[Senate Hearing 106-243]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-243
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-047 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biserko, Ms. Sonja, chairperson, Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights in Serbia............................................... 24
Prepared statement of........................................ 26
Dobrijevic, Father Irinej, executive director, Office of External
Affairs, Serbian Orthodox Church............................... 33
Prepared statement of........................................ 36
Fox, John, director, Washington Office, Open Society Institute... 29
Gelbard, Hon. Robert S., Special Representative of the President
and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords.................................................. 3
Prepared statement of........................................ 7
Hooper, James R., executive director, Balkan Action Council...... 39
Prepared statement of........................................ 43
Pardew, Hon. James W., Jr., Deputy Special Advisor to the
President and the Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton
Implementation................................................. 12
Prepared statement of........................................ 14
(iii)
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:23 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Smith and Biden.
Senator Smith. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
apologize for our late beginning, but we are voting a lot
today.
But we convene this Subcommittee on European Affairs to
discuss the prospects for democracy in Yugoslavia and what the
United States can do to assist those in Serbia who seek to oust
the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Our first panel
consists of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Special Representative
of the President and the Secretary of State for implementation
of the Dayton Peace Accords, and Ambassador James Pardew,
Deputy Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of
State for Kosovo and Dayton Implementation.
After we hear from administration representatives, the
subcommittee will welcome Ms. Sonja Biserko--I apologize if my
pronunciation is incorrect--chairperson of the Helsinki
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; Mr. James Hooper,
executive director of the Balkan Action Council; Father Irinej
Dobrijevic, executive director of the Office of External
Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church here in the United
States; Mr. John Fox, director of the Washington office at the
Open Society Institute.
This hearing, by the way, will be the first in a series by
this subcommittee on United States policy in the Balkans. This
afternoon we are going to focus specifically on what is
happening in Serbia right now, as opposition parties are
rallying their supporters to take to the streets against
Milosevic, as army reservists are launching protests after
their return from Kosovo, as the Serbian Orthodox Church has at
least spoken out in favor of replacing the regime for the good
of the Serbian people.
In the fall, we will examine the course of political and
diplomatic events that led to the NATO bombing in Kosovo, as
well as the lessons the United States and our NATO allies can
learn from the manner in which the war was waged. This has
enormous implications for NATO and its future.
In addition, I am pleased that Senator Rod Grams will
convene a hearing in September to look into the response of
UNHCR to the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis. I agree with
Senator Grams that assessing the performance, both positive and
negative, of UNHCR can be useful if and when we are faced with
another refugee explosion in the future.
I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses today to
appear before the subcommittee, to share their thoughts and
expertise on the prospects of democracy in Yugoslavia. We have
an opportunity in Yugoslavia that we must not let pass.
Milosevic has been weakened by the Serbian defeat in Kosovo and
I feel that for the first time many average citizens of
Yugoslavia have finally decided that they have had enough as
well of his policies of repression and destruction.
He is now vulnerable. But as we all know, he has managed to
be in vulnerable positions before, always managing to
outmaneuver his opponents. He seems to be able to divide and
conquer that way.
Now that he has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, I
can only imagine that his desperation to hang onto power has
intensified. Since the end of the war in Kosovo, opposition
leaders in Serbia have launched demonstrations throughout the
country, but thus far they have been unable to coordinate their
message or their actions to reach out to a broader segment of
the population. If these opposition forces have any hope of
ousting Mr. Milosevic, it seems obvious to me that they must
put aside personal differences and political ambition and, for
the sake of their country, work together.
Ambassador Gelbard, I know that you have been working very
hard on this issue, and I hope that in your comments you can
offer me and other members who will join us some hope that we
are moving in the right direction.
Furthermore, there are several other actors in this
process: Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, the Serbian
Orthodox Church, the student movement, which was so active in
the 1996-97 demonstrations, and organizations like the
independent media and trade unions. I am interested in
exploring what role they can play in bringing about democratic
change for Serbia.
I note that just yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee
approved the Serbian Democratization Act, legislation that was
introduced by Senator Helms in March, that I co-sponsored along
with 11 other Senators. Specifically, the legislation
authorizes $100 million in democratic assistance to Serbia over
the course of the next 2 years. This is critically important.
We must help those who are trying to establish democracy in
their country.
I am pleased that the administration agrees with this
approach and I understand that tomorrow in Sarajevo the
President will announce that the United States will dedicate
$10 million for this purpose. I encourage the administration to
quickly identify appropriate organizations in Serbia so that
this money can begin to have an effect as soon as possible.
Milosevic must get this message: His days in power are over.
I believe we will soon be joined by Senator Biden and other
members, but without delay we will turn to you, Ambassador
Gelbard, and we welcome you and look forward to your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
Ambassador Gelbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
particularly for giving me the opportunity once again to appear
before the committee to discuss the status of our efforts on
democratization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
With your permission, sir, I would like to enter the full
text of my statement for the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection, we will receive that.
Ambassador Gelbard. This hearing comes at a moment of
particular importance for the future of Yugoslavia and for the
entire southeast European region. The success of the NATO air
campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the establishment of the
U.N. civil administration in Kosovo have left President
Slobodan Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited
domestically as well as internationally.
Milosevic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is now an
international pariah and an indicted war criminal. While he and
his regime remain in power in Belgrade, Serbia and the FRY
cannot take their place among the community of nations, nor can
they join the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, symbolized
tomorrow by the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo.
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly
articulated by President Clinton: As long as the Milosevic
regime is in place, the United States will provide no
reconstruction assistance to Serbia and we will continue our
policy of overall isolation. Although we continue to provide
the people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through
international organizations, like UNHCR, we cannot allow
Milosevic or his political cronies to benefit from our aid.
Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges would funnel
money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends,
prolonging the current regime and denying Serbia any hope of a
brighter future.
We must keep Milosevic isolated. Our European allies agree
fully with this approach. We are working closely with them to
coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any attempt at
weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.
Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support
the forces of democratic change that exist within Serbian
society. Serbia's citizens have spontaneously demonstrated
their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger for democratic
government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout the
country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking
advantage of the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have
organized their own rallies and are beginning to mobilize for a
larger effort in the fall. Serbia's independent media are also
attempting to struggle out from under the weight of a draconian
and repressive media law.
These are all very positive signs and we want to nurture
them. At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize
the possibility that the Milosevic regime will fall soon.
Milosevic continues to hold the main levers of power in his
hands, most importantly the army, the police, and the state-
owned media. Overcoming these obstacles would be difficult even
for a united opposition in Serbia, but, sadly, the Serbian
opposition remains far from united.
In all our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders--and I
am in regular contact with every segment of the democratic
opposition--we have urged them to overcome the politics of ego
and to work together instead for the common good of Serbia and
their people. I have repeatedly told opposition leaders--and I
want to emphasize here--that the United States and the
international community more broadly cannot do their job for
them.
Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the
outside, which means from us. We can buttress the opposition's
efforts. We can provide training and technical assistance to
opposition parties. We can even provide equipment, and we can
help widen the reach of the independent media. But we cannot
win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people.
That can only happen if the opposition unites around a
strong platform for positive change, a platform that must
emphasize the destructive nature of Milosevic's policies and
presents a viable democratic alternative.
It is not for us to pick a single winner out of the
opposition pack. It is for them to combine their different
strengths in service for the greater goal.
Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we
are focusing our efforts and in what ways we are promoting
democratization in the FRY. Regardless of whether Milosevic
stays or goes in the very short term, our support for
democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's and Yugoslavia's
future.
I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from
ground zero by any means here. In the 2 years leading up to the
Kosovo crisis we spent $16.5 million on programs in support of
Serbian democratization. The beginning of the conflict in
Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in Belgrade by
necessity cut short some of our programs, but we are now
revitalizing our democracy support as quickly as possible.
I would divide the U.S. Government's efforts on Serbia
democratization into five categories: First, as I noted at the
beginning, we are making sure that Milosevic remains completely
isolated. This involves not just our sanctions policy, which
means three levels of sanctions, starting with the outer wall,
the Kosovo-related sanctions starting a year and a half ago,
and then the wartime sanctions including the fuel embargo, but
also the visa ban, which has had a demonstrably negative effect
on members of the Milosevic regime psychologically and in real
terms, and of course The Hague Tribunal indictments.
Second, we are beginning to assist a wide array of
democratic groups, including NGO's, political parties,
independent media, youth organizations, and independent labor
unions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.
Third, we are consulting closely with European allies in
order to coordinate our activities both on Kosovo and on Serbia
democratization generally.
Fourth, we are encouraging the active engagement of
regional countries in southeast Europe and particularly the
neighbors, to harness their expertise with democratization and
transition.
Fifth, we are providing strong support for the reform
government in the FRY Republic Montenegro.
I would like to discuss briefly some of these tracks in
greater detail. As I mentioned, over the past 2 years U.S.
agencies such as AID, as well as NGO's such as the National
Democratic Institute, the International Republic Institute, and
the National Endowment for Democracy, have spent $16.5 million
on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance
and civil society in the FRY.
The situation this year was complicated by the outbreak of
the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in
the pipeline for immediate use on Serbian democratization
projects and we are using it right now. I am working closely
with the National Endowment family, including IRI and NDI, to
explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and,
crucially, to encourage all opposition groups to work together.
The consensus among the experts is that opposition parties
will be best served if we provide them with technical
assistance and first class political advice, the kind that may
seem commonplace to us but represents a whole different way of
thinking to them.
Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition
in Serbia. Youth and student organizations, as well as
independent labor unions, were very active in the 1996-97
demonstrations in Serbia and will undoubtedly be important
sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO's Solidarity
Center has done good work with independent unions in Serbia
and, with our support, is now readying a new program for
interaction.
On a larger economic scale, the Center for International
Private Enterprise is preparing a program aimed at business
leaders and independent economists in Serbia. Such economists,
particularly those grouped under the G-17 in Belgrade, are
widely respected and influential in Serbian society.
In short, by working with these groups we want to show the
people of Serbia that our policy is not aimed against them, but
against their leadership.
With regard to independent media, we are moving on two
fronts. First, in order to increase the amount of objective
news coverage reaching the Serbian population, we are nearing
completion of what we call the ``ring around Serbia,'' a
network of transmitters that permits us to broadcast Voice of
America, Radio Free Europe, and other international news
programs on FM frequencies throughout the country. RFE has now
increased its Serbian language broadcasting to 13\1/2\ hours
daily.
Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen
Serbia's own independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer
to get their news from their own sources in their own context.
To this end, AID together with other international donors is
reviewing a proposal by ANEM, the independent electronic media
network in Serbia, that would assist individual television and
radio stations, as well as create new links among them. Other
programs to train journalists, support local print
publications, and utilize Internet connections are also under
consideration.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, I would add, as you know, that the
administration does support the Serbian Democratization Act
sponsored by Senator Helms and you, Mr. Chairman, and 11
others.
The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I would
like to highlight is our cooperation with the Europeans. The
NATO alliance proved its strength during the Kosovo air
campaign and that solidary has continued to be the rule, not
the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular
consultations between Secretary Albright and her European
colleagues on issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia, as well
as periodic meetings at the expert level.
The Western Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia
and agree that isolating Milosevic must be the cornerstone of
our strategy. We have pushed back on some efforts to lift
selectively the oil embargo and provide fuel to opposition-
controlled municipalities in Serbia, not because we object to
helping opposition-run municipalities, but because oil is a
fungible commodity and its distribution in Serbia would
inevitably benefit Milosevic's regime.
The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to
promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their
democratization projects, as well as to ensure that we are all
sending the same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.
The third pillar of our policy is the effort to engage the
countries of southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization
process. Leaders of these countries will meet together with
Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in Sarajevo under the rubric of
the new Stability Pact for the region. At that meeting,
participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic
development and express their regret that the FRY cannot take
its rightful place at the summit because of the Milosevic
regime.
We believe the countries of central and southeast Europe,
with their vast experience in the transition to democratic and
market-oriented societies, have a great deal to offer the
people of the FRY. We are encouraging NGO's and governments in
the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia and
to share the benefits of the wisdom they have gained over the
past decade.
Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional
partners, we assign special importance to our cooperation with
and support for the Government of Montenegro. This morning I
noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing the
United States of neglecting Montenegro, which I find
astonishing in its absolute incorrectness and the fact that it
is totally wrong. We were not consulted on that editorial, of
course.
The fact is that over 2 years ago we recognized that Milo
Djukanovic had the potential to become an effective
counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I
began meeting with Djukanovic regularly even before he became
the President of Montenegro a year and a half ago. I was with
him during his inauguration when we felt that a strong
international presence, a public presence, would deter a
Milosevic-inspired coup. The U.S. provided $20 million in
budgetary support over the last several months, when no other
country stepped in to fill the gap, and we are prepared to do
more.
We established a joint economic working group to discuss
ways of modernizing the Montenegrin economy. We allowed
Montenegrin-owned ships to enter U.S. ports during the conflict
and we provided a blanket waiver from Montenegro from FRY-
related sanctions from the very beginning as a way of
stimulating their economy.
Djukanovic has managed to craft a multi-ethnic democratic
coalition government that focused on political and economic
reform and integration with the European mainstream. He and his
government have consistently demonstrated courage and
determination in implementing reform and in resisting
Belgrade's attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional
powers. As a result, we have steadily increased our support for
Montenegro, providing financial and technical assistance as
well as humanitarian assistance of many millions of dollars
through UNHCR.
Because the Government of Montenegro represents the most
credible and powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we
believe that President Djukanovic and Montenegro can play a
constructive role in promoting democratic change in Serbia,
too. While it is too small to change Serbia directly, it can
serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition.
What Montenegro needs now is support from their European
neighbors in concrete terms, and particularly the same kind of
sanctions waivers that we have provided all along. We have
urged the Europeans to take a more forward-leaning approach to
Montenegro and come through in concrete terms.
Mr. Chairman, it is clear that we have not reached the
point where we can say that Serbia is irreversibly on the road
to democracy. Our efforts now, however, can do two things. In
the short term, we can help the indigenous Serbian opposition
to focus their energies and more effectively articulate their
anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer
term, we can cultivate and strengthen these forces that will
carry the democracy banner as long as Milosevic remains in
power.
Both of these are important goals. U.S. leadership in this
endeavor is critical and your support is essential. As I said,
the proposed Serbian Democratization Act, which would authorize
$100 million over 2 years for democratization projects, is an
excellent example of the convergence of administration and
congressional perspectives on the Serbia democracy issue.
We look forward to working together with Congress to bring
democracy to Serbia and the entire Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and restore real stability to the region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gelbard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard
Thank you for giving me the opportunity once again to appear before
the committee to discuss the status of our efforts on democratization
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This hearing comes at a moment
of particular importance for Yugoslavia and for the entire Southeast
Europe region. The success of the NATO air campaign, the deployment of
KFOR, and the establishment of the UN civil administration in Kosovo
have left FRY President Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited
domestically. Milosevic is now an international pariah and an indicted
war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in Belgrade,
Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the community of
nations, nor can they join the process of Euro-Atlantic integration
symbolized this week by the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo.
u.s. policy
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated
by President Clinton. As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the
United States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia.
Although we continue to provide the people of Serbia with humanitarian
assistance through international organizations like UNHCR, we cannot
allow Milosevic or his political cronies to benefit from our aid.
Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges would funnel money
directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends, prolonging the
current regime and denying Serbia any hope of a brighter future. We
must keep Milosevic isolated. Our European allies agree fully with this
approach. We are working closely with them to coordinate our activities
on Serbia and to deter any attempt at weakening the existing sanctions
regime against the FRY.
Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces
of democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia's
citizens have spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic
and their hunger for democratic government by gathering in the streets
of cities throughout the country for the last several weeks. Opposition
parties, taking advantage of the popular sentiment against Milosevic,
have organized their own rallies and are beginning to mobilize for a
larger effort in the fall. Serbia's independent media are also
attempting to struggle out from under the weight of a draconian and
repressive media law. These are all very positive signs and we want to
nurture them.
At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the
possibility that the Milosevic regime will fall anytime soon. Milosevic
continues to hold the main levers of power in his hands, most
importantly the army, the police, and the state-owned media. Overcoming
these obstacles would be difficult even for a united opposition in
Serbia, and--sadly--the Serbian opposition remains far from united.
In all of our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders (and I am in
regular contact with every segment of the democratic opposition) we
have urged them to overcome the politics of ego and work together for
the common good of Serbia. I have told opposition leaders--and I want
to emphasize here--that the United States, and the international
community more broadly, cannot do their job for them. Change in Serbia
must come from within, not from the outside. We can buttress the
opposition's efforts, provide training and technical assistance to
opposition parties, and help widen the reach of the independent media,
but we cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people. That can
only happen if the opposition unites around a strong platform for
change, a platform that emphasizes the destructive nature of
Milosevic's policies and presents a viable democratic alternative. It
is not for us to pick a single winner out of the opposition pack; it is
for them to combine their different strengths in service of a greater
goal.
what we are doing
Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are
focusing our efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization
in the FRY. Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the short
term, our support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's
future.
I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero
by any means. In the two years leading up to the Kosovo crisis, we
spent 16.5 million dollars on programs in support of Serbia
democratization. The beginning of the conflict in Kosovo and the
subsequent closure of our embassy in Belgrade by necessity cut short
some of these programs, but we are now revitalizing our democracy
support as quickly as possible.
I would divide the U.S. government's efforts on Serbia
democratization into five categories:
first, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure that
Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just
our sanctions policy but the visa ban--which has had a
demonstrably negative impact on members of the Milosevic
regime--and ICTY indictments;
second, we are planning to assist a wide array of democratic
groups, including NGOs, political parties, independent media,
youth organizations and independent labor unions;
third, we are consulting closely with European allies in
order to coordinate our activities both on Kosovo and on Serbia
democratization generally;
fourth, we are encouraging the active engagement of regional
countries in Southeast Europe to harness their expertise with
democratization and transition;
and fifth, we are providing strong support for the reformist
government in the FRY republic of Montenegro.
I would like to discuss some of these tracks in greater detail.
assistance to democratic groups
As I mentioned, over the past two years, U.S. government agencies
such as USAID--as well as NGOs like NDI, IRI and the NED--have spent
16.5 million dollars on projects aimed at the development of democratic
governance and civil society in the FRY. The situation this year was
complicated by the outbreak of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still
have money available in the pipeline for immediate use on Serbian
democratization projects.
We are moving forward swiftly on a whole range of such projects. I
am working closely with the NED family, including IRI and NDI, to
explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and--crucially--to
encourage all opposition groups to work together. The consensus among
the experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we
provide them with technical assistance and first-class political
advice, the kind that may seem commonplace to us but represents a whole
different way of thinking to them.
Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in
Serbia. Youth and student organizations, as well as independent labor
unions, were very active in the 1996-97 demonstrations in Serbia and
will undoubtedly be important sources of mobilization in the future.
The AFL-CIO ``Solidarity Center'' has done good work with independent
unions in Serbia and, with our support, is now readying a new program
for interaction. On a larger economic scale, the Center for
International Private Enterprise is prepared to develop a program aimed
at business leaders and independent economists in Serbia. Such
economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in Belgrade, are
widely respected and influential in Serbian society. In short, by
working with these groups, we want to show the people of Serbia that
our policy is not aimed against them, but against their leadership.
With regard to independent media in Serbia, we are moving on two
fronts. First, in order to increase the amount of objective news
coverage reaching the Serbian population, we are nearing completion of
the ``Ring Around Serbia,'' a network of transmitters that will permit
us to broadcast VOA, RFE and other international news programs on FM
frequencies throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian-
language broadcasting to 13\1/2\ hours daily. Perhaps even more
important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia's own independent
media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from their own
sources, in their own context. To this end, USAID, together with other
international donors, is reviewing a proposal by ANEM (the independent
electronic media network in Serbia) that would assist individual
television and radio stations as well as create new links among them.
Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications,
and utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.
working with allies
The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I would like to
highlight is our cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance
proved its strength during the Kosovo air campaign, and that solidarity
has continued to be the rule, not the exception, in the post-conflict
period. There are regular consultations between Secretary Albright and
her European colleagues on issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia, as
well as periodic meetings at the expert level.
The Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia and agree that
isolating Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy. We have
pushed back on some European efforts to selectively lift the oil
embargo and provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in
Serbia--not because we object to helping opposition-run municipalities
but because oil is a fungible commodity and its distribution in Serbia
would inevitably benefit Milosevic's regime. The Europeans, like us,
are seeking the best ways to promote democracy in Serbia. They are
eager to coordinate their democratization projects as well as to ensure
that we are all sending the same message of unity to the Serbian
opposition.
working with the region
The third pillar of our Serbia policy is the effort to engage the
countries of Southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process.
Leaders of SE European countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic
leaders tomorrow in Sarajevo under the rubric of the new Stability Pact
for the region. At that meeting, participants will reaffirm their
commitment to democratic development and express their regret that the
FRY cannot take its rightful place at the summit because of the
undemocratic nature of the Milosevic regime. We believe that the
countries of central and southeast Europe, with their vast experience
in the transition to democratic and market-oriented societies, have a
great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging NGOs and
governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in
Serbia and to share the benefits of the wisdom they have gained over
the past decade.
montenegro
Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners,
we assign special importance to our cooperation with and support for
Montenegro.
