lose their offices; and, having misbehaved 
themselves in such manner as to lose their offices, are with propriety 
to be rendered ineligible thereafter.
  The next question of importance is in what cases the House of 
Representatives have a right to impeach the President, the Vice-
President, and the other civil officers.
  It has been said that a judge can not be indicted for the same crime 
for which he may be impeached, ``for,'' says the honorable manager (Mr. 
Campbell), ``it would introduce the absurdity that a person might be 
punished twice for the same crime.''
  This honorable Court will observe that the two punishments which may 
here be inflicted on impeachment and subsequent indictment amount to no 
more than in England takes place on a single prosecution; for there on 
a single conviction a judge may be removed from office and also fined, 
imprisoned, or otherwise punished according to the nature of his 
offense. But the whole of this power the United States have not vested 
in the same body. To the Senate they have confined the punish-
                                                            Sec. 2361
ment of removal from office, and disqualification of the person from 
holding offices in future; but can there be a single doubt that a 
person by impeachment removed from office can not afterward, according 
to the nature of his crime, be punished by indictment? Can gentlemen 
suppose a removal from office was intended to wash away all crimes the 
officer should have committed? What are the crimes for which an officer 
can be impeached? ``Treason, bribery, and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
  Suppose a judge removed from office by impeachment for treason. Would 
that wash away his guilt? Would he not afterwards be liable to be 
indicted, tried, and punished as a traitor. Undoubtedly he would; so in 
the case of bribery. Yet, if the gentleman's idea is correct, a removal 
from office on impeachment for either of those crimes would free the 
officer from any other punishment. Consider the monstrous consequences 
which would result from the principle suggested by the managers, that a 
judge is only removable from office on account of crimes committed by 
him as a judge, and not for those for which he would be punishable as a 
private individual! A judge, then, might break open his neighbor's 
house and steal his goods; he might be a common receiver of stolen 
goods; for these crimes he might be indicted, convicted, and punished 
in a court of law; but yet he could not be removed from office because 
the offense was not committed by him in his judicial capacity, and 
because he could not be punished twice for the same offense.
  The truth is, the framers of the Constitution, for many reasons which 
influenced them, did not think proper to place the officers of 
Government in the power of the two branches of the Legislature further 
than the tenure of their office. Nor did they choose to permit the 
tenure of their offices to depend upon the passions or prejudices of 
jurors. The very clause in the Constitution of itself shows that it was 
intended the persons impeached and removed from office might still be 
indicted and punished for the same offense, else the provision would 
have been not only nugatory, but a reflection on the enlightened body 
who framed the Constitution; since no person ever could have dreamed 
that a conviction on impeachment and a removal from office, in 
consequence, for one offense, could prevent the same person from being 
indicted and punished for another and different offense.
  I shall now proceed in the inquiry, For what can the President, Vice-
President, or other civil officers, and, consequently, for what can a 
judge, be impeached? And I shall contend that it must be for an 
indictable offense. The words of the Constitution are, ``that they 
shall be liable to impeachment for treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.''
  There can be no doubt but that treason and bribery are indictable 
offenses. We have only to inquire, then, what is meant by high crimes 
and misdemeanors? What is the true meaning of the word ``crime?'' It is 
the breach of some law which renders the person who violates it liable 
to punishment. There can be no crime committed where no such law is 
violated. The honorable gentleman to whom I before alluded has cited 
the new edition of Jacob's Law Dictionary; let us, then, look into that 
authority for the true meaning of the word ``misdemeanor.'' He tells 
us--
  ``Misdemesnor, or misdemeanor, a crime less than felony. The term 
`misdemeanor' is generally used in contradistinction to felony, and 
comprehends all indictable offenses which do not amount to felony, as 
perjury, libels, conspiracies, assaults,'' etc. (See 4 Comm. c. 1, p. 
5.)
  ``A crime or misdemeanor, says Blackstone, is an act committed or 
omitted in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding 
it. This general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors 
which, properly speaking, are mere synonymous terms, though in common 
usage the word `crimes' is made use of to denote such offenses as are 
of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults and omissions 
of less consequence are comprised under the gentle name of misdemeanors 
only.
  ``In making the distinction between public wrongs and private, 
between crimes and misdemeanors, and civil injuries, the same author 
observes that public wrongs or crimes and misdemeanors are a breach and 
violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, 
considered as a community in its social aggregate capacity.'' (4 Comm., 
5.)
  Thus it appears crimes and misdemeanors are the violation of a law 
exposing the person to punishment, and are used in contradistinction to 
those breaches of law which are mere private injuries, and only entitle 
the injured to a civil remedy.
  Blackstone's Commentaries, volume 4 page 5, is cited by Jacob, and is 
as there stated. I shall not turn to it. Hale, in his Pleas of the 
Crown, volume 1, in his Proemium, which is not paged, speaking of the 
division of crimes, says:
  ``Temporal crimes, which are offenses against the laws of this realm, 
whether the common law or acts of Parliament, are divided into two 
general ranks or distributions in respect to the punishments
Sec. 2361
that are by law appointed for them, or in respect to their nature or 
degree; and thus they may be divided into capital offenses, or offenses 
only criminal, or rather, and more properly, into felonies and 
misdemeanors. And the same distribution is to be made touching 
misdemeanors, namely, they are, such as are so by the common law, or 
such as are specially made punishable, as misdemeanors, by acts of 
Parliament.''