This morning I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal
accusing the U.S. of neglecting Montenegro, which I regard as both
factually incorrect and fundamentally wrong. The fact is that over two
years ago we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to
become an effective counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian
policies. I began meeting with Djukanovic regularly even before he
became the President of Montenegro; I was with him during his
inauguration when we felt that a strong international presence would
deter a Milosevic-inspired coup; the U.S. provided 20 million dollars
in budgetary support when no other country stepped in to fill the gap;
we established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of
modernizing the Montenegrin economy; we allowed Montenegrin-owned ships
to enter U.S. ports; and we provided a blanket waiver for Montenegro
from FRY-related sanctions from the very beginning.
Djukanovic managed to craft a multi-ethnic, democratic coalition
government that focused on political and economic reform and
integration with the European mainstream. Djukanovic and his government
have consistently demonstrated courage and determination in
implementing reforms and in resisting Belgrade's attempts to strip
Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result, we have steadily
increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial and technical
assistance as well as humanitarian assistance worth millions through
UNHCR.
Because the government of Montenegro represents the most credible
and powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe that
Montenegro can play a constructive role in promoting democratic change
in Serbia. While Montenegro is to small to change Serbia directly, it
can serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition. What
Montenegro needs now is support from their European neighbors in
concrete terms, and in particular the same kind of sanctions waiver
that we provided all along. We have urged the Europeans to take a more
forward-leaning approach to Montenegro.
conclusion
It is clear we have not yet reached the point where we can say that
Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democracy. Our efforts now,
however, can do two things. In the short term, we can help the
indigenous Serbian opposition to focus its energies and more
effectively articulate the anger and frustration of the Serbian public.
In the longer term, we can cultivate and strengthen those forces that
will carry the democracy banner as long as Milosevic remains in power.
Both of these are important goals. U.S. leadership in this endeavor
will be critical, and your support will be essential. The proposed
Helms Democracy Act, which would authorize 100 million dollars over two
years for democratization projects, is a good example of the
convergence of Administration and Congressional perspectives on the
Serbia democracy issue. We look forward to working together with
Congress to bring democracy to Serbia and restore real stability to the
region.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Ambassador Gelbard.
Before we turn to you, Ambassador Pardew, we are pleased to
be joined by my colleague Senator Biden. We would love to hear
your comments.
Senator Biden. I would ask unanimous consent that my
statement be placed in the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Senator Biden. Then I will be commenting.
Senator Smith. All right.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important
hearing. I can think of no subject that is more timely than the
prospects for democracy in Yugoslavia.
I believe this Committee is doing a real service to the American
people through the detailed analysis the expert witnesses and Senators
will offer.
It is easy to fall into the trap of personalizing politics--of
tracing every development to an individual and minimizing, or ignoring,
larger societal factors.
But there is no denying that for more than a decade Slobodan
Milosevic has exercised a dominant influence on the destiny of Serbia,
and of Yugoslavia.
There is no doubt that Serbian nationalism is one of the strongest
and deepest in Europe.
It is also true that ever since the founding of the first Yugoslav
state--the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes--in 1918, there have
been bitter antagonisms and quarrels among the various peoples in
Yugoslavia.
But, Mr. Chairman, it is also true that a far-sighted statesman,
concerned with the well-being of his country rather than his own
personal agenda, could have steered a positive course of economic and
political reform.
Instead, Milosevic turned to demagogy, playing on ethnic fears and
discontent, and tapping into Serbian ultra-nationalism in order to
climb to power in Serbia.
Then, once firmly established as the unchallenged boss of Serbia,
he cynically provoked successive crises in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Kosovo in order to hold onto power by distracting
public attention from his corrupt mismanagement of the Serbian economy
and state.
What have been the results of Milosevic's brutal policies?
The grim human legacy is hundreds of thousands of dead Croats,
Bosniaks, Serbs, Albanians, and others.
In political terms, instead of the ``Greater Serbia'' that
Milosevic tried to create, centuries of Serbian culture in the Krajina
have been eradicated, the cradle of Serbian civilization in Kosovo is
in grave danger, and Serbian-ruled territory threatens to be reduced to
the borders of last century's Pashalik of Belgrade.
As a result of Milosevic's latest ill-fated adventure in Kosovo,
much of Serbia's infrastructure now lies in twisted ruins.
Serbian citizens are already chopping wood in preparation for what
promises to be a cruel, unheated winter.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe for a minute that the majority of
Serbs, if they had been given the facts, would have voted for a policy
of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
The brave mayor of the Serbian town of Cack recently accused
Milosevic of having shamed Serbia's name before the entire world.
Leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church have voiced similar sentiments.
Considering all these developments, one would think that the time
was ripe for getting rid of Milosevic.
It may well be. The problem, of course, is that the opposition
forces appear to remain as fragmented as they proved to be in the
spring of 1997.
I will leave it to our expert witnesses to pursue this topic in
detail. I hope I am not unduly pessimistic about the chances of the
various opposition groups' uniting.
Yesterday this Committee passed the ``Serbia Democracy Act of
1999,'' which, among other measures, authorizes one hundred million
dollars in assistance over the next two years to promote democracy and
civil society in Serbia and to help the reformist government of
Montenegro.
Tomorrow the leaders of the United States, of Western European
countries, and of all the countries of the Balkans except Milosevic
will meet in Sarajevo to discuss a Southeast Europe Stability Pact,
which is supposed to provide a regional framework for economic
reconstruction.
But, I submit, the sine qua non for regional development in the
Balkans is a democratic government in Belgrade that is tolerant of, and
willing to cooperate with, its neighbors.
That, of course, can only happen if Slobodan Milosevic leaves the
scene. At long last the West has come to the conclusion that instead of
being part of the solution to the Yugoslav Problem, Milosevic is that
problem. Our governments have been slow learners, but I suppose
``better late than never.''
Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for holding this hearing. I look
forward to hearing the testimonies of our two panels of witnesses and
to having the opportunity to ask them questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. PARDEW, JR., DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR KOSOVO AND
DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION
Ambassador Pardew. Mr. Chairman, I too have a brief
statement that I would like to submit for the record.
Senator Smith. We would be pleased to receive that.
Ambassador Pardew. I am grateful for this opportunity to
discuss with you today our efforts to promote democracy in
Kosovo. The movement toward democracy is key to promoting U.S.
interests of regional stability in southeastern Europe.
Secretary Albright was in Kosovo today meeting with
representatives of the international community and the people
of Kosovo to promote our objectives. Tomorrow she will join
President Clinton and more than three dozen other world leaders
at the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo to emphasize our
interest in a stable, prosperous, and democratic southeastern
Europe.
Democracy in Kosovo must be built from the ground up. It
must rise literally from the ashes of a savage campaign of
destruction and murder waged by Milosevic's forces. And it must
rely ultimately on the Kosovar Albanian population, which has
been prohibited for more than a decade from participating in
the existing structures of government, structures that were
themselves undemocratic.
But we cannot forget that in the time since Belgrade
revoked Kosovo's autonomy Kosovar Albanians built and managed
their own shadow government institutions. Despite the horrors
of recent conflict, therefore, a basis for self-government
already exists, but it must be revived, guided, and allowed to
move toward true multi-ethnic democracy.
Our immediate steps in meeting this challenge have been
achieved. First, Serb forces responsible for carrying out the
systematic campaign of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo have been driven from the province by NATO's successful
air campaign. Second, more than 700,000 of approximately
800,000 refugees driven out of Kosovo by Milosevic have been
able to return more rapidly than anyone imagined and have begun
to rebuild their lives. Third, the international security force
and civil administration called for in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1244 under NATO and the United Nations are being
established.
KFOR currently has about 35,600 troops from 20 nations,
including 5,600 U.S. forces, in Kosovo. KFOR is rapidly
establishing the secure environment necessary for political and
economic development in the province in the future.
The U.N. mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK, is making steady
progress in deploying civil administrators, civilian police,
and judicial authorities to the field under difficult
circumstances. UNMIK has a powerful mandate, one sufficient to
create the foundation for a democratic society. Nevertheless,
there is still a long way to go, and we are urging the U.N. and
contributing countries to deploy their resources and personnel
to Kosovo as quickly as possible.
About 700 international staff are already on the ground,
including more than 160 civilian police. Approximately 50
Kosovar judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys have already
been appointed, and civilian personnel continue to move in to
fill positions within the U.N. administration.
Last Sunday, UNMIK issued its regulation No. 1, which
specifies that all legislative and executive authority in
Kosovo is vested in UNMIK, and it lays out how that authority
is to be exercised.
For our part, we are moving to place American officials in
leadership positions within UNMIK and to commit personnel and
resources to the programs that would be crucial to future
democracy in Kosovo. An experienced American diplomat, Jock
Covey, is in Kosovo as the principal deputy to the U.N.
Secretary General's Special Representative Bernard Kouchner. We
have placed Americans in a number of other key UNMIK positions.
Further, if the Congress approves we intend to open a U.S.
office in Pristina that enables us to engage directly with the
international agencies, Kosovar leaders and citizens.
The effort to promote democracy in Kosovo has several
components. The most urgent item on UNMIK's agenda is the
establishment of a civilian police force that will assume
responsibility for law and order. The U.N. intends to deploy
3,100 international civil police in Kosovo, the largest
international civilian police operation in which the U.S. has
participated. The UNMIK civilian police will be armed and will
have arrest authority. The U.S. has committed 450 of those
civilian police.
As these police deploy, the OSCE will begin to train the
Kosovar police of about 3,000, which will eventually take over
responsibility for civilian policing. The U.S. is playing a
leading role in this effort as well. An American has been
appointed to head the police training academy. Nearly 6,000
applications have already been received from the Kosovar public
for membership in this police force. The site for the police
academy has been identified and the first class should begin
training next month.
No less important than police in the long run is the prompt
establishment of a judicial system and a human rights
monitoring regime. The U.S. is working closely with the U.N.
and OSCE to develop a comprehensive coordinated approach to
implementing a justice system that operates under UNMIK
authority, but that is staffed by Kosovar judges and attorneys.
In order to avoid a cycle of revenge and to foster an
atmosphere of reconciliation, the U.S. has nominated 21
qualified human rights monitors as part of the OSCE contingent
of more than 100 who will monitor and protect human rights of
all Kosovars, whatever their ethnicity or religion.
We pushed hard and successfully for the creation of a human
rights ombudsperson in Kosovo, and we intend to provide
manpower and resources to support that office. In addition, we
have pledged $9 million for the ICTY to ensure that the work of
the War Crimes Tribunal in Kosovo can be carried forward.
Further down the road, democratization in Kosovo will
require an active, pluralistic political life, free and fair
elections, and self-government. We have no intention of seeing
one single-party system replace another. In that regard, UNMIK
is establishing local and national councils which are intended
to guarantee the broadest possible citizen participation in the
process of creating self-government in Kosovo.
Though Serbs and Albanians have at one time or another
boycotted the work of these councils, they remain essential to
building the conditions in which democracy can take root. In
her meeting today in Kosovo, Secretary Albright has emphasized
to both Albanians and Serbs the need to participate fully and
to make these councils work.
We are also working with the United Nations, the OSCE, and
other international organizations to foster political party
development and support training programs for civil
administrators. Our goal is to hold local and Kosovo-wide
elections as soon as possible.
The fostering of independent and responsible media is
another indispensable part of building democracy and civil
society in Kosovo. In addition to our continuing assistance to
indigenous media there, I am pleased to note that an American,
Doug Davidson, has been named to be head of OSCE's Division of
Media Affairs, which will have the responsibility for promoting
the development of responsible independent media in Kosovo.
The most urgent task is to get Radio-TV Pristina operating,
not as the mouthpiece of one party and one ethnic group, but as
an independent, nonpartisan voice of all the people of Kosovo.
Radio Pristina was on the air yesterday afternoon for the first
time since the beginning of the NATO air campaign, broadcasting
news and features in both Albanian and Serbian.
The commitments that I have just listed are essential to
the creation of a peaceful democratic Kosovo, which is a
critical element of U.S. interests in Europe. In the end,
however, the establishment of democracy will depend on the
people of Kosovo themselves.
Our overall objective is to see Kosovo, a democratic
Serbia, and the whole of southeastern Europe as an integral
part of an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. For we
have learned from the history of this century that without
stability in southeastern Europe the continent as a whole will
not be peaceful. And we have learned from the history of the
last 10 years that without peace, a democratic peace, in Kosovo
there can be no stability in southeastern Europe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardew follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador James W. Pardew, Jr.
I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today our
efforts to promote democracy in Kosovo. Movement toward democracy is
key to promoting the U.S. interest of regional stability in
southeastern Europe. Secretary Albright is in Kosovo today meeting with
representatives of the international community and the people of Kosovo
to promote our objectives. Tomorrow she will join President Clinton and
more than three dozen other world leaders at the Stability Pact summit
in Sarajevo to emphasize our interest in a stable, prosperous, and
democratic southeastern Europe.
Democracy in Kosovo must be built from the ground up. It must rise
literally from the ashes of a savage campaign of destruction and murder
waged by Milosevic's forces. And it must rely ultimately on a Kosovar
Albanian population which has been prohibited for more than a decade
from participating in the existing structures of government--structures
that were themselves undemocratic. But we should not forget that, in
the time since Belgrade revoked Kosovo's autonomy, Kosovar Albanians
built and managed their own ``shadow government'' institutions. Despite
the horrors of the recent conflict, therefore, a basis for self-
government already exists. But it must be revived, guided, and allowed
to move toward true multi-ethnic democracy.
Our immediate steps in meeting this challenge have been achieved.
First, the Serb forces responsible for carrying out a systematic
campaign of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo have been driven
from the province by NATO's successful air campaign. Second, more than
700,000 out of the approximately 800,000 refugees driven out of Kosovo
by Milosevic have been able to return more rapidly than anyone
imagined, and have begun to rebuild their lives. Third, the
international security force and civil administration called for in
UNSC resolution 1244, under NATO and the UN, are being established.
KFOR currently has about 35,500 troops from twenty one nations,
including 5,596 U.S. forces, in Kosovo. KFOR is rapidly establishing
the secure environment necessary for political and economic development
in the province.
The UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is making steady progress in
deploying civil administrators, civilian police and judicial
authorities to the field under extremely daunting circumstances. UNMIK
has a powerful mandate, one sufficient to create the foundation for a
democratic society. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go, and
we are urging the UN and contributing countries to deploy their
resources and personnel to Kosovo as quickly as possible.
About 700 international staff are already on the ground, including
more than 160 civilian police; approximately 50 judges, prosecutors and
defense attorneys have already been appointed; and civilian personnel
continue to move in and fill positions within the UN administration.
Last Sunday, UNMIK issued its regulation number one, which specifies
that all legislative and executive authority in Kosovo is vested in
UNMIK, and lays out how that authority will be exercised.
For our part, we are moving to place American officials in
leadership positions within UNMIK and to commit personnel and resources
to the programs that will be crucial for the future of democracy in
Kosovo. An experienced American diplomat, Jock Covey, is in Kosovo as
the principal deputy to the UN Secretary General's Special
Representative Bernard Kouchner; we have placed Americans in a number
of other key UNMIK positions; further, if the Congress approves, we
intend to open a U.S. office in Pristina that enables us to engage
directly with international agencies, Kosovar leaders and citizens.
There are four pillars to UNMIK's operations in Kosovo. One is
humanitarian, under the UNHCR, which is up and running, providing
urgent humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs. Then there is
reconstruction, to be led by the European Union, which held its first
donors conference yesterday in Brussels. A third pillar is interim
civil administration. And last, but certainly not least, is institution
building, which is the responsibility of the OSCE.
The effort to promote democracy in Kosovo has several components.
The most urgent item on UNMIK's agenda is the establishment of a
civilian police force that will assume responsibility for law and
order. The UN intends to deploy 3,100 international civilian police in
Kosovo--the largest international civilian police operation in which
the U.S. has ever participated. The UNMIK civilian police will be armed
and will have arrest authority. The U.S. has committed to provide 450
of those police.
As these police deploy, the OSCE will begin training the Kosovar
police force of 3,000 which will eventually take over responsibility
for civilian policing. The U.S. is playing a leading role in this
effort as well. An American (Steve Bennett) has been appointed to head
the police training academy; nearly 6,000 applications have already
been received; the site for the academy has been identified; and the
first class should begin training next month.
No less important than police in the long run is the prompt
establishment of a judicial system and a human rights monitoring
regime. The U.S. is working closely with the UN and OSCE to develop a
comprehensive, coordinated approach to implementing a justice system
that operates under UNMIK authority, but that is staffed by Kosovar
judges and attorneys.
In order to avoid a cycle of revenge and to foster an atmosphere of
reconciliation, the U.S. has nominated 21 qualified human rights
monitors as part of the OSCE's contingent of more than 100 who will
monitor and protect the human rights of all Kosovars, whatever their
ethnicity or religion. We pushed hard and successfully for the creation
of a human rights ombudsperson in Kosovo, and we intend to provide
manpower and resources in support of that office, which will be under
the aegis of the UN. In addition, we have pledged nine million dollars
for the ICTY to ensure that the work of the War Crimes Tribunal in
Kosovo can be carried forward.
Further down the road, democratization in Kosovo will require an
active, pluralistic political life, free and fair elections, and self-
government. We have no intention of seeing one single-party system
replace another. In that regard, UNMIK is establishing local and
national councils which are intended to guarantee the broadest possible
citizen participation in the process of creating self-government in
Kosovo. Though both Serbs and Albanians have at one time or another
boycotted the work of these councils, they remain essential to the
building of conditions in which democracy can take root. In her
meetings today in Kosovo, Secretary Albright has emphasized to both
Albanians and Serbs the need to participate fully and make these
councils work.
We are also working with the UN, the OSCE, and other international
organizations to foster political party development and support
training programs for civil administrators. Our goal is to hold local
and Kosovo-wide elections as soon as possible.
The fostering of independent and responsible media is another
indispensable part of building democracy and civil society in Kosovo.
In addition to our continuing assistance to indigenous media there, I
am pleased to note that an American (Douglas Davidson) has just been
named to head the OSCE's Division of Media Affairs, which will have
responsibility for promoting the development of responsible independent
media in Kosovo. Their most urgent task is to get radio/TV Pristina
operating, not as the mouthpiece of one party and one ethnic group but
as an independent, nonpartisan voice of all the people of Kosovo. Radio
Pristina was on the air yesterday afternoon for the first time since
the beginning of the NATO air campaign, broadcasting news and features
in both Albanian and Serbian.
The commitments I have just listed are essential to the creation of
a peaceful, democratic Kosovo, which is a critical element of the
overall U.S. interest in a Europe that is united and free. In the end,
however, the establishment of democracy will depend upon the people of
Kosovo themselves.
Our overall objective is to see Kosovo, a democratic Serbia, and
the whole of southeastern Europe as an integral part of an undivided,
democratic, peaceful Europe. For we have learned from the history of
this century that without stability in southeastern Europe, the
continent as a whole will not be peaceful; and we have learned from the
history of the last ten years that without peace--a democratic peace--
in Kosovo, there can be no stability in southeastern Europe.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Ambassador Pardew.
Ambassador Gelbard, I wonder if Balkan ghosts are so alive
even in Serbia that these opposition forces can actually unite
to extricate Mr. Milosevic. What are the odds? I mean, do you
see it happening?
There is a number of parties here, Mr. Draskovic and Mr.
Djindjic. Can they put aside personal ambition for national
good in this effort?
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, one thing I
have learned after a number of years working in the Balkans is
that I do not give odds. I like to be pleasantly surprised if
that should happen.
The biggest obstacle right now, as I said, has been the
fractiousness of some elements of the opposition and the
possibility that they may not have learned from the mistakes
they committed in the past, where they allowed their egos,
personal differences, and perhaps even some ideological
differences to get in the way from achieving the ultimate goal
that they all say they desire.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, and as Senator Biden knows very
well, the Zajedno group blew their opportunity during the
winter of 1996-97 when they had victory in their hands. A
principal reason for that was indeed personality differences
between Draskovic and Djindjic. Over the last year and a half,
some elements of the opposition appear to have learned from
this. Several coalition groups have developed in a very
positive way, including the Alliance for Change, the Alliance
for Democratic Political Parties, and others, and their message
appears to be a constructive one, a forward-looking one about
the future that could be that of Serbia and the FRY.
Our message to the opposition has been that this time they
need to learn from the mistakes of the past, because they have
such an extraordinary opportunity now, and they need to find a
way, if they cannot construct a single opposition front, then
at least to develop a loose coalition that follows the same
line and to avoid undercutting each other.
There have been a number of non-aggression pacts signed
among opposition groups and parties so far. That is a positive
sign, and we think it is critical that they continue to move
forward on this kind of code of conduct, as well as similar
platforms in their demonstrations as they move forward.
Senator Smith. As you look into the future and you think of
Montenegro and what they are doing, is Montenegro something of
a model for how Kosovo could develop? Is Montenegro likely to
go independent as well?
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first, we have, as I said in my
written testimony, continued to point to the government, the
ruling party, the ruling coalition in Montenegro, as the right
kind of example for Serbia, in the sense that they have
developed a multi-ethnic democratic coalition, which
incidentally includes Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, Bosniacs,
lots of others.
In that sense, we would hope that the Serbian political
parties and NGO's, labor unions and the like, could learn from
this. It is very interesting for me that Serb opposition
leaders really look up to President Djukanovic, not just
because he is six five, but because he is somebody who clearly
has demonstrated a willingness and an ability to construct a
democratic coalition that functions and that pursues free
market economic policies.
So we certainly hope that, whether it is the people of
Serbia and their leadership, their political parties, or in
Kosovo, that this can be a kind of example. At the same time,
our preference, of course, strong preference, as I repeatedly
told President Djukanovic, is for Montenegro to remain an
integral part of the FRY.