  Thus, then, it appears that crimes and misdemeanors are generally 
used as synonymous expressions, except that ``crimes'' is a word 
frequently used for higher offenses. But while I contend that a judge 
can not be impeached except for a crime or misdemeanor, I also contend 
that there are many crimes and misdemeanors for which a judge ought not 
to be impeached unless immediately relating to his judicial conduct. 
Let us suppose a judge provoked by insolence should strike a person; 
this certainly would be an indictable but not an impeachable offense. 
The offense for which a judge is liable to impeachment must not only be 
a crime or misdemeanor, but a high crime or misdemeanor. The word 
``crime,'' as distinguished from ``misdemeanor,'' is applied to 
offenses of a more aggravated nature; the word ``high,'' therefore, 
must certainly equally apply to misdemeanors as to crimes. Nay, sir, I 
am ready to go further and say there may be instances of very high 
crimes and misdemeanors for which an officer ought not to be impeached 
and removed from office; the crimes ought to be such as relate to his 
office, or which tend to cover the person who committed them with 
turpitude and infamy; such as show there can be no dependence on that 
integrity and honor which will secure the performance of his official 
duties.
  But we have been told, and the authority of the State of Pennsylvania 
has been cited by one honorable manager (Mr. Rodney) in support of the 
position, that a judge may be impeached, convicted, and removed from 
office, for that which is not indictable, for that which is not a 
violation of any law.
  What, sir! Can a judge be impeached and deprived of office when he 
has done nothing which the laws of his country prohibited? Is not 
deprivation of office a punishment? Can there be punishment inflicted 
where there is no crime? Suppose the House of Representatives to 
impeach for conduct not criminal; the Senate to convict, does that 
change the law? No, the law can only be changed by a bill brought 
forward by one House in a certain manner, assented to by the other, and 
approved by the President. Impeachment and conviction can not change 
the law and make that punishable which was not before criminal.
  It is true it often happens that the good of the community requires 
that the laws should be passed making criminal and exposing to 
punishment conduct, which, antecedently, was not punishable; but even 
in those cases Government has no power to punish acts antecedently 
done; it can only punish those acts done after the enaction of the law. 
The Constitution has declared ``no ex post facto law shall be passed.''
  Should such a principle be once admitted or adopted, could the 
officers of Government ever know how to proceed? Admit that the House 
of Representatives have a right to impeach for acts which are not 
contrary to law, and that thereon the Senate may convict and the 
officer be removed, you leave your judges and all your other officers 
at the mercy of the prevailing party. You will place them much in the 
unhappy situation as were the people of England during the contest 
between the white and red roses, while the doctrine of constructive 
treasons prevailed. They must be the tools or the victims of the 
victorious party.
  I speak not, sir, with a view to censure the principles or the 
conduct of any party which has prevailed in the United States since our 
Revolution, but I wish to bring home to your feelings what may happen 
at a future time. In republican governments there ever have been, there 
ever will be a conflict of parties. Must an officer, for instance a 
judge, ever be in favor of the ruling party whether wrong or right? Or, 
looking forward to the triumph of the minority, must he however 
improper their views act with them? Neither the one conduct nor the 
other is to be supposed but from a total dereliction of principle. 
Shall, then, a judge by honestly performing his duty and very possibly 
thereby offending both parties be made the victim of the one or the 
other, or perhaps of each, as they have power? No, sir: I conceive that 
a judge should always consider himself safe while he violates no law, 
while he conscientiously discharges his duty, whomever he may displease 
thereby.
  But an honorable manager (Mr. Campbell) has read to us an authority 
to prove that a judge can not in England be proceeded against by 
indictment for violation of his official duties, but only in Parliament 
or by impeachment; his authority was the new edition of Jacob's Law 
Dictionary. Let me be indulged with reading to this honorable Court the 
case from 12 Coke, the case of Floyd and Barker
                                                            Sec. 2361
to which Jacob refers, and it will be found that the reasons there 
assigned, however correct they might be as to judges in England, can 
have no possible application to the judges of the United States.
  [Here Mr. Martin read the following part of the third resolution, to 
wit:]
  ``It was resolved that the said Barker who was judge of assize, and 
gave judgment on the verdict upon the said W. P., and the sheriff who 
did execute him according to the said judgment, nor the justices of 
peace who did examine the offender, and the witnesses for proof of the 
murder before the judgment were not to be drawn in question, in the 
Star Chamber, for any conspiracy; nor any witness, nor any other person 
ought to be charged with conspiracy in the Star Chamber, or elsewhere, 
when the party indicted is convicted or attaint of murder or felony, 
and although the offender upon the indictment was acquitted, yet the 
judge, be he judge of assize, or a justice of peace, or any other 
judge, by commission and of record and sworn to do justice, can not be 
charged for conspiracy for that which he did openly in court as judge 
or justice of peace; and the law will not admit any proof against this 
vehement and violent presumption of law, that a justice sworn to do 
justice will do injustice, but if he hath conspired before out of 
court, this is extrajudicial, but due examination of causes out of the 
court, and inquiring by testimony and similar is not any conspiracy, 
for this he ought to do; but subornation of witnesses, and false and 
malicious prosecutors, out of court, to such whom he knows will be 
indictors, to find any guilty, etc., amounts to an unlawful conspiracy.