Senator Smith. Is that likely, or what do you expect will
happen?
Ambassador Gelbard. President Djukanovic is looking for a
fairer deal under the constitution that exists. The
constitution itself is not bad; it has been the way Milosevic
has twisted it over the last 7 or 8 years. Djukanovic is now
looking for more autonomy under this constitution as a way of
keeping Montenegro inside of Yugoslavia, and we do not disagree
with that.
We want to continue to see Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia
and we feel that a country made up of equal republics is a
reasonable and decent way to go.
Senator Smith. Ambassador Pardew, without a democratic
change in Belgrade, though, is it realistic for Kosovo to be a
truly autonomous province in Serbia?
Ambassador Pardew. In the long run we must have a
democratic change in Belgrade. We are going to do everything
that we possibly can to create the institutions of democracy in
Kosovo, without regard to what happens in Belgrade.
But you are right, there are limits to how far you can go
with the current regime in Belgrade. So I agree with you.
Senator Smith. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, they are both good statements, I
believe. There is so much to ask. Let me start by picking up
where the chairman left off. Montenegro has basically issued an
ultimatum to Serbia, which says: We want greater autonomy, we
want to be able to conduct relations with other countries
without Belgrade's interference. They set a deadline for that
to occur. They are going to hold a referendum. That has been
pushed back, as I understand it, until September.
I do not know where that goes. If Milosevic accedes to
that, he demonstrates he has even less power than he is trying
to portray. And if he does not, there is nothing he can do to
stop what Montenegro is going to do.
Would you comment on that, Ambassador Gelbard?
Ambassador Gelbard. First, under the constitution of the
FRY, the Federal constitution, and under Montenegro's
constitution they do have certain rights which go further than
we would normally expect part of a sovereign state to have. For
example, they do have legitimately their own foreign minister
and ability to conduct some foreign policy functions
constitutionally.
They also have the right to have a referendum on
independence under their constitution. My sense is that right
now the vote would not go in favor of independence. But what is
very clear, Senator, is that Milosevic has been the one who has
pushed the Montenegrin people in this direction over the course
of the last 2 years.
As I mentioned in my testimony, Milosevic and his puppet,
the former president of Montenegro, Momir Buledovic, tried to
overthrow Djukanovic before he was inaugurated as President on
June 15, 1998. They also increased the size of the army, the
VJ, in Montenegro during the conflict in Kosovo from 9,500,
which is its usual size, up to 40,000 by adding on reservists
and some other regular army personnel.
There was a very delicate dance that took place there
between the VJ and the police, which come under the Montenegrin
Government. I think Milosevic knew that if the army tried to
overthrow Djukanovic there was likely to be civil war. The army
was likely to fracture and the police are quite strong.
Nonetheless, the Montenegrin Government is showing prudence
in how it is trying to proceed. Djukanovic by his own public
statements has said that he does not want independence. What he
wants is equal opportunity inside of the FRY.
Senator Biden. But he has threatened a referendum, has he
not?
Ambassador Gelbard. He has threatened a referendum, which,
as I said, is legitimate under their constitution. So I would
not want to give you a hypothetical answer about where this is
going, but Djukanovic is trying to keep his coalition together.
He is trying to cope with a significantly increased percentage
of the population who are now tremendously frustrated by
Milosevic's boycotts and blockades against the Montenegrin
people. I think President Djukanovic deserves a great deal of
credit for trying to walk a very delicate line right now even
as he is trying to stay inside Yugoslavia.
Senator Biden. That's a great non-answer, and I appreciate
it very much. Since I am not a diplomat most people forget what
I have to say anyway.
Ambassador Gelbard. I never do, Senator.
Senator Biden. Djukanovic is looking to cut himself a deal
so he gets a major piece of the reconstruction that is going to
go on in the Balkans. Serbia cannot block access now. Boycotts
are not going to matter.
I wonder how this is playing in Belgrade. Who is more
afraid of a referendum; Serbia or Djukanovic? But you have
answered as you probably should.
Ambassador Pardew, we talk about supporting a free and open
media. How do we do that?
Ambassador Pardew. We work primarily through
nongovernmental organizations. We have established, as
Ambassador Gelbard mentioned, ring around Serbia, which is
using international broadcasts, but we are offering that to
independent voices in Serbia. We are using international
facilities and making them available to independent groups.
Senator Biden. Let me put it another way. We can make
facilities available. Are we prepared to shut down facilities
that spew propaganda?
Ambassador Pardew. We have, Senator.
Senator Smith. We have. This is the long haul.
Ambassador Pardew, During the war, during the conflict in
Kosovo, we and our allies----
Senator Biden. No, I know that. I am asking, I want to know
from now.
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, as far as I am aware, Serb
television is still being cutoff the EUTELSAT facilities, and
we have made sure that whenever they made an attempt--and there
was a brief moment when they got back on another satellite--we
shut them off those.
What we are really trying to do, the use of the
international facilities that Ambassador Pardew referred to,
particularly RFE, RL, and the ring around Serbia, is a
temporary measure. What we are trying to do over the long term
is support an alternative indigenous voice for the Serbian
people through mechanisms such as ANEM, the network of
independent radio and television.
We have funds available that we were just about to deliver
when the conflict broke out and Milosevic switched them off.
But we have funds available that we are on the verge of
providing to them again so that independent television and
radio can be augmented throughout Serbia. We are supporting
Montenegrin television and radio so that they can be another
voice for the Serb opposition and the Serb people, as well as
of course for the Montenegrin people. And we are looking at
other means to really augment the capability or startup again
the capability of free Serbian voices inside of Serbia.
Ambassador Pardew. Can I add to that, Senator?
Senator Biden. Yes.
Ambassador Pardew. The international community is promoting
the printing of newspapers, previously printed in Kosovo, in
Macedonia. Those papers are distributed in Kosovo free of
charge. You will hear later from John Fox of the Soros
Foundation. They have been instrumental in putting funding into
independent radio in Kosovo. We encourage that.
The former Serbian radio and TV in Pristina has been taken
over by the international community and we have denied access
to one group to insure no single group dominates broadcasting.
We do not want a single voice in Kosovo, and we will ensure
that there are multiple voices to be heard.
So there are a range of programs ongoing in Kosovo, as Bob
mentioned.
Senator Biden. What can we do inside Serbia? For example,
doesn't Draskovic continue to deny access to Studio B?
Ambassador Gelbard. No, he has actually given access to
Studio B--excuse me, given access of Studio B to Radio B-92. My
understanding is that Radio B-92, one of the independent
voices, has just re-opened as Radio B-2-92.
We want Draskovic to open up Studio B to the rest of the
opposition and that is a message that he will be getting from
us in the next few days.
Senator Biden. The last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Sure.
Senator Biden. We all say, myself included, that ultimately
there is no long-term integration of the Balkans into an
undivided Europe until Milosevic goes. I wonder whether we are
saying that too much these days, myself included. Let me be
more precise.
As long as there is success in Sarajevo, the commitments
are real, the civilian police force is put in place, the media
is not dominated, the reconstruction of Kosovo and Macedonia
and Montenegro and the surrounding areas really begins in
earnest, with the European community taking the lead, I do not
know what Serbia can do under Milosevic's leadership that can
affect whether or not we succeed in that part.
In other words, I agree that until the Serbian people have
come to terms with their leadership and what was done you
cannot have a solution here. I do not however know what
Milosevic and an antagonistic Serbia can do to affect about 500
things we have got to do in the meantime to begin to put
together economically and politically a larger plan for the
Balkans.
Am I missing something here?
Ambassador Gelbard. Senator, I believe that Milosevic has
an infinite capability for creating damage. Even while he had
so many problems at home, he tried to overthrow the Dodec
government, the moderate Bosnian Serb Government in Republika
Srpska. We were able to stymie that and Dodec and his
government emerged strong after the conflict.
Senator Biden. But what about his ability to provide force
to back up any effort to provide assistance?
Ambassador Gelbard. He still has the capability of
providing force, not in Bosnia, but in Montenegro. And in his
own perverse way----
Senator Biden. How can he do that? Be specific?
Ambassador Gelbard. Through the army.
Senator Biden. If in fact that occurs, I cannot imagine
that the international community and KFOR will not come down on
that effort like a gosh-darn mountainside being blown up. I do
not understand that. Is there any doubt on the part of the
alliance that if there is use of military force, of the VJ, in
Montenegro that we will not use all force available to us to
take them out?
Senator Smith. Or are you telling us that we will not?
Ambassador Gelbard. I am not certain that that is something
which is in--that is not necessarily in NATO's agreed NATO
action at this point or when the current mandate terminates.
What I worry about is that Milosevic survives by creating
trouble. He is in the worst trouble he has ever been. He is in
a corner. The economy has collapsed totally. Real wages were at
the same level as the early 1950's before the conflict and
right now they have virtually no reserves left. But this is why
it is imperative to see a change in the regime, to have
democratic government arrive in Belgrade as a way of having the
region whole. That is why we consider that to be an imperative
in our foreign policy.
Senator Biden. As you know, there has been no one you have
known in Congress to be more supportive of arriving at that
conclusion than I. But I like to think of myself as a realist.
The idea that we are going to produce a democratic government
in Serbia between now and the end of the year is about as
likely as this podium getting up and walking to the back of the
room.
What I want to sort of disabuse everybody of here is a new
State Department-arrived at notion that through State
Department speak we are going to arrive at something that is
not possible. The most likely way to catch Milosevic is by
literally going in, getting him and dragging him to The Hague.
If we had a brain in our collective heads, that is what we
would do.
But we are not going to do that because our European
friends lack the will, and we will lack the willingness to push
that initiative forcefully.
So I just hope we make it clear that the idea that he may
be alive and well in Serbia does not impede us from pursuing
all our other objectives in the meantime. If they want to
wither on the vine and die, so be it.
Which takes me to a question relating to, humanitarian
financial assistance. We are not providing financial assistance
or reconstruction aid, but rather humanitarian assistance. I
think that is a very fine line to draw. We should be very aware
that his ability to create mischief and gain credibility will
relate to how tightly we monitor that.
How do we prevent Milosevic from claiming credit for
Western assistance to Serbia, particularly when the media is
still not a free media? I am not asking you to respond because
it is unfair. If you would like to, I welcome it. But I think
this is not over until he is gone. But we cannot assume as long
as he is gone we can hedge our assessment of what we are able
to do outside of Serbia.
Senator Smith. I would like to follow onto what Senator
Biden is saying here. One of the reasons that I voted to
support President Clinton and the allies in this action in
Kosovo was my belief that if Milosevic could work this kind of
mischief we would be pinned down in Bosnia for a long, long,
long time, and that by defanging his military we could go home
earlier.
Is that a naive belief on my part?
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first to answer Senator Biden's
question----
Senator Smith. And by the way, I think he is going to
commit mischief if we are saying that we are not willing to do
anything.
Ambassador Gelbard. First to answer Senator Biden, though.
Senator, I agree with you. That is why we are continuing to
push ahead on all other initiatives and we are working with the
Europeans on the Stability Pact, which is a regional effort, a
regional approach regarding democracy, security, and economic
development. That is what we feel it has to be, a regional
focus on every place.
The line, the fine line you ask about, I agree with you
again. That is why, again, we are not trying to play games on
the issue of assistance. We are saying humanitarian assistance
means food and medicine. We have looked at other types of
possible assistance, but we feel, as I said in my statement,
that it is imperative to maintain the isolation with the three
layers of sanctions: the outer wall, the Kosovo-related
sanctions, and the wartime sanctions.
President Clinton and the administration, the entire
administration, feel very strongly that we should be
maintaining all these sanctions as a way of maintaining this
type of isolation because, you are right, it would be very easy
to begin to blur the line. I know, as you know, Senator, there
are countries out there that are interested in moving over
different lines over time.
Senator Biden. I am worried about us setting the bar so
high that we build in failure if a year from now there is not
democracy in Serbia after we keep talking about democratic
forces. There are not any democratic forces in Serbia now.
Draskovic is not a democracy.
I think we should be honest about this. There is a big
difference between clearing the bridge debris out of the Danube
so our allies can use it, and building the new bridge. I will
clear it. I will do everything in my power to make sure there
is not a cent that can be spent to build it.
I think they have to come to the realization of what they
have enabled Milosevic to do. Until there are democratic forces
there, I do not know who to give the $100 million we voted for
to. I know what I would like to give it to.
But we Americans tend to think, whether it was Ronald
Reagan in Latin America or ourselves in the Balkans, that there
is some Jeffersonian democrat waiting to spring up somewhere to
lead a democratic revival.
There aren't any democrats in Serbia that I have found, nor
any democratic leadership that has any realistic possibility of
moving.
It is a little bit like when the Secretary got mad at me
when I said months ago to stop talking about Rambouillet, and
how we want to bring them back to the table. We do not want to
bring them back. We want to beat them until they stop. That is
what we want, and that is the only thing that has worked.
We are in effect saying that we are not going to succeed
until we have a democratic Serbia. That is ultimate success.
But I am afraid that if after 4 months, we do not have
democracy, people will say we should not be spending all this
money.
Ambassador Gelbard. Well, in fact I said in my statement
that in the short term it is hard to imagine that it will be
able to achieve a democratic solution in Serbia. That is why we
have to be prepared to support democratic forces. And there are
democratic forces.
Senator Biden. There isn't much democratic leadership.
Ambassador Gelbard. Tomorrow a representative of the
democratic opposition, Dragoslav Avramovic, will be in Sarajevo
for the summit. This is a man who is a very high common
denominator. He is part of the Alliance for Change.
Vuk Draskovic is a really flawed individual.
Senator Biden. He is the Rasputin of the 21st century, or
about to be. We are not quite there yet.
Ambassador Gelbard. I will tell him you said that.
Senator Biden. I told him that.
Ambassador Gelbard. We still hope that he can be part of
the solution here.
Senator Biden. I hope so, too.
Ambassador Gelbard. He is going to take work.
Mr. Chairman----
Senator Biden. He is going to take a lot of work. That is a
very high maintenance fellow.
Ambassador Gelbard. I know. believe me, I know.
Mr. Chairman, regarding the question, the Republika Srpska
has emerged coming out of the conflict, if anything, with
significantly strengthened moderate leadership. The Dodec
government is stronger than they were at the beginning of the
year. They are stronger than they were after the elections in
September.
When I last met with Prime Minister Dodec about a month
ago, he was much more comfortable, much more confident about
his ability to govern. We are seeing that the extremes, what
were weakened after the September national elections, are
becoming weaker still. High Representative Carlos Westendorf,
whose last day is tomorrow, banished President Poplashin, the
leader of the Radical Party, from his position and it is now
very clear that his Radical Party is weaker than ever, as is
Karadzic's SDS.
We see prospects for the moderates better than ever and,
while there is still a ways to go, the prospects look much
better.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Ambassador Pardew. If I could just comment on the democracy
issue. We do not have any illusions about who we are dealing
with here, but I do think democracy is an aspiration of many of
the Serb people. In that regard, I do not think we ought to
stop talking publicly about it, Senator. I think we ought to
continue to discuss it as an issue.
Senator Biden. I am not saying we should not talk about it.
I am suggesting we talk about it realistically. It is amazing
what can happen when you eliminate the extremes.
The single best thing that ever happened to Republika
Srpska was when we defeated Milosevic. There isn't any
alternative left. That is the reason why it happened. It had
nothing to do with elections. It had to do with the fact that
Westendorf had the right idea, and that there isn't an
alternative. Belgrade is no beacon, no help, no place to go. So
there is no alternative.
It is amazing what a salutary impact that has upon extremes
in countries. That is why my dream is to visit Milosevic in
prison. I mean that sincerely. If you put Milosevic in prison,
things in the region will change drastically.
If you said to me you can leave him where he is or give him
a plane ticket to take off like the former leader of Uganda,
Idi Amin. I would say no, leave him there until we get him. Put
him in jail.
Short of that, I do not know how we get to that point. And
by the way, I often wonder. Karadzic is part of the SDS. The
only misnomer in that, they should have dropped the ``D''. I
mean, these guys are bad guys, bad guys. They are no good.
Senator Smith. When Senator Biden makes that visit to that
prison, I want to be your junior companion.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. We
appreciate it.
Senator Biden. Thanks.
Senator Smith. We will call now our second panel. That
panel will consist of Sonja Biserko, Father Irinej, and John
Fox, and Jim Hooper.
We are pleased to be joined by Senator Santorum. Senator,
if you have any opening statement we welcome that.
Senator Santorum. Just here to listen to witnesses, and I
appreciate the opportunity to be here and participate.
Senator Smith. Terrific.
Ms. Biserko, why do we not begin with you, and we will just
move this way across the dais.
STATEMENT OF SONJA BISERKO, CHAIRPERSON, INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA
Ms. Biserko. Distinguished Senators, ladies and gentlemen--
--
Senator Smith. You can pull the microphone real close to
you.
Ms. Biserko. I am honored to be with you today. I thank you
very much for your invitation to participate in this important
hearing.
In my remarks I will concentrate on three aspects of the
current situation: developments in the aftermath of the NATO
military campaign, the current political landscape in Serbia,
and possible options of further developments.
Developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the NATO
campaign. The NATO military campaign has changed the course of
events in Yugoslavia. It seems to have put an end to the
Serbian regime's adventure. The NATO action has also galvanized
the overall internal dynamics in Serbia. What we now witness in
Serbia is the release of accumulated frustration, anger, and
confusion.
This is especially true of provincial regions, which have
suffered greatest misery and the greatest mobilization during
the recent Serbian operation in Kosovo. Belgrade itself is at
this moment politically the most conservative and centralist
oriented.
However, we have to be aware that the frustration, anger,
and confusion have not yet led to the political awakening of
the Serbian population and its political and intellectual
elite. The major reason behind this situation is almost total
identification of the population and its elite with the Greater
Serbia Project. Unfortunately, the Serbian imperial aspirations
to dominate the Balkans, although militarily defeated, have not
yet been mentally rejected. The people in general still
experience the military defeat as ``the moral defeat of NATO,
the European Union, and the United States,'' the international
protectorate over Kosovo as a foreign occupation and not as a
result of the failed and aggressive policies of Belgrade.
The official media has developed the notion, widely
accepted, that NATO member countries are morally obliged to
reconstruct Serbia. This also explains the recent refusal of
Milosevic to allow transitting of the Danube unless all eight
bridges be reconstructed.
There is no room yet, therefore, for factual and objective
analysis of the recent past and of the responsibility in
general for the suffering caused to the neighboring countries
and to the Serbian people itself. The long-term policy of
aggression, compounded by isolation and the effect of bombing
campaign, have led to state of anarchy and dysfunction of the
entire political, judicial and moral system. Serbia lives in a
limbo which can easily be manipulated with opening space for
different scenarios for the future.
Political landscape and its protagonists. In such
circumstances, major protagonists on the political scene are:
still Milosevic himself; his ruling party, Socialist Party; and
his wife's party; two pro-Milosevic opposition parties,
Radicals led by Seselj and SPO, led by Vuk Draskovic; other
opposition parties organized in different coalitions; the
military; the Serbian Orthodox Church; and the intellectual
elite, mostly represented in the Serbian Academy.
Milosevic's maneuvering space has been greatly reduced,
especially after the indictment by The Hague War Crimes
Tribunal and his total international isolation. Being thus
straightjacketed, Milosevic is still capable in his lust for
power and desperation to pull down Serbia into even deeper
repression and violence.
In that respect it is most important to get the situation
in Kosovo under full control as soon as possible, as well as
foreclose any possibilities of suppressing Montenegro's careful
moving away from the retrograde Belgrade politics. NATO's
warnings to Belgrade to keep its hands off Montenegro are of
utmost importance.
One cannot exclude that Milosevic still counts on the
Russian card, which provides Russia with a very strong foothold
in the Balkans and an important leverage in its political
bargaining with the West. As for the others, Seselj or the
like, time may come if Serbia becomes more radicalized, which
has to be prevented. Draskovic is once again unpredictable and
unreliable. In his inconsistency, he best reflects the fluidity
of the situation by still balancing between sides.
The opposition, mainly the recently formed Coalition for
Change, steps up demonstrations and rallies around Serbia with
the aim to provoke a general rebellion. It calls for a change
of the regime, the removal of Milosevic, and early elections.
Up to this moment they have not taken any stand on the causes
of Serbia's downfall, concentrating on putting all the blame on
Milosevic alone. They have not articulated any alternative
vision for the future, nor have they recognized their
accountability regarding the past.
The highest military has sided with Milosevic, but that
reserve forces have protested, demanding to be paid. There are
no firm indications, but there are speculations that the
younger officers may be restless and perhaps attracted to more
radical changes.
The Serbian Orthodox Church, which had an important role in
creating Serbian project, has stepped up its anti-Milosevic
activities and is developing into an even more important
political player. For the first time in 10 years of destruction
and horrific atrocities, the church has for the first time
stated that a major sin has been committed in our name against
Kosovars.
The Serbian elite, or most of it, had a very important role
in the process of organizing the Serbian project, but is still
very unwilling to come up with its own accountability. Coming
mostly from the rural background, it remains committed to
egalitarianism and monism. Market and rule of law is aligned to
them.
Possible future options. Notwithstanding the fact that the
situation in Serbia is not evolving faster and more positively,
as many would want and expect, the current discontent is bound
to further ferment. The direction in which this energy is
channeled will depend on the interrelationship and dynamics
between different protagonists. The process will be slow and
there should be no exaggerated expectations in this regard.
The removal of Milosevic could come only from the inside,
riding and pushed by the wave of popular discontent. In that
sense, we may not speak about the following possible scenarios.