  ``And as a judge shall not be drawn in question in the cases 
aforesaid at the suit of the parties, no more shall he be charged in 
the said cases before any other judge at the suit of the King.
  ``And the reason and cause why a judge, for anything done by him as a 
judge, by the authority which the King (concerning his justice) shall 
not be drawn in question before any other judge, for any surmise of 
corruption, except before the King himself, is for this; the King 
himself is de jure to deliver justice to all his subjects; and for 
this, that he himself can not do it to all persons, he delegates his 
power to his judges, who have the custody and guard of the King's oath.
  ``And forasmuch as this concerns the honor and conscience of the 
King, there is great reason that the King himself shall take account of 
it, and no other.''
  But even in England it has been solemnly determined that judges may 
be proceeded against by indictment for the violation of the laws in 
their official conduct, for which I refer this honorable Court to 
Viner's abridgment, 14th volume, page 579, (F), pl. 3, and in notes, 
where he says:
  ``A justice can not rase a record, nor imbecile it, nor file an 
indictment which is not found, nor give judgment of death where the law 
does not give it, but if he doth this it is misprision, and he shall 
lose his office and shall make fine for misprision.'' (In the note 
``Brooke, Corone pl. 173 cities 2 R, 3, 9, 10, S. C. and P. and that he 
shall be indicted and arraigned.'')
  And that to Hawkin's Pleas of the Crown, volume 1, chapter 69, 
section 6, where that author tells us:
  ``It is said that at common law bribery in a judge, in relation to a 
cause depending before him, was looked upon as an offense of so heinous 
a nature that it was sometimes punished as high treason, before the 
25th Edward III, and at this day it certainly is a very high offense 
and punishable not only with the forfeiture of the offender's office of 
justice, but also with fine and imprisonment,'' etc.
  Mr. President, the principle I have endeavored to establish is that 
no judge or other officer can, under the Constitution of the United 
States, be removed from office but by impeachment, and for the 
violation of some law, which violation must be not simply a crime or 
misdemeanor, but a high crime or misdemeanor.
  But an honorable manager (Mr. Rodney), who has this morning referred 
to some authorities as to other parts of the case has also contested 
the correctness of the foregoing principle, and has introduced the 
constitution of the State of Pennsylvania, by which he has told us a 
judge may, by the governor, be removed from office without the 
commission of any offense upon the vote of two-thirds of the two houses 
for his removal; notwithstanding that constitution has a similar 
provision for removal by impeachment as has the Constitution of the 
United States. To this I answer as we have no such provision in the 
Constitution of the United States the reverse is to be inferred, to 
wit, that the people of the United States from whom the Constitution 
emanated did not intend their judges should be removed, however 
obnoxious they might be to any part or to the whole of the Legislature, 
unless they were guilty of some high crime or misdemeanor, and then 
only by impeachment. It is also well known that the governor of 
Pennsylvania has not considered those words in the constitution of that 
State, ``that he may remove the judges on such address,'' as being 
imperative. For, in a recent instance,
Sec. 2362
where he did receive such address, instead of admitting the 
construction to be as was contended, ``you must,'' he determined it to 
be ``I will not,'' and I have had the pleasure of seeing that judge 
some time since that transaction on the bench with his brethren 
dispensing justice. I again repeat that as the framers of the 
Constitution of the United States did not insert in their Constitution 
such a clause as is inserted in the constitution of Pennsylvania, it is 
the strongest proof that they did not mean a judge or other officer 
should be displaced by an address of any portion of the legislature, 
but only according to the constitutional provisions.
  The same gentleman (Mr. Rodney) has told us that the tenure by which 
a judge holds his office is good behavior, therefore that he is 
removable for misbehavior; and, further, that misbehavior and 
misdemeanor are synonymous and coextensive. Here I perfectly agree with 
the honorable gentleman and join issue with him. Misbehavior and 
misdemeanor are words equally extensive and correlative; to misbehave 
or to misdemean is precisely the same; and as I have shown that to 
misdemean, or, in other words, to be guilty of a misdemeanor, is a 
violation of some law punishable, so, of course, misbehavior must be 
the violation of a similar law.
  The same honorable gentleman has mentioned the impeachment and 
conviction of Judge Addison, and has told us that he was not impeached 
for the breach of any law, but only for rude or unpolite conduct to his 
brother judge; that this objection was made with much energy on his 
defense, but that the Senate were convinced by the great talents and 
eloquence of Mr. Dallas and some other gentlemen that the objection was 
groundless; they, therefore, convicted and removed him. I have not here 
the proceedings against Judge Addison and, therefore, it is possible 
that the senate of Pennsylvania erected themselves into a court of 
honor to punish what they might consider breaches of politeness; but 
does this honorable Court sit here to take its precedents from the 
State of Pennsylvania or any other State, however respectable? I should 
rather hope that this honorable Court should furnish precedents which 
might be respected and adopted by the different States. I would also 
ask, ``When was that precedent established? Was it not at a time when 
there is too much reason to believe that the warmth and violence of 
party had more influence in it than justice; and that the senate of 
Pennsylvania overleaped their constitutional limits? But if we are to 
go to Pennsylvania for a precedent, why should we not be guided by that 
which the same State has so recently given us in a trial in which that 
gentleman bore so conspicuous a part? a precedent of acquittal; a 
precedent which we are perfectly willing should be adopted, and which 
we trust will be adopted on the present occasion.
  My observations thus far have been principally with a view to 
establish the true construction of our Constitution, as relates to the 
doctrine of impeachment.

  2362. Chase's impeachment, continued.
  Argument of Mr. Robert G. Harper, counsel for Mr. Justice Chase, on 
the nature of the power of impeachment.
  And finally, on behalf of the respondent, Mr. Harper said: \1\

  The honorable managers, indeed, are as much at war with themselves on 
this point as with the Constitution and the laws. For when they have 
told us in one breath that this is merely a question of policy and 
expediency, they resort in the next to legal authorities, both English 
and American, for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of 
impeachment, and of proving that the acts alleged against the 
respondent amount to impeachable offenses; thus paying an involuntary 
homage to truth and furnishing an instance of the irresistible power 
with which she forces herself on the mind, even when most obstinately 
determined to resist her. Let us also, Mr. President, be permitted to 
adduce the authority of an elementary writer, of very high authority, 
on the laws of England in support of the principle for which we 
contend. Woodeson, in his Lectures, volume 2, page 611, treating on the 
law of impeachment, speaks thus: ``As to the trial itself, it must of 
course vary in external ceremony, but differs not in essentials from 
criminal prosecutions before inferior courts. The same rules of 
evidence, the same legal notions of crimes and punishments, prevail. 
For impeachments are not formed to alter the law, but to carry it into 
more effectual execution, where it might be obstructed by the influence 
of too powerful delinquents, or not easily discerned in the ordinary 
course of jurisdiction, by reason of the peculiar quality of alleged 
crimes. The judgment therefore is to be such as is warranted by legal 
principles or
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Annals, pp. 505-514.
                                                            Sec. 2362
precedents. In capital cases the mere stated sentence is to be 
specifically pronounced.'' Thus far this learned professor and 
commentator of the laws of England; and he cites as authorities for 
this doctrine Selden and the State Trials; the latter of which, this 
honorable court need not be informed, is a collection of adjudged cases 
in the highest courts of England; and the former, a writer of great 
learning and very high authority, peculiarly tenacious of every 
principle tending to the security of public liberty, and not likely to 
mistake on a point so essential as the law of impeachment.
  Thus we find that even in England, where the power of impeachment is 
subject to no express constitutional restrictions and where abuses of 
that power, for the purpose of party persecution and State policy, have 
sometimes been committed, and more frequently attempted, an impeachment 
has never been considered as a mere inquest of office, but always as a 
criminal prosecution, differing not in essentials from those which are 
carried on before the ordinary tribunals of justice and subject to the 
same rules of evidence, and the same legal maxims concerning crimes and 
punishments, as a proceeding contrived not to alter the law, but to 
carry it into more effectual execution. These authorities, sanctioned 
by the practice of one hundred and fifty years, prove the principle for 
which we contend. Instances may, no doubt, be found in the history of 
that country where these salutary principles have been disregarded and 
impeachments have been converted into engines of oppression. But this 
abuse does not destroy or impair the principle. That remains as eternal 
as the laws of reason and justice on which it is founded, while the 
abuse passes into oblivion with the temporary interests and fleeting 
projects which it was made to subserve, or remains in our recollection 
as a sad monument of the excesses into which frail man is hurried by 
his passions.
  And has not this great principle of English jurisprudence, which in 
that country has weathered so many storms of faction, revolution, and 
civil war, received the sanction also of this honorable court? Has not 
testimony been rejected because it was judged illegal according to the 
ordinary rules of evidence? And how could those rules apply to this 
case unless it were considered as a criminal prosecution?
  The Constitution of the United States will as little bear out the 
managers in their position as the laws of England. That Constitution 
gives the power of impeachment to the House of Representatives and to 
the Senate the power of trying impeachments. Had the authors of that 
instrument and those who adopted it intended to leave this power at 
large or to erect it into a general inquest for inquiring into the 
qualifications of judges and the expediency of removing them, nothing 
more would have been done than merely to give the power. But it will be 
found that various restrictions are imposed in the subsequent parts of 
the instrument, which prove that no person can be impeached except for 
an offense.
  Thus, for instance, in speaking of the power of pardoning, the 
Constitution provides (art. 2, sec. 2) that ``the President may grant 
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in 
cases of impeachment.'' Is not this the same thing as saying that cases 
of impeachment are cases of offenses? What, Mr. President, are offenses 
in the language of the Constitution and the laws? For a definition of 
the term ``offense,'' in a constitutional sense, we must consult our 
law books and not the caprice or the varying opinions of popular 
leaders or popular assemblies. Those books tell us that word 
``offense'' means some violation of law. Whence it evidently follows 
that no officer of Government can be impeached unless he has committed 
some violation of the law, either statute or common. It is not 
necessary for me to contend that this offense must be an indictable 
offense. I might safely admit the contrary, though I do not admit it, 
and there are reasons which appear to be unanswerable in favor of the 
opinion that no offense is impeachable unless it be also the proper 
subject of an indictment. But it is not necessary to go so far, and I 
can suppose cases where a judge ought to be impeached for acts which I 
am not prepared to declare indictable. Suppose, for instance, that a 
judge should constantly omit to hold court, or should habitually attend 
so short a time each day as to render it impossible to dispatch the 
business. It might be doubted whether an indictment would lie for those 
acts of omission, although I am inclined to think that it would. But I 
have no hesitation in saying that a judge in such a case ought to be 
impeached. And this comes within the principle for which I contend, for 
these acts of culpable omission are a plain and direct violation of the 
law which commands him to hold courts a reasonable time for the 
dispatch of business, and of his oath which binds him to discharge 
faithfully and diligently the duties of his office.