First, I would say the most positive one is the
establishment of a transition government that would be composed
of technocrats. This government would prepare the grounds for
democratic elections in 1 or 2 years time. There should be no
illusions about the ideological or political profile of such
government.
Second, social misery may lead to further radicalization of
the situation, to calls for law and order, which may prompt the
military to support some sort of dictatorship. The legal
framework has already been prepared, including the abolishment
of university autonomy and restrictions on the media.
Third, the worst scenario is more violence and some sort of
a civil war, which many people are now calling for.
What can the international community do to help bring about
a peaceful and democratic change in Serbia? It is important not
to totally isolate Serbia, but to develop a coherent strategy
of support for democracy-building based on reality and a
realistic assessment of the situation and of its protagonists.
This assessment should guide the international community in
its support for independent media, for social awareness-
raising, for the development of the civil society, and
ultimately for the emergence of a new democratic political core
within a firm framework of standards, rules, and
accountability, some sort of civil protectorate.
The continuous and more intense work of The Hague War
Crimes Tribunal and the insistent pressure and monitoring of
the refugee return in all the successor states of the former
Yugoslavia remain the cornerstones of this strategy and
prerequisites of returning the region to normalcy and its
integration into the European mainstream.
Distinguished Senators, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you
for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Biserko follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sonja Biserko
serbia in the aftermath of kosovo crisis
1. In recent weeks Serbia has been in a turmoil. Political scene is
in disarray and as the situation country-wide is volatile it is not
easy to predict the future course of events. All options are possible,
including the worst one, namely massive outburst of wrath and violence.
What we are in fact witnessing, following the heroic resistance of our
army against the state-of-art technical-technological aggression, is
``testing the waters'' between the regime and opposition. The regime is
widely promoting ``the post-war reconstruction,'' while both sides are
trying to consolidate their positions in the wake of defeat. In short,
NATO military campaign has galvanized the internal dynamics but has
also brought to surface the overall confusion and the contamination of
the entire population.
2. By careful analysis of the public discourse it is difficult to
expect immediate sobering up. Most of the population has been
identified with the Serbian project. Additionally, with the
totalitarian mindset it is difficult to create space for analysis not
only of the recent history but also the meaning of Yugoslavia as the
common state. The Serbian illusion that Yugoslavia is only enlarged
Serbia and their lamenting that the whole century has been ``lost'' and
that the ``loss will be difficult to compensate'' clearly illustrates
that Yugoslavia has not been seen as the project of other nations.
Serbs have never acknowledged their expectations and urge to be equal.
3. Opposition is stepping up demonstrations and rallies Serbia-wide
and endeavors to provoke general ``rebellion,'' all the while voicing
demands for the unseating of the regime and calling for snap elections.
Opposition parties are currently exploiting enormous popular discontent
and counting on a large scale protests, alike the 1996-97 unrest. But
other demands, indispensable for inclusion in the reconstruction
program, failed to be voiced. Likewise there is no recognition of
massive atrocities in Kosova. Opposition is still split, and there is a
palpable tension between its Belgrade seats and local committees.
Belgrade-based centralism and absolute dictatorship of opposition
leaders often generate discord at the local level, which are apt to
show a much higher degree of flexibility. The ongoing power-struggle
did not crystalize new programme. The same old methods are still in
practice (populism). The new radicalization is also possible calling
for the ``social minimum.'' Most of the population has not been
seriously working for last ten years.
Recently launched initiative, namely citizens signing up a petition
for Milosevic's resignation, although unlikely to produce that result
in the short run, is nonetheless an important, fear-liberating action
for people at large.
4. As the situation in Serbia is not transparent, but rather fluid
and open-ended, it is not possible to predict any definite outcome. It
seems that Vuk Draskovic's inconsistency best reflects that fluidity.
This most charismatic leader, and self-styled ``international king of
streets'' has recently stated that ``he is giving another chance to
Milosevic.'' The future course of events will be most likely decided by
the very Milosevic. His perception of his own standing will play a
crucial role in future developments. It seems that he is weighing up
the general situation, feeling the pulse of people and waiting for the
unfolding of the Kosovo operation. He still has instruments to
destabilize the Kosovo operation, either through the Russians, or
through his loyalists who have stayed out in Kosovo.
5. Exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, after the entry of international
troops, and simultaneous return of Albanian refugees and the KLA units,
have become chips in the vying match between the regime and opposition.
While the regime insists on the Serbian refugees return, irrespective
of the current situation in Kosovo, opposition mentions their plight
solely for self-promotional purposes, and makes no genuine effort to
assist them. The Serbian Orthodox Church has organized itself and
remained the only Serbian institution in Kosovo to fill the security
vacuum under the newly-emerged circumstances. The Orthodox Church,
which has stepped up its anti-Milosevic activities, is turning into an
important player in the political developments. After a recent session
of its Synod the SOC addressed its believers by stating that ``in our
name a major sin was committed against Kosovars.'' After the Kosovo
defeat the SOC quickly responded to the new situation. Its priests
(especially father Sava from Decani) who had stayed in Kosovo during
the air campaign now play a double role, namely they take both physical
and spiritual care of the Serbs remaining in Kosovo. Due to the police
and army departure ``the SOC had to take on the role which it once had
under the Turkish occupation.''
According to Father Sava from Decani Monastery (NTV Studio B-7
July) approximately 80,000 Serbs have left Kosovo. The High
Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina said (Politika, 6 July)
that 8,000 have returned to Kosovo. The government is making an effort
to push back as many as possible Kosovo refugees. Pensioners cannot
obtain their pensions outside Kosovo, the same applies to car owners
who are entitled to petrol coupons. Kosovo school children are not
allowed to register in for the coming school year outside Kosovo.
Though situation in Kosovo is getting under the international
control Serbs are still on their way out. The local leader from the
Serbian Resistance Movement Dusan Ristic said that apart from the
``Albanian terrorists, the Belgrade regime is also responsible for the
massive exodus of Serbs.'' Many Serbs from Kosovo (namely Istok, Babusa
and Prizren) according to their testimonies have been pushed out by the
Serbian police. Dusko Ristic is also blaming the Serbian leadership
from Kosovo (SPS, JUL, SRS) for leaving without protecting people they
have left behind. It is evident that Serbia cannot cope with additional
refugees and is therefore trying to keep them away. Additionally their
anger can be crucial in generating the discontent. It should, however,
also be kept in mind that Belgrade may still expect to get away with
partitioning. Kosovska Mitrovica may serve as an example.
6. The Army is another dynamic factor in the Serbian scene at the
moment. The Army has profiled itself in the first weeks of military
campaign as a patriotic Army after the years of being humiliated. The
last defeat is attributed to Milosevic and, of recent, to Russians whom
they blame for ``betrayal.'' So far the Army anger is generated by
being unpaid for months. Having in mind the military tradition in the
Serbian society they might play more substantial role in months to come
once it becomes clear which line is prevailing.
7. Developments in Montenegro after President Djukanovic's letter
on the need to re-define relationship between the two federal units
clearly indicate that Montenegro is setting the stage for more
independent status and forging closer links with Europe. However
growing speculation that the Yugoslav army might attack Montenegro
should not be wholly discarded. Milosevic's hesitancy to move more
resolutely against Djukanovic, ``who is trying to backstab Serbia at
the most critical moment'' indicates the weakness of the Serbian
regime. In that sense the NATO's warnings to the regime to keep its
hands off Montenegro obviously play a decisive role. But, the Russians
might also spring some surprises, as both for them and Serbia,
Montenegro is much more important than Kosovo. The first meeting
between the Serbian and Montenegrin ruling coalitions has been more a
testing on both sides than serious talks. It is worth mentioning that
Bogoljub Karic in an interview to the daily paper Vijesti (17 July)
said: ``If there is no substantial agreement between Montenegro and
Serbia then there is no reason for them to leave. Then we have to see
how Germany and Austria are cooperating for years and recently Chech
Republic and Slovakia.'' The similar statement was made by former
president Lilic few days earlier.
8. In the meantime the Serbian Academy has also discussed
concerning the ``tragic status of the Serbian people.'' It is
highlighted that ``in the momentous changes which happened in the world
in the last decade, the Serbian nation suffered great losses, and has
the worst status today, for the politically lost wars were waged for
the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. The state which
we in vain considered our homeland, was broken up.'' Some members of
the Academy also voiced that demand for Milosevic's removal because
``if he stays Serbia will be the only ghetto-state in Europe and the
only state to remain outside the European Union.'' But voices of
dissent were also heard: ``We cannot back the NATO-pursued anti-
Milosevic policy. The ouster of Milosevic and his regime are our
internal matter, hence the Academy cannot act as an authority above the
people.'' Unfortunately the Serbian Academy did not muster up enough
intellectual courage to assume responsibility for the creation of
Milosevic's regime program. On the contrary it denied the importance of
the Memorandum as a blueprint for the regime's ideological program.
Moreover the Academy stated that ``the Memorandum had an essentially
filo-Yugoslav and anti-Titoist character, amply indicating the weak and
ruinous state of the 1974 Constitution.''
9. It is manifest in Serbia that the populace is aware of the need
for change. But there is also a massive perception that the unseating
of only one man will not resolve the issue of a viable political
alternative. The Serbian Academy which essentially has been backing
Milosevic all the time and has never renounced its Project states that
``the present-day political scene is dominated by parties and
politicians with backward ideologies of civil wars, as such defeated by
the overall progress of the world.'' It goes on to say that ``those
ideologies, self-styled `left' and `right' are morally compromised,
historically conservative and bereft of personal authority.''
10. A genuine democratic and reform potential--imprisoned in the
political dinosaur called the Serbian Socialist Party--and in some
parts of the Yugoslav Army is yet to be brought to light. If that
potential emerged, then its coupling with the massive rallies could
represent the most painless way to transition, alike the one in
Republika Srpska or Montenegro. The recent information on Arkan's offer
to the Tribunal, if true, is the first signal of the inside
differentiation.
11. One of th external elements that may influence the internal
dynamics could be the role of Russians in the whole process. It is
perilous for the future of Serbia to turn to the Russians, as the last
refuge, while such a move would provide the latter with an opportunity
to easily recover their role of ``the leading power.'' By extension the
Russians are very adroit in exploiting their role in the Balkans: they
get their dividends for such engagement by the West. Hence the Russians
take on a double role, the one of instigator, and one of the
peacemaker. For Milosevic the Russians represent the only point of
support, although they publicly denounce him. But were they to get
involved in Serbian developments, like they did in the past, in some
East European countries, it could possibly lead to Milosevic stepping
down. But the question is whether the Russians are currently more
interested in their competition with the NSTO or in the fate of the
people led astray. Were they to ``assist'' in Milosevic stepping down,
it would perhaps constitute their first good-will towards the Serbian
people.
12. Massive popular discontent for the time being has not found its
expression in an articulated political vision of Serbia. The political
elite is still neither ready nor able to assume responsibility. That
leaves room for the ``wounded beast,'' namely Milosevic's regime to
engage in the ultimate act of brinkmanship by dragging quickly Serbia
into total disaster. International community's attempts to ``lure'' by
various promises the Serbian opposition to Europe might be futile. The
fact is that all the neighboring countries are under some kind of
protectorate of international community. Only Serbia is under constant
pressure, but even that measure proved to be of a limited effect.
Corruption and lack of scruples of the Belgrade regime seem to be its
enormous advantage over the Western democracies, and desperation and
fatalism its most powerful weapon in defying the West.
13. However, differentiation process has started. For example
Kosovo Serbs have genuine feeling of recent events in Kosovo but also
for the whole last decade. There are ample testimonies illustrating
that but that is only one fragment. Obviously there is not only one
answer to the current situation. ``Sickness of the society'' is
profound and therefore needs a long term cure. The society needs help
in understanding what has happened. Serbia has in the meantime cut off
all the relations with the world and has become an autistic society
without real insight in the European mainstream trends. Stereotype
thinking is still prevailing (for example Germany is still seen as the
old Second World enemy, conspiracy theories are answer to all our
troubles--Kouchner is seen as a Serb-hater etc.).
14. The present political and intellectual elite is completely
drained, a new one has yet to be articulated. The liberal elite which
has been marginalized needs support and comeback in order to create
space for analysis and new modern vision of Serbia. The ongoing outside
pressure, especially from the neighbouring countries, has an enormous
impact on the fermentation of the ongoing process. The Stability Pact,
if seriously applied, will have crucial role in modernizing and
Europenizing of Serbia.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Biserko.
Mr. Fox.
STATEMENT OF JOHN FOX, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE, OPEN
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators.
I would first like to thank the committee on behalf of the
nongovernmental community and for many in the region for the
forthright and bipartisan approach that you have taken over the
years on Balkans issues and particularly for the strong support
that you have given to democratization in Yugoslavia and the
neighboring countries.
Slobodan Milosevic is not only the first sitting head of
state to be indicted as a war criminal by the United Nations.
He is also by several years the dean of all the leaders in
Europe and Eurasia. Now that NATO has 100,000 troops deployed
in the Balkans, and less than 4 years after Mr. Milosevic was
an honored American guest and guarantor of the Dayton Peace
Agreement, it is a principle aim of U.S. and European policy to
see him removed from power.
After 10 years of resolutely refusing engagement with
democratic forces in Serbia, the West is urgently reaching out
to democrats, pseudo-democrats, and even compromised
nationalists to hasten Mr. Milosevic's departure. In other
words, the U.S. and Europe are just starting out on a road we
should have taken a decade ago when Washington was leading the
way in supporting democratic forces throughout Central and
Eastern Europe.
Why did America not seriously engage with embryonic
democratic forces in the former Yugoslavia much earlier, at low
cost? The lost list of policy misjudgments and missed
opportunities is rooted in the dominant view toward
southeastern Europe throughout much of this decade, that the
West has no real interest in the Balkans, which is a condemned
region of murderous ethnic zombies that must somehow be walled
off from civilized Europe.
Only with the war in Kosovo has the international community
abandoned the blood-soaked myth of post-Yugoslav
exceptionalism, the notion that modern European standards could
not apply among feuding Balkan tribes, a view that fit nicely
with the ideology and practice of the region's war criminals.
I think it is fair to say that if the United States and its
allies had treated the Rumanian or the Bulgarian or Slovak
opposition the way we have treated the Serbian opposition, that
is if they had been left in a cave of isolation after 1989
without political or material support or international
partners, governing multi-ethnic coalitions would not now be
driving those democracies on a Euro-Atlantic track to full
integration in Western institutions. Without the sustained
commitment of the U.S. and nongovernmental organizations to
indigenous democratic forces, destabilizing nationalism and
anti-reform politics would today be much stronger in those and
many other countries in the transition region.
Whereas the practitioners of ethnic terror and repression
were given free reign in Serbia, Croatia, and much of Bosnia,
in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe the tested and true
conditionality of free and fair elections, human rights, rule
of law, market reform, and good neighbor policies were helping
to lay the foundation, the strong foundation for the widening
zone of democratic stability that we see today.
Last September a leading Serbian democratic activist listed
five major weaknesses of the democratic opportunity: one, lack
of unity and a mentality of defeat; two, fear of regime's
repression; three, lack of funding for regular activities;
four, belief that Milosevic enjoys the support of the West;
five, lack of an effective Western strategy in support of a
democratic Serbia.
At the same time, the same weaknesses plagued the Croatian
opposition, which had been left for years in its particular
cave of isolation and nationalist temptation while Washington
supported the Tudjman regime and traded favors on Bosnia.
Following the decisive U.S. policy shift to support Croatia's
democratic forces last year, most of this list of weaknesses no
longer apply and the prospects for a democratic transition in
Croatia at the next elections are increasingly promising. A
nonviolent democratic transition in Croatia would be a vital
contribution to democratizing Serbia, as the Tudjman and
Milosevic regimes not only have maintained a condominia of
interests in Bosnia, but have politically reinforced one
another's domestic anti-democratic policies.
The same pattern could hold true in Serbia and, while there
is urgency to this challenge, there are not necessarily the
shortcuts that truly energized Western governments would like
to find. The strong political will in Washington and in
European capitals in support of a democratic Serbia has yet to
be accompanied by the flow of material support that was
essential to nearly every successful democratic coalition that
has overcome an authoritarian regime in the past 20 years,
whether in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Africa.
Of the widely advertised millions of dollars in U.S.
democratic assistance for Serbia over the past 2 years, only a
limited stream has actually reached indigenous groups in
Serbia, and that has gone for civil society and media, not for
political coalitions. So we must go beyond the technical
assistance advice that Ambassador Gelbard was describing. He
explicitly did not talk about material assistance, which has
been vital to every democratic coalition from Bulgaria to
Poland and Slovakia in the region.
The absence of international engagement with the democratic
forces has had the added effect of increasing the large and
unsustainable political burden carried by a relatively few
Belgrade-based civil society and independent media
organizations in recent years. Because the West's decade of on
again, off again partnership with the Milosevic regime stirred
the deepest doubts among the Serbian people and elites about
what America and Europe truly wanted to see in Serbia, American
and European policy today must not only be unified, but crystal
clear.
Support should be given to the unified democratic coalition
Alliance for Change, to groups willing to cooperate with it,
and, as in earlier cases from Poland to Slovakia, individual
leaders who fail to cooperate with the coalition should not be
supported. Political and material support should go to
organizations, not personalities.
American and European officials should also respect one
rule in their public and backgrounded statements, which are
read microscopically in the region: Do not criticize publicly
the coalition or individual actors within it. U.S. senior
officials in particular fell into this counterproductive habit
around the time of the Zajedno demonstrations in 1997 and it
still has not stopped. Those messages need to be delivered
privately if this is really ever going to be a partnership.
The West has successfully delivered its message about the
linkage of Serbia's future acceptance in the international
community to the departure of the Milosevic regime. More needs
to be done, however, to deliver the affirmative message that
sanctions lifting and economic and political benefits will be
conditioned, as they were throughout Eastern Europe, on
democratic governance, market reform, respect for human rights,
in other words on implementation of the coherent program that
the democratic coalition must develop and take to the Serbian
people in order to prevail.
There is, of course, a particular affliction that much of
the Serbian opposition as well as the civil society has
suffered from, an intolerant, often hard line and even racist
nationalism. Following the war in Kosovo and the war crimes
committed on a mass scale by thousands of Serb forces, there is
substantial denial at both the popular and elite level about
these crimes. There is a poll, recent poll, showing that two-
thirds of the Serbian people do not believe the atrocities took
place.
There is instead in many quarters a deepening sense of
victimization of the Serbian people. Much as many in Serbia and
in the West would like to move pragmatically past the moral
issue of individual and political responsibility for war
crimes, the culture of victimization in Serbia creates a
practical problem for the opposition. Any successor Belgrade
government will have to face up to how to treat the indicted
and harbored war criminals and will not be able to lead Serbia
into Europe without de-Nazifying the elites.
Just as the indictment of Milosevic hastened the end of the
Kosovo war by demonstrating to the Serbian people beyond a
doubt that the West was finished dancing with this dictator, so
a meaningful de-Nazification campaign will speed Serbia's
reforms and integration into the international system.
Balkan war criminals and their mafias have proved to be
deadliest enemies of reform and where left in place they have
managed to keep most of the former Yugoslavia out of Europe.
Strong linkage between cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and
international concessions to Serbia must be at the core of the
West's policy for a sustainable democratic transition to occur.
I conclude with some specific recommendations that could
accelerate democratization in Serbia and promote stability in
the region. The European Union-U.S. visa blacklist of 300-plus
key officials and regime supporters is proving remarkably
effective and should be expanded, and I think a corresponding
honors list of civil society and democratic leaders could be
created who get multi-entry visas and are invited precisely to
the events that the Serbian officials are excluded from. This
should be a major, intensive exchange and targeted travel
opportunities reaching out into sectors and parts of the
country in Serbia that we have not reached. We have tended to
rely more on a Belgrade-centered civil society set. We need to
go well beyond that into the professions, local government
officials, and so forth.
The OSCE should assure that the expelled Serb citizens from
Croatia that are now living outside the country vote in the
next Croatian elections and that the ethnic Croat citizens of
Bosnia do not vote. Humanitarian assistance I think could be
given on a trial basis through nongovernmental local opposition
channels, but if that does not work it should be halted.
We could also support leading nongovernmental organizations
from the transition countries in Central Europe to work in
Serbia.
The arrest of Karadzic and friends, indicted friends, would
certainly still send a powerful message and effect inside
Serbia. I think the tribunal should be given the additional
resources and management to prepare hundreds of indictments of
high level, mid-level Serb and many Croat officials, security
figures, and so forth. I think that would have a very salutary
effect on their transitions.
So with a strong and enduring U.S.-led commitment on
democratization in Serbia and Croatia, the withdrawal date of
NATO forces from the region should be advanced somewhat, as
should the integration of Europe and the Atlantic community as
a whole, following indeed the same pattern that America
promoted in postwar Western Europe and post-cold war Central
Europe. There really is no third way to this objective, I
think.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Fox.
Father, we invite your testimony.
STATEMENT OF FATHER IRINEJ DOBRIJEVIC, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, BROADVIEW
HEIGHTS, OH
Father Dobrijevic. Thank you kindly, honorable chairman. I
would beg the indulgence of the chair to enter the full text of
this speech into the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Father Dobrijevic. My approach will essentially be
theoretical and practical, as an investigation of a wide
variety of proposed solutions in light of the contribution of
the church.