  The honorable gentlemen who opened the case on the part of the 
prosecution cited the case of habitual drunkenness and profane swearing 
on the part of a judge as an instance of an offense not indictable and 
yet punishable by impeachment. But I deny his position. Habitual 
drunkenness in a judge and profane swearing in any person are 
indictable offenses. And if they were not, still they are viola-
Sec. 2362
tions of the law. I do not mean to say that there is a statute against 
drunkenness and profane swearing. But they are offenses against good 
morals, and as such are forbidden by the common law. They are offenses 
in the sight of God and man, definitive in their nature, capable of 
precise proof and of a clear defense.
  The honorable managers have cited a case decided in this court as an 
authority to prove that a man may be convicted on impeachment without 
having committed an offense. I mean the case of Judge Pickering. But 
that case does not support the position. The defendant there was 
charged with habitual drunkenness and gross misbehavior in court 
arising from this drunkenness. The defense set up was that the 
defendant was insane, and that the instances adduced of intoxication 
and improper behavior proceeded from his insanity. On this point there 
was a contrariety of evidence. It is not for me to inquire on which 
side the truth lay. But the court, by finding the defendant guilty, 
gave their sanction to the charge that his insanity proceeded from 
habitual drunkenness. This case therefore proves nothing further than 
that habitual drunkenness is an impeachable offense.
  As little aid can the honorable gentlemen derive from the case of 
Judge Addison, on which also they have relied. The articles of 
impeachment will show that Judge Addison was not impeached, as the 
honorable gentlemen suppose, for rude and ungentleman-like behavior in 
court to one of his colleagues; but for a supposed usurpation of power 
in preventing his colleague, by an exertion of authority, from 
exercising the right which he was supposed to possess to charge a grand 
jury, and in exerting his official influence and power to prevent the 
jury from paying attention to the legal opinions expressed by his 
colleague in a civil case. The report of that trial, now in my hand, 
will attest the correctness of this statement and will show also that 
Judge Addison was so far from being charged with rude and ungentleman-
like behavior to his colleague that the honorable gentleman himself 
towards whom that behavior is supposed to have been used and who gave 
evidence on the trial, bore testimony to the mildness and politeness of 
Judge Addison's manner on the occasions which furnished the grounds of 
impeachment. Whether the acts done by that learned and distinguished 
judge did amount to an usurpation of unconstitutional power, or whether 
his colleague did possess those rights in the exercise of which he was 
supposed to have been improperly restricted, are questions foreign from 
the present inquiry. But I am free to declare that if Judge Addison's 
colleague did possess those rights and if he did arbitrarily prevent 
and impede the exercise of them by an unconstitutional exertion of the 
powers of his office he was guilty of an offense for which he might 
properly be impeached, because he must in that case have acted in 
express violation of the Constitution and laws.
  The great principle for which we contend, and which is so strongly 
supported by the clause of the Constitution already cited, that an 
impeachment is a criminal prosecution and can not be maintained without 
the proof of some offense against the laws, pervades all the other 
provisions of the Constitution on the subject of impeachment. The 
fourth section of the second article declares ``that the President, 
Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be 
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This provision, I 
know has been considered by some as a mere direction of what shall be 
done in those specified cases, and not as a prohibition confining 
impeachment to those cases. But it must be recollected, Mr. President, 
that the Constitution is a limited grant of power, and that it is of 
the essence of such a grant to be construed strictly and to leave in 
the grantors all the powers not expressly or by necessary implication 
granted away. In this manner has the Constitution always been construed 
and understood; and although an amendment was made for the purpose of 
expressly declaring and asserting this principle, yet that amendment 
was always understood by those who adopted it and was represented by 
the eminent character who brought it forward as a mere declaration of a 
principle inherent in the Constitution which it was proper to make for 
the purpose of removing doubts and quieting apprehensions. When, 
therefore, the Constitution declares for what acts an officer shall be 
impeached, it gives power to impeach him for those acts and all power 
to impeach him for any other cause is withheld. The enumeration in the 
affirmative grant implies clearly a negative restriction as to all 
cases not enumerated. This provision of the Constitution, therefore, 
must be considered upon every sound principle of construction as a 
declaration that no impeachment shall lie except for a crime or 
misdemeanor; in other words, for a criminal violation of some law.
  The same idea is found in the second section of the third article, 
third clause, where it is declared that ``the trial of all crimes, 
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;'' plainly implying 
that cases of impeachment are cases of ``trials for crimes.''