Honorable Senator Gordon Smith, Honorable Senator Biden,
and Honorable Senator Santorum, ladies and gentlemen: It is
indeed my distinct honor and privilege to be able to address
this august body on behalf of the recently created Office of
External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Kindly permit
me to begin by congratulating and profoundly thanking the
Honorable Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, and his distinguished colleagues, among
them our honorable chairman, for unanimously passing a bill
introduced by the Honorable Chairman Helms allocating $100
million for promoting democracy in Serbia and Montenegro.
Without the aid of critically needed funding, the process
of democratization would have been seriously hampered in a
nation where it is estimated that $30 billion are needed over a
decade for recovery. Poor economic conditions tend to encourage
political radicalism and provide a strong impetus for localism
as a phenomenon, with its attempts to resolve economic problems
through jobs, taxes to central government and contracts to
relatively small communities.
A lesson taken from the Iraqi people clearly indicates that
they have little or no incentive to drive out Saddam Hussein as
long as they are kept in poverty. In today's Yugoslavia,
socioenvironmental concerns such as increased radiation levels
and mounting toxicity, combined with disastrously low levels of
social security, rampant unemployment, and a high refugee
population will continue to destabilize the regions by
producing a new outpouring of economic immigrants. Without
extensive foreign economic assistance, it is highly improbable
that Yugoslavia will be able to recover socially, politically,
or even culturally.
The Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in
the Americas in a recent statement noted: ``The large-scale
violence and atrocities in Kosovo, as well as the bombing of
Yugoslavia, have come to an end. Many Albanian refugees and
expellees are returning to Kosovo. Many Serbs are now fleeing.
While war appears to have ended in Kosovo, the peace has not
been won. What lies ahead is the painful and difficult work of
conflict resolution and reconciliation, rebuilding and
reconstruction in Kosovo, in Yugoslavia as a whole, and in the
whole of southeastern Europe. The religious communities of that
region must take a full and active part in the work of building
a peaceful and just present and future for all the peoples of
that region.''
National self-determination and regional integration, two
often incompatible trends, are intrinsically tied to the
building of an internationally acceptable, modern civil
society. Peace and stability can be fostered only through
functional and secure social, economic, and political
institutions. Yet the reconstruction of Kosovo is currently
being espoused without extending the same to all Yugoslavia
unless the Serbian people overthrow the Milosevic government,
while only limited and extended conditions are placed upon the
full disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA.
This contradictory measure undermines reasonable
integration policies by replacing one repressive system with
another. The result is evidenced through bitter retaliation by
Kosovar Albanians as the KLA gains in latitude and the
relentless persecution of the diminished number of Kosovo Serbs
and other ethnic minorities. With such solutions in place,
there can be no victors, only victims.
Should not there be a moral imperative for the NATO Pact
countries to offer reconstruction to Yugoslavia, as was offered
to Germany through the Marshall Plan? Deputy Finance Minister
Nikos Chrisodoulakis told BBC television that Greece favored
unconditional reconstruction aid for Yugoslavia: ``If countries
are given the chance to build their future, then democracy will
consolidate and totalitarian regimes will leave more easily.''
As violence is thoroughly incapable of establishing a just
and enduring peace, so also isolationist policies cannot
promote a healthy foundation for the building of a stable civil
society.
The first step, therefore, is to recognize that the Western
notion of civil society is culturally specific as the result of
certain social and historical conditions. Merely exporting or
imposing Western forms of civil society onto southeastern
Europe, without cultural substance and understanding, is
meaningless.
An essential and perhaps more productive approach to the
region would be based on comprehension of how indigenous forms
of social and political association and considerations of
Western notions of civil society might accommodate local
environments, rather than replace them. Given this historical
and cultural context, the Serbian Orthodox Church offers unique
recourse to the issue of civil society and democratic change as
a meridian between East and West.
Whenever governments and elements of civil society are at
odds with each other, religious leadership retains the unique
ability to set the foundation for solid regional cooperation
with other faith communities, nongovernmental organizations,
and ultimately extending itself to the international community.
Therefore, in order for peace and stability to effectively take
root in Kosovo, throughout southeastern Europe and into the
world, the voice of religious leadership can no longer be
ignored.
The faith communities must be an integral part of and an
equal partner in the peace process, promoting true
reconciliation, equitable reconstruction, and advocating
democracy in order to secure the present and ensure the future
of Kosovo through valid national self-determination and proper
regional integration.
The Serbian Orthodox Church under the leadership of
Patriarch Pavle in general and in Kosovo under Bishop Artemije
has attempted to promote peace. As a source of moral authority,
the church represents the preeminent voice of its people,
offering regional stability and continuity. Therefore, as the
only institution trusted by the people, the church serves to
inform the inner psyche of its faithful and transcends the
narrow constraints of self-serving nationalism.
In calling upon ``the Federal president and his government
to resign in the name of the people and for the salvation of
the people,'' the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox
Church clearly and courageously paved the way for a government
that would be acceptable to those at home and abroad.
Often, in areas of conflict resolution, nongovernmental
organizations and private volunteer organizations have made
recourse to the local church, through whom access has been
gained to designated officials of independent-minded
principalities and other positive opposition forces. For the
sake of context and historical affirmation, religious leaders,
such as Archbishop Makarios, who was elected in 1960 as the
first President of an independent Cyprus, and Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, who continues to offer a cathartic mechanism in
opposition to apartheid, serve to affirm the essential role of
the church in transitional stability in order to rebuild
fragmented societies rising out from under oppressive regimes.
Pragmatically, the church, especially in view of a weakened
and fragmented opposition, can serve as a neutral and fair
monitoring system, providing a sound and secure basis for a
national referendum and registration of voters, while averting
the dangers of a potential civil conflict. Given the
international proportions of the Serbian Orthodox Church, this
privilege could be either contained to those citizens residing
within Serbia and Montenegro proper or duly extended to those
living in the diaspora.
One such referendum model might be charged with the task of
allowing citizens the choice of voting for a republic or a
constitutional monarchy. The latter maintains a distinct
historical precedent in Serbia, which at the turn of the
century, while fostering a strong liberal intellectual
tradition, enjoyed having freely elected exiled King Peter I as
its monarch. Today Spain stands to underscore the positive role
of King Juan Carlos in rebuilding a prosperous nation from a
dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy.
With the serious lack of stability in Kosovo, one possible
option might be a bicameral system of governance similar to
that of the Government of the United States. One house would be
established proportionate to its population and maintain
autonomy. In order to assure a true multi-ethnic state,
preventing secession and fragmentation while securing regional
stability, another house would maintain equal representation
from all ethnic groups.
It would then follow that from this house the chief
executive would be appointed, at least provisionally. The
assent of both houses would be required to effect legislation.
This approach attempts to reconcile Western concepts of civil
society with the local environment.
The American governmental model is one that could be
readily applied to Serbia and Montenegro, that is to say
Yugoslavia. However, given its current political, economic, and
ecological difficulties in the aftermath of a decade of
violence, Serbia and Montenegro is most likely in need of an
apolitical transitional government.
The concept of a technocratic government or government of
experts has been espoused by groups such as the Council for
Democratic Changes in Serbia, which advocates a system of a
cabinet of experts, proportionate to the distribution of the
Serbian population, two-thirds from Serbia and one-third from
the diaspora.
A group of Serbian and Montenegrin economists known as
Group 17 have come up with a plan, the Pact on Stability in
Serbia. G17 made the call for a government of ``national
salvation,'' which is to say the salvation of the people, not
only in answer to this problem, but directly in response to the
call of the Serbian Orthodox Church for Milosevic's
resignation.
Such a transitional government of experts would give
itself, depending on the plan, from 1 to 3 to 5 years to effect
economic reform, revamp the constitution, call for free
elections, and promote free media, while paving the way for
Belgrade's eventual accession to the Pact on Stability for
southeastern Europe, through which the West anticipated
bringing peace, development, and a free market economy to this
troubled region.
One precise mechanism for a potential handover is being
worked out by G17 in association with the Independent Society
of Judges of Serbia. Timing is of the essence in all matters
concerned.
Properly supported, the Serbian Orthodox Church could fully
assume its rightful role in society, a privilege denied it for
the past 50 years. And to end once again with a quote from the
Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops here in the
Americas: ``If peace is to be won for all of southeastern
Europe, it is particularly important that the Orthodox Churches
of the region assume an active and constructive regional role
in spiritual renewal, economic reconstruction, and humanitarian
responsibility. It is critically important that the Serbian
Orthodox Church be given a quick and strong affirmation as a
key participant in the process of regional reconstruction and
that this involvement of the Church of Serbia be understood as
an important starting point for the civil and democratic
renewal of Yugoslavia.''
I thank you kindly for your indulgence.
[The prepared statement of Father Dobrijevic follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rev. Irinej Dobrijevic
It is indeed my distinct honor and privilege to be able to address
this august body on behalf of the recently-created Office of External
Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Kindly permit me to begin by congratulating and profoundly thanking
the Honorable Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, and his distinguished colleagues for unanimously
passing a bill, introduced by the Honorable Chairman Helms, allocating
$100 million for promoting Democracy in Serbia and Montenegro. Without
the aid of critically needed funding, the process of democratization
would have been seriously hampered in a nation where it is estimated
that $30 billion are needed over a decade for recovery.
Poor economic conditions tend to encourage political radicalism and
provide a strong impetus for ``localism'' as a phenomenon, with its
attempts to resolve economic problems through jobs, taxes to central
government and contracts through relatively small communities. A lesson
taken from the Iraqi people clearly indicates that they have little or
no incentive to drive out Saddam Hussein as long as they are kept in
poverty. In today's Yugoslavia, socio-environmental concerns, such as
increased radiation levels and mounting toxicity, combined with
disastrously low levels of social security, rampant unemployment and a
high refugee population will continue to destabilize the region by
producing a new outpouring of economic immigrants. Without extensive
foreign economic assistance, it is highly improbable that Yugoslavia
will be able to recover socially, politically or even culturally.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ According to Miadjan Dinkic, author of the bestseller, The
Economics of Destruction and a coordinator of Group 17: ``Leaving
Serbia isolated is a grave error which will sooner or later provoke a
new war disaster . . . I strongly believe that this was one of the main
reasons for the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia . . .''
Dinkic continues by arguing that nobody will be willing to invest in a
country void of a functional infrastructure. ``Taking this into
consideration, once the economic interest prevail over an irrational
war logic, all problems will be easily resolved.'' 21 May 1999, http://
www.g17.org.yu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the
Americas in a recent statement, noted: ``The large-scale violence and
atrocities in Kosovo as well as the bombing of Yugoslavia have come to
an end. Many Albanian refugees and expellees are returning to Kosovo.
Many Serbs are now fleeing.''
``While war appears to have ended in Kosovo, the peace has not been
won. What lies ahead is the painful and difficult work of conflict-
resolution and reconciliation, rebuilding and reconstruction in Kosovo,
in Yugoslavia as a whole, and in the whole of Southeastern Europe. The
religious communities of that region must take a full and active part
in the work of building a peaceful and just present and future for all
the peoples of the region.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ SCOBA Statement on Kosovo and the Balkans, 23 June 1999, http:/
/www.goarch.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National self-determination and regional integration, to often
incompatible trends, are intrinsically tied to the building of an
internationally acceptable, modern civil society. Peace and stability
can be fostered only through functional and secure social, economic and
political institutions. Yet, the reconstruction of Kosovo is currently
being espoused, without extending the same to all of Yugoslavia--unless
the Serbian people overthrow the Milosevic government--while only
limited and extended conditions are placed upon the full disarmament of
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This contradictory measure undermines
reasonable integration policies by replacing one repressive system with
another.\3\ The result is evidenced through bitter retaliation by
Kosovar Albanians as the KLA gains in latitude and the relentless
persecution of the diminished number of Kosovo Serbs continues.\4\ With
such solutions in place, there can be no victors, only victims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ As radical post-authoritarian political groups emerge,
differences from other similar groups as well as the outgoing regime
are stressed. The moderate Kosovar Albanian political leader who should
have emerged under normal circumstances was Ibrahim Rugova. However, it
was inevitable that the radical and violent KLA would win, not only
because of the policies of Milosevic, but also because of the process
of political organization in a weak and atomized society.
\4\ According to ecclesiastical sources (27 July 1999, http://
www.decani.yunet.com/destruction.html), during the month and one half
NATO/UN sponsored ``peace,'' 130,000 Serbs have become refugees or
internally displaced persons, which represents \2/3\ of the pre-war
Serbian population of Kosovo; 150 Serbs have been killed; 200 kidnaped
and 40 churches [of the 1,657 sacred shrines In Kosovo] have been
damaged or destroyed in what now appears to be a systematic eradication
of the Serbian religious and cultural heritage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Should not there be a moral imperative for NATO Pact countries to
offer reconstruction to Yugoslavia as was offered to Germany through
the Marshall Plan? Deputy Finance Minister Nikos Chrisodoulakis told
BBC Television \5\ that Greece favored unconditional reconstruction aid
for Yugoslavia. ``If countries are given the chance to build their
future, then democracy will consolidate and totalitarian regimes will
leave more easily.'' As violence is thoroughly incapable of
establishing a just and enduring peace, so also isolationist policies
cannot promote a healthy foundation for the building of a stable civil
society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 11 June 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first step, therefore, is to recognize that the ``western''
notion of civil society is culturally specific as the result of certain
social and historical conditions. By merely exporting or imposing
western forms of civil society onto Southeastern Europe, without
cultural substance and understanding, is meaningless. An essential and
perhaps more productive approach to the region would be based on
comprehension of indigenous forms of social and political association,
and on considerations of how western notions of civil society might
accommodate local environments, rather than replace them. Given this
historical and cultural context, the Serbian Orthodox Church offers
unique recourse to the issue of civil society and democratic change as
a meridian between East and West.
Whenever governments and elements of civil society are at odds with
each other, religious leadership retains the unique ability to set the
foundation for solid regional cooperation with other faith communities,
non-governmental organizations and ultimately, extending itself to the
international community. Therefore, in order for peace and stability to
effectively take root in Kosovo, throughout Southeastern Europe and
into the world, the voice of religious leadership can no longer be
ignored. The faith communities must be an integral part of and an equal
partner in the peace process, promoting true reconciliation, equitable
reconstruction and advocating democracy in order to secure the present
and insure the future of Kosovo through valid national self-
determination and proper regional integration.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ A resounding example of the same may be witnessed in the
unwavering position of the monastic communities of Kosovo. On 26 July
1999, a meeting of Kosovar Albanian representatives with Hieromonk Sava
Janjic of Decani Monastery was held in Pec. The Albanians expressed
their trust in the Serbian Orthodox Church as the only constructive
Serbian factor in establishing peace in Kosovo and Metohia, and as the
only institution which nurtures friendly relations with the Albanians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Serbian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Patriarch Pavle
in general and in Kosovo under Bishop Artemije, has attempted to
promote peace. As a source of moral authority, the Church represents
the pre-eminent voice of its people offering regional stability and
continuity. Therefore, as the only ``institution'' trusted by the
people, the Church serves to inform the inner psyche of its faithful
and transcends the narrow constraints of self-serving nationalism. In
calling upon ``the Federal President and his government to resign in
the name of the people and for the salvation of the people,'' \7\ the
Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church clearly and
courageously paved the way for a government that would be acceptable to
those at home and abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 15 June 1999. Previously, the Church requested the resignation
of the Milosevic regime in favor of a government of national salvation
during the student demonstrations in the winter of 1996-1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Often, in areas of conflict resolution, non-governmental
organizations (NGO's) and private volunteer organizations (PVQ's) have
made recourse to the local Church through whom access has been gained
to designated officials of independent-minded principalities and other
positive opposition forces. For the sake of context and historical
affirmation, religious leaders, such as Archbishop Makarios, who was
elected 1960 as the first president of an independent Cyprus, and
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who continues to offer a cathartic mechanism
in opposition to apartheid, serve to affirm the essential role of the
Church in transitional stability in order to rebuild fragmented
societies rising out from under oppressive regimes.
Pragmatically, the Church--especially in view of a weakened and
fragmented opposition--can serve as a neutral and fair monitoring
system, providing a sound and secure basis for a national referendum
and registration of voters, while averting the dangers of a potential
civil conflict. Given the international proportions of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, this privilege could be either contained to those
citizens residing within Serbia and Montenegro proper or duly extended
to those living in the Diaspora.
One such referendum model might be charged with the task of
allowing citizens the choice of voting for a republic or a
constitutional monarchy. The latter maintains a distinct historical
precedent in Serbia, which at the turn of the century, while fostering
a strong liberal intellectual tradition, enjoyed having freely elected
exiled King Peter I (1903-1921) as its Monarch. Today, Spain stands to
underscore the positive role of King Juan Carlos in rebuilding a
prosperous nation from a dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy.
With the serious lack of stability in Kosovo, one possible option
might be a bi-cameral system of governance, similar to that of the
government of the United States. One house would be established,
proportionate to its population and maintain autonomy. In order to
assure a true multi-ethnic state, preventing secession and
fragmentation while securing regional stability, another house would
maintain equal representation from all ethnic groups. It would then
follow that from this house the chief executive would be appointed, at
least provisionally. The ascent of both houses would be required to
effect legislation. This approach attempts to reconcile western
concepts of civil society within the local environment.
The American governmental model is one that could be readily
applied to Serbia and Montenegro, i.e., Yugoslavia. However, given its
current political, economic and ecological difficulties in the
aftermath of a decade of violence, Serbia and Montenegro is most likely
in need of an a-political, transitional government. The concept of a
``technocratic'' government or government of experts has been espoused
by groups such as the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia, which
advocates a system of cabinet of experts, proportionate to the
distribution of the Serbian population, two thirds from Serbia and one
third from the Diaspora. A group of Serbian and Montenegrin economists,
Group 17 (G17), have come up with a plan--the ``Pact on Stabilty in
Serbia.'' \8\ G17 made the call for a government of ``national
salvation,'' i.e., ``salvation of the people,'' not only in answer to
this problem, but directly in response to the call of the Serbian
Orthodox Church for the Milosevic's resignation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``G17 `Experts' Ponder The Big Problem--What About
Milosevic?'', by Milenko Vasovic, a Journalist based In Belgrade, July
24, 1999, Institute of War & Peace Reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such a transitional government of experts would give itself,
depending on the plan from one, to three to five years to effect
economic reform, revamp the constitution, call for free elections, and
promote free media, while paving the way for Belgrade's eventual
accession to the Pact on Stability for Southeastern Europe, through
which the West anticipated bringing peace, development and a free
market economy to this troubled region. One precise mechanism for a
potential hand over is being worked out by G17 in association with the
Independent Society of Judges of Serbia. Timing is of the essence in
all matters concerned.
Properly supported, the Church could fully assume its rightful role
in society, a privilege denied it for the past 50 years. ``If peace is
to be won for all of southeastern Europe, it is particularly important
that the Orthodox Churches of the region assume an active and
constructive regional role in spiritual renewal, economic
reconstruction, and humanitarian responsibility. It is critically
important that the Serbian Orthodox Church be given quick and strong
affirmation as a key participant in the process of regional
reconstruction and that this involvement of the Church of Serbia be
understood as an important starting point for the civil and democratic
renewal of Yugoslavia.'' \9\
--------------
\9\ SCOBA Statement on Kosovo and the Balkans, 23 June 1999, http:/
/www.goarch.org.
Senator Biden [presiding]. Thank you very much, Father. We
appreciate it.
Mr. Hooper.
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. HOOPER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BALKAN ACTION
COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hooper. Thank you. I request the committee's approval
to enter the text of my statement into the record.
Senator Biden. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Hooper. I was elated that Senator Smith decided to hold
this hearing. I think it could not be more timely. The topic is
very important. There has been a good turnout. I hope that you
are in the process of turning the interested members of this
committee into an informal caucus for the continuing support of
Serbian democratization. I think they need it and they could
certainly benefit from it.
Senator Biden, I am very pleased to see you here. I know
you have spent more time meeting with members of the democratic
opposition than perhaps anyone except for Ambassador Gelbard,
perhaps even more than Ambassador Gelbard.
I know Senator Lugar is not here, but he continues to be
very interested in the issue, his writings and public
statements.
I want to make the point that Serbian democracy is not just
another important Washington issue or one aspect of a complex
Balkan tapestry or whatever, but it is the issue regarding the
future stability of the Balkans, the viability of the NATO
alliance, and the leadership of the United States in post-cold
war Europe.
Until there is a stable democratic government in Belgrade,
American troops and those of the allies will have to remain
stationed in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, and perhaps elsewhere
in the region if additional crises and threats arise. Serbian
dictator Slobodan Milosevic will continue to generate these new
crises, perhaps in Montenegro or Macedonia or with his own
remaining minorities in Serbia, all the while seeking to
manipulate Russia's fragile democracy toward distracting
confrontations with the West. Each crisis will revive questions
about the credibility of American leadership and the alliance
that surfaced in Kosovo and Bosnia.
I believe the committee understands that and applaud its
decision to approve the Serbian Democracy Act that was
discussed earlier. Ambassador Gelbard understands this also. He
has done more than almost any other U.S. Government official to
nurture support for the Serbian democratization movement. I
hope that his well-deserved appointment to the embassy in
Jakarta will not lead to any decompression in Washington's
efforts to effectively promote democratization in Serbia.
A more ominous source of concern, however, is the decision
by the Secretary of Defense and the White House to relieve NATO
Supreme Commander Gen. Wesley Clark of his command prior to
conclusion of his first term. Not only did General Clark do
more than virtually anyone else in this administration to win
the war over Kosovo and provide security for Montenegro, but he
also has come to understand the dynamics, intricacies, and
nuances of the interrelated set of problems in the Balkans
better than any other senior U.S. military officer.
General Clark in my view is paying the price for shaping
the victory and getting NATO's action right. Despite all the
predictions made at the time, his bombing of Serbia's
infrastructure and the military defeat he imposed on Serbian
forces set the stage for the rebirth of the Serbian
democratization movement.
The decision to replace him might well be construed by Mr.
Milosevic as a repudiation of the tough administration policy
toward the regime and will undoubtedly embolden Milosevic and
the Belgrade hardliners. General Clark's Serbian counterpart,
General Dragolijub Ojdanic, received a promotion and a medal
for his services.
It is now more essential than ever, therefore, that the
United States undertake to provide the hope and the help that
Serbian opposition democrats require to implant democracy
there. They now believe that they can win and they have
demonstrated a greater degree of unity and purpose than at any
time since the Belgrade street demonstrations of 1996 and 1997
and a broader countrywide support for that effort. They must
carry the heaviest burdens of the democratization struggle, but
they will not prevail without the support of the Western
democracies.
As in Poland during the 1980's and Portugal and Spain
during the 1970's, U.S.-led Western assistance can be critical
to the outcome of uneven contests between oppressive regimes
and popular movements. Serbia, however, does present a
different problem from other Communist-era transitions.
Decisions made in Moscow will not be made crucial in removing
Milosevic. He has exploited, but never depended upon, Russian
support to survive. He thrives, not on imported political
ideologies backed by foreign military power, but on home-grown
extreme nationalism, an extension of 19th century Serbian
nationalism and 14th century myths.
Removing Milosevic is the first step toward ending the
manipulation of potent ultranationalist and ultraracialist
ideas by Serbian leaders. The second step is the establishment
of stable democratic structures and institutions of civil
society strong enough to tape this nationalism so that NATO
need not contain it externally military force.
The Alliance for Change and other political movements offer
the best hope for achieving democratic change. It does no
disservice to their cause to note that some of the political
parties and leaders who make up the alliance have made mistakes
of judgment. Lec Waleca and Mario Soares made their share of
political errors, too. It is only in retrospect that victory
appears to have been certain.
Let us keep in mind that Solidarity had Ronald Reagan and
Lane Kirkland, to name two, in their corner and Portugal was
blessed with Frank Carlucci as the activist U.S. Ambassador
leading an activist embassy staff.
I am convinced that Serbian democrats have learned from
their mistakes. Support throughout Serbia for the democratic
opposition has yet to crest. Serbs are also showing renewed
interest in free labor unions and other components of civil
society. We have only to wait for September and October to see
what the Serbian student organizations will contribute to the
cause.
Milosevic appears to take the opposition movement seriously
as he plays for time, hoping to exhaust the energies of his
opponents, wait for the opportune moment to co-opt them, and
resume playing political footsie with Western governments. He
has drawn the upper echelons of the military into a tight
embrace, with his indicted chief of staff, military chief of
staff, projecting the military's backing for his regime as
support for legitimate elected constitutional authority. He
hopes to keep the lower ranks, the reservists who have taken to
the streets to demand back pay for their service in Kosovo,
passive into next year by offering payments spread over 6
months.
He has placed major obstacles in the way of humanitarian
organizations that seek to provide assistance to the Serbian
people through democratically elected city councils in some
towns. The Goebbels-like state-controlled media blankets the
country with daily installments of ``the big lie,'' and the
democratically elected Government in Montenegro, a key bastion
of support for Serbian democratic forces, remains under threat
from Belgrade.
What can the United States do to provide hope and help to
these democratic forces? First, unlike long periods during the
fighting in Bosnia and until the bombing began in Kosovo, when
many in the Congress, the NGO community, the media, and the
American public were at loggerheads with what they perceived as
administration inactivism on the Serbian democratic front, if
not outright support for Milosevic, the administration's
commitment to the replacement of Milosevic by the democracy
opposition offers significant opportunities for cooperation. We
should all recognize this and find ways to work together. That
is the goal of the newly formed Serbia Democracy Coalition, a
grouping of key NGO's.
Second, differentiate between the complicity of many Serbs
in ethnic cleansing, most recently in Bosnia, and the efforts
of Serbian democrats who want to end it. Do not let the Serbian
people off the hook in their denial, but recognize that
democratization offers them the best means of coming to terms
with the policies that Milosevic has perpetrated in their name.
In practice, this will require that the Serbian people
accept that they live in a multi-ethnic state with significant
numbers of ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, Roma, and
other minorities residing as citizens in Serbia proper. It also
means coming to terms with the likely permanent loss of Kosovo.
Third, surround Serbia with functioning, secure
democracies. The democratically elected Montenegrin Government
requires a NATO security guarantee to ensure that it can
withstand persistent Belgrade destabilization, whether it
chooses to remain in the federation with Serbia or declare its
independence.
In Kosovo, the United States should press for a rolling
electoral process that begins with some municipal elections
later this year and moves quickly to parliamentary elections by
spring.
Croatian parliamentary elections that must be held by
January promise serious democratization, as democratic forces
there seem primed to win if it is a free and fair campaign.
Senator Biden. That is right.
Mr. Hooper. In Bosnia the United States has made a
potentially crippling mistake by scheduling a reduction of SFOR
troop strength by nearly 50 percent. If anything, SFOR needs to
be increased in order to take the risks necessary to return
ethnically cleaned refugees to homes in areas where they are in
the minority, which will pave the way for a resumption of
democratization efforts.
Indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic must also be
arrested. These two actions will signal to Milosevic that NATO
is taking Bosnia off the table and increase domestic pressure
against him.
Fourth, support the Alliance for Change and other
democratic parties and movements working in parallel with the
Alliance to Establish Democratic Government in Serbia. The
Alliance needs money--relatively small amounts of a few hundred
thousand dollars can make an enormous difference--and training
supplied, in the words of the Italian Prime Minister,
discretely but not clandestinely. Our political party
institutes, working through the NED, can best provide this, but
it must be done quickly.
There is far too much talk of assistance and far too little
delivery. Days have become weeks, which can easily turn into
months as AID and the Congress seek a level of comfort on
disbursement procedures.
I really want to underline the importance of getting
funding to the Alliance for these demonstrations. There could
be more demonstrations today, tomorrow, next week. All it takes
is--there is a lot of money back here, relative to the
prevailing situation, in Washington. The funds we are talking
about are invisible, they are negligible, they are nothing. In
Serbia they can have an enormous impact.
The money is here, the Alliance and other political
groupings are out there that are prepared to use it, and a way
has to be found quickly to move that there, for computers, for
vehicles, for posters, for long distance phone calls within the
country, for fax machines, for gasoline. It is these kinds of
things that we are talking about, and it does not cost that
much.
Fifth, engage the municipalities that are governed by
democratically elected councils. American humanitarian
organizations could try to run projects with some of them. If
the regime refused to cooperate, the democratic opposition
could turn the issue against Milosevic. American cities could
establish sister city programs with counterparts in Serbia. We
might even consider a small pilot program funded at $1 million
or so for reconstruction efforts in a few of these
municipalities if we were confident that the United Nations or
others would not seize this as a precedent to advance much
larger reconstruction efforts that would benefit the regime.
Sixth, persuade the AFL-CIO to make a commitment to
significantly expand its support for Serbia's courageous
democratic labor movement, modeled on the AFL's assistance to
the Polish Solidarity movement during the 1980's. The AFL-CIO
could even work with Serbian unions in partnership with
Solidarity.
This would involve programmatic increases of several
hundred thousand dollars, not tens of millions of dollars. Once
again, by prevailing standards the funding required is
incredibly modest.
Seventh, American religious groups should engage actively
with members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has provided
intermittent support for the democratic movement, to encourage
the Serbian Orthodox Church to provide more sustained backing
for democratization.
In conclusion, it is important to understand that the
democratic movement in Serbia is still growing, drawing in more
supporters, and soon perhaps producing new leaders.
Democratization has yet to reach critical mass. This may happen
faster than many people think if the West rolls up its sleeves
and provides resources needed to reach their goal.
The price of failure will be high--the indefinite
stationing of American and allied troops in the region and more
crises that raise all the familiar dilemmas, policy dilemmas,
for American administrations of sitting on the sidelines while
Milosevic continues to destabilize the region or shouldering
the risks of military and political action to stop him.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooper follows:]
Prepared Statement of James R. Hooper
providing hope and help for serbian democratization
I want to thank the Committee and Senator Gordon Smith for holding
these hearings and inviting me to participate. Serbian democracy is not
just another important Washington issue or one aspect of a complex
Balkan tapestry. It is the issue regarding the future stability of the
Balkans, viability of the NATO alliance, and leadership of the United
States in post-Cold War Europe.
Until there is a stable democratic government in Belgrade, American
troops and those of the allies will have to remain stationed in Kosovo,
Bosnia, Macedonia and perhaps elsewhere in the region if additional
threats arise, Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic will continue to
generate new crises, perhaps in Montenegro or Macedonia or with his
remaining minorities, all the while seeking to manipulate Russia's
fragile democracy toward distracting confrontations with the West. Each
crisis will revive questions about the credibility of American
leadership and the alliance that surfaced in Kosovo and Bosnia.
I believe the Senate understands that, and applaud its decision--
undertaken with the leadership of members of this Committee--to send to
the House of Representatives the Serbian Democracy Act. Once signed
into law, it will encourage the Serbian people to anticipate a post-
Milosevic era in which Serbia is no longer governed by indicted war
criminals but by democratically elected officials not in the thrall of
the virulent ultranationalism that has become pervasive under
Milosevic.
Ambassador Gelbard understands this also, and has done more than
almost any other United States government official to nurture support
for the Serbian democratization movement. I hope that his well-deserved
appointment to the embassy in Jakarta will not lead to any
decompression of Washington's efforts to effectively promote
democratization in Serbia.
A more ominous source of concern is the decision by the Secretary
of Defense and the White House to relieve NATO Supreme Commander
General Wesley Clark of his command prior to the conclusion of his
first term. Not only did Gen. Clark do more than virtually anyone else
in this Administration to win the war over Kosovo, but he also has come
to understand the dynamics, intricacies and nuances of the interrelated
set of crises in the Balkans better than any other U.S. military
officer. General Clark is paying the price for shaping the victory and
getting NATO's action right. Despite all the predictions made at the
time, his bombing of Serbia's infrastructure and the military defeat of
Serbian forces were the cause of the rebirth of the Serbian democratic
movement. The decision to replace him might well be construed by
Milosevic as a repudiation of the tough American policy toward the
regime and will undoubtedly embolden Milosevic and the Belgrade
hardliners. Clark's Serbian counterpart, General Dragoljub Ojdanic,
received a promotion and a medal for his services.It is now more
essential than ever that the United States undertake to provide the
hope and the help that Serbian opposition democrats require to implant
democracy there. They now believe that they can win and have
demonstrated a greater degree of unity and purpose than at any time
since the Belgrade street demonstrations of 1996-1997. They must carry
the heaviest burdens of the democratization struggle, but they will not
prevail without the support of the Western democracies. As in Poland
during the 1980s and Portugal and Spain during the 1970s, U.S.-led
Western assistance can be critical to the outcome of uneven contests
between oppressive regimes and popular movements.
Serbia, however, does present a different problem from other
communist-era transitions. Decisions made in Moscow will not be crucial
in removing Milosevic. He has exploited but never depended upon Russian
support to survive. He thrives, not on imported political ideologies
backed by foreign military power, but on homegrown extreme nationalism,
an extension of nineteenth century Serbian nationalism and fourteenth
century myths.
Removing Milosevic is the first step toward ending the manipulation
of potent ultranationalist and ultraracialist ideas by Serbian leaders.
The second step is the establishment of stable democratic structures
and institutions of civil society strong enough to tame this
nationalism so that NATO need not contain it externally by military
force.
The Alliance for Change and other movements offer the best hope for
achieving democratic change. It does no disservice to their cause to
note that some of the political parties and leaders who make up the
Alliance have made mistakes of judgment. Lech Walesa and Mario Soares
made their share of political errors too. It is only in retrospect that
victory appears to have been certain. Let us keep in mind that
Solidarity had Ronald Reagan and Lane Kirkland in its corner, and
Portugal was blessed with Frank Carlucci as the U.S. ambassador leading
an activist embassy staff.
I am convinced that Serbian democrats have learned from their
mistakes. Support throughout Serbia for the democratic opposition has
yet to crest. Serbs are also showing renewed interest in free labor
unions and other components of civil society. We have only to wait for
September and October to see what Serbian student organizations can
contribute to the cause.
Milosevic appears to take the opposition movement seriously as he
plays for time, hoping to exhaust the energies of his opponents, wait
for the opportune moment to co-opt them, and resume playing political
footsie with Western governments. He has drawn the upper echelons of
the military into a tight embrace, with his indicted chief of staff
projecting the military's backing for his regime as support for
legitimate elected constitutional authority. He hopes to keep lower
ranks of reservists who have taken to the streets to demand back pay
for their service in Kosovo passive into next year by offering payments
spread over six months. He has placed major obstacles in the way of
humanitarian organizations that seek to provide assistance to the
Serbian people through democratically elected city councils in some
towns. The Goebbels-like state-controlled media blankets the country
with daily installments of The Big Lie. And the democratically elected
government of Montenegro, a key bastion of support for Serbian
democratic forces, remains under threat from Belgrade. What can the
United States do to provide hope and help to these democratic forces?
1. First, unlike long periods during the fighting in Bosnia and
until the bombing began in Kosovo, when many in the Congress, NGO
community, media and the American public were at loggerheads with what
they perceived as Administration inactivism on the Serbian democratic
front, if not outright support for Milosevic, the Administration's
commitment to the replacement of Milosevic by the democratic opposition
offers significant opportunities for cooperation. We should all
recognize this and find ways to work together. That is the goal of the
newly-formed Serbia Democracy Coalition, a grouping of key NGOs.
2. Differentiate between the complicity of many Serbs in ``ethnic
cleansing,'' most recently in Kosovo, and the efforts of Serbian
democrats who want to end it. Don't let the Serbian people off the hook
in their denial, but recognize that democratization offers them the
best means of coming to terms with the policies that Milosevic has
perpetrated in their name. In practice, this will require that the
Serbian people accept that they live in a multiethnic state, with
significant numbers of ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, Roma and
other minorities residing as citizens in Serbia proper. It also means
coming to terms with the likely permanent loss of Kosovo.
3. Surround Serbia with functioning, secure democracies. The
democratically elected Montenegrin government requires a NATO security
guarantee to ensure that it can withstand persistent Belgrade
destabilization, whether it chooses to remain in the Federation with
Serbia or declare its independence. In Kosovo, the United States should
press for a rolling electoral process that begins with some municipal
elections later this year and moves quickly to parliamentary elections
by spring. Croatian parliamentary elections that must be held by
January promise serious democratization, as democratic forces there
seem primed to win if the campaign is free and fair. In Bosnia, the
United States has made a potentially crippling mistake by scheduling a
reduction of SFOR troop strength by nearly 50 percent. If anything,
SFOR needs to be increased and ordered to take the risks necessary to
return ``ethnically cleansed'' refugees to homes in areas where they
are in the minority, which will pave the way for a resumption of
democratization efforts. Indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic must
also be arrested. These two actions will signal Milosevic that NATO is
taking Bosnia ``off the table'' and could increase domestic pressure
against him.
4. Support the Alliance for Change and other democratic parties and
movements working in parallel with the Alliance to establish democratic
government in Serbia. The Alliance needs money--relatively small
amounts of a few hundred thousand dollars can make an enormous
difference--and training supplied, in the words of the Italian prime
minister, discreetly but not clandestinely. Our political party
institutes working through the NED can best provide this, but it must
be done quickly. There is far too much talk of assistance and far too
little delivery; days have become weeks which can easily turn into
months as AID and the Congress seek a level of comfort on disbursement
procedures.
5. Engage the municipalities that are governed by democratically
elected councils. American humanitarian organizations could try to run
projects with some of them; if the regime refused to cooperate, the
democratic opposition could turn the issue against Milosevic. American
cities could establish sister city programs with counterparts in
Serbia. We might even consider a small pilot program funded at one
million dollars for reconstruction efforts in a few of these
municipalities if we were confident that the U.N. would not seize this
as a precedent to advance much larger reconstruction efforts that would
benefit the regime.
6. Persuade the AFL-CIO to make a commitment to significantly
expanded support for Serbia's courageous democratic labor movement,
modeled on their assistance to Polish Solidarity during the 1980s. The
AFL-CIO could even work with Serbian unions in partnership with
Solidarity. This would involve programmatic increases of several
hundred thousand dollars, not tens of millions. Once again, by
prevailing standards, the funding required is incredibly modest.
7. American religious groups should engage actively with members of
the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has provided intermittent support
for the democratic movement, to encourage more sustained backing of
democratization.
In conclusion, it is important to understand that the democratic
movement in Serbia is still growing, drawing in more supporters and
soon perhaps producing new leaders. Democratization has yet to reach
critical mass. This may happen faster than many people think, if the
West rolls up its sleeves and provides resources needed to reach their
goal. The price of failure will be high: the indefinite stationing of
American and allied troops in the region and more crises that raise all
the familiar dilemmas of sitting on the sidelines while Milosevic
continues to destabilize the region or shouldering the risks of
military and political involvement in stopping him.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Hooper.
We have been joined by two of my colleagues who are not
members of this committee, but I am anxious to give them an
opportunity to ask questions. The distinguished Senators from
Pennsylvania and Ohio are here.
I will begin, and I will not take the full 10 minutes and
then yield to my colleagues and come back for additional
questions.
Let me start by saying, Ms. Biserko, I want to publicly
acknowledge, and I hope it does not hurt you, how courageous
you have been. I think that the service that you have provided
for the world here has been significant. Although I found your
statement pessimistic, I must admit I share your degree of
pessimism about what is likely to happen in the near term
absent some serious turn-around. I will have some questions,
but I just want to acknowledge how much I appreciate your being
here.
Also, Messrs. Fox and Hooper, as they say, you were there
before it was fashionable to be in the Balkans. You
underestimate the impact you have had on the thinking of a lot
of people here in this town, and I compliment you for the
honorable way in which you voiced your disagreement to policies
when you were in the administration. I mean that sincerely.
Father, it is an honor to have you here. I am of the view
that the Serbian Orthodox Church has the potential to play an
incredibly positive role if it so chooses and if given the
opportunity. I do not suggest it has the same influence as the
Roman Catholic Church had in Poland, but it does have an
exceptional capacity to impact events.
I would like to begin by making a statement relative to
something you said, Father, and then invite your response if
you would like. I can understand your frustration and, although
you did not display any, possible anger at what you probably
perceive to be a double standard in rebuilding Kosovo and not
Serbia. You compared it to what we did in Germany.
I would like to suggest to you that there was a
fundamentally different situation in Germany. We occupied all
of Germany. We took over the institutions. We initiated the
Marshall Plan when there were four sectors in Germany,
controlled by the victors. There was a Konrad Adenauer. I do
not see one arising at this moment in Serbia. There were other
significant democratic leaders, and the condition upon which
the Marshall Plan went forward was absolute evidence of
democratization, not a promise of democratization, but absolute
evidence of democratization.
So I would respectfully suggest that, although I do not
rule out the possibility and hopefully, if things move
properly, the probability of the West uniting with other donor
nations to rebuild Serbia, I do respectfully suggest that what
Mr. Fox has said was already under way. The de-Nazification of
Germany, the forceful requirement that the Germans recognize
Wagner was not a politician, that heroic notions of German
ultranationalism were mistaken, and the other requirements that
the German people had to come to terms after watching the
Nuremberg trials.
So I do not expect you are suggesting that we should do any
of those things in Serbia, that is either occupy Serbia, or
have show trials in the literal sense like the trials that took
place in Nuremberg. Nor are you suggesting that there is a
Konrad Adenauer or others like him present.
I believe your commitment to democratization. I believe
that is what the church wants. I am trying to figure out how
can you use the potentially significant influence of the church
to promote that. Let me end by being very specific. When the
recent protests, which have not reached the level of the
protests that took place after Milosevic negated the municipal
elections several years ago, were taking place, the leader of
the opposition said that, he hoped in 10 days all of the bells
in Serbia would ring in unison as a sign to Milosevic that
there was unity on the issue that he should leave.
To the best of my knowledge, not a single Serbian Orthodox
Church bell rang. Is there a reason for that?
Father Dobrijevic. I thank you for your kind observations,
and if you will permit me respectfully to respond. My remarks
were predicated in great part on my personal experience living
in Yugoslavia during the academic year of 1996 and 1997. I was
there at the invitation of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle to
teach at the Graduate School of Theology in Belgrade, and that
entire academic year was thoroughly destroyed because of the
good work and the good intentions of the students demonstrating
on the streets of Belgrade, trying to usher in democracy and
reform.
It was precisely at that time when there was a throng of
students, of mainstream intellectuals and the church present
together on the streets, trying to somehow topple the Milosevic
government and at best perhaps gain the attention of the West
in joining them in their efforts. They feel completely
demoralized and they feel that they have been clearly let down
in the course of their actions.
I think this is why today we are witnessing demonstrations
only peripherally. There are no demonstrations in Belgrade.
They are everywhere save Belgrade and very limited in Novi Sad.
I believe that this is one of the keys. They feel that they
have been let down.
And, with all due respect, not only that I subscribe to
this mind set, but I do state it for the record, that the
Serbian people as a whole do feel that the NATO forces during
the course of their campaign and now with their presence are an
occupying force. One must come to terms with this mentality in
order to help break it down if it is not so.
Senator Biden. I think in truth we are right now. There is
an occupying force.