                                                            Sec. 2362
  It is material, also, Mr. President, to advert to the peculiar force 
of the term ``conviction,'' which is employed in several parts of the 
Constitution, in application to cases of impeachment. The third section 
of the first article, sixth clause, speaking of the trial of 
impeachments, says: ``And no person shall be convicted without the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.'' The seventh clause 
of the same section, treating on the extent and operation of a judgment 
in impeachment, says: ``But the party convicted shall nevertheless be 
liable and subject,'' etc. And the fourth section of the second article 
declares that certain officers ``shall be removed from office on 
impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery,'' etc. This term 
``conviction'' has in our law a fixed and appropriate meaning. There is 
indeed no word in our legal vocabulary of more technical force. It 
always imports the decision of a competent tribunal pronouncing a 
person guilty of some specific offense for which he has been legally 
brought to trial. In an instrument so remarkable as the Constitution of 
the United States for technical accuracy in the use of terms the 
frequent and indeed constant use of this word is decisive to prove that 
in the intention of the framers of that instrument no man could be 
impeached except for some offense against law of which he might in 
legal language be said to be ``convicted.''
  In fixing the construction of this instrument no safer guide can be 
followed than contemporaneous expositions furnished by those who made 
or ratified it; and among those expositions the most authoritative are 
to be found in the constitutions of the several States, formed about 
the same time, and drawn up in many instances by the same persons. 
Whenever it appears clearly from the context of these constitutions 
that they affix a certain meaning to particular terms we may safely 
infer that those or similar terms in the Constitution of the United 
States were intended to have the same meaning. And we shall find by 
inspecting the constitutions of the several States that impeachment has 
been considered by all of them as a criminal prosecution for the 
punishment of defined offenses against the laws.
  Let us begin with that of Pennsylvania. In treating of impeachments, 
article the fourth, it speaks of conviction on impeachment, and 
declares that all civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any 
misdemeanor in office. The term ``misdemeanor'' is of as accurate 
meaning and of as much technical force as any term in the law. It 
describes a class of offenses against law, as well defined as any in 
the criminal code. A still stronger argument is furnished by the second 
section of the fifth article, which provides that for any reasonable 
cause which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment the governor 
may remove any of the judges on the address of two-thirds of each 
branch of the legislature. It is most manifest that this provision 
would have been wholly unnecessary had the people of Pennsylvania, in 
framing their constitution, considered impeachments, like the honorable 
managers, merely as inquests of office by which a judge might be 
removed for any cause which two-thirds of each branch might think 
reasonable. And the arguments derived from the constitution of 
Pennsylvania have more force, inasmuch as the terms ``misdemeamor in 
office,'' used by it for describing impeachable acts, are much less 
strong than ``treason, bribery, and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' employed by the Constitution of the United States for 
the same purpose.
  The constitution of Delaware, section 22, directs that impeachments 
shall lie against all persons ``offending against the State, either by 
maladministration, corruption, or other means by which the safety of 
the State may be endangered.'' This is a very broad description of 
impeachable offenses against the laws, liable to punishment in the 
regular course of justice. It is declared that all impeachments shall 
be commenced ``within eighteen months after the offense committed'' and 
shall be prosecuted by the attorney-general or such other persons as 
the house of assembly shall appoint, according to the laws of the land. 
Persons found guilty on impeachment are to be disqualified, or removed, 
``or subjected to such pains and penalties as the laws shall direct.'' 
And the term ``conviction,'' whose peculiar technical force has been 
already remarked, is applied by this constitution to cases of 
impeachment.
  The people of Maryland did not think fit to invest the legislature 
with the power of impeachment, but have directed by their bill of 
rights, section 30, and by their constitution, section 40, that 
misbehavior in office shall be proceeded against by indictment in a 
court of law only, and that removal, and, fn some cases, 
disqualification, shall be the consequence of conviction. It will not 
be denied that ``misdemeanor'' and ``misbehavior in office'' are 
convertible terms. If there be any difference, the latter is the less 
strong; and yet the people of Maryland have declared that the term 
``misbehavior in office'' means an indictable offense, of which a 
person may be convicted in a court of law.
  The constitution of Virginia provides that persons offending against 
the State by maladministration, corruption, or other means by which the 
safety of the State may be endangered, ``shall be impeach-
Sec. 2362
able by the house of delegates'' in the general court, according to the 
laws of the land; ``and that if all or any of the judges of the general 
court should, on grounds (to be judged by the house of delegates), be 
accused of any of the crimes or offenses above mentioned, such house of 
delegates may, in like manner, impeach the judge or judges so accused, 
to be tried in the court of appeals.'' Hence it appears most clearly 
that these general words ``offending against the State by 
maladministration, corruption, or other means by which the safety of 
the State may be endangered,'' words far more general and indefinite in 
themselves than those employed by the Federal Constitution, were 
considered by the people of Virginia as meaning specific crimes or 
offenses, which might be proceeded against in a court of law according 
to the usual course of criminal justice. The words ``any other means by 
which the safety of the State may be endangered'' are certainly broad 
enough to embrace those reasons of political expediency and State 
policy for which the honorable managers contend that a judge may be 
removed by impeachment; but we find that the people of Virginia had no 
idea of giving them a construction so contrary to the notions 
entertained in this country respecting legal rights, personal safety, 
and constitutional liberty.
  The provisions made on this subject by the constitution of North 
Carolina breathe the same spirit. That instrument declares, section 23, 
``that the governor and other officers offending against the State by 
violating any part of this constitution, maladministration, or 
corruption, may be prosecuted on the impeachment of the general 
assembly or presentment of the grand jury of any court of supreme 
jurisdiction in this State.'' This plainly implies that impeachable 
acts, though described in terms the most indefinite were neither more 
nor less than offenses indictable in the ordinary course of law.
  In the constitution of South Carolina, article 5, we find the same 
idea necessarily implied. The words ``misdemeanor in office'' are used 
as the description of impeachable offenses; the term ``conviction'' is 
applied to impeachments, and it is provided that persons so convicted 
``shall, nevertheless, be liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and 
punishment, according to law.'' It is plain, therefore, that the words 
``misdemeanor in office,'' were understood and intended by the people 
of South Carolina to mean offenses against the laws for which the 
offender might be indicted and ``convicted.''
  The constitution of Georgia contains no words which can operate in 
any manner to define or describe impeachable offenses. It merely 
directs who shall have the power of impeaching, who shall try 
impeachments, and what description of persons may be impeached. But in 
that of Vermont there is a provision on this subject, which, though 
very concise, is very strong to our present purpose. Among the powers 
given by it, section 9, to the house of representatives is that to 
``impeach State criminals.'' This term ``criminals,'' which in our laws 
is never applied except to persons charged with offenses of the highest 
nature, sufficiently declares that the people of Vermont considered 
impeachments as applicable to cases of crimes only, and not to removals 
for reasons of State expediency; not even to cases of smaller offenses, 
much less of indiscretion or impropriety of behavior, such as is 
alleged against the respondent in this case. For surely it would be an 
abuse of language to apply the term ``criminal'' to improper 
interruptions of the counsel, to rude, hasty or intemperate 
expressions; to ridicule employed by a judge against counsel who, in 
his opinion, conducted themselves incorrectly, or to the precipitate 
and ill-timed expression of a correct legal opinion. No, sir. This word 
imports the intentional violation of some known law, the perpetration 
of some specific defined crime, which may admit of precise proof, which 
every citizen may be able to avoid, against which, when accused of it, 
he may know how to make his defense.
  Such, Mr. President, is the solemn exposition of impeachable offenses 
given by the people of the United States through the medium of their 
constitutions. Though not accustomed to talk about the will of the 
people, there is no man that bows with more reverence to that will when 
constitutionally declared. And shall we, Mr. President, let go this 
sheet-anchor of personal rights and political privileges to commit 
ourselves to the storms of party rage, personal animosity, and popular 
caprice? Shall we throw down this great landmark, fixed by the wisdom 
and patriotism of our fellow-citizens and fathers? Instead of having 
our best and dearest rights secured by fixed and known principles of 
law, shall we leave them to be governed and disposed by the ever 
varying whims and passions of the moment? No, sir, I trust not. When I 
look at these benches and recollect how deep a stake the members of 
this honorable court have in those rights which form the palladium of 
our safety and are now intrusted to their care and keeping, I can not 
but confidently expect that they will feel the whole importance of the 
great trust reposed in them by their country; that they will regard 
themselves as acting for future generations, as well as for the present 
age; and will elevate themselves above the sphere of little views and 
momentary feelings. They will recollect, sir, that unjust principles, 
adopted to answer particular purposes,
                                                            Sec. 2363
are two-edged swords, which often rebound on the head of him who 
strikes with them, and that justice, though it may be an inconvenient 
restraint on our power while we are strong, is the only rampart behind 
which we can find protection when we become weak. They will remember 
that power which depends on popular favor is of all sublunary things 
the most fleeting and transient; that it must, from time to time, 
change hands; and that when the change which sooner or later must 
arrive shall have taken place, when those who now direct the thunder of 
impeachment shall be placed, as ere long they must be, in a situation 
to be smitten by its bolts, they will be glad to invoke, and unless 
they now set a great example of correct decision, will invoke in vain 
those constitutional privileges to which we now cry for safety.
  Need I, Mr. President, urge the necessity of adhering to those 
principles, as it respects the independence of the judiciary 
department? Need I enlarge on the essential importance of that 
independence to the security of personal rights, and to the well-being, 
nay, to the existence of a free government? These considerations of 
themselves strike the mind with a force not to be increased by any 
efforts of mine. It is sufficient merely to bring them into the view of 
this honorable court.
  But it is not to the party accused, to the nation, to posterity, and 
to the interests of free governments that the observance of settled 
constitutional principles in cases of impeachment is alone important. 
It is equally so to the character and feelings of those appointed to 
judge. Is there any member of this honorable court who would wish, nay, 
who would consent, in deciding this cause, to be set free from the 
restraints of the law, or, more properly speaking, to be deprived of 
its guidance and left to the influence of his own passions, feelings, 
or prepossessions? Were causes like this to be determined on 
expediency, and not on fixed principles of law, to what suspicions 
might not the judges be liable, of having sought the indulgence of some 
animosity, or the attainment of some selfish end, instead of consulting 
for the public good? But when they are known to be governed by the 
settled rules of law, and are considered as merely its organs, their 
motives will be more respected, and their conduct less liable to 
suspicion or reproach. Is any member of this honorable body prepared to 
relinquish the high and venerable station of the organ and expounder of 
the law, in order to assume the doubtful and dangerous character of a 
judge, subject to no rule but his own arbitrary will?