Father Dobrijevic. So that must be stated, I think, for the
record. With this in mind, having watched these people and
having seen them, having been there during the course of the
bombing and seeing this blank, lifeless look on the people on
the streets of the city, in the institutions, everywhere you
go, I feel very strongly committed to the fact that if they are
not given adequate and proper economic support they will never
be able to usher in democracy.
This is why I entered my remarks as I did.
Senator Biden. I want to state for the record, I have a
deep abiding faith that if the Serbian people, who have been
denied the control of the media, had an honest, clear look at
what Milosevic did in their name, they would be revolted by
what has happened.
My avocation is theology. I happen to be fairly
knowledgeable about the Serbian Orthodox Church. The only other
thing I ever thought of doing was wearing a collar like you
have, only a Roman one. And I find that you have been in a
very, very delicate position, not unlike the Roman Catholic
Church was in Poland during the Communist period.
We all give the Roman Church a great deal of credit for
what has happened in Poland, and they deserve it. But there
were long periods where the ability to speak out and act on
their right moral instincts, was either muffled or avoided.
The Serbian Orthodox Church has a phenomenal opportunity
now. We would be forever in your debt if the kind of moral
leadership it is capable of could be exerted now. I do not want
to overstate what I think to be the responsibility of the
church, nor do I want to overstate what I believe to be the
capacity of the church, even if it does everything correctly.
Nor do I want to suggest that there is a clear path as to how
to do it.
I would suggest, Father, that there is a dramatic
distinction between the Marshall Plan in Germany and the
willingness to rebuild Serbia, absent some concrete movement,
beyond humanitarian assistance.
But my time is up. I know it is not orthodox, no pun
intended, to yield to non-committee members, but these two
gentlemen have keen interest and are knowledgeable about this
and I would like to give them an opportunity. I am going to
come back then, if I may to ask you some specific questions.
But I yield to my friend from Pennsylvania.
Senator Santorum. Thank you.
As the Senator from Delaware knows, this is an issue that
is very important. We have a large constituency of Serbians,
Croatians, other people from the Balkans, in Pennsylvania, and
I wanted to thank Father Dobrijevic for being here. I asked
some people from the Serbian community in Pennsylvania, as did
Senator Voinovich in Ohio, and all of them pointed to Father
Dobrijevic as being a good spokesman for the Serbian community
here in the United States. So I am glad that the chairman here
was able to make provisions for you to be able to be here.
I wanted to followup on your comments and then ask the
other people on the panel to respond to them. You focused on
the solution of having the Serbian Orthodox Church take a major
role, a transitional role. None of the other speakers really--I
mean, you talked about how we are going to support democracy,
sort of--and I do not mean to be critical, but sort of
traditional views, how we would do things here in the United
States.
What I heard, from Father Dobrijevic was, this is not the
United States, this is not Western culture as we know it, and
we have got to do things differently in Serbia. The suggestion
is that we need, an idea that I do not think we would have
advocated, or at least I would not have even thought of,
something that would be anathema here in the United States, the
church actually taking a lead role, as you described it, a
transitional governmental role, where you would have a
technocracy or a bunch of technocrats and governmental
officials who would try to transition into democracy.
A couple of questions. No. 1, Father, how does that happen?
How do we go from where we are now, and what is the United
States' role, if any, or NATO's role, if any, in accomplishing
that, No. 1?
Then I would like from the panelists a response from you as
to whether you think this is reasonable or unreasonable. You
are speaking on behalf of, at least from my understanding, a
feeling that is held by many Serbians, not just the church, by
many Serbians here in this country as really the only workable
solution from their perspective of how this is accomplished.
I just found it interesting that you would mention it, but
none of the experts that are observing the situation there have
brought this to the table. I just want to understand why that
is the case and why you are suggesting what you are.
Father Dobrijevic. Thank you, sir. I mentioned it very
specifically because it is already taking place. It was not
necessarily that I subscribed the church to play an interim
governmental role, but to facilitate some sort of an interim
governmental role, and therein lies the difference.
How this is taking place already can be seen in the fact
that all of the opposition leaders are turning to the church in
order to receive some sort of sanction for their work, for
their attempts in revamping the government and the structure of
the government in Yugoslavia. Not only is the opposition
turning to the church, but it is the populace which turns to
the church and even, as witnessed in my remarks, Group 17,
which is a very prominent, an eminent group of economists from
Serbia and from Montenegro. They are already turning to the
church and they have initiated their reforms in response to the
church.
So we see the key role that the church does play in Serbia
is trying to usher in democracy. Part of the frustration of the
church, and why I brought it out so strongly to the forefront,
is that the church did try desperately to avert the entire
conflict in Kosovo. Namely, Bishop Artemije, who is the Serbian
Orthodox Bishop of Kosovo, had visited the United States no
less than five times and had presented his point of view to
various levels of the U.S. Government. He had also traveled to
France and spoke in Paris. He spoke before the Parliament in
England. He was in Bonn, he was at the Russian Duma, and so on,
addressing the major governments of the world, trying to tell
them of the impending dangers and what would happen, what
disaster would unfold in Kosovo, if this were not averted.
But nobody heeded the moderate voice of religious
leadership. Tragically coupled with this is the fact that in
Vienna on March 18, under the aegis of the Appeal of Conscience
Foundation headed by Rabbi Arthur Schneier of New York, a
document was signed, a joint declaration by the Serbian
Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Muslim
leadership of Kosovo, trying to come to some sort of consensus
to stave off the impending war which everybody foresaw.
They stated at that time that they categorically reject any
and all forms of violence and that they would want to bequeath
to their future generations a legacy of Kosovo which they could
all jointly take pride in. This is part of the growing
frustration that this voice, this moderate voice of religious
leadership, has not been heeded, and the results have been
rather tragic.
It is for this reason that the people are naturally turning
to the church. The Polish model is indicative of the same, I
believe. So for those reasons I did bring forth the church in
order to facilitate this interim government.
Mr. Hooper. I would support a more active role by the
church in supporting a democratization, a movement toward
democratization. I think the key here is to sustain that
support, to make sure that the church is committed, that it can
provide a context, a backing, a sanction, as Father Dobrijevic
said, a roof, whatever you want to call it. I think that would
be very helpful. I hope that would be encouraged by American
religious leaders, religious groups, Orthodox and non-Orthodox.
I think there should be more support for that.
But the key is sustained support by the church for the
democratization movement. I think that is what is important, so
that they draw a line with Mr. Milosevic and that regime and
then do not cross over that line themselves, that they stay on
the democratic side of that line. I think it is very important
that it be sustained.
Mr. Fox. Well, a couple of points. I think, as Senator
Biden suggested with respect to the Polish church in its
testing time, there are analogous divisions in the Orthodox
Church. There is a more accommodationist wing. It is well
represented, I would say, by the Belgrade representatives. So
it is not a unified church on these issues. I think that is one
of the reasons that the bells do not all ring.
So one could hope for the wing of the church that is
represented here today prevailing in fact. I think one of the--
and whatever can be done from the international community side
I think should be done to assist that.
But I think one of the positive elements of the withdrawal
of the Milosevic forces from Kosovo is that in fact Bishop
Artemije now has a role that he did not have before and Father
Sava has some movement and is being well respected by both the
U.N. administration and, I must say, the Kosovo Albanian
leadership. That is all to the good, and I know that is
something that gives a lot of heart to the Albanian moderates,
the Kosovo Albanian moderates, who are relying on that.
But I would have to also respectfully suggest that the
church's primary impact we could hope would be on the Belgrade
authorities, and so far that impact----
Senator Biden. Would be on the what? I am sorry?
Mr. Fox. On the Belgrade authorities, whether with respect
to the violence in Kosovo or democratization. And that is much
less apparent, that there is that impact.
Ms. Biserko. Well, being an insider, I have some
difficulties with the role of the church in general, especially
over the last 20 years, I would say. As you know, they had a
very important role in mobilizing Serb nationalism and emotions
over Serbian victimhood. Only 2 years ago, Patriarch Pavle has
initiated a declaration on amnestying Karadzic, a declaration
on genocide of Serbs, and these are I would say very important
points in the church's recent history.
I would say this is a welcome change in Kosovo that came
only once Kosovo is lost to Serbia. As you say, Father
Artemije, accompanied with some other Serbian leaders from the
region, has been visiting the United States and other European
states, but only coming up with some sort of plan of
cantonization, of course, which always hides behind the unitary
concept.
Somehow I think that the Serbian church has always been
very conservative. It is an unreformed church, you know, and
not very modern, I am afraid. I think that if they could
restore their moral leadership, which we have a vacuum now of,
of moral system in general, and that would imply that they
would denounce all the war crimes, not only in Kosovo, in
Croatia, in Bosnia, all of the minorities, help refugees return
and not merely gather them back home to improve our blood in
Serbia and so on.
There are a lot of racist positions in church rhetoric over
the last 10 years, and I would very much welcome their role
because someone has to play a role. It cannot be a political
role. They have been linked to this regime. They have been
linked to the Communist regime. So their history is also very
discredited, I would say. So in order to have this role we are
talking about, I think they should do much more.
Senator Santorum. I would like to give Father Dobrijevic a
chance to respond to what you have just heard. The fact that
you are not a united church, the fact that there is not the
speaking up within Belgrade to the authorities, and the
comments that Ms. Biserko made, if you could respond to that. I
know my time is up.
Senator Biden. No, go ahead.
Father Dobrijevic. I believe that the church not only has
articulated its position against Milosevic, not only has it
called for his resignation and the resignation of his entire
government, but it has also condemned the ethnic cleansing that
took place in Kosovo.
I as a personal translator for Patriarch Pavle when he had
received many visiting foreign dignitaries, I know for a fact
that he consistently condemned all of the violence which had
taken place in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
throughout the entire former Yugoslavia. So his voice is a very
consistent and staid voice. That is why he is highly respected
as a moral leader and has the authority that he does enjoy
within not only the Serbian church, but within all the Orthodox
churches, and I would say within all the population of
Yugoslavia.
So the church is not being inconsistent with itself. I
think it is very consistent. Again, my emphasis was not in
having the church play some sort of political role, but simply
to facilitate change. It could be a facilitator for change, and
I think that everybody is intuitively turning toward the
church.
Senator Santorum. My time is up.
Senator Voinovich. I would first of all like to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and giving these
witnesses an opportunity to share their observations.
Senator Biden. Thank you for coming.
Senator Voinovich. I think it is very timely.
I first of all would like to say that I have been involved
indirectly and directly with what has been happening over in
Serbia for the last couple of years. A group of Serbian
Americans who represented the Serbian diaspora came to me and
urged me to see if I could provide an opportunity for them to
meet with our State Department officials to talk about some
alternative to Slobodan Milosevic, who I have considered to be
a war criminal for a long period of time, in fact on occasion I
have been invited to Serbia and have never gone because of the
fact that he was the leader of the country.
Unfortunately for probably a couple of reasons, the
response did not come from our State Department. I would
probably attribute it to two things: one, that he was the
President of the country and that meeting with some other group
perhaps might have jeopardized the State Department's position
in terms of Milosevic; and I would also like to think that
maybe the reason is because they thought that they had a handle
on Milosevic.
I kept reminding them that he was the problem and that as
long as he was there what we would all like to see take place
in Serbia was not going to take place.
I do not think that when the demonstrations took place that
we really gave them much help, and they were on their own and
they were demoralized. So there is not a great feeling there
about help.
That is over now and the question is how do we go about
engendering this and encouraging this alternative leadership
that we need as quickly as possible. When I was in St.
Petersburg, as I shared with you, Mr. Chairman, I worked to get
a resolution passed----
Senator Santorum. He is not chairman yet. Let us not
advance him too quickly.
Senator Biden. Acting minority chairman, who is the only
member of the committee, which gives me some residual
authority, but very little, very little.
Senator Voinovich. As far as I am concerned, you showed up
today, you are the chairman.
Senator Biden. I like your attitude.
Senator Voinovich. But the fact is that as a result of the
outpouring of concern from many nations in the Balkans about
the humanitarian and infrastructure needs, a resolution was
passed that basically urged the Stability Pact nations and the
54 nations represented at the OECD to encourage humanitarian
and infrastructure projects in the region, including in Serbia,
which impacted on the region.
The reason for it was that they were complaining, the
Bulgarians, Rumanians, the Hungarians, that we did not really
understand that what is happening over there has had a dramatic
negative impact on their respective economies and they would
like to get going now that the war is over.
So that resolution passed, and things that were talked
about were things like cleaning up the Danube, perhaps
rebuilding one or two bridges that are needed for travel
through Serbia to move goods, and a few other things. In
addition to that, there was also talk of humanitarian efforts
to reach out to the Serbian people, understanding that in
Serbia you have over 500,000 refugees and another probably
75,000 to 100,000 may be coming in now from Kosovo, and that if
humanitarian help is not given that you are going to have some
real tremendous humanitarian problems in Serbia. And some of
the adjacent countries said: We are going to have an exodus of
people out of Serbia who will become refugees in our countries
because they are not going to be able to get the help in
Serbia.
I would like to know from you, how do we best as a nation
encourage, what things should we be doing now? We have Senator
Helms' resolution, $100 million. We have Congressman Smith's
SEED program of $35 million over in the House. What do you
think we ought to be doing to move this anti-Milosevic or, let
us put it in the positive, to bring democracy, democratization,
to Serbia?
Maybe, Mr. Fox, would you like to start?
Mr. Fox. Yes. I think it is very important to recognize
that, as frustrated and disappointed as I think all of us are
who have been on this account now for however long it has been,
there is one big difference between what has been done in all
the countries I named and is now being done in Croatia just in
the past year with an activist U.S. Ambassador and a complete
change in policy toward the opposition there, which was
regarded as weak, nationalist, divided, hopeless, all the same
attributes--did not have quite the baggage that the Serbian
opposition has, but quite a bit----
Senator Biden. A lot.
Mr. Fox. Not for want of trying in some cases.
One year ago, the policy changed, 1 year ago. Resources
went in. NGO's were brought in. The IRI-NDI program was stepped
up. Ambassador Montgomery has taken a very hands-on approach
there, and much more active attention to the tribunal, a
variety of aspects to this.
But it was good old-fashioned basic baseball
democratization: campaign assistance; they have worked with
that coalition, they are whipping them into shape; providing
resources.
That has simply not been done in Serbia. It has never been
done. It has to be stressed that as of today they have not seen
resource one, material resource one from all of this.
Senator Biden. Will the Senator yield on that point? We can
maybe do this in tandem here, because I will not take you off
point.
Croatia desperately wants economic integration in Europe.
We have an ambassador in Zagreb. We have no ambassador in
Serbia. Could we mechanically do what you suggested in Serbia?
Could we send in NGO's? How would we get them in? Could we
physically engage in the way we have in Croatia?
You are making a comparison which I think is legitimate,
but mechanically is it a possibility?
Mr. Fox. I think it is a combination. Well, that is, I
think the decision on whether and when the U.S. sends back
representation should be heavily guided by this consideration,
that if and when we do send a charge back in it ought to be for
this purpose. I would argue that that is the one consideration
that would argue for an earlier return.
But yes, you can do it. As I see it, this is a combination
of Poland pre-1989 and Bulgaria early 90's and Slovakia over
the last couple of years. You have it has been, I think, more
and more accepted in the Serbian opposition that this coalition
of coalitions approach that was tried in Slovakia, where they
also had personality disorders in the opposition and the usual
problems.
They overcame that and both the NGO's and the opposition
disciplined themselves quite effectively with judicious outside
assistance. In Bulgaria, something like a million dollars in
material assistance went to the Union of Democratic Forces in
1990. They did not get the endless conferences and how-to and
so forth. They got some of that. They got computers, faxes,
vehicles, gasoline. That is what they got.
They have never gotten that in Serbia. It is what they are
starved for right now, and those are the building blocks. That
is how you develop a partnership with an opposition. I think,
to be fair to them, they have never gotten it. It is an
egregious situation, frankly, and it still has not been
corrected as of this moment.
Senator Biden. Keep going, Senator.
Senator Voinovich. Father Dobrijevic.
Father Dobrijevic. I would tend to agree with that. Part of
the problem, as you have mentioned, is the vast amount of
refugees who are now located in Serbia and the many more who
are coming there. Another part of the problem is that there is
a hidden statistic which often escapes the eye of those who
come in to monitor refugees, and that is that approximately 97
percent of all of those refugees are privately housed. So with
the crippling effects of sanctions on top of everything else
that has taken place, you have not only a refugee crisis on
your hands, but you have an entire population which is in
crisis.
Having worked in the field of humanitarian aid since the
beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, I understand how
repatriation demands simple commodities such as computers and
all the other things which were just mentioned. We see none of
this pouring into Serbia. We see no incentive for the people.
On a practical level, the work ethic of the Serbian people
in Yugoslavia has also been broken, because they often work and
they never reap the benefits of their labors, they are never
given wages for the jobs that they have. Many of those who are
trying to earn a living in Yugoslavia are persons who have been
internally displaced, not once, but now twice within a short
span of 4 years, as many of my own family members have, first
from the Krajina and now again from this situation in Kosovo.
So it is a violent cycle which somehow has to be broken.
Senator Voinovich. Father, one of the things that--and we
talked about this. There is the opinion, and I have really
talked to some people high up in our government about this,
that if we do infrastructure say in Serbia or humanitarian aid,
that that would be helpful to Milosevic and further solidify
his position.
I would be interested, what reaction do you think it would
have if some infrastructure or humanitarian, if there was a
real outpouring, in terms of his--would he take advantage of
that or do you think it would result in the opposite happening?
Father Dobrijevic. Well, of course the pendulum could swing
either way on that. He could simply take advantage, which he is
already taking advantage, of the humanitarian aid commodities
which are coming in. There is a problem now with the
distribution of medicines, where that has been taken over by
the Yugoslavia Government and the International Red Cross. So
that there is always a chance for the abuse of any commodity
whatsoever.
I would beg the issue that if you are already distributing
humanitarian aid, however limited it may be, of what use is it
for a hospital to receive medical commodities, to receive food
and bedding and so on, and not have electricity, not have
running water? Somebody who lives in Pancevo, for instance, who
depends on crossing the river every day in order to come into
Belgrade to work, if he cannot come in to work, if he has no
means to transport himself, he cannot earn a living. What are
they to do?
This is part of breaking that vicious cycle, you see. So
this is why I see the need for economic assistance.
Infrastructure is intrinsically tied to the question of
humanitarian aid and the question of rebuilding Serbia.
Senator Voinovich. Well, some people say, Father, that if
you do not give it and you do not do the infrastructure, that
things are going to get so bad and that will accelerate his
demise.
Father Dobrijevic. Quite the contrary, I would disagree. I
think it would so thoroughly demoralize the people that they
would not be able to rise up against him. You cannot starve
someone into submission.
Mr. Fox. We have an interesting case of this in the last
couple of weeks, and that is Mr. Canac, who is a leading figure
in the coalition, opposition coalition, based in Novi Sad has
said: ``Give me a bridge and I will fight the regime.'' The
Austrians offered him a bridge, a pontoon bridge for Novi Sad,
and engineers to go with it, and they were denied visas.
Senator Biden. Denied visas by whom?
Mr. Fox. Denied visas by Belgrade. They want the bridge
going through the Belgrade authorities. They demand that all of
the city to city assistance that the Germans and the British
and others are trying to provide, the Austrians, is not getting
in. It is just a trickle.
The opposition itself is saying, do not do it unless it
goes through our channels. That is the dilemma. I think this
has to be tested carefully. In fact, it might well be that the
Orthodox Church, some of the international Orthodox Christian
charities and others can play more of a role here on the
humanitarian assistance. But it has to be accountable, because
I think those institutions themselves would be damaged if it is
not.
Senator Biden. You keep going.
Senator Voinovich. The one last question is the issue of
who could provide that, be the facilitator. My head says to me
that if the humanitarian aid was promised and there were some
infrastructure projects they were willing to go in, say that
did not necessarily benefit only Serbia but just say the
region--let us talk about cleaning up the river, for example--
and it was done by a neutral party, let us say the Orthodox
Church, and that the condition was that for it to occur that it
would have to be done through that. Then if it was and it was
offered and Milosevic came back and said, oh no, we are not
going to let you have this, we are not going to let you have
that, do you not think that if it was really well understood
what it was and that he was standing in the way for it to
happen, that that would be an added momentum to say to the
people, we have got to get rid of this man because without it
we are not going to get this help?
Mr. Fox. Well, I think that is certainly what I am saying,
is test it carefully step by step, and then if he tries to stop
it blow the whistle. But do not go ahead with it, certainly not
when your democratic partners are saying do not go ahead with
it.
Senator Biden. Senator, I think you are on the mark here.
You and I have had private discussions about this. I do not
think there is any disagreement that, for example, the Senator
and I have about either Milosevic or about the need to help the
Serbian people. I do not think there is any disagreement,
except on the details.
I wanted to ask Ms. Biserko here a question. Suppose we
make a decision that we are going to send in fax machines, what
we call in American politics walking around money, so that the
opposition actually had money on the ground to send out faxes,
to distribute literature, to do basic campaign things.
Do you think that Milosevic would allow fax machines to be
sent in to the opposition, or would we have to do them
clandestinely?
Ms. Biserko. Well, it has happened so far.
Senator Biden. What has happened?
Ms. Biserko. I know people who have fax machines and
computers, some of us who have been supported from outside. So
I think that is not the major problem.
I think humanitarian aid you're referring to has always
been disseminated by the national Red Cross, by International
Red Cross, UNHCR, and it was always manipulated to some extent,
because it is not only refugees who need aid. It is now the
whole country is a social problem in one way or the other.