  To a judge, too, it is the sweetest consolation in the discharge of 
his painful duties that when he has doomed a fellow-citizen to dishonor 
and misery, he has merely pronounced the decision of the law, and not 
the dictates of his own will; that he is not the author of the sentence 
by which so much calamity is brought on others, but merely its official 
organ. This reflection soothes his mind under the anguish which it must 
feel from another's woe. And is there any member of this honorable 
court who would consent to relinquish this consolation? I boldly say, 
no. I feel that every heart will respond to the assertion. And if any 
who hear me be capable of entertaining a contrary opinion, or would 
wish, in the same situation, to hold a different conduct, I envy not 
their feelings, however highly I may estimate their intellectual 
powers.
  In every light, therefore, in which this great principle can be 
viewed, whether as a well-established doctrine of the Constitution; as 
the bulwark of personal safety and judicial independence; as a shield 
for the characters of those whose lot it may be to sit under the trial 
of impeachments; or as a solace to them under the necessity of 
pronouncing a fellow-citizen guilty; it will equally claim, and I can 
not doubt that it will receive the sanction of this honorable court, by 
whose decision it will, I trust, be established so as never hereafter 
to be brought into question, that an impeachment is not a mere inquiry, 
in the nature of an inquest of office, whether an officer be qualified 
for his place, or whether some reason of policy or expediency may not 
demand his removal, but a criminal prosecution, for the support of 
which the proof of some willful violation of a known law of the land is 
known to be indispensably required.

  2363. Chase's impeachment, continued.
  At the conclusion of the final arguments in the Chase trial, the 
court set a day and hour for giving final judgment.
  It does not appear surely that the House attended on the final 
judgment in the Chase impeachment.
  In the Chase trial the court modified its former rule as to form of 
final question.
  Two-thirds not having voted guilty on any article, the Presiding 
Officer declared Mr. Justice Chase acquitted.
Sec. 2363
  As soon as the arguments were concluded, on February 27,\1\ it was, 
on motion of Mr. James Jackson, of Georgia, a Senator--

  Resolved, That the court will on Friday next, at 12 o'clock, 
pronounce judgment in the case of Samuel Chase, one of the associate 
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

  On Friday, March 1,\2\ the court being opened by proclamation, the 
managers, accompanied by the House of Representatives, attended.\3\
  The counsel for the respondent also attended.
  The consideration of the motion, made yesterday for an alteration of 
one of the rules in cases of impeachments, was resumed; whereupon,

  Resolved, That in taking the judgment of the Senate upon the articles 
of impeachment now depending against Samuel Chase, esq., the President 
of the Senate shall call on each Member by his name, and upon each 
article, propose the following question, in the manner following: ``Mr. 
------, how say you; is the respondent, Samuel Chase, guilty or not 
guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor, as charged in the ------ article 
of impeachment?''
  Whereupon, each Member shall rise in his place, and answer guilty or 
not guilty.

  The President rose, and addressing himself to the members of the 
court, said:

  Gentlemen: You have heard the evidence and arguments adduced on the 
trial of Samuel Chase, impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. You 
will now proceed to pronounce distinctly your judgment on each article.

  The Secretary then read the first article of impeachment.
  The article having been read, the President took the opinion of the 
members of the court respectively, in the form following:

  Mr. ------, how say you; is the respondent, Samuel Chase, guilty or 
not guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor, as charged in the first 
article of impeachment?

  And thus, after the reading of each article, the opinion of the court 
was taken.
  At the conclusion, the President rose and said: On the first article, 
sixteen gentlemen have pronounced guilty and eighteen not guilty; on 
the second article, ten have said guilty and twenty-four not guilty; on 
the third article, eighteen have said guilty and sixteen not guilty; on 
the fourth article, eighteen have said guilty and sixteen not guilty; 
on the fifth article, there is an unanimous vote of not guilty; on the 
sixth article, four have said guilty and thirty not guilty; on the 
seventh article, ten have said guilty and twenty-four not guilty; and 
on the eighth article, nineteen have said guilty and fifteen not 
guilty.
  Hence, it appears that there is not a constitutional majority of 
votes finding Samuel Chase, esq., guilty on any one article. It, 
therefore, becomes my duty to declare that Samuel Chase, esq., stands 
acquitted of all the articles exhibited by the House of Representatives 
against him.
  Whereupon, the court adjourned without day.
  It does not appear, from the House Journal,\4\ that the decision was 
communicated to the House; and there is no record in the House Journal 
that the House attended either as Committee of the Whole House or 
otherwise.
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  \1\ Senate Impeachment Journal p. 523; Annals, p. 664.
  \2\ Journal, pp. 523-527; Annals, pp. 664-669.
  \3\ The House Journal raises a doubt as to whether or not the House 
as a Committee of the Whole attended. No mention of such attendance is 
made, after February 23 (Journal, pp. 149-162). It is probable that in 
the pressure of business, attendance as an organized body was omitted.
  \4\ House Journal pp. 157-162.