So it is either taken into official stores and then sold
out, and you always have some profiteers out of that. But I
think international agencies so far, they always count on that
to some percentage.
But I think in this whole discussion my feeling is that
what we lack is really, what do we do with the republican and
federal administrations, because these are the only people who
are skillful in doing something? We are now talking----
Senator Biden. The only people who what? I am sorry.
Ms. Biserko. Politically skillful.
Senator Biden. Politically skillful. I am sorry, I did not
hear what you said. I understand.
Ms. Biserko. Even including SDS people and the other minor
parties. So we are talking about the political opposition,
which is not yet politically articulate and does not have a
structure, which we are now through your help trying to
buildup. This is something which is done by NDI and some others
from the United States and other countries. So they are just
learning how to deal with that.
But people who are professional, highly professional in the
administration, which should also be looked at, because if you
have this critical mass being created in the streets of
discontent of the wider population, which is coming up anyway,
it can be channeled professionally also with these people, who
will at one point detect Milosevic because they will understand
that things are going different parts.
So you have also to focus on these people as well, some of
them.
Senator Biden. I apologize for not understanding; by
``these people'' are you referring to people within the
Milosevic regime now?
Ms. Biserko. Yes, yes, all the structures, in the parties,
and in his own circle.
Senator Biden. And you think it is possible to destabilize
him by dealing with some of them? Is that what you are saying?
Ms. Biserko. Well, that should be, I should say, done in
shadow.
Senator Biden. Yes, I see.
Ms. Biserko. Because this street sort of critical mass
coming up, married with this internal sort of dynamics, can
bring about the positive change.
Senator Biden. I wanted to ask you something--and please
interrupt me, Senator----
Senator Voinovich. No, go ahead.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Because I would like this to be
more of a conversation because I am learning something here.
There is a distinction some are making, I among them,
between the command level of the VJ and the conscripts, and the
reservists who were called up--the people who are protesting
now within the military. In other words, those with the stars
on their shoulders seem to be very loyal at this moment to
Milosevic? For reasons that they may get tried next and
indicted next, but they seem to be very loyal.
There is at the lower levels within the military some real
discontinent. Is the discontent because they are not getting
paid?
Ms. Biserko. Yes.
Senator Biden. Or is the discontent because they would like
to get rid of Milosevic because they think he has done bad
things for their country? In other words, do we have any hope
in the military being any part of an ultimate opposition to
Milosevic?
Ms. Biserko. Well, talking about reservists, so far it is
only discontent for not being paid, because otherwise they
could have rebelled before the Kosovo operation and they did
not. So this is now really, at this point it is not yet quality
in this sense.
There are some voices from the military, like Perecic, who
is probably also a war criminal, who said that the Yugoslavia
army is now being used as a party cell of SDS. So he is
obviously trying to call for non-party sort of engagement of
the army, which it was always a party army throughout the last
50 years, not only now, and even during the Perecic time.
But this is a voice which at this point may indicate
something, and they say that he is rather popular in the lower
ranks in the army. So whether and how much they can deliver,
this discontent will continue. It will buildup. It does not
have any other message at this point.
To remove Milosevic is also something which is widely
supported now. I would say at one point there is some sort of,
to scapegoat Milosevic, make him responsible for everything,
and amnesty all of us for any responsibility, and this is an
oversimplification. He has to go, and I think that we all have
to take up our own accountability for what has happened,
because all these recruits could have stopped army operations
last year.
Parents were coming to our office, we have dealt with them,
and we tried to organize sort of protests in the streets, but
we did not succeed. We had only five parents standing up. There
was no mother movement until the moment that young people
arrived in the coffins back home in Krusevac and other places.
Senator Biden. As we say unfortunately here, the body bags
began to come home.
Ms. Biserko. Only then, once they suffered. The protests in
Serbia proper especially came as a result of suffering, of
misery and everything, because they were mostly hit down there.
As you know, Serbia proper was a stronghold of the SDS and
Milosevic. So now they hit the bottom and these young men who
closed down these radio stations and called the people to come
into streets did what they did.
But you know, this is quality which has to be worked on
yet.
Senator Biden. That is not inconsistent with what Mr. Fox
is saying, I do not think. There is an old expression: ``better
the devil you know than the one you do not.'' Here it seems to
be ``the better the devil you do not know than the one you do
know,'' here. I thought your analogy in Croatia was an accurate
one, in the sense that promoting opposition is kind of a
nurturing process. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Fox. Absolutely. I think we tend to forget, even those
of us who have been involved on the front lines in various ways
in government and out of government, these oppositions never
start very well. Some of the ones that are now models of
transition democracy were replete with very intolerant
nationalists, people that did not want to allow any minority
parties to register, et cetera, et cetera.
We had leverage on these oppositions because we were doing
things for them and with them. We were giving them resources
that they needed. We could help shape the moderates within the
coalitions, but work with, whether it is IRI or NDI, the usual
democracy groups, the Trade Union Institute. That was a vital
partnership.
That has been lost, frankly, because we have had so many
transitions now people have almost forgotten how to do it.
Frankly, the assistance bureaucracy not only does not encourage
it, it rather discourages it in the case of the democracy
groups, which is why we are all arguing for the resources to go
through the NED, by the way.
Senator Biden. Through the what?
Mr. Fox. The National Endowment for Democracy, rather than
the Agency for International Development.
Senator Biden. That is the vehicle you believe----
Mr. Fox. Absolutely, it has to go through the NED,
absolutely.
But let us take another case. Let us take Slovakia. Again,
the shift on Slovakia, real attention to Slovakia, it was not
there in 1994, it was not there in 1995. It really came when
Secretary Albright assumed her present position, got some
serious attention, and we had an ambassador who was very
engaged and we had NGO's that were very engaged. That was a
couple of years in the making, and that was a lost case until
policy changed.
Senator Biden. Well, I do not want to drag this out and I
want the Senator to pursue any other area that he would like to
pursue. But let me say that I do not think anyone disagrees
that if we could get more NGO's in; if we were able to get more
direct access to individuals; if I could put it in the parlance
of Federal relationships with States; if we could go straight
to the mayors and not through the Governor, no offense,
Governor, if we could go straight to the county councils and
not to the State legislature; if we could be in the position to
go in like we did in other countries for a while in Poland,
where we went straight to individuals and identified whether
they were mayors or whether they were opposition leaders or
whether they were local officials in small villages, and went
in and assisted them; if we, the European community and
ourselves, could get in to do that, then it seems to me over
time it would work.
We were able to do that in Slovakia. We were able to do
that in Croatia. I do not see the circumstance where Belgrade
will allow essentially a mini-Peace Corps to all of a sudden
invade Serbia. The evidence, I would argue, is the example you
gave in, was it, west Novi Sad? I forgot the name of the
leader.
Mr. Fox. Novi Sad.
Senator Biden. Where the Austrians said they would build
Serbia a pontoon bridge, and Belgrade says, they don't want a
pontoon bridge. Yet Belgrade is saying they want to be able to
cross the river. So I just wonder how we do that.
Do you understand what I am saying? If there is opposition,
I do not think we should fail to try to do that. What is the
alternative?
Let me say one last thing and then ask you to comment if
you wish to any event. Father, it seems to me that the Senator
from Ohio is correct. The church theoretically could be
uniquely situated to dispense a lot of this humanitarian aid. I
am not at all certain, because I think it is accurate what Ms.
Biserko said. The leadership in Belgrade in the church, and I
will not make apologies for them, has not been as forthcoming
as the leadership in Kosovo has in terms of distancing
themselves from the political leadership, either under the
Communists or now.
I am not passing judgment. I am not sitting here saying you
should have done the following. I am just stating what I think
is historically factual. It has been very difficult because you
may get shot or you may get put in prison.
I am convinced that if there was a mechanism able to be
worked out where the Orthodox church was a vehicle for
distribution of humanitarian aid, you would get overwhelming
support in this place for that to happen.
Father Dobrijevic. May I respectfully note that the church
has been a vehicle for the distribution of humanitarian aid.
The church has its own department for humanitarian aid. It is
called ``Covekoljublje,'' which means ``Philanthropy,'' and it
is now presently revamped through the efforts of International
Orthodox Christian Charities, IOCC. They are now working on the
ground.
IOCC is the only organization which maintained an
expatriate presence in Yugoslavia during the bombing campaign
and is still there working. They have distributed a substantial
amount of aid during that time. IOCC is sponsored by all of the
Orthodox churches here in America and they interface directly
with the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Senator Biden. I am aware of that, Father. What I am
talking about is a much grander scale. What I am talking about
is the potential for there to be hundreds of millions of
dollars.
Senator Voinovich. The problem is that somebody has to put
the package together.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. And it is like we are trying to figure
out what to do, and as we are waltzing time is running out. I
think that we need to say this is what we are willing to do and
put it in a package and say this is a major commitment that we
are willing to make, we are going to be willing to do it
through, say, through the Serbian Orthodox Church or maybe
particular projects in one area maybe through the local
political officials, and just lay it out in a well understood
program where people can comprehend this is really something
spectacular, this is great, this will be great for our country.
But I think if we do little pieces here and pieces there,
you really do not get the full impact of what it could mean for
the people in Serbia. I think that that is what we should be
encouraging the Stability Pact nations to be doing. I think
that is what we have--we have allocated what, almost $900
million for humanitarian aid. We have got this money.
We need to just lay it out and say, here are the things
that we are going to do, and put the package together. We need
the leadership to do that.
Senator Biden. I think that is right. The only point I am
trying to make is that the difference between Croatia and
Tudjman, who may very well get indicted as a war criminal
himself, and Serbia and Milosevic is that there is serious
leverage in Croatia.
Croatia desperately wants to become part of the EU. It also
wants to become a member of NATO. And that is real leverage. It
wants to be part of the West. Milosevic does not want Serbia to
go West, young man. He is not looking for it to go West. The
leverage we have over Milosevic, short of arresting him, is
minimal.
So I am not suggesting that we should not have scores of
Western NGO's in Serbia. If tomorrow the West put together a
package saying we are prepared to send 5,000 NGO's into Serbia
and move them in the following circumstances to rebuild
infrastructure and distribute humanitarian aid, I would say let
us go to it. I cannot imagine Milosevic allowing that to
happen.
But I understood your earlier point to be that we should
put together a package that demonstrates to the Serbian people
that we are prepared to rebuild their country; but only through
the following mechanisms, not through Belgrade and the
Milosevic government. If that is stopped, it is because
Milosevic stopped it.
Is that kind of what you were saying?
Senator Voinovich. Yes, I think specifically that is what I
am saying, unless there is some other way of getting it done.
Senator Biden. And by the way, I do not disagree with what
the Senator says. You and I have been sort of talking our way
through this on the floor, because I know of your extreme
interest and you know of mine. You know it better than I do in
terms of the impact on the Serbian people and the flowback from
that over here.
But I think that is the key. How do we get that aid in and
have it not be the existing Socialist Party and Milosevic that
dispenses the aid and is able to claim credit. Milosevic will
say that the West is morally corrupt, and that it will rebuild
Serbia because it has demonstrated its moral corruptness.
As a new bridge goes across the Danube, he will stand there
as he breaks a bottle of champagne over it and says: ``This is
evidence of the fact I was right. They have acknowledged their
moral corruptness, they have come forward.'' I do not know how
you keep that from happening.
Mr. Hooper. Senator, could I ask just to say a couple of
things?
Senator Biden. Please.
Mr. Hooper. First, if it is not out of place to suggest so,
you have had so much experience with the Bosnia issue. You knew
that one. You fought it for 3 years, 4 years. You really
pressed this Kosovo issue hard. I think you understand the
background on Serbian democratization.
If it is not--and I am not being coy. I really mean this.
If you would be prepared to--you are asking all the right
questions. Senator Voinovich is asking a lot of good questions.
But if you would be prepared to go out yourself or go out with
some of your colleagues to ask some of these questions and look
into some of these, and then come back here and work the system
back here in Washington----
Senator Biden. That is precisely what I am about to do as
of September the 1st.
Mr. Hooper. Second, I think--thank you very much. I
congratulate you. I am glad you are doing that.
We may not--it may not be possible for NGO's to go in, but
it certainly is possible for Serbs to come out. That is one
way. There are other Slavic neighbors who may be more amenable,
who may be more acceptable, Bulgaria, Slovakia, so forth. There
is Montenegro. There are lots of ways to do this.
In Poland, AFL-CIO got in printing presses during the
1980's, the AFL-CIO. These things can be done.
Senator Biden. I could not agree with you more.
But I do not want anybody walking away with an absolute
comparison of what happened in Slovakia or what happened in
Bulgaria or what happened on Croatia to what is happening in
Serbia.
Mr. Hooper. But many of the same techniques----
Senator Biden. But the same techniques can work.
For me, I think all the points you mentioned have to occur.
The best building block first and foremost is the stabilization
of the democracies in the region.
If you told me I could only do one thing at a time, the
first thing I would do would be to help Montenegro and
Macedonia, work on Croatia, and deal with Hungary. You
surround, not to isolate, but to embolden. You surround Serbia
with functioning democratic neighbors who have benefited
economically from the integration and the willingness of Europe
to participate along with us.
I am not suggesting, Senator, you do not feed anybody in
the meantime. I am not suggesting you let anarchy reign in
Serbia in the meantime. We have got to arrange our priorities
in a way that enables the very thing Mr. Fox is suggesting.
That is, what is the best way, over the nearest timeframe, to
establish a legitimate democratic opposition? It may find root
in the military. It may find root in former socialists. It may
take root in other places.
I think that is a difficult objective. I am not saying we
should not do it, but the one thing I do not think we should do
is allow for the economic, humanitarian, and structural aid to
Serbia to go through the pipeline of Belgrade, the Socialist
Party, and Mr. Milosevic.
Senator Voinovich. Senator, I agree with you on that. But I
will tell you this, that if you want to get this going you
ought to support the people that are already there. When I met
with Staiyonov in Bulgaria, he was saying: You have got to
understand, we want to get rid of Milosevic, but you also have
to understand that during this period of time our economy has
been in lockjaw. We are a new democracy. We need to get going.
We cannot get anybody to invest in this place. Do you not
understand that we have got to go through Serbia if we are
going to move goods?
When I was at the OSCE, the Hungarians saying to me: Do you
not understand, the railroads are out, the bridges are out, the
river cannot be used. The Ukrainians, you would think maybe
they would not be interested, coming to me and saying: Do you
not understand that this has had a billion dollars worth of
negative impact on our economy?
I met with the Greek Ambassador, who said the same thing:
We cannot bring our goods anywhere; we have got to take them
across the Adriatic and take them over to Italy.
Senator Biden. One of the things that was said here earlier
was that Milosevic has indicated that unless we rebuild the
Danube as he wants it rebuilt, he is not going to let any ships
go through the Danube from Hungary or anywhere else.
Now, whether that is true or not I do not know.
Ms. Biserko. It is, it is in the New York Times today.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I read it in the paper. But I have
got to say to you, if the President of the United States after
Sarajevo and the Stability Pact nations said, we are going to
get together as a humanitarian gesture and we are going to
clean this river out, and we are just telling you, Mr.
Milosevic, we are going to get it done----
Senator Biden. I am with you.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I think he is going to be
in a pretty difficult position if he says, well, we are not
going to let you do it unless you do it my way, because the
people in those areas are going to say, I will be darned, we
are going to get it done.
Senator Biden. I would agree with you that if we attempt to
do it and make it clear if we cannot do it it is because he
will not let us do it, that that is a helpful thing.
But anyway, we are keeping you all very, very late. Would
any of you like to make any closing comment or ask us any
questions? We will flip this around. I mean, seriously, is
there anything you would like to add? You have been all very,
very helpful.
Anybody have any closing comments?
Mr. Hooper. Can I ask if you would be willing to look in,
while you are here in Washington, to look into just the issue
of the money that will go to the resources for the democracy
parties? I know you have concerns about that.
Senator Biden. The answer is I personally, and I am sure
the Senator already has, commit to you that I have started
that. That is why the first question I asked was the mechanics,
how do we do this. I am anxious to do it; the administration is
anxious to do this. This is not something there is any
reluctance on the part of the administration.
I am anxious to do it and any suggestions you have would be
appreciated.
Mr. Hooper. Keep in touch with both IRI and NDI and check
with them, because there really honestly is an awful lot of red
tape. There is a blowtorch to get that money out there, but it
is not happening because various--and I do not mean
congressional procedures.
Senator Biden. No, I understand.
Mr. Hooper. That is not a problem.
Senator Biden. I promise you that I will. If I can figure
out what should be done to my satisfaction, I will. I have no
reluctance to borrow a blowtorch, none.
Mr. Fox. I have just one final comment, in addition to
thanking you very much for this hearing and for all the
blowtorches that you bring to these issues. We admire what you
do very much in our sector, believe me.
I do not want to rain on this humanitarian parade, but if
you got $100 million in humanitarian assistance through non-
State channels, I am not sure it would bring you democracy in
Serbia, either. If you got the kinds of resources that we have
referred to today direct, by a variety of channels, drawing on
different examples from the past, and you start that in the
present, and I mean this week, next week, and really that
serious engagement that we have seen in every other successful
democratic change, if it does not work it would be the first
one that did not.
Ms. Biserko. I would like to thank you all for your time
and dedication to help Serbian democracy. I just would like to
make one more point clear: that Serbia maybe at this point,
when the territorial issue is somehow closed down by having the
protectorate in Kosovo, by having all these independent States
around, and hopefully Montenegro out of it, that they will
focus on what is Serbia.
I think the main Serbian problem for all these years has
been that they have been focused, together with the opposition,
on the----
Senator Biden. Good point.
Ms. Biserko. That is why it is important to keep Kosovo and
Montenegro out of Serbia now. We have to acknowledge what we
are, what is our territory. This was what was lacking all the
time. Even last week Vuk Draskovic was saying those who are
encouraging Montenegro to go are encouraging civil war. I mean,
none of them are really clear on this position toward
Montenegro.
This, I think the administration has to make a clear
message to Belgrade that Montenegro is a serious issue, like
Kosovo as well. Only in that case will we be able to focus on
our own issues, on our own democracy agenda. Nobody has defined
what is the democracy agenda of Serbia. It is not only the
replacement of Milosevic.
I would also add one more thing, that Serbia is set up of
different regions which have different historical backgrounds,
which have different political cultures, like Vojvojina, which
was part of Austro-Hungary, which was the third richest region
in former Yugoslavia, that has different potential. Serbia
proper is different. I mean, it is more rural, it is more
conservative. Now they have demonstrations. We do not know how
it will end.
Belgrade, politically speaking, is the most conservative
bastion, I would say, of this unitary centralized concept. You
have to deal with people in Belgrade, and also pushing them to
define the democracy agenda of Serbia. One thing is to get the
removal of Milosevic, but they have to say what is the
transition agenda really of Serbia.
Senator Biden. If I may be so bold, in 1993 in Belgrade I
asked to meet with the opposition, the intellectual community,
and the church as well. Fifty people showed up, all of whom
professed to not be supporters of Milosevic, and talking about
democracy. I am sure I did not get it all, but everyone I
remember talking to talked about a greater Serbia. Everyone I
remember talking to talked about a circumstance that did not
bear a lot of relationship to reality, particularly the
intellectual community, which surprised me.
I should have known. I should have known, but I did not.
The point I was trying to make at the outset here when I
talked about the Republika Srpska, what you just said about
Serbia having to come to grips with what is Serbia and who they
are, is enhanced if the rest of the region becomes solidified,
in the same way it would force the attention of the Republika
Srpska.
Once the war occurred and NATO prevailed, the road became
much smoother. The extremes began to diminish because there was
no realistic possibility of realizing the dream of the
Republika Srpska and their more radical factions to unite with
a greater Serbia. There was not much benefit in uniting with
it. It was a non-starter.
So I think the larger point you make about simultaneously
making sure that we issue a clear declaration to Montenegro and
how seriously we take it and the rest of the region is
important. You have said more clearly what I was saying early
on. I, for one, do not disagree with you, because I still think
in the end that this is an incredibly rich culture. This is an
incredibly capable people.
It is almost the ultimate squandering of talent and
culture, in my view. So I still have faith that if we provide
the environment the right thing is going to be done.
Father, you want the closing word?
Father Dobrijevic. Yes.
Senator Biden. You have benediction.
Father Dobrijevic. In lieu of benediction, if you would
kindly permit me to end with the issue of ringing of bells,
inasmuch as you initiated your dialog with me on that subject.
Senator Biden. Please, be my guest.
Father Dobrijevic. I would like to reiterate today what I
said to President Clinton once in a meeting with him, that when
all is said and done I think that the United States of America
and all of the allies will once again see in Serbia one of its
greatest and most tried and true allies in that region. We have
a record of being allied with the United States, as you well
know, during World War I, World War II, the posthumous awarding
of the Award of Legion to General Draza Mihailovic. And I
believe, if I am not mistaken, that Serbia alone has the
distinction of having a U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, asking
for all church bells throughout America on June 28, 1918, the
day of the commemoration of Battle of Kosovo, to be rung at
noon, noting the Serbs were fighting for the freedom of the
world.
So I thank you for allowing the Serbian Church to come here
and I thank you for allowing bells to be heard once again, as
they rightly should be.
Senator Biden. Well, let us hope they are heard in both
countries.
Senator, any comment, closing comment?
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much for coming today.
Senator Biden. I want to thank you all. I can assure you
that this will be not the last time we will ask you for your
input, particularly Messrs. Fox and Hooper, who have been great
for a long time here. I again thank you all for being here. As
my mother would say, with the grace of God and the good will of
the neighbors, we may be able to get something done here.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 6:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